A new public interest forensic brief has raised a series of questions about how billions of shillings linked to Kenya’s health financing and infrastructure programmes are collected, transferred, contracted and ultimately accounted for, calling for detailed records that can allow the public and independent auditors to follow the money from its source to its final beneficiary.
The 31 page report, titled “Public Money Traceability and Oversight in Kenya,” examines three separate areas: the 2 percent HIMS deduction under the Social Health Authority, the role and ownership of Finsprint and Impactsoft in the digital health payment ecosystem, and the newly established National Infrastructure Fund. It also examines the earlier Commtech and Starway ownership trail connected to the SHA ecosystem.
The report makes an important distinction from the outset. It asks a much simpler but potentially more consequential question: Can every shilling, ownership change and major decision be independently reconstructed from official records?
The 2 percent SHA deduction ¶
At the centre of the health financing questions is a 2 percent HIMS utilisation fee contained in the Digital Health Regulations published through Legal Notice 77 of 2025.
The fee is reported as being deducted from healthcare provider claim payments and is capped at KSh5,000 per defined transaction. The existence of the fee in the regulations is therefore documented. The bigger questions concern how it is calculated, how much has actually been collected, where the money goes and whether hospitals can independently reconcile what they were owed with what they eventually received.
The brief points out that simply knowing that a 2 percent fee exists does not answer whether the charge is cost justified or whether it has been correctly applied.
For example, the report asks why the charge is precisely 2 percent and whether the cost of processing a digital health transaction actually increases in proportion to the value of a medical claim.
It also raises a practical question about the meaning of a “transaction”. The KSh5,000 ceiling could produce very different results depending on whether the fee is imposed per claim, per line item or against a bulk settlement.
The documents that could answer these questions include the cost study, financial model, regulatory impact assessment, system rules, fee schedules and billing logs.
Most importantly, the report says the public needs access to the gross to net payment trail.
That means being able to start with an approved hospital claim, see every deduction made, establish the net amount paid to the hospital and match that payment to a bank reference.
Without such a reconciliation, the public cannot independently establish how much was deducted from providers or whether the deductions correspond with the amounts authorised.
The report identifies a fresh constitutional challenge filed on August 4, 2026, seeking to halt the 2 percent HIMS fee. As of the material reviewed in the brief, the petition had been filed but the requested conservatory orders had not been granted.
The Finsprint and Impactsoft question ¶
The second major issue concerns Finsprint, a company reported as operating within the SHA digital health payment ecosystem, and Impactsoft, which is reported to hold a majority stake in Finsprint.
The report does not describe this ownership structure as evidence of wrongdoing. Instead, it identifies a corporate governance question that requires documentary verification.
Finsprint was incorporated in 2020, while Impactsoft was incorporated on October 30, 2024. This creates a basic documentary question: if Impactsoft later acquired or received a controlling stake in Finsprint, who held those shares before the transaction, when did control change and what consideration was paid?
The brief reports a 575 share controlling position, but says the natural person ultimately controlling Impactsoft has not been publicly resolved through certified records.
It therefore calls for the original Finsprint shareholder register, annual returns, share transfer or allotment documents, board and shareholder resolutions, stamp duty records, proof of consideration and the beneficial ownership register of Impactsoft.
The report also raises questions about who funded the acquisition and who ultimately receives dividends or shareholder loan repayments.
The Konvergenz and Finsprint relationship ¶
Another area requiring scrutiny is the relationship between Konvergenz and Finsprint.
The forensic brief identifies a shared director connection between the two companies and reports Impactsoft as the majority owner of Finsprint.
Again, the report does not treat that relationship as proof of misconduct. Instead, it says the relationship creates a standard related party governance test.
Were conflicts disclosed?
Did interested individuals recuse themselves from decisions?
Was the Finsprint subcontract independently benchmarked?
Were the services actually required?
Were the invoices separate from services already being paid for under the wider consortium arrangement?
These questions can be answered through conflict declarations, board minutes, procurement records, pricing benchmarks, technical due diligence, contracts, invoices and bank payment records.
Following the money beyond the first account ¶
One of the strongest arguments in the report is that identifying the first recipient of public money is not enough.
A public payment can enter an official account before being used to pay a contractor, subcontractor or other private entity.
The report therefore proposes following the chain from:
Hospital claim → HIMS deduction → DHA public account → consortium payment → Finsprint invoice → Impactsoft economic benefit → ultimate natural person.
That is the level of reconciliation the report says would allow investigators to establish whether public money remained within its authorised purpose and who ultimately received economic value.
The Commtech and Starway trail ¶
The report also examines the earlier ownership trail involving Commtech, Starway and Milestone Games, while warning that this should not automatically be merged with the separate 2 percent HIMS fee controversy.
Commtech is reported as holding 22.5 percent of Konvergenz, while Starway appears in an earlier position and Commtech later acquired 25 percent of Milestone Games.
The report says the public record reviewed does not establish the transaction price, form of consideration or natural person controlling Starway.
Possible explanations include a legitimate sale or restructuring followed by reinvestment, a share swap, shareholder loan, debt set off, vendor financing or third party funding.
A higher risk possibility involving related parties or undisclosed principals is also identified, but the report stresses that such a theory would require direct ownership and funding evidence.
Importantly, the report says there is currently no public bank trail establishing a direct Finsprint to SportPesa transfer or a direct transfer of SHA contributions to SportPesa.
That distinction matters because the report warns against turning a pattern of corporate transactions into an established allegation without financial evidence.
The National Infrastructure Fund ¶
The third major area is the National Infrastructure Fund, established through legislation in March 2026.
Unlike the SHA issue, the NIF is a statutory infrastructure investment vehicle intended to mobilise public and private capital for commercially viable infrastructure projects.
The Government's June budget statement identified KSh106 billion from the Kenya Pipeline Company IPO and an expected KSh204 billion from partial Safaricom divestiture as seed capital for the Fund.
The High Court has already imposed an important transparency requirement.
Treasury was ordered to provide Auditor General certified accounts from the commencement of the Fund, including the exact dates of deposits, transactions, expenditures and allocations. Detailed quarterly reporting is also required while the petition remains pending.
The court, however, declined to freeze the Fund at the interim stage.
August 24 becomes a key date ¶
The report identifies August 24, 2026 as an important date because Treasury is expected to file the certified NIF accounts.
The report says the filing should contain more than a statement that accounts exist.
Investigators and the public should be able to see the opening account details, every deposit, every withdrawal and transfer, beneficiaries, approvals, investment holdings, valuations, project allocations, fees, intermediaries and the Auditor General's certification and any limitations.
The report warns that simply describing accounts as “certified” does not automatically mean that every procurement decision, valuation or conflict has been examined.
What about the alleged KSh150.7 billion account? ¶
The brief separately addresses a public allegation concerning an alleged KSh150.7 billion Sovereign Bond Proceeds Account.
It deliberately does not classify this alleged account as part of the NIF.
The report says the claim has not been established through documentary evidence and should instead be tested using official account opening records, CBK or Treasury account details, opening and closing balances, deposit records, account mandates, transfer instructions and corresponding Exchequer or Consolidated Fund entries.
This is one of the report's strongest warnings against mixing separate allegations simply because they involve large sums of public money.
The bigger problem: opacity by layering ¶
The report argues that the SHA, Finsprint and NIF questions share a governance concern rather than necessarily sharing the same beneficiaries.
In each case, public money or public assets can pass through several layers including statutory funds, contractual vehicles, private operators, subcontractors, advisers, project companies and holding structures.
Each individual transaction may potentially have a lawful explanation while the complete economic chain remains difficult for the public to see.
The report describes this as “opacity by layering.”
That is why the central demand is not simply for explanations from officials or companies. It is for documents.
The documents that could settle the questions ¶
The report identifies several priority records that would allow independent reviewers to move from allegations and speculation to evidence.
Among them are:
- DHA bank accounts receiving HIMS fees and the general ledger
- Claim level gross to net settlement records
- The 2024 SHA consortium financial model and master contract
- All HIMS fee schedules
- The Konvergenz Finsprint subcontract, invoices and bank payments
- Finsprint's complete share history
- The documents transferring or issuing the 575 Impactsoft shares
- Impactsoft's beneficial ownership and funding records
- NIF Auditor General certified accounts
- NIF account opening mandates and signatories
- NIF investment policy, business plan and project pipeline
- Beneficial ownership records for NIF project companies and contractors
- Commtech Starway and Commtech Milestone transaction documents.
The six questions every shilling should answer ¶
The report proposes a straightforward test for public money.
Where did the money originate?
What law, contract or appropriation authorised it?
Which account first received it?
What transfers, deductions or set offs followed?
Who ultimately received the economic benefit?
Which independent institution can verify the entire chain?
The report says this approach avoids the common mistake of stopping the investigation at the first government account or the first registered company. A proper audit must follow both the cash trail and the control trail, including shareholders, beneficial owners, lenders, nominees, voting rights, guarantees and related parties.
No criminal finding, but serious transparency questions ¶
The document is careful not to conclude that the 2 percent fee is criminal proceeds, that a named official personally owns or benefits from Finsprint or Impactsoft, that SHA money financed SportPesa, or that NIF money has been stolen or diverted.
It also says the SHA and NIF matters should not be presented as having a common beneficiary without bank, ownership or communication evidence.
That makes the central issue one of accountability rather than accusation.
If the fee structure, subcontracting arrangements, ownership changes, NIF accounts and project allocations are legitimate and commercially justified, full disclosure should be capable of demonstrating that.
If something is wrong, the same records should show where the problem occurred.
As the report's closing position puts it, the strongest argument for transparency is not that wrongdoing has already been proven. It is that major public money systems should be structured so that wrongdoing cannot hide behind complexity.
For Kenya, the real test is now simple: can the Government produce a complete, independently verifiable trail showing where the money came from, where it went, who benefited and under whose authority every step was taken?