



Report

of the

National Taskforce on Improvement of the Terms and Conditions of Service and other Reforms for Members of the National Police Service, Kenya Prisons Service and National Youth Service

By Chairperson:

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Presented to:

His Excellency

Hon. William Samoei Ruto, PhD., C.G.H.

President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander-in-Chief of the
Defence Forces

November, 2023

**Report of the National Taskforce on
Improvement of the Terms and Conditions of
Service and other Reforms for Members of the
National Police Service, Kenya Prisons Service and National
Youth Service**

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

**His Excellency the President of the Republic of Kenya
and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces**

Hon. William Samoei Ruto, PhD., C.G.H.

Harambee House

NAIROBI

Your Excellency,

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASKFORCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND OTHER REFORMS FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE, KENYA PRISONS SERVICE AND NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE


The National Taskforce on improvement of the terms and conditions of service and other reforms for members of the National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Prisons Service (KPS), and National Youth Service (NYS) was appointed by Your Excellency *vide* Gazette Notice No. 15792 dated the 21st December, 2022 to, among other issues:

- (a) identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational constraints on effective service delivery by NPS, KPS, and NYS;
- (b) identify and recommend legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational reforms in NPS, KPS, and NYS for effective service delivery;
- (c) review and recommend improvement of the terms and conditions of service of officers in all cadres of NPS, KPS, and NYS;
- (d) review and recommend improvement of matters relating to the welfare of officers in all cadres of NPS, KPS, and NYS, and all other matters incidental to the optimal service delivery by the NPS, KPS, and NYS; and
- (e) review and make recommendations on any other matter incidental to improved terms and conditions of service and other reforms in NPS, KPS, and NYS.

The Taskforce has undertaken the assignment and made observations findings and recommendations, as was required, which are captured in this Report.

We take this opportunity to thank Your Excellency for the trust and responsibility that you have bestowed upon us.

Yours faithfully,



Chief Justice (Emeritus) David Kenani Maraga

Chairperson




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
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


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


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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL	III
LIST OF TABLES	XII
LIST OF FIGURES	XV
PREFACE.....	XVII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	XX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	XXI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	XXIII
PART I: PRELIMINARY	XXXIX
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 BACKGROUND	1
1.2 REFORMS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE.....	1
1.3 TERMS OF REFERENCE.....	1
1.4 INTERPRETATION OF TERMS OF REFERENCE.....	4
1.5 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH	4
1.6 RECOMMENDATIONS BY PREVIOUS TASKFORCES.....	6
1.7 STRUCTURE AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE REPORT	6
CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW OF THE REFORM PROCESS.....	7
2.1 INTRODUCTION	7
2.2 OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS REFORMS	7
2.3 REFORM RATIONALE	13
PART II: NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE	17
CHAPTER THREE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE.....	19
3.1 STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE.....	19
3.2 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE	21
3.3 RANKING STRUCTURE	22
3.4 NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION.....	22
3.5 INDEPENDENT POLICING OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY	22
3.6 FUNDAMENTALS OF TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE	22
3.7 POLITICAL WILL TO DRIVE REFORMS.....	26
3.8 COMMAND STRUCTURE	31
3.9 SPECIALISED UNITS	35
3.10 POLICE AIR WING.....	37
3.11 MARINE POLICE UNIT.....	39
3.12 TRAFFIC POLICE UNIT	42
3.13 NATIONAL POLICE RESERVISTS	48
3.14 RESTRUCTURING OF THE KENYA POLICE SERVICE AND THE ADMINISTRATION POLICE SERVICE ..	50
CHAPTER FOUR: HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT	57
4.1 INTRODUCTION	57
4.2 CONTEXT AND STRUCTURE OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	59

4.3 RECRUITMENT	62
4.4 POSTING, DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFERS.....	67
4.5 TRAINING.....	70
4.6 HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING.....	74
4.7 CAREER PROGRESSION/SCHEME OF SERVICE, REWARD, AND PROMOTIONS	75
4.8 EXIT AND POST-EXIT MANAGEMENT	80
CHAPTER FIVE: TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE FOR THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE	85
5.1 INTRODUCTION	85
5.2 SALARIES AND REMUNERATION	85
5.3 NEW AND APPLICABLE ALLOWANCES	101
CHAPTER SIX: WELFARE REFORMS IN THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE.....	109
6.1 INTRODUCTION	109
6.2 MEDICAL SCHEME	110
6.3 MENTAL HEALTH.....	119
6.4 COMPENSATION SCHEME	121
6.5 HOUSING.....	123
CHAPTER SEVEN: TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY	131
7.1 INTRODUCTION	131
7.2 ICT AND DIGITISATION.....	131
7.3 LOGISTICAL CAPACITY, TOOLING, AND EQUIPMENT	133
7.4 DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND JOINT OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS.....	137
CHAPTER EIGHT: OTHER REFORMS IN THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE	141
8.1 INTRODUCTION	141
8.2 UNIFORMS.....	141
8.3 FORENSIC LABORATORY	143
8.4 COMMUNITY POLICING.....	146
8.5 IMPROVEMENT OF NPS PREMISES AND TITLING OF LAND.....	149
8.6 GENDER MAINSTREAMING.....	151
8.7 SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE.....	153
8.8 STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT IN NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE	155
CHAPTER NINE: NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE BENCHMARKING AND MODERNISATION	159
9.1 INTRODUCTION	159
9.2 BENCHMARKING.....	159
9.3 MODERNISATION	164
CHAPTER TEN: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX (NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE).....	167
10.1 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	167
10.2 IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX	188
PART III: KENYA PRISONS SERVICE.....	229

CHAPTER ELEVEN: LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE	231
11.1 INTRODUCTION	231
11.2 GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP CONCERNS	232
CHAPTER TWELVE: STRUCTURAL AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE.....	237
12.1 INTRODUCTION	237
12.2 ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK IN KENYA PRISONS SERVICE	238
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT	245
13.1 INTRODUCTION	245
13.2 RECRUITMENT	246
13.3 DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFERS	254
13.4 TRAINING.....	259
13.5 CAREER PROGRESSION, SCHEMES OF SERVICE, REWARD AND PROMOTION	263
13.6 REWARD AND SANCTIONS	267
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: REMUNERATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE	273
14.1 INTRODUCTION	273
14.2 SYSTEM OF REMUNERATION	274
14.3 SALARY	282
14.4 NEW AND APPLICABLE ALLOWANCES	287
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: WELFARE REFORMS IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE	297
15.1 INTRODUCTION	297
15.2 HOUSING.....	297
15.3 MEDICAL SCHEME	300
15.4 COMPENSATION SCHEME.....	306
15.5 MENTAL HEALTH.....	309
15.6 GENERAL WELFARE	310
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY	315
16.1 INTRODUCTION	315
16.2 ICT AND MODERNISATION.....	315
16.3 LOGISTICAL CAPACITY, TOOLING AND EQUIPMENT	318
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: OTHER REFORMS IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE	325
17.1 INTRODUCTION	325
17.2 TITLING OF LAND AND PREMISES.....	325
17.3 HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING	338
17.4 UNIFORMS.....	340
17.5 GENDER MAINSTREAMING.....	345
17.6 SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE.....	348
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: BENCHMARKING AND MODERNISATION.....	351
18.1 INTRODUCTION	351

18.2 BENCHMARKING	351
18.3 MODERNISATION	355
CHAPTER NINETEEN: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX (KENYA PRISONS SERVICE)	357
19.1 SUMMARY OF RECOMENDATIONS	357
19.2 IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX	371
PART IV: THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE	423
CHAPTER TWENTY: LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE	425
20.1 INTRODUCTION	425
20.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	426
20.3 THE LEGAL STANDING OF SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN	432
CHAPTER TWENTY ONE: HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE.....	435
21.1 INTRODUCTION	435
21.2 RECRUITMENT	435
21.3 DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFERS	438
21.4 CAREER PROGRESSION AND SCHEMES OF SERVICE.....	440
21.5 REWARDS	442
21.6 EXIT AND POST-EXIT MANAGEMENT	443
CHAPTER TWENTY TWO: REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE	447
22.1 INTRODUCTION	447
22.2 SYSTEM OF REMUNERATION	448
22.4 SALARY	455
22.5 NEW AND APPLICABLE ALLOWANCES	459
22.6 PROVISION OF STIPEND FOR THE SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN.....	465
CHAPTER TWENTY THREE: WELFARE REFORMS IN THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE	467
23.1 INTRODUCTION	467
23.2 MEDICAL AND COMPENSATION SCHEME	467
23.3 MENTAL HEALTH.....	469
23.4 HOUSING.....	472
CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR: TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE	477
24.1 INTRODUCTION	477
24.2 TOOLING, MODERNISATION AND ICT	477
24.3 TITLING OF LAND AND BUILDING MODERN PREMISES	481
24.4 TRAINING.....	484
24.5 GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT	490
CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE: BENCHMARKING AND MODERNISATION.....	495

25.1 INTRODUCTION	495
25.2 BENCHMARKING	495
25.3 MODERNISATION	497
CHAPTER TWENTY SIX: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX (NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE).....	499
26.1 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	499
26.2 IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX	507
PART FIVE: ANNEXURES	517
ANNEX 1: GAZETTE NOTICE 1	519
ANNEX 2: GAZETTE NOTICE 2	522
ANNEX 3: GAZETTE NOTICE 3	523
ANNEX 4: LIST OF FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS VISITED BY THE TASKFORCE	524
ANNEX 5: LIST OF ORGANISATIONS WHO APPEARED BEFORE THE TASKFORCE	528
ANNEX 6: LIST OF ORGANISATIONS INVITED TO SUBMIT INFORMATION TO THE TASKFORCE	530
ANNEX 7: NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO PARTICIPATED IN PUBLIC HEARINGS PER COUNTY	534
ANNEX 8: CALL FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 1	536
ANNEX 9: CALL FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 2	537
ANNEX 10: LIST OF SECRETARIAT SUPPORT STAFF	538

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. 1: Reports of previous Taskforces reviewed	5
Table 3. 1: National Police Service Formations and Units.....	21
Table 3. 2: Police geographic and operational boundaries	22
Table 3. 3: NPS common ranking structure	22
Table 3. 4: Command, operational and administrative structure of the NPS.....	35
Table 3. 5: Status of aircraft from 2010 to 2022.....	38
Table 3. 6: Number of NPR per county	49
Table 3. 7: APS and KPS formations and units policing focus area after restructuring/merger.....	53
Table 3. 8: Transformed strength of APS units following restructuring/merger	53
Table 3. 9: Transformed strength of KPS following restructuring/merger.....	53
Table 4. 1: Summary NPS Human Capital Development Directorate and its functions	61
Table 4. 2: NPS trends in total recruitment and exits from 2012 to 2022	63
Table 4. 3: NPS promotions from 2012–2022.....	76
Table 5. 1: Civil Service remuneration system based on job group classification	88
Table 5. 2: Basic salary comparison for Job Group ‘F’ equivalent grades.....	90
Table 5. 3: Basic salary comparison for Job Group ‘G’ equivalent grades	90
Table 5. 4: Basic salary comparison for Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades in the various services.....	91
Table 5. 5: Incremental notches from minimum basic salary to maximum salary for uniformed officers in the National Police Service.....	94
Table 5. 6: Trends in inflation, consumer price indices and rise in the cost of living, 2012 – 2022	94
Table 5. 7: Gross salary of a constable on joining the National Police Service in January 2013	95
Table 5. 8: Gross salary of a constable on joining the National Police Service in January 2022	95
Table 5. 9: Trends in increments in gross salary for a constable who joined the National Police Service effective January 2013 to January 2023	96
Table 5. 10: Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service as per FY 2022/2023	97
Table 5. 11: Recommendation for New Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service by the Taskforce.....	97
Table 5. 12: Remuneration structure for Non-Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service FY 2021/22.....	97
Table 5. 13: Recommended Remuneration Structure for Non-Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service to be implemented in FY 2024/2025	98
Table 5. 14: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group ‘F’ equivalent grades.....	99
Table 5. 15: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades.....	99
Table 5. 16: Remuneration gaps across disciplined services.....	100
Table 5. 17: List of allowances currently payable to uniformed members of the Service and rate applicable per rank or job group.....	101
Table 5. 18: Comparison of allowances paid to NPS, KPS, NYS and the wider public sector FY 2022/2023	103
Table 5. 19: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group ‘F’ and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23.....	105
Table 5. 20: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group ‘G’ and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23.....	106
Table 5. 21: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group ‘P’ and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23	106
Table 5. 22: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group ‘F’ equivalent grades in FY 2022/23(KDF included).....	106
Table 5. 23: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades in FY 2022/23.....	107
Table 6. 1: Summary NPS current medical scheme benefits.....	115
Table 6. 2: Distribution of accredited CIC facilities by category	115
Table 6. 3: Distribution of accredited CIC facilities by department.....	116
Table 6. 4: Distribution of accredited CIC facilities for NPS and KPS officers by county	116
Table 6. 5: Number of reported suicide cases involving NPS officers	120
Table 6. 6: Benefits payable under the GPA and WIBA	122
Table 6. 7: NPS officers injured or killed in the line of duty, 2014-2022	122

Table 6. 8: NPS officers' unpaid or pending claims (Group Life, Injuries, Disability, Terminal Illness, Mental Health Illness, and last expenses), 2014-2022.....	122
Table 6. 9: Number of NPS officers currently living in institutional police housing and private housing within communities in each county.....	125
Table 6. 10: Phase 1 A — Completed project units: 850 units.....	126
Table 6. 11: Phase 2a & 2b — Completed units: 552 units.....	126
Table 6. 12: Housing units at advanced stages: 630 units	127
Table 8. 1: Summary of status of NPS land	150
Table 8. 2: National Police Service gender distribution by rank	151
Table 8. 3: Gender composition in the Kenya Police Service, APS and DCI	151
Table 8. 4: Sexual offences cases recorded by IAU between 2017 and 2022	153
Table 11. 1: Commissioner General of Prisons since 2008.....	232
Table 13. 1: In-post officers between 2016 and 2022.....	252
Table 13. 2: Variance between authorised establishment and in-post officers in KPS.....	253
Table 13. 3: KPS distribution of in-post officers by rank, 2011 to 2022.....	253
Table 13. 4: Retirement data between 2012 and 2022.....	269
Table 14. 1: Civil Service system of remuneration based on Civil Service job group classification	275
Table 14. 2: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades.....	276
Table 14. 3: Basic salary comparison JG 'G' equivalent grades	277
Table 14. 4: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in the various services.....	278
Table 14. 5: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades.....	278
Table 14. 6: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades.....	278
Table 14. 7: Incremental notches from minimum to maximum salary for uniformed officers in KPS	279
Table 14. 8: Remuneration gaps across disciplined services.....	280
Table 14. 9: Trends in inflation, consumer price indices and rise in the cost-of-living, 2012 – 2022.....	284
Table 14. 10: Gross salary of a constable on joining the Kenya Prisons Service in May 2010.....	285
Table 14. 11: Gross salary of a constable on joining the Kenya Prisons Service in January 2022.....	285
Table 14. 12: Trends in increments in gross salary of a Prisons constable who joined the KPS from May 2010.....	285
Table 14. 13: Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the Kenya Prisons Service as per FY 2022/2023	286
Table 14. 14: Recommendation for New Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the Kenya Prisons Service by the Taskforce.....	287
Table 14. 15: List of allowances currently payable to uniformed members of the Service and rates applicable per rank or job group.....	287
Table 14. 16: Comparison of allowances paid to NPS, KPS, NYS and the wider public sector FY 2022/2023	289
Table 14. 17: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various Services in FY 2022/23	292
Table 14. 18: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23.....	292
Table 14. 19: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for JG 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23	292
Table 14. 20: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23 (KDF included)	293
Table 14. 21: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23	293
Table 15. 1: Medical scheme benefits provided for under the current cover.....	302
Table 15. 2: Number of accredited CIC facilities in comparison with NHIF facilities	303
Table 15. 3: Benefits payable under the GPA and WIBA	306
Table 15. 4: Unpaid compensation and claims (Group Life, Disability, Injuries, Disability, Terminal Illness, Mental Health Illness and Last Expense)	307
Table 15. 5: KPS officers killed or injured in the line of duty since 2012	307
Table 15. 6: KPS officers admitted to rehabilitation centres since 2020.....	309
Table 16. 1: Status of current vehicles	321

Table 16. 2: Recommendation for additional vehicles	321
Table 17. 1: Categories of KPS land ownership and status	326
Table 17. 2: KPS human rights courses.....	339
Table 17. 3: KPS officers working uniform	341
Table 17. 4: KPS Ceremonial uniform	342
Table 17. 5: Inmate uniform and beddings.....	342
Table 17. 6: Uniform and beddings for capital remand inmates (men)	342
Table 17. 7: Uniform and beddings for capital remands (women)	343
Table 17. 8: KPS gender distribution for prisons/correctional facilities (inmate population and uniformed officers).....	346
Table 17. 9: KPS uniformed officers' gender distribution	346
Table 17. 10: Ranking prison officers by gender	347
Table 20. 1: NYS Director General since 2003	431
Table 20. 2: Uniformed officers' establishment in the NYS	432
Table 21. 1: NYS trends in uniformed officers' recruitment and exit, 2012 - 2023	436
Table 21. 2: NYS trends in uniformed officers' promotions 2012 - 2023	441
Table 22. 1: Disciplined Services remuneration based on Civil Service job group classification.....	448
Table 22. 2: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades.....	450
Table 22. 3: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'G' equivalent grades.....	450
Table 22. 4: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in the various services.....	451
Table 22. 5: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades.....	451
Table 22. 6: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades.....	452
Table 22. 7: Incremental notches from minimum basic to maximum salary for uniformed officers in the National Youth Service.....	452
Table 22. 8: Remuneration gaps across the disciplined services	453
Table 22. 9: Trends in inflation, consumer price indices and rise in the cost-of-living, 2012 – 2022	455
Table 22. 10: Gross salary of an NYS private on joining the Service in January 2010.....	456
Table 22. 11: Gross salary of NYS private on joining the Service in January 2021	456
Table 22. 12: Trends in increments in gross salary of NYS private who joined the Service in January 2010	457
Table 22. 13: Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Youth Service FY 2022/2023	458
Table 22. 14: Recommendation for New Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Youth Service by the Taskforce.....	458
Table 22. 15: List of allowances currently payable to uniformed members of the Service and the rate applicable per rank or job group.....	459
Table 22. 16: Comparison of allowances paid to NPS, KPS, NYS, and the wider public sector FY 2022 and 2023 ..	460
Table 22. 17: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23.....	463
Table 22. 18: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowance for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23	463
Table 22. 19: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23.....	463
Table 22. 20: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship, leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022 and 23 (KDF included).....	464
Table 22. 21: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022 and 23	464
Table 23. 1: Number of NYS officers killed or injured in the line of duty since 2012	468
Table 23. 2: Number of NYS officers admitted to rehabilitation centres since 2012.....	470
Table 23. 3: Distribution of NYS officers housing and accommodation.....	473
Table 23. 4: Distribution of NYS housing per unit	474

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3. 1: NPS command structure.....	33
Figure 3. 2: Traffic Department organisational chart	43
Figure 3. 3: Traffic Department command and control structure	44
 Figure 4. 1: NPS transfer and deployment rate per rank, 2016 to 2022	68
Figure 4. 2: NPS promotion rate by rank.....	77
 Figure 5. 1: Trends in inflation rate and rise in cost of living, 2012 - 2022	95
Figure 5. 2: Trends in increments in gross salary for a constable who joined the National Police Service effective January 2013 to January 2023	96
 Figure 7. 1: Disaster management cycle.....	138
 Figure 12. 1: The Prisons system organogram	239
 Figure 13. 1: Growth in uniformed officers in-post between 2012 and 2022.....	252
 Figure 14. 1: Trends in inflation rate and rise in cost-of-living, 2012 - 2022.....	284
Figure 14. 2: Trends in increments in gross salary of a constable who joined the KPS from May 2010	286
 Figure 15. 1: Organisation structure for the Directorate of Rehabilitation.....	312
 Figure 22. 1: Trends in inflation rate and rise in cost-of-living 2012 - 2022.....	456
Figure 22. 2: Trends in increments in gross salary of NYS private who joined the Service in January 2010	457

PREFACE

1. Security defines the contours of nationality and determines the potential and viability of any society. No meaningful socio-economic or even political development can be realised, let alone sustained, where there is no sound legal framework, and a reliable mechanism for its enforcement.
2. For a country to function properly and thrive, it requires strict enforcement of the rule of law, evident in enduring security. This is the critical role that the security agencies are expected to play. The women and men who serve in sensitive security roles are the first defenders of democracy: holding forte against lawlessness and chaos. When security services are unable to optimally perform their roles, for whatever reason, the very foundation of the nation and its fabric comes under threat. The conditions that undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of security agencies therefore require urgent attention.
3. Unlike previous commissions and committees, this Taskforce was not established to respond to any security crisis. The country was, however, facing a dilemma: loss of public confidence in the internal security institutions, especially the police, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the institutions feeling that their services were not being appreciated.
4. Cognisant of these challenges and elements of political partisanship as well as low morale among members of the National Police Service (NPS), the Kenya Prisons Service (KPS) and the National Youth Service (NYS), on December 21, 2022, H.E. Hon. William Samoei Ruto, PhD., C.G.H., President and Commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces, established the National Taskforce to review the terms and conditions of service for members of the three Security Services. The overarching terms of reference were to identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational constraints impeding their effective service delivery and make appropriate recommendations.
5. The Taskforce undertook a fairly extensive desk review, which covered the past reform reports on the three Services. Views were also collected from members of the public during public hearings, as well as memoranda received electronically and physically. Extensive participation from a cross-section of stakeholders in the government, justice and security sectors, as well as from the primary stakeholders and the three Services themselves. Based on these, this Report draws attention to the banes of the Services' lethargy leading to poor service delivery: endemic corruption, incompetence as well as gross underfunding of the Services' operations, and has made a raft of recommendations to address those issues.
6. One of the most remarkable observations from the field visits was the public skepticism about whether the Taskforce's Report and recommendations will ever be implemented or make any difference. This is a well-founded anxiety based on the depressing reality that the issues surfaced through these public dialogues have, for decades, been flagged but remained largely unaddressed for just as long.
7. Specifically, the Taskforce established that institutional and cultural failures that have frustrated transformation in the three disciplined Services for decades range from endemic corruption and land grabbing to sexual harassment, inhuman treatment, and outright injustice; indolence and aversion to learning; as well as political meddling all resulting in loss of public confidence in the three institutions. Corruption, in literally every aspect of the Services' affairs, was particularly singled out as having undermined professionalism and thus rendered them almost dysfunctional.
8. Over the past 15 years, desperate efforts have been made to reform the National Police Service in particular – especially after the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election

Violence which cited the Service for causing deaths, failing to protect the public and taking sides in the prevailing political contest. Taxpayers and the international community have poured billions of shillings into reforms that do not seem to materialise. Efforts to reform NPS have included a change in the Constitution, the enactment of a raft of laws and regulations, and the establishment of civilian oversight mechanisms.

9. None of these has yielded the desired result. Instead, every year, the National Police Service is routinely ranked as the most corrupt institution in the country without any sanctions, thus breeding a culture of impunity, which has spread to the other uniformed Services. The failure of community policing to take off is emblematic of this impunity.
10. On Prisons reforms, the Council to streamline the management and accountability of the Kenya Prisons Service has never been operationalised years after it was entrenched in law. Consequently, corruption in the Services has been allowed to unashamedly fester into a culture that now defines their operations—from recruitment at the lowest levels to promotions and appointments into the top leadership. That leadership has, in turn, traded their professional ethos for political patronage, driving these institutions into a slothful incompetence that is allergic to learning and resistant to harnessing technology for service delivery.
11. The privilege of leading this Taskforce has granted me a unique opportunity to see and hear a version of Kenyans' lived reality, which reinforces the view I have always held that Kenya is a great and relatively rich country with an industrious and law-abiding citizenry. All we need is uncompromising enforcement of the law and everything will fall into place. With serious enforcement of the law, corruption, which admittedly gobbles close to seven percent (7%) of the country's GDP annually, will be radically reduced and, as a country, we will not need to seek foreign aid, especially foreign borrowing that is now almost crippling our economy.
12. Sadly however, this appears like a pipe dream. The culture of impunity in the Services and their glaring failure to effectively enforce the rule of law are slowly driving the country into a state of lawlessness and anarchy. We are already losing investments to neighbouring countries partly because of this sad state of affairs which should not be allowed to continue. As part of the definitive break from the past, there must be a paradigm shift. The majority of the men and women in our security Services are doing a remarkable and dedicated job of trying to ensure, often at great personal risk and sacrifice, that we live in peace. With the recommended improved terms of service and modernisation of the Services' tools and equipment, Kenyans must begin to demand and receive value for their money. The leadership of the three Services must continuously be held accountable to ensure that they deliver on their respective mandates.
13. We acknowledge that transforming the three Services will not happen overnight: there are no quick fixes, but there are quick wins which, if secured immediately, can begin to deliver change. One such major recommendation concerns the establishment of the Security and Disciplined Services Sector to bring under one umbrella the Kenya Defence Forces, the National Intelligence Service, the National Police Service, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service. Not only will this harmonise the welfare as well as the terms and conditions of service of officers in the sector, but will also, hopefully, end the grumbling in some Services over preferential treatment of others.
14. In the course of development of this Report, the Taskforce had the opportunity of presenting the Preliminary Report to His Excellency the President, the Deputy President, the Prime Cabinet Secretary, Cabinet Secretaries, and the leadership of the three Services. I am grateful

for their invaluable feedback that formed the basis for further consultation and indeed improved and enriched this Report.

15. This Report would not have been possible without the cooperation and support of the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and National Administration, Prof. Kithure Kindiki, as well as the Principal Secretary, State Department of Interior and Security, Dr. Raymond Omollo; the generous financial support from the United Nations and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) Kenya. I want to thank my Vice-Chairperson, all members of the Taskforce and Joint Secretaries for their active participation, knowledge, skills, intellect and experience.
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God bless you all!

Chief Justice (Emeritus) David K. Maraga, FCI Arb, E.G.H.

Chairperson, National Taskforce on Improvement of the Terms and Conditions of Service and other Reforms for Members of the National Police Service, Kenya Prisons Service and National Youth Service.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACU	Anti-Counterfeit Unit
AIE	Authority to Incur Expenditure
ACP	Assistant Commissioner of Police
ACP	Assistant Commissioner of Prisons
AG	Attorney General
AIG	Assistant-Inspector-General
ALEHU	Axle Load Enforcement Highway Unit
APS	Administration Police Service
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Areas
ATPU	Anti-Terror Police Unit
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence
CGP	Commissioner General of Prisons
CIPU	Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit
CPC	County Police Commander
CPV	Community Police Volunteers
CS	Cabinet Secretary
CSC	Cabinet Security Committee
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigation
DEFKO	Defence Forces Canteen Organisation
DIG	Deputy Inspector-General
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
EACC	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
CSIC	County Security Intelligence Committee
DTO	Divisional Traffic Officer
SSOs	Service Standing Orders
GJLOS	Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector
GD	General Duty
GSU	General Service Unit
HR	Human Resource
HRMAC	Human Resource Management Advisory Committee
IAU	Internal Affairs Unit
ICT	Information Communication Technology

IG	Inspector-General of Police
IPOA	Independent Policing Oversight Authority
ICT	Information, Communication & Technology
IT	Information Technology
KCGS	Kenya Coast Guard Service
KCSE	Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KPS	Kenya Prisons Service
KPTC	Kenya Police Training College
KPR	Kenya Police Reserve
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
KCAA	Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
RDU	Rapid Deployment Unit
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRIC	Police Reforms Implementation Committee
PS	Principal Secretary
PSC	Public Service Commission
NASD	National Air Support Department
NCTPU	Northern Corridor Transit Patrol Unit
NGCDF	National Government Constituency Development Fund
NGAO	National Government Administration Officers
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPR	National Police Reservists
NPS	National Police Service
NPSC	National Police Service Commission
NPSAW	National Police Service Air Wing
NYS	National Youth Service
NYSPUT	National Youth Service Pre-University Training
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
SAGA	Semi-Autonomous Government Agencies
SRC	Salaries and Remuneration Commission
SSU	Special Service Unit
TORs	Terms of Reference

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

1. The Taskforce was set up to identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional, and operational constraints on effective service delivery by the National Police Service (NPS), the Kenya Prisons Service (KPS) and the National Youth Service (NYS) (the Services), and to review the welfare and the terms and conditions of service for members of the three Services.
2. This Report is in five parts. Part One contains the introduction and preliminary. Part Two presents the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce touching on National Police Service. Part Three contains findings and recommendations regarding Kenya Prisons Service. Part Four presents the findings and recommendations regarding the National Youth Service. Part Five contains all the Annexures.

Interpretation of the Terms of Reference

3. In interpreting its Terms of Reference (TORs), the Taskforce was guided by the objectives that informed its establishment. Besides identifying issues, specifically, the Taskforce understood its mandate as requiring a comprehensive examination and review of the legal, policy, administrative, institutional, and operational constraints impeding effective service delivery by NPS, KPS and NYS; review of welfare and terms and conditions of service of officers of the three Services; a review of other matters incidental to their improved service delivery; and making appropriate recommendations in all these areas.
4. In a nutshell, the Taskforce understood its mandate as calling for examination and review of the various aspects that touch on welfare, terms and conditions of service, capabilities and service delivery, and to additionally identify the key levers for comprehensive change in the Services. During this review, it became clear to the Taskforce that the challenges facing the Services were not just laws, policies, institutions and processes but also leadership gaps in the Services. It also became clear that the reform recommendations stand little chance of being implemented if the leadership issues in the respective Services are not boldly addressed.
5. Indeed, for this Taskforce, it was clear that the problems identified were not new to the Services. They had been the subject of previous taskforces and committees. Though previous reforms had improved many aspects of the three institutions, there was, however, a compelling public interest in strengthening operational and welfare reforms to ensure that the members of the three Services effectively serve the public.
6. The Taskforce evaluated the challenges and realized that “service” was the sum total of all the operations and processes of the three Services. It is what these agencies are about in everything they are engaged in. Further, the Taskforce established that on most of the issues, there are legal, policy, administrative, institutional, and operational challenges. The most appropriate way to present the findings and recommendations was by isolating the issues and dealing with them separately. Consequently, the Taskforce has organized the findings and recommendations according to the areas of review as per the TORs.
7. The Taskforce held an inaugural meeting with the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and National Administration, at which the CS outlined the Government’s vision and objectives in establishing the Taskforce.
8. Subsequently, the Taskforce embarked on its work and established four committees to guide the discharge of its mandate, namely: Legal and Policy; Welfare and Terms and Conditions; Technical and Operational Capabilities; and Management.

9. The Taskforce undertook an initial review of reports by previous taskforces, policies, legislation, and administrative instruments on NPS, KPS and NYS to establish the scope and nature of the reforms undertaken as well as the progress in their implementation.
10. In line with the TORs, the Taskforce undertook consultations with diverse stakeholders. First, the Taskforce received submissions from the leadership of NPS, KPS and NYS. Submissions were also received from the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) and the National Youth Service Council. Further, consultations were held with the leadership of various government ministries, including the Ministry of Interior and National Administration; the National Treasury; the Salaries and Remuneration Commission; relevant Parliamentary Committees; Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs); and other key State Organs and Institutions.
11. Subsequently, the Taskforce also held consultative meetings with representatives of all cadres of members of the respective Services across the country.
12. In line with the constitutional principle of public participation, the Taskforce undertook extensive public and stakeholder consultations in all the 47 counties. In those fora, the Taskforce also received views from a diversity of experts on various issues relevant to its mandate, the private sector, civil society organizations and faith-based groups, among others. In addition, the Taskforce conducted site visits to various offices and facilities of the Services in each of the counties.
13. To expand its public reach, the Taskforce secured a phone number and operated an email address as well as social media accounts to appraise the public of its activities and receive feedback.
14. Finally, the Taskforce presented an interim report to the appointing authority and received feedback that formed the basis for further consultations and finalisation of this Report.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON SALIENT ISSUES

15. The Taskforce established that the three Services are bedeviled with myriad challenges, foremost among them being underfunding; endemic corruption; leadership in the three Services; poor handling of human capital management and development; and other structural challenges as captured in this summary. This section provides a summary of the issues in each of the three Services and the recommendations to address the issues and challenges identified. The last section identifies the common issues that cut across the three Services and the recommendations of the Taskforce.

National Police Service

Underfunding

16. The Taskforce established that the National Police Service is the most affected by underfunding. The Service has been consistently underfunded despite having to confront enormous emerging security challenges. The review by this Taskforce takes place at a time when the operating context for the Service is drastically altered from what was obtained before. The modern socio-economic and political environment as well as rapidly changing information and communication technologies present new vulnerabilities and security challenges for the country.
17. Cattle rustling and banditry in many parts of the country, especially in the North Rift; terrorism and violent extremism; human trafficking; exploitation of new technologies to commit

cybercrimes; consumption of second-generation alcohol; drug trafficking, and drug and substance abuse have placed a significant strain on the capacities and capabilities of the NPS.

18. Within these challenges, NPS has not been properly facilitated to effectively discharge its mandate. Severe supply gaps present the NPS with serious logistical nightmares in its operations. For instance, the current monthly fuel allocation of 450 litres per vehicle, irrespective of the operational needs of different areas, or the vastness of some counties such as Marsabit and Turkana, is simply insufficient. The equipment and gear currently provided to NPS officers is grossly inadequate, hardly serviced and maintained and mostly in a poor state of repair.
19. The Police do not have adequate physical and operational infrastructural facilities at both the training colleges and at police station levels. This leaves them poorly prepared to train or effectively provide security, and maintain law and order. Besides lacking basic facilities like examination rooms for sexual violence cases, police stations detain arrested persons in dingy and crowded rooms with deplorable ablution facilities. In many places across the country, the living conditions for NPS officers are dehumanizing, thus undermining their morale and ability to deliver quality services. In some cases, NPS officers and their families live in dilapidated, congested and condemned structures which are sometimes shared.
20. The Taskforce urges the Government to adequately fund the NPS to modernize its facilities, equipment, and gear, and enhance its logistical and technological capabilities as well as provide decent housing for NPS officers in order to enable the Service discharge its mandate efficiently and effectively.

Corruption

21. The public, other stakeholders and even members of NPS stated that corruption in the Service remains endemic and is now deeply embedded in the institutional culture and psyche of NPS. Despite institutional policies and strategies specifically targeted at addressing corruption in NPS, and existence of guidelines and policies that seek to enhance integrity in critical processes such as recruitment, most police jobs are sold to those who can afford or only offered to relatives of the powerful and politically connected.
22. The Taskforce heard, from literally all 47 counties, of rampant corruption, cronyism, nepotism, favouritism, tribalism and political influence peddling during police recruitment exercises. Further reports indicated that slots were being sold for up to KSh600,000 if not more. Those who enter the NPS through political influence sustain their place in the Service by remaining loyal to those 'they know' while those who are picked on merit 'grease' their positions by granting favours to police bosses.
23. Endemic corruption also permeates other aspects of the Service's operations. Transfers, deployments, promotions, as well as procurement are riddled with corruption and favouritism, which undermines morale among NPS officers. Cases of conflict of interest that fuel corruption have been reported. These include traffic police officers owning public service vehicles and motor vehicle breakdown services, alcohol outlets, gambling outlets, and generally engaging in business and activities that compromise their impartiality and professionalism.
24. The Traffic Department of NPS came up for special mention in literally all meetings that the Taskforce held in the 47 counties and in submissions by most stakeholders. Unanimously, police roadblocks were described as corruption toll stations from where the 'loot' collected was shared up to the highest levels in the hierarchy of police leadership. Following this widespread condemnation, the Taskforce recommends the restructuring of the current Traffic

Police Unit into a new Traffic Management Unit that is well trained, leaner in numbers, and mainly reliant on technology to control and manage traffic flow in the country. The taskforce envisages the use of technology in the detection of traffic infractions, and the attendant fines becoming cashless by use of technology. While that is being done, the Taskforce recommends appropriate amendment of Section 65 of the NPS Act within six months and abolition of police roadblocks and their replacement with mobile patrol units.

The challenge of leadership

25. As stated, a point even the 2010 Ransley Taskforce also made, the NPS lacks competent leadership with strategic vision and commitment to discharge its mandate. The Taskforce established that most of the legal frameworks required for effective and professional police performance are in place but these are not adhered to due to lack of competence and lethargy to undertake the required reforms in the Service.
26. Standards of professionalism and fairness on issues such as recruitment, training, promotions, transfers, deployment and general performance of policing duties have been compromised. Based on the views received, and recommendations of past taskforces, this Taskforce attributes these competence gaps mainly on the manner of hiring the NPS leadership.
27. Article 232 of the Constitution lays down the values and principles of Public Service, which include responsive, prompt, effective, impartial, and equitable provision of services. As regards NPS, Article 239 (3) of the Constitution directs the Service to be impartial and not to “further any interest of a political party or cause; or prejudice a political interest or political cause that is legitimate under the Constitution.” As is stated in the Waki Commission and Ransley Taskforce reports, past misuse of the police for partisan political objectives has significantly eroded public trust and professionalism in the Service. Further, Article 244 requires NPS to be transparent and accountable in the discharge of its mandate and to strive for the highest standards of professionalism and discipline among its members, qualities that it sorely lacks.
28. The letter and spirit of these constitutional provisions is to have all positions, especially in the leadership cadres of the NPS, competitively filled as is the case with all recruitment into other Government institutions. Regrettably, however, that is not what is obtaining in the NPS. The Security Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act of 2014 repealed the provisions of the NPS Act which provided for an open, transparent, and competitive recruitment of the Inspector-General and Deputy-Inspectors General.
29. In the circumstances, and to ascertain whether the current top leadership of the NPS has the competence, integrity, and experience required to drive the requisite reforms and achieve the vision of the Service, the Taskforce has recommended a fresh vetting by an independent panel to be appointed by the President for all officers of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) and above. To this end, the Taskforce urges the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration to immediately develop a bill and request Parliament to enact legislation to reinstate the constitutional requirement for the open, transparent and competitive recruitment of the Inspector-General, the Deputy-Inspectors General, and the Director of Criminal Investigations as was provided for under Sections 12, 13 and 30 of the NPS Act prior to the 2014 amendment.
30. And to enhance professionalism in NPS, the Taskforce recommends that the minimum qualifications for recruitment into the Service should be raised to grade C minus (C-) in KCSE. However, for the marginalized areas, the Taskforce recommends the retention of Grade D+ when there are no applicants with grade C- in KCSE. After recruitment, the initial

training should be extended from nine months to 12, with emphasis placed on competency-based training in line with international policing standards and introduction of a practical attachment component to the training of NPS officers.

31. To address junior officers' complaints on transfers and deployments, the Taskforce recommends the amendment of Regulation 9 (1) of the NPSC (Transfer and Deployment) Regulations to limit operational deployments to a period not exceeding six (6) months. In all other deployments, the Taskforce recommends that no person should serve in one county for a period of more than three (3) years, save for those deployed to the specialised units.
32. Regarding promotions, it is the view of the Taskforce that a professional and motivated NPS should be based on a clear career progression and advancement path that takes into consideration factors such as competence, integrity, training and relevant qualifications, skills and experience. The Taskforce established that the stagnation of junior officers in one rank, in many cases until retirement, is the source of widespread discontent and low morale in the Service. The Taskforce therefore recommends the establishment of grades of Inspector II and I and the introduction of Constable III, II, and I, and Corporal III, II, and I within the same ranks, all of which must be filled through open and competitive promotions based on merit.

Leadership of the National Police Service Commission

33. The National Police Service Commission (NPSC) is established to streamline the management of the human resource function and thus mandated to promote professionalism and accountability in NPS. In this regard, it is expected, among other things, to formulate appropriate policies on training and human capacity management and development, and also to exercise disciplinary control over NPS members and rid the Service of or at least minimise corruption, inefficiency, nepotism and general lack of professional management.
34. Regrettably, however, the NPSC leadership has acquiesced to the continued usurpation of its functions by the NPS leadership, thereby exacerbating the vices that it was established to redress. It has also generally been unable to develop policies and institute measures that would enable it to perform its constitutional and statutory obligations. In the circumstances, the Taskforce has been left with no option but to recommend that Government considers initiating a negotiated exit, or any other legally recognised modality, for the current Commissioners of NPSC.
35. Other important aspects of NPS leadership that the Taskforce has singled out and made appropriate recommendations on, include the 2018 reorganisation of the operations of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service within the National Police and the Service's Command Structure; the Police Airwing; the Coast Guard; and the role of the Internal Affairs Unit.

The role of the Cabinet Secretary in NPS

36. The major role of the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration is the formulation of appropriate policies to guide NPS. The Taskforce has, however, established from recent history that rather than restrict themselves to the development of policies, there has been systemic micro-management of the Service by previous Cabinet Secretaries that has significantly eroded the operational independence of the Service. To remedy this situation, the Taskforce has recommended that the Cabinet Secretary should develop a Sessional Paper on policing and reforms to guide the long-term transformation of NPS and thereby take immediate and urgent steps to address the current policy and oversight gaps in the Services, such as the operationalisation of the Police Reform Unit envisaged under Section 126 (2) (b) of the NPS Act.

The Reorganisation of NPS

37. Prior to 2018, the way NPS constituent Services were organised showed clear lines of overlap and duplication of functions at all levels. There existed parallel and lateral Kenya Police Service, Administration Police Service and Directorate of Criminal Investigations commanders at all levels from regional, right down to ward and locational levels. Among the three commanders, it was not clear who headed each level, as a majority were of the same rank. This was clearly not an optimal allocation of resources because teams were operating in a disjointed manner.
38. However, the 2018 reorganisation loosely referred to as the “merger” of the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service meant to remedy this situation by eradicating the overlap and duplication of functions, was not properly executed and did not sit well with members of Administration Police Service. Across the country, Administration Police Service officers expressed frustration at being treated as juniors to their Kenya Police Service counterparts and felt that their issues were not given the necessary consideration and regard by the NPS leadership. The continued exclusive protective role of the Kenya Police Service over institutions considered “lucrative” such as the Central Bank and airports, is seen by Administration Police Service officers as an example of their disadvantage since under the reorganisation, the protection of these institutions should be part of their mandate.
39. Besides the disenchantment of the Administration Police Service officers, the 2018 reorganisation has led to significant escalation of crime and undermined national security. The absorption of a large fraction of the Administration Police Service officers into the Kenya Police Service and reduction of their mandate at county level to protection of critical infrastructure, ran contrary to the National Police Service Act and has significantly undermined the preventive (community-based) policing which the Administration Police Service has historically excelled in.
40. More importantly, the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service are established under Article 243 of the Constitution as constituting the National Police Service. The National Police Service Act, on the other hand, spells out the detailed functions and responsibilities of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service under sections 24 and 27, respectively. Therefore, any reorganisation or restructuring of the two Services, such as the one undertaken in 2018, should be guided by the constitutional and legal framework underpinning the existence and functioning of the two Services. This was not done.
41. To remedy this situation and stem the sibling rivalry between the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service officers, the Taskforce has recommended the restructuring of the command and staffing in the NPS by maintaining the distinction between the three Services only up to the NPS inspectorate level; the designation of NPS Gazetted Officers as NPS officers without affiliation to any particular Service; and subjecting all Gazetted Officers to the same training and promotional standards and thereafter deploying them for duty in any of the three Services.
42. Further, the Taskforce recommends beefing up the Administration Police Service strength, and that the Inspector-General, in consultation with the Joint Service Board, should establish formations in Administration Police Service to enable the Service effectively perform its functions as required by Sections 10 and 27 of the NPS Act.

The Police Airwing

43. The National Police Service Air Wing (NPSAW) was established in 1949 for NPS’s reconnaissance operations, a critical component of police operations. In 2019, following a

presidential directive, it was transferred to the National Air Support Department (NASD) headed by a Kenya Defence Forces officer. Since that transfer, NPS has had challenges in accessing and using its aircrafts, as it must now seek NASD's authority to do so. The Taskforce heard how this has hampered NPS's operations and affected its capacity in flight operations.

44. The Taskforce's attention was drawn to Gazette Notice Supplement No. 19 of February 18, 2022, reinforcing the requirement that NPSAW aircrafts be maintained and operated under the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) regulations. It is not clear if NASD, partially staffed with KDF officers, is regulated by the KCAA.
45. Though the idea of pooling resources for effective and economical utilization of expensive national assets like aircrafts as other countries have done is laudable, the Taskforce finds that the NPS, an independent security organ with a clear and unshared constitutional mandate to maintain internal security, cannot effectively utilise the Airwing when its operations are under, or, are controlled by another organ.
46. And while reports of poor management, technical failures to maintain and operate the Police Air Wing may have prompted the decision to transfer the management of the Airwing to NASD, appropriate measures should have been taken to address those failures as opposed to transferring the Air Wing to another agency.
47. For these reasons, the Taskforce recommends that the Police Airwing be restored to the exclusive control of NPS forthwith. However, the restored Airwing should be operated in strict adherence to KCAA standards on maintenance and airworthiness, including qualifications, training, and relevant accreditation of professionals working in NPSAW. The Taskforce urges Parliament to provide adequate resources and budgetary support for the effective and optimal operation of NPSAW. On its part, NPSC should provide competitive terms of remuneration for professionals involved in the running and maintenance of police aircraft to ensure their retention in NPSAW. Alternatively, the Taskforce recommends Lease Hire of Police Aircrafts as is the case with Police motor road transport.

The Marine Police Unit and the Kenya Coast Guard Services

48. The Marine Police Unit is established under Chapter 7 of the Service Standing Orders as a Specialised Unit under the Kenya Police Service. On November 16, 2018, the Government established the Kenya Coast Guard Service (KCGS) through the Kenya Coast Guard Service Act, 2018, to assist in coordinating a multi-agency approach to policing of Kenya's territorial waters, in line with the country's international and regional commitments. The complexity of policing in territorial waters requires a multi-agency approach and coordination, which has been achieved through KCGS. Accordingly, the Taskforce notes that the Marine Police Unit and KCGS cannot co-exist. In these circumstances, the Taskforce recommends that the IG and the Director-General, KCGS, develop structures and procedures for engagement between KCGS and the Border and Sea Operations Team (BORSOBTS) to guide multi-agency approach in the policing of Kenya's territorial waters under the KCGS.

The Internal Affairs Unit

49. To address the junior officers' complaints of being subjected to multiple disciplinary processes, the Taskforce recommends that Parliament should amend Section 87 of the NPS Act to provide for: competitive recruitment of the IAU Director; secure the tenure of the Director and clearly state the Director's mandate; decentralisation of the Unit's functions; and to expressly authorise the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) to enforce discipline and professional standards within the NPS. The NPS Act should be further amended to focus the functions of

IAU on strictly disciplinary offences and not criminal matters that fall within the purview of DCI and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.

Kenya Prisons Service

Underfunding

50. Though some positive changes have taken place in KPS over the years, still, the Service has had an annual average funding deficit of about 40 per cent since 2008. This has affected its institutional development. Worse still, unlike the case in the NPS, there is no modernization plan in place for KPS.
51. The Service has large tracts of land that should have been utilized to ensure self-sufficiency in food supply. Prisons farms have, however, been run down owing to lack of resources as well as leadership wrangles, poor management that lacks innovation, and endemic corruption.
52. Overcrowding is a perennial problem. Prison facilities currently have capacity for 29,000 inmates but they are often forced to hold over 60,000. In some instances, insufficient ablution and sanitation facilities force inmates to use buckets in the poorly ventilated prison dormitories. Nothing can be more dehumanizing and offensive to the inmates' rights to dignity, privacy, and a clean environment. As the late President Nelson Mandela once said, "*... no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones.*"
53. In many prisons across the country, the KPS officers' living conditions are dehumanizing. As is the case with the NPS, officers in KPS and their families live in mud housing, dilapidated, congested, and in condemned structures. In some KPS stations, different families live in dormitories with each family only separated by a bedsheet curtain. Officers also live in tents or shacks that they construct for themselves. Needless to say, these conditions undermine the morale of officers in the Service and consequently affect their performance and service delivery.
54. The Taskforce urges the Government to adequately fund the KPS to modernize its facilities, tooling, equipment and gear, and enhance its logistical as well as technological capabilities, and provide decent housing for its officers to address these challenges.

Corruption in the Kenya Prisons Service

55. The Taskforce was informed that corruption deeply permeates every aspect of KPS from recruitment, promotions, deployment, transfers to procurement and issuance of stores; and that the senior leadership of the Service is largely disconnected from the daily realities of junior officers. Such are the levels of nepotism and corruption in recruitment into the KPS that several officers have had their family members employed in the Service. Some of these family members are serving together in the same station, thus creating huge command challenges. The Taskforce was informed that some prison operations are run like family affairs.
56. Widespread reports of persistent behaviour of collusion between rogue prison officers and prisoners in the running of phone scams, fraud, petty trade and drug trafficking from precincts of prisons paint a picture of a highly compromised Service that is not able to perform its core role mandate of correction and rehabilitation.

57. The Taskforce notes that while the Madoka Committee prescribed external leadership as a response to the challenges in the KPS, every Commissioner General appointed since has always encountered internal entrenched interests which they benefit from and are keen to preserve the *status quo*. As such, the challenges to the leadership manifest in the form of capture of any new leadership or resistance to progressive reform.

Leadership of the Kenya Prisons Service

58. As regards the Kenya Prisons Service (KPS), the Taskforce notes that the adoption of an “Open Door Policy” in 2001, in the hitherto closed KPS, paved the way for reforms, transparency, and critical partnerships. The Taskforce was informed, however, that corruption deeply permeates every aspect of the KPS from recruitment, promotions, deployments and transfers, to procurement and supplies of stores. Further, the senior leadership of KPS is largely disconnected from the daily realities of junior officers. The reform journey in the KPS remains incomplete because most of the issues that previous reports identified remain unaddressed. The Taskforce found it outrageous that overall, the situation remains the same as what the Madoka Committee established about 15 years ago. The issues that have been addressed, have been implemented in patchwork and a lackadaisical attitude remains a critical impediment to transformational change in the Service.
59. Low pay, poor working and living conditions, outdated tools and equipment as well as lack of support for welfare concerns, among other issues, were cited as the main causes of ineptitude and low morale.
60. Officers and other key stakeholders however lauded the efforts of the current Commissioner General in reforming the Service. Nonetheless, the problems bedevilling the KPS are systemic and structural in nature and require urgent decisive action if any meaningful changes are to take place in the Service. While the Madoka Committee prescribed external leadership as a panacea to the challenges in the KPS, especially after the internal crisis that led to the strike by staff in 2008, little has changed, as new leadership has often either been captured by entrenched internal interests keen to preserve the *status quo* or faced internal resistance.
61. To address these leadership challenges and corruption in the KPS, the Taskforce recommends a fresh vetting by an independent panel to be appointed by the President for all officers of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Prisons (SSP) and above (save for the current CGP) within 6 months of publication of this Report.
62. The Prisons Act, Section 20(1)(c), provides for the establishment of a Prisons Council that would consider all questions affecting the welfare and efficiency of the Prisons Service and provide a measure of oversight and supervision. However, this Council has never been constituted despite the recommendation by the Madoka Committee.
63. The Ministry should also restructure the Prisons Council to comprise of: a Chairperson who shall have the same qualifications as those of a Supreme Court Judge; the PS National Treasury or his or her representative; a representative of the Public Service Commission; the PS Correctional Services; and the Commissioner General of Prisons who shall be the Secretary to the Council. Further, the Cabinet Secretary should establish a Prisons Reform Unit to ensure continuous and sustainable KPS reforms. The role of the Ministry of Interior, and the State Department for Correctional Services, should remain one of providing policy guidelines to the Service.
64. The entry requirement into the Service should be capped at a minimum grade C minus (C-) except for candidates from marginalised areas. To address the challenges around immaturity

prevalent in the entrants, the minimum recruitment age should be raised from 18 to 21 years for the respective Services.

65. To be able to undertake relevant theoretical and practical training including field attachments to ensure competency in training and professionalism, the initial training for cadets should take not less than 15 months while the one for constables should not be less than 12 months.
66. As is the case with the NPS, the Taskforce established that the stagnation of the KPS junior officers in one rank, in many cases until retirement, is a source of widespread discontent and low morale in the Service. The Taskforce, therefore, recommends the establishment of grades of Inspector II and I and the introduction of Constable III, II, and I, and Corporal III, II, and I within the same ranks, all of which must be filled through open and competitive promotions process based on merit.
67. KPS officers live and work in horrendous conditions. The current housing and working conditions compromise privacy, human dignity, and are a source of low morale and disillusionment, especially among junior officers. To remedy the situation, the Taskforce recommends that the Prisons Council (to be appointed) should urgently develop a housing policy to guide matters such as affordable and sustainable construction and the equitable allocation of houses, as well as management of KPS housing units, among other factors. The management of KPS housing should be under a directorate responsible for housing in the office of the CGP, pursuant to the provisions of a KPS housing policy developed by the Service.
68. It is incomprehensible that KPS still relies on outdated laws such as the Prisons Act, 1977, the Borstal Institutions Act, 1963, and the Kenya Prisons Service Standing Orders of 1979 to run its operations. These laws are obsolete, and many of their provisions are against the spirit and text of the Constitution. The Taskforce recommends that Commissioner General of Prisons (CGP) should, within one year, in consultation with the Attorney General, oversee the complete overhaul of these laws and regulations.
69. CGP is not the Accounting Officer for the KPS. That function has remained with the Principal Secretary in charge of Correctional Services at the Ministry of Interior. This arrangement is what fuels the blame games between the KPS leadership and the Ministry of Interior over who is responsible for the Service's perennial failures and camouflages the lack of interest in undertaking comprehensive changes in the Service. To ensure financial probity and enhance service delivery, the Taskforce recommends that the CGP be designated as the Accounting Officer for the Service.

The role of the cabinet secretary in KPS

70. The major role of the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration is the formulation of appropriate policies to guide the Service. The Ministry also is in charge of the finances and planning of the Service, through the Office of the Permanent Secretary in charge of correctional services. The Taskforce has established that there is competition and conflict between the Service and the Office of the PS that ends up hurting the delivery of services. To remedy this situation, the Taskforce has recommended urgent revision of the Prisons Act to address the specific reform issues identified.

National Youth Service

Underfunding

71. NYS was initially founded to reintegrate into society, youth who were involved in the fight for independence. Besides the paramilitary training to instil discipline and patriotism for national service and support to the military in times of war and the police when needed, the

major focus of the Service is to tool the youth with skills needed for development. Through vocational training and personal development programmes, NYS is tasked to equip Kenyan youth with masonry, plumbing, electrical engineering, plant operation, plant mechanics, driving, supply chain management, catering and other skills to enable them undertake enterprises and commercial activities to earn a living and contribute to national development.

72. Many Kenyans see NYS as a training programme for government employment. The Taskforce received earnest pleas from the public, and parents in particular, to set up NYS training institutions in every county to provide training opportunities for the youth. On his part, H.E. the President has urged NYS to plan its resources and capacity to facilitate the admission of at least 100,000 youth every year in order to address this need.
73. Over the years, however, NYS has faced funding challenges that have constrained the attainment of its mission and vision. Given its numbers, it will be difficult to adequately fund all its operations. The Taskforce recommends that for NYS to be self-reliant, and to discharge its mandate without relying on the national coffers, it should be granted seed funding to undertake income generating projects.

Corruption

74. It is common knowledge that the corruption scandals that rocked the National Youth Service in 2015 and 2018 resulted in the massive looting of public resources. That crisis precipitated the restructuring and transformation of NYS from a government department to a Semi-Autonomous Government Agency (SAGA) and the establishment of the NYS Council in a bid to make operations at the institution more transparent and accountable.
75. These changes have, however, not achieved the intended objective. The Taskforce heard from various cadres of staff that the poor state of NYS farms and equipment is not just a result of limited budgetary support but also the product of systemic corruption over the years.
76. With regard to qualifications and experience, the Taskforce has recommended that members of the Council should be citizens of Kenya; hold degrees from universities recognized in Kenya; have at least 10 years (15 for the Chairperson, Director-General and Deputy-Director General (Corporate) experience in their respective professions; and meet the leadership and integrity requirements in Chapter Six of the Constitution.

