The Gachagua impeachment judgment is not a story of judges rescuing a fallen Deputy President, and it is not a story of courts sabotaging Parliament, but a brutal lesson in how the Senate walked into a constitutional process with the numbers, the power and the time, only to injure its own case through unnecessary arrogance.

The most important lesson from the judgment is that the Senate cannot hide behind the Judiciary after mismanaging a constitutional process that was already prescribed in the 2010 Constitution.

The Judiciary cannot be blamed for the mistakes of other arms of government, especially when the Senate was the institution that created the fatal fair hearing problem and then expected the courts to look away in the name of political convenience.

This case is unique because it became the first real moment the 2010 Constitution was stretched, tested and strained on the impeachment of a Deputy President, the legal effect of that impeachment, the consequences of replacing him immediately, and the remedies available after a court finds that his rights were violated during the process.

For the first time, Kenya came dangerously close to the absurd constitutional risk of having two Deputy Presidents claiming legitimacy, one saying his removal violated fair trial rights, and another already occupying the office under Article 149.

That alone should remind the political class that constitutional gaps are not academic jokes, because they can easily become national crises when reckless politicians weaponize them without thinking through the consequences.

The court was clear that impeachment of a President or Deputy President is not a creature of an ordinary Act of Parliament, because it is directly prescribed by the Constitution under Articles 145 and 150, meaning the absence of a special Act of Parliament could not automatically make the process dead on arrival.

That is why the court said Parliament should urgently enact a dedicated statutory framework for the removal of a Deputy President, but also made it clear that the absence of that framework did not vitiate the impeachment that had already taken place.

In simple language, the court did not say Parliament had no power to impeach Gachagua, neither did it say the National Assembly acted outside the Constitution by processing the motion and escalating the matter to the Senate.

In fact, the court found that the National Assembly’s public participation met the constitutional threshold, the Standing Orders were not unconstitutional, IEBC was not required in the replacement process, and Kindiki’s nomination and appointment were valid.

The real problem, and this is where the Senate completely dropped the ball, was the refusal to adjourn when Gachagua was reported ill during the proceedings.

This is where the Senate’s own arrogance became its biggest enemy, because even the Speaker’s communication showed that the Senate still had room to adjourn the matter to Saturday and conclude within the constitutional window.

Instead of exercising discretion carefully, reasonably and with the seriousness demanded by a process removing a Deputy President, the Senate chose political speed over constitutional fairness.

That is why the court found that Gachagua’s rights under Articles 47 and 50 were infringed when the Senate declined to allow the adjournment.

This was not the Judiciary inventing sympathy for Gachagua, and it was not the Judiciary frustrating the impeachment process, because the court simply examined the record and found that the Senate had an option to slow down without breaking the Constitution.

The irony is that the same political actors now attacking the Judiciary are the same people who created the problem by refusing to do the obvious thing, which was to adjourn briefly and deny Gachagua the argument that he was condemned unheard.

The Senate wanted to appear ruthless, efficient and politically decisive, but in doing so, it handed Gachagua the cleanest constitutional argument in the entire case.

However, this is also where many people are missing the most important legal complication in the judgment.

Senior Counsel Paul Muite, who was appearing for Rigathi Gachagua, had moved the court with a clear position that the former Deputy President was not interested in returning to office even if the court found that his rights had been violated during the impeachment process.

That statement mattered because once Gachagua’s own lead counsel had indicated that reinstatement was not the remedy being pursued, the court could not casually grant him back an office that his own side had effectively told the court he did not want to return to.

The court also explained the bigger constitutional problem that would arise if the Senate resolution was quashed, because the law would automatically restore the status quo ante, meaning Gachagua would resume office as Deputy President by operation of law, irrespective of his stated unwillingness to return.

That is where Article 148 became important because the Constitution clearly provides the circumstances under which the term of a Deputy President may end, including when the next elected President is sworn in, when the Deputy President assumes the office of President, or through resignation, death or removal from office.

In other words, a courtroom statement by a lawyer cannot become a new constitutional method of vacating the office of Deputy President.

That is why the court was trapped between two serious constitutional realities, because on one hand it had found that Gachagua’s rights had been violated, but on the other hand reinstatement would have created confusion after another Deputy President had already been sworn in, while Gachagua’s own lawyer had also indicated that he did not want to return.

Even then, the court did not reverse the impeachment because it found that Article 145 creates finality once the Senate resolves to impeach and the vacancy is subsequently filled.

That part is very important because it means the court recognized the violation of rights but refused to create a bigger constitutional absurdity where the country would have two Deputy Presidents, a destabilized executive office, and a remedy that had already been complicated by the position taken by Gachagua’s own side.

So the honest reading of this judgment is not that Gachagua won everything or that the State lost everything, but that the Senate messed up a process that the Constitution had already given Parliament power to conduct.

The National Assembly followed enough of the law to make the impeachment survive, but the Senate handled the fair hearing question so badly that the court had no choice but to call out the violation.

This is why the current attempt to blame the Judiciary is dishonest, because judges did not hospitalize Gachagua, judges did not refuse the adjournment, and judges did not force the Senate to proceed when it still had time left.

The Judiciary only read the Constitution, read the Senate record, and told the country that political convenience cannot be treated as a substitute for fair hearing.

The lesson for future impeachments is simple enough for even the most excited politician to understand.

If the Senate wants to remove a President, Deputy President, Governor or any other public officer, it must treat impeachment as a constitutional trial and not as a political rally with Standing Orders.

It is now time to enact a clear supporting law giving direct, unambiguous and complete guidance on how a Deputy President can be removed from office, how the hearing should be conducted, when courts can intervene, what remedies are available after a violation is found, and whether replacement should wait until constitutional challenges are resolved.

As things stand, the same confusion can return in 2029 or in any other political cycle, because the country now knows that a Deputy President can be impeached, replaced, and still successfully prove that his rights were violated during the process.

That is not a small legal inconvenienceb but a constitutional time bomb.

Senate had the power, Senate had the numbers, Senate had the constitutional window, but Senate still chose unnecessary recklessness at the exact point where discipline was required.

That is Senate being given a loaded constitutional weapon and still managing to shoot itself in the foot.