Leadership

77. NYS also faces leadership challenges. To secure the requisite competencies and to be self-reliant as stated, the NYS Act should be amended to provide that the chairperson and members of the NYS Council shall be recruited through a competitive process by a selection panel constituted by the President for that purpose. The other members of the Council shall be the Principal Secretary, National Treasury; the Principal Secretary of the ministry responsible for the Service; the Director-General who shall be the Secretary to the Council; the Chief of Defence Forces, and the Inspector-General of National Police Service or their representatives.
78. The management of NYS (led by the Director-General and Deputy-Directors General) will oversee the day to day running of administration and operations of the Service. In addition to the Director General, the Act should be amended to provide for two Deputy Directors General: one in charge of the technical division (paramilitary training) and the other in charge of the commercial investments and vocational training in the NYS.
79. The Act should also provide that the DG and the two Deputy-Directors-General shall be competitively recruited by the Council. The Deputy-Director General in charge of the technical division should be competitively recruited from within the Service while the Deputy

Director-General in charge of corporate division should be recruited from the external open market. Save for the Director-General and Deputy-Director General (Corporate), all other officers must be recruited from among people who are or have previously undergone the NYS paramilitary training.

80. The Taskforce also recommends that NYS recruits should hold, as a minimum, a KCSE certificate and that the NYS officers be recruited from among ex-servicemen/women.
81. Servicemen and women form an integral part of NYS and are relied on to perform operational functions whenever the Service is called upon. However, the status of servicemen and women under the current law is unclear. This vagueness in the law and policy has denied servicemen and women critical facilitation and benefits such as insurance and other advantages that are ordinarily due to members of the Service. The Taskforce recommends, therefore, the amendment of the First Schedule of the Act to include Part I for the officers of the Service and Part II to expressly recognise that recruits and servicemen and women are members of the Service and provide for their ranking structure.
82. There is a historical case of stagnation of officers at lower levels in the Service. Many junior officers begin and end their career without any form progression or advancement. The Taskforce, therefore, recommends the establishment of grades of Inspector II and I and the introduction of Constable III, II, and I, and Corporal III, II, and I within the same ranks, all of which must be filled through open and competitive promotions process based on merit.
83. NYS lacks a comprehensive medical insurance scheme. Service members only access the benefits of the general statutory contribution scheme under the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). Furthermore, servicemen and women are currently not under any cover. The Taskforce recommends that the current medical scheme for the officers of NYS be expanded to include the servicemen/women. The Service should establish fully equipped dispensaries in every field unit and station to provide medical aid and enter into agreements with other disciplined Services to be allowed access to their medical facilities. The NYS should also implement a comprehensive medical cover for its members as provided for in its Strategic Plan.
84. To address the systemic challenges that affect the Service, the Taskforce has recommended several institutional and structural changes in the Service. These include: reconstitution of the NYS Council with greater focus on appropriate experience and qualifications, competitive recruitment of council members (save for those representing ministries and offices), and a change of the terms of service for council members.
85. The Taskforce has also recommended that NYS should be domiciled in the Ministry of Interior for better coordination, given its core functions, and to end the itinerant character that has plagued the Service over the years.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Salaries and Allowances

86. The remuneration and allowances payable to the members of the three Services has been one of their key grievances. The Taskforce notes that a major challenge in evaluating and determining the remuneration of the Services has been the Salaries and Remuneration Commission's use of inappropriate tools and its lack of recognition that the Services' mandate and nature of work is unique and different from that of mainstream Public Service in terms of decision-making, risks, and disruption of family life, among other factors. For those reasons, and for purposes of harmonisation of their welfare as well as terms and conditions of service,

the Taskforce recommends the creation of “the Disciplined and Security Services Sector” comprising the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Service (NIS), National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Prison Service (KPS), and National Youth Service (NYS) as a separate budget sector.

87. Having considered the submissions of the National Treasury, SRC, NPSC, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, IPOA, PSC, and the public, and considering the wage differential gaps within and between the Disciplined and Security Services, the Taskforce recommends complete harmonisation of the remuneration within the sector while maintaining the pecking order. To this end, and to harmonise it with those of the other Disciplined and Security Services, the Taskforce has recommended that the basic salary of the members of the three Services be raised by 40 per cent at the lowest constable level with a decompression ratio, based on the current salary, achieving a 3 per cent increment in basic salary at the highest rank. The new remuneration structure should be implemented in three (3) phases from 1st July, 2024.
88. For non-uniformed members of NPS, given their work environment, the Taskforce has recommended a new allowance to improve their terms and conditions of service. Given their job descriptions, roles and responsibilities, the Taskforce has not reviewed their remuneration structure as it is in line with the rest of the Public Service.
89. Allowances payable to the officers of the three Services have also been revised as stated in the Tables in the main body of this Report. To address complaints of misappropriation, the Taskforce has recommended that the payment of all allowances should be automated and promptly made directly into the officers’ bank accounts. Cash payment of allowances should be prohibited.

Human Capital Management and Development

90. It is common knowledge that human resource is the most important factor of production in any organisation. Professionalisation in any organisation depends on how it handles its human resource management and development. Both are even more critical in the security agencies, which are, by their very nature, labour intensive.
91. The Taskforce has established that the three Services have not automated their HR processes, thus creating loopholes and opportunities for manipulation and corruption. Additionally, there are many instances where human resource functions are undertaken by uniformed officers who are not qualified HR professionals and end up making grave errors, even on mundane issues, to the chagrin of members of the Services.
92. To remedy this situation, the Taskforce recommends that, save for operational matters related to deployment, all other HR functions should be left to officers with the requisite HR training, experience, and competence to handle personnel matters in the Services.
93. Full digitalisation of all HR services, including the payments of allowances will ensure rapid response to the needs of all NPS officers.

Recruitment, Deployment, Transfers and Promotions

94. The Taskforce also received complaints about solicitation of bribes and/or sexual favours in exchange for deployment, transfers, training and promotions in the Services and has recommended automation of all those processes to ensure transparency and equity.
95. To stem malpractices in recruitment into the Services and promote competence, accountability and integrity, the Taskforce recommends automation of the recruitment

processes, starting with online applications for the advertised positions followed by personal interviews at the recruitment centres.

Medical Insurance

96. The current medical insurance cover has been a source of great anguish, frustration, and discontent, especially among the junior officers of the NPS and KPS. The Taskforce has established that the poor transition process from the previous scheme and illegal daily capitations have contributed to the poor services that officers have and continue to receive.
97. Given the complaints, members of the two Services have voiced, the Taskforce recommends:
 - (a) The non-renewal of the 2023 medical insurance contract to ensure that any future medical insurance negotiations should ensure there is an adequate transition period to avoid disruptions;
 - (b) Any new insurer should have and provide proof of adequate, accessible, and effective accredited service providers taking into consideration the nature of the services required especially in the “forward” areas; and
 - (c) The insurance scheme should comprehensively cover mental health and the implementation of all policies related to mental and psychosocial care should be prioritised.

Forensic Laboratory

98. Forensic investigation is an expensive venture. For effective and optimal utilisation of the DCI Forensic Laboratory, the Taskforce urges Parliament to enact enabling legislation to establish an adequately funded and well-regulated National Forensic Laboratory under the DCI but open to use by other criminal justice sector institutions. A mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the processes and results of the Forensic Laboratory should be part of the regulatory framework.

Uniforms

99. The Cabinet Secretary for Defence, in consultation with the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration are urged to develop and propose legislation for the establishment of a National Uniforms Committee composed of representatives from the Disciplined and Security Services whose mandate will be to approve standards, colours and qualities of uniforms for use by each Service. This recommendation flows from the numerous complaints voiced on the quality and supply of uniforms to the members of the three Services.
100. As regards the NPS uniforms, in line with the overwhelming views of members of the public, police officers themselves, and the leadership of NPS, the Taskforce recommends that the NPS reverts to its old uniform for a period of three years, during which a process of designing a new uniform should be commenced in accordance with the recommendations in this Report. The Committee should also address the mis-use of uniforms by the public.

Titling of Institutional Land

101. The Taskforce received complaints of encroachment on to and outright grabbing of pieces of land owned by the Services. The Taskforce recommends that the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and National Administration should, within six months, appoint and facilitate a committee to carry out an inventory of the three Services’ institutional land and ensure its titling. The relevant state agencies and institutions should provide the requisite cooperation and facilitation to the committee.

Conclusion

102. This Executive Summary has provided a general scan and overview of the main findings and recommendations regarding NPS, KPS and the NYS. It is the view of the Taskforce that addressing the challenges identified will provide a basis for the envisaged transformation of the Services. The rest of the recommendations are contained at the end of each section and summary of recommendations including implementation matrix for each Service are contained in the respective part of this Report.

PART I: PRELIMINARY

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

1. The National Taskforce (herein referred to as the Taskforce) on improvement of the terms and conditions of service and other reforms for members of National Police Service (NPS) and Kenya Prisons Service (KPS) was established *vide* Gazette Notice No. 15792 dated December 21, 2022.
2. Through a special Gazette Notice, No. 2853 of 2023 dated March 3, 2023 the scope of the assignment for the Taskforce was expanded to include the National Youth Service (NYS). Further extension was granted *vide* Gazette Notice No. 14717 of 2023, which extended the term of the Taskforce to November 4, 2023. The Taskforce interpreted its Terms of Reference (TORs) after the expansion of its mandate to mean that issues relating to NYS would refer to members as well as servicemen and women and would only be included in the relevant general TORs and where both NPS and KPS are specifically referred to.

1.2 Reforms in Global Perspective

3. Globally, reforms in the disciplined services such as the police and prisons are an ongoing process. That is because the demands of security and law enforcement challenges call for continued adaptation to changing circumstances in terms of human resource processes, recruitment, training, tools and equipment, among others. Reforming these institutions internally is always a most difficult challenge for every country. For that reason, various countries have found it necessary to set up special taskforces or commissions from time to time to undertake evaluations and reviews on law enforcement and corrections.
4. In the United States, President Lyndon Johnson in 1967, established the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice to examine crime, its causes and control in the United States. More recently, President Barack Obama established the Taskforce on 21st Century Policing in 2014 with a mandate to "to identify best policing practices and offer recommendations on how those practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust"; and in 2015 the Law Enforcement Equipment Working Group that was tasked "to identify actions that can improve Federal support for the appropriate use, acquisition, and transfer of controlled equipment by State, local, and tribal Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)."
5. In South Africa, following the 2012 killing of 34 striking miners by the police at a mine in Marikana, the Government established a Commission of Inquiry and, subsequently, a Panel of Experts on Policing and Crowd Management in 2018.
6. Likewise, prisons reforms continue to be an ongoing process across the world in tune with the changing demands on corrections and punishment.
7. The changing operating context for NPS, KPS and NYS means that these institutions have to continuously adapt, transform and retool themselves for better public service.

1.3 Terms of Reference

8. The objectives for the establishment of the Taskforce are to:
 - (a) identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational constraints on effective service delivery by NPS, KPS and NYS.
 - (b) identify and recommend legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational reforms in NPS, KPS and NYS for effective service delivery;
 - (c) review and recommend improvement of the terms and conditions of service;

- (d) review and recommend improvement of matters relating to welfare of officers in all cadres of NPS, KPS and NYS and all other matters incidental to the optimal service delivery by NPS, KPS and NYS; and
 - (e) review and make recommendations on any other matters incidental to improved terms and conditions of service and other reforms in the NPS, KPS and NYS.
9. On welfare of members of NPS, KPS and NYS, the Taskforce is expected to:
- (a) examine the existing legislative, policy, institutional, administrative and operational structures, systems and strategies and recommend comprehensive reforms in NPS, KPS and NYS;
 - (b) examine the extent of the uptake of the recommendations by previous taskforces, including but not limited to the John Mutonyi, (2002–2003), the Philip Ransley (2009) and the Titus Naikuni (2010--2012) taskforces;
 - (c) review the human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in recruitment, deployment, transfers, training, career progression, performance-based and competitive promotions, reward, exit, and post-exit management and recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in NPS, KPS and NYS;
 - (d) consider recommendations of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC), the National Police Service Commission, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) and any other recommendation on NPS, KPS and NYS welfare or reforms by any state organ;
 - (e) recommend the review of remuneration of members of NPS, KPS and NYS and consider new and applicable allowances to NPS, KPS and NYS to enhance professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness of those services;
 - (f) assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current medical scheme for NPS, KPS and NYS and recommend comprehensive reform or revision of the same with a view to improving it;
 - (g) assess and recommend the establishment of funds or schemes to cater for loss of life or injuries in the line of duty, terminal illness -- including mental health illness -- and possible legal and administrative frameworks to cater for NPS, KPS and NYS officers' dependents;
 - (h) assess and recommend improvement of working and living conditions of members of NPS, KPS and NYS;
 - (i) assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current housing policy for members of NPS, KPS and NYS and, where appropriate, recommend review of the same including recommendation for a housing mortgage for officers;
 - (j) examine all capacity building measures, including training curriculum, syllabus, continuous development trainings, reward measures and recommend reforms, including incorporation of incentives for Police, Prisons and NYS officers, especially the lower cadres to address professionalism, motivation and retention;
 - (k) consider the integration or otherwise of constitutional human rights and fundamental freedoms in the training and curriculum for NPS, KPS and NYS officers, including application of international instruments ratified by the State;

- (l) assess issues of gender mainstreaming, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, establishment of gender desks, psychological support, guidance and counselling at station level and any other recommendation to improve mental wellbeing for NPS, KPS and NYS; and
 - (m) assess, consider, review and recommend the nature, quality and standard of the uniform for NPS, KPS and NYS officers as well as that of prisoners/inmates;
10. On technical and operational capability of NPS, KPS and NYS, the Taskforce is expected to:
- (n) assess and review tooling, equipping, logistical and technological capacity of NPS and recommend changes necessary to sustain modern security management, disaster management, conflicts and early warning, rapid response systems and joint operational preparedness strategy;
 - (o) assess adequacy, sufficiency or otherwise of NPS tools, equipment, gear, communication and surveillance measures including use of drones and make appropriate recommendations including modernisation and embracing technology in policing;
 - (p) assess the necessity of adopting and operationalising ICT usage in all NPS, KPS and NYS operations including adoption of digital occurrence books, body cameras, vehicles cameras, smart and intelligent surveillance equipment, among others, consistent with the Constitution;
 - (q) assess and recommend general reforms and improvement of NPS, KPS and NYS premises, including titling of all NPS, KPS and NYS land, as well as progressive adoption and building of modern police stations and penal facilities that comply with international best practices and standards;
 - (r) assess and consider the administration of the forensic laboratory with a view to ensuring more independence in its operations and decision making, and expand its usage by multiple agencies within the criminal justice system;
 - (s) assess and propose the review of reporting command, governance and accountability frameworks within NPS, KPS and NYS;
 - (t) assess the implication on command and good order of NPS following the restructuring/merger of the Administration Police Service and Kenya Police Service;
 - (u) assess and recommend establishment of clear guidelines on formation of specialised units within NPS;
 - (v) assess and consider opportunities and platforms for benchmarking on regional and international standards and exchange programmes with a view to modernising policing and correctional services;
 - (w) assess the legal and administrative framework to operationalise community policing with a view to embracing all-inclusive measures to combat crime;
 - (x) undertake a comprehensive audit of legal framework to assess its consistencies and adequacy in executing the constitutional and statutory mandate of the NPS, KPS and NYS;
 - (y) identify and propose any legislative and policy review, including review of standing orders, necessary to give effect to the recommendations of the Taskforce; and
 - (z) make any other recommendation(s) incidental to the improvement of terms and conditions of service for members of NPS, KPS and NYS.

1.4 Interpretation of Terms of Reference

11. In its interpretation of the TORs, the Taskforce was guided by the objectives of its establishment. Specifically, the Taskforce understood that it was expected to identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational constraints on effective service delivery by NPS, KPS and NYS; review the terms and conditions of service; review matters of welfare; review other matters incidental to improved terms and conditions of service; and make appropriate recommendations in all these aspects.
12. The Taskforce understood and interpreted the TORs as requiring a comprehensive review and examination of the challenges and constraints impeding effective service delivery of NPS, KPS and NYS. In particular, the Taskforce understood that its establishment had been necessitated by the recognition that the NPS, KPS and NYS face serious and perennial welfare challenges that undermine their performance and effectiveness. Previous reforms had improved many aspects of the three institutions but there is a compelling public interest in strengthening welfare reforms to ensure that these institutions effectively serve the public.
13. The Taskforce evaluated the issues and concluded that “service delivery” was the sum total of all the operations and processes of the three Services and could not therefore be isolated as a stand-alone issue. It is what these agencies are about in everything they are engaged in.
14. Further, the Taskforce established that on most of the issues, there are legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational challenges, and isolating these separately was not the most appropriate way of presenting the findings and recommendations. Consequently, the Taskforce has organised the findings and recommendations in terms of areas of review as per the TORs.
15. The Taskforce understood its mandate as being to examine the various aspects that touch on welfare, terms and conditions, capabilities and service delivery and to also identify the key levers for comprehensive change in the Services. It became clear that the key challenges were not just technical, regarding laws, policies, institutions and processes but most fundamentally of leadership gaps. Indeed, for this Taskforce, it was clear that none of the problems identified were new to the Services as they had been the subject of reports by previous taskforces. It was also clear to the Taskforce that the recommendations stood little chance of being implemented if the leadership issues in the Services were not boldly addressed.

1.5 Methodology and Approach

16. The Taskforce began its assignment by holding an inaugural meeting with the Cabinet Secretary (CS), Ministry Interior and National Administration, where the CS outlined the government’s vision and objectives in establishing the Taskforce.
17. Subsequently, the Taskforce embarked on its work, and established four committees to guide the delivery of its mandate. These were: Legal and Policy; Welfare and Terms and Conditions; Technical and Operational Capabilities; and Management.
18. The Taskforce commenced its work, beginning with a comprehensive understanding of its TORs. This common understanding of the scope and nature of work and responsibilities vested in the Taskforce informed all activities and measures taken in pursuit of its mandate.
19. The Taskforce formulated rules of procedure to guide its operations and set up committees, structures and systems to assist in the effective execution and discharge of its mandate including a secretariat to coordinate administration and logistics.

20. The Taskforce reviewed previous reports, policies, legislation, administrative instruments on NPS, KPS and NYS reforms and the extent of their implementation. This review informed engagements with the three Services, members of the public and other key stakeholders.

Table 1. 1: Reports of previous Taskforces reviewed

	REPORT REVIEWED
NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE	Report of the Technical Taskforce of Kenya Police Reforms Committee, 2002–2005 (Dr John Mutonyi);
	Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, 2008 (Justice Philip Waki);
	The National Taskforce on Police Reform, 2009 (Hon. Rtd. Justice Phillip Ransley);
	Police Reforms Implementation Committee, 2010- 2012, (Dr. Titus Naikuni);
	Presidential Committee on Review of Terms and Conditions of Service for the Kenya Police Force, the Administration Police Force, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service, December 1996 – August 1997; and
	Policy Framework and Strategy for Reorganisation of the National Police Service and Provision of Decent and Affordable Housing for Police Officers and Integration with Communities and Neighbourhoods.
KENYA PRISONS SERVICE	Report of the High-Level Committee on the Prisons Crisis, 2008 (Hon Maj (Rtd) Marsden Madoka); and
	Presidential Committee on Review of Terms and Conditions of Service for the Kenya Police Force, the Administration Police Force, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service December 1996 – August 1997.
NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE	Presidential Committee on Review of Terms and Conditions of Service for the Kenya Police Force, the Administration Police Force, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service December 1996 -- August 1997; and
	Report of Inter-Agency Committee submitted to the Cabinet Secretary on Restructuring of National Youth Service (NYS) (2018).

21. The leadership of the three Services was among the first stakeholders the Taskforce engaged with. Being the primary institutions that are the subject of the Taskforce's work, it was necessary to get the views of the leadership of NPS, KPS and NYS to lay ground for further engagement with the Taskforce. The Taskforce subsequently held consultative meetings with representatives of all cadres of members of the respective Services.
22. The Taskforce further consulted and received verbal as well as written submissions from the leadership and membership of relevant parliamentary committees, Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), and other key State Organs and institutions.
23. The Taskforce also received views from civil society organisations involved in police and prison reform and security sector governance, the private sector, development partners and professional associations.
24. In line with the constitutional principle of public participation, the Taskforce undertook extensive public and stakeholder consultations. In this regard, the Taskforce published advertisements in daily newspapers of national circulation detailing its schedule of hearings in the 47 counties, including set times and venues. Subsequently, public hearings were

conducted in all the 47 counties where verbal and written submissions were received. (See Annex 8 -9 of this Report).

25. In each of the 47 counties, delegations of the Taskforce, led by members, visited and met with respective Governors and other county officials. The delegations also visited the offices of County Commissioners and met with the National Government Administrative Officers (NGAO).
26. For wider outreach, the Taskforce operated social media platforms on which members of the public submitted their views and were also appraised of the activities of the Taskforce. Further, the Taskforce operated an email account and a phone number through which members of the public and stakeholders submitted their views and memoranda.
27. Members of the Taskforce visited NPS, KPS and NYS facilities and received views from senior and junior officers separately. The views of inmates were also received during prison visits. Where appropriate, the Taskforce held *in camera* sessions in accordance with the Taskforce rules of procedure.
28. Finally, the Taskforce presented the preliminary findings and summary recommendations to the appointing authority and received feedback and input that formed the basis for further consultation and finalisation of the Report.

1.6 Recommendations by Previous Taskforces

29. In line with its mandate and the TORs, the Taskforce reviewed all the key reports of previous relevant taskforces as well as other relevant documents. The review was aimed at informing the Taskforce on what had previously been proposed as well as the status of implementation. The Taskforce established that previous taskforces had undertaken fairly comprehensive analyses of the challenges facing the three Services and had made numerous recommendations.
30. The Report of this Taskforce has referred to the relevant recommendations on various issues that it has analysed, and also highlighted the status of their implementation.

1.7 Structure and Arrangement of the Report

31. This Report is in five parts:
 - (a) Part One contains the introduction and preliminary (Chapters 1 and 2)
 - (b) Part Two presents the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce touching on National Police Service including implementation matrix (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10)
 - (c) Part Three contains findings and recommendations regarding Kenya Prisons Service including implementation matrix (Chapters 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19)
 - (d) Part Four presents the findings and recommendations regarding the National Youth Service including implementation matrix (Chapters 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26)
 - (e) Part Five contains all the Annexures.

CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW OF THE REFORM PROCESS

2.1 Introduction

32. Over the years, Kenya has undertaken constitutional, legal and institutional reforms but comprehensive transformation of NPS, KPS and NYS remains elusive. Despite the existence of recent legislation, policies and other administrative measures that seek to enhance the effectiveness of these Services, these institutions have continued to face significant systemic and structural impediments that hamper their effectiveness, hence the establishment of this Taskforce.
33. Transformation and reform of these institutions cannot be meaningfully undertaken without examining previous reform proposals and recommendations. It is important that any new reform process is informed by the past, in part to understand what worked and what did not, and the reasons for success or failure. An understanding of past reform efforts is not only critical to avoid the mistakes of the past, but also provides a sound basis for the future. Indeed, it is this understanding that was reflected in the TORs of the Taskforce in respect of which it was required to consider the reports of previous taskforces.
34. This section, therefore, examines the reform journeys of NPS, KPS and NYS as a way of providing context for the current reform undertaking by the Taskforce.

2.2 Overview of previous reforms

35. As stated, there have been many previous efforts to undertake comprehensive and transformational reforms in NPS, KPS and, to a limited extent, NYS. These reforms have been driven by internal demands for transformation and, in other cases, triggered by external crises. For instance, the post-2007 election violence in the country necessitated a comprehensive assessment of the Kenya Police Force through the 2009 National Task Force on Police Reforms. In 2008, a countrywide strike by prisons officers led to the establishment of the High-Level Committee on the Prisons Crisis chaired by Major (Rtd) Marsden Madoka, while the 2015 NYS corruption scandal necessitated the creation, through an Act of Parliament, of a Council to provide oversight on the operations and management of the Service. A brief account of the reform journeys in the three Services follows.

National Police Service

36. The National Police Service, originally the British East Africa Police, was set up in Mombasa in 1896 when the British Foreign Office assumed the responsibility of administering what was then known as British East Africa from the Imperial British East Africa Company.¹ Initially, police presence was only confined to Mombasa. By 1902, however, there was some police presence in Nairobi and Kisumu, besides Mombasa. Police leadership was principally European, with a few Indian officers. In 1920, when Kenya formally became a British colony, the title of the police changed from British East Africa Police to Kenya Police Force.
37. From its origins in 1896, the Kenya Police Force was established as a squad to contain and pacify Africans, to protect the railway and British trade.² The colonial police force was largely paramilitary hence the Kiswahili word for soldier and police officer in Eastern Africa was the same: *askari*. Recruitment into the Force was racialised and ethnicised. Officer levels were reserved for Europeans and Asians, with Africans recruited as constables. To avoid the risk of

¹ W. Robert Foran, *The Kenya Police: 1887-1960*, (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1962)

² Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa*. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press 1989).

African constables shifting their loyalties to their ethnic kin, those recruited as colonial police were deployed to serve far away from their communities – a practice that continues to date.

38. The Kenya Police Force, the agency with the responsibility for investigating crimes, was focused on urban areas, the railway routes and areas occupied by the propertied classes. The rural areas where Africans lived were under the Tribal Police (TP) whose origins can be traced back to around 1902 with the enactment of the Village Headman Ordinance. The ordinance, which was enacted to enable penetration into the native areas, was ostensibly to bring the native into the money economy, enforce tax, control livestock movement, regulate agriculture, labour, movement of people and various other social and economic regulations. The village headman, as the chief was then known, was the prime instrument of the Regional Agents, as the District Commissioners were then known. In 1929 the Tribal Police Ordinance was enacted to give legal backing to the Native Police and their training taken up by the respective Regional Agents, most of whom had a military background. In 1958 the Tribal Police Ordinance was changed to the Administration Police Act and the Force commenced centralised training at Ruring'u, Nyeri.
39. At independence, both the Kenya Police Force and the Native Police were retained with the Native Police renamed Administration Police. The independence Constitution envisaged a neutral and professional police service administered by the Police Service Commission and a National Security Council. However, these provisions were never implemented. Instead, the autonomy of the police was removed in the 1966 constitutional amendment, making the Force part of the Kenyan Civil Service. The rise of what has been called the “Imperial Presidency” in Kenya was characterised by the emergence of a Police Force that was only accountable to the executive, largely in service of the powerful, and one that had become the preferred tool for the repression of political opposition during the single-party period. By the late 1990s, the reputation of the police was perceived as being irredeemably soiled by widespread accusations of gruesome torture of suspects, corruption, politicisation and incompetence in preventing crime.
40. The first significant efforts at police reforms commenced in 2003 as part of the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation. The strategy set out as one of its aims the transformation of the Kenya Police Force and Administration Police into effective, efficient, human rights-compliant, people-oriented and accountable institutions over a five-year period. The strategy highlighted the need to improve police officers’ welfare, including remuneration and housing. Another significant reform effort was the establishment by the then Police Commissioner in 2003 of the Kenya Police Reforms Committee (Mutonyi Committee) to collect information on areas of urgent reform. On the basis of that committee’s recommendation in 2004, the National Comprehensive Community Policing Programme was initiated by the Government and a curriculum as well as a handbook on community policing developed³
41. The next significant development in the police reforms journey was, as stated, triggered by the 2007-2008 post-election violence. In its report, the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), headed by Justice Philip Waki, stated that police officers were politically partisan in their conduct, failed to respond efficiently and effectively to the crisis, and generally conducted themselves in an unprofessional manner. The commission’s (popularly known as the Waki Commission) report noted that many officers had allowed their ethnic prejudices to trump their professional responsibility. As such, the Waki Report

³ Mutonyi Report, p. 97.

concluded that there was need for comprehensive reforms of the police if public confidence was to be restored.

42. Following the recommendations of the Waki Report and as part of the long-term reforms agreed to under National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008, the National Task Force on Police Reforms was established in 2008 under the leadership of retired judge Philip Ransley. The mandate of that taskforce was to examine and make proposals on how to transform the Kenyan police into an effective, efficient and accountable Service. The Ransley Taskforce was the first comprehensive assessment on the performance and public image of the Police Service in Kenya's history and it concluded that the Kenyan police was not only critically inefficient and unaccountable but was also riddled with corruption and had consequently largely lost public confidence. The Report made over 200 recommendations on legal, policy, and institutional reforms the Kenyan police urgently needed to undertake.
43. The Ransley Report recommended the establishment of a unified command for the two services (Kenya Police and Administration Police) under an Inspector-General; the establishment of mechanisms for internal accountability through the creation of a National Police Service Commission and an Independent Policing Oversight Authority for external oversight. The taskforce also recommended the adoption of a decentralised style of policing, the promotion of impartiality and professionalism as well as the involvement of the community in policing as part of the process of restoring public confidence in then Service.
44. Following the recommendations of the Ransley Report, the Government established the Police Reforms Implementation Committee (PRIC) headed by Titus Naikuni. The mandate of the Naikuni Committee was to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of the Ransley Report. The committee was an important innovation that kept the reforms momentum and ensured the implementation of some of the key recommendations of the Ransley Report. Among others, the Naikuni Committee oversaw the development of a new curriculum for the training of the police and the preparation of key legislative reform proposals that would eventually be enacted into law. Among the Bills that were proposed included: the National Police Service Bill, the National Police Service Commission Bill, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill, the Private Security Regulation Bill and the National Coroners' Service Bill.
45. The promulgation of the 2010 Constitution gave impetus to police reforms. Some of the recommendations from previous processes found anchor in the Constitution. Among other things, the Constitution established the NPS comprising the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service under the command of the Inspector-General and provided for the National Police Service Commission (NPSC). One of the major functions the Constitution assigns the police is a duty to promote and respect human rights in their policing work.
46. The enactment of the NPS Act, the NPSC Act and the IPOA Act in 2011, recommended by the Ransley Taskforce and the Naikuni Committee, operationalised Articles 239 (5), 244, 245, and 246 of the Constitution, which provide for the establishment of National Police Service, independence of the office of the Inspector-General, the National Police Service Commission, and civilian oversight of the police. However, the 2015 changes to the NPS Act and the NPSC Act, through the Security Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act of 2015, substantially clawed back on the gains made by the operationalisation of Articles 239 (5), 244, 245, and 246 of the Constitution. The Court declared some of the amendments to be unconstitutional.⁴

⁴ *Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) & 2 Others v Republic of Kenya & 10 Others* [2015] eKLR.

Kenya Prisons Service

47. Like the Police, the Prisons Service was introduced to East Africa by the colonial administration with Fort Jesus, in Mombasa, established in 1895 as the first prison in the region. The adoption and application of the Indian Prisons Act of 1894 throughout the British East Africa Protectorate introduced into the region and legal system incarceration and imprisonment, forms of punishment that hitherto did not exist, in the colonial rule. This was followed by the East African Prisons Regulations⁵ of 1902, which provided a detailed legal framework. The current Prison Service was formally established as an autonomous service in 1911 (vide Circular No. 1 of 18 March 1911) and its management placed in the Prisons Board. On August 12, 1914, the East African Regulations were repealed and the new Prisons Ordinance⁶ was enacted.
48. Administratively, the then Regional and District Officers (Provincial and District Commissioners) were authorised to superintend all prisons within their jurisdictions, with the Inspector-General of Police charged with overall control and command responsibility over national prisons. In the circumstances, though the control of prisons was under the Prisons Board, prison operations were, however, under the control of the Police Force until 1917 when the post of the Commissioner of Prisons was created.
49. The use of imprisonment and incarceration, which was introduced as part of colonial rule, heightened during the State of Emergency period (1952-1958) in colonial Kenya. During this era, the criminal and penal system was basically used as a tool for retribution, detention and punishment. The control of 'errant natives' and their rehabilitation did not feature as an object of imprisonment until much later.
50. As the country crossed over to independence in 1963, it inherited major challenges that had beset the prisons system during the colonial era. These included: a growing inmate population, a culture of hostile treatment of offenders and remand inmates, and the poor state of facilities (some of which were used as detention camps during the crackdown on Mau Mau insurgency).
51. For many years thereafter, the Service remained closed to the public. Over time, however, reports continued to emerge about the deplorable conditions in prisons. In 1997, the then Standing Committee on Human Rights noted depraving conditions in Kenyan Prisons and rampant abuse of human rights. The committee called on the Government to institute necessary reforms, but not much was done.
52. It is the clamour for democratisation in the country in the 1990s that, for the first time, thrust the Prisons Service into the public limelight following the detention of high-profile political leaders. As a result, the Kenya Prisons Service came under pressure to open up to external assessment of obtaining prison conditions.
53. The widely reported death of six prisoners in unclear circumstances, when they tried to escape the Nyeri Main Prison in King'ong'o in 2000, led to a public outcry and increased the pressure on the Service to change course. In 2001, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Sir Nigel Rodley, visited various prisons in Kenya as part of his country assessment mission and concluded in his report that the conditions were appalling. Among his findings was the fact that the prisons were overcrowded, prisoners were subjected to illegal corporal punishment, and wore tattered clothes. In response to Sir Nigel Rodley Report, an 'open door' policy was adopted in 2000 during the tenure of the then Commissioner of Prisons, Abraham Kamakil, opening up the prisons to the outside world, and allowing for partnerships with stakeholders

⁵ No.12/1902

⁶ No.13 of 1914, Chapter 37. Laws of Kenya

such as non-governmental organisations and faith-based organisations focused on prison reforms. To this end, in 2001, the Kenya Prisons Service, together with Penal Reform International (PRI), held a conference under the theme, ‘Towards methods of improving prison policy in Kenya’. The conference convened in October, 2001 laid the basis for the subsequent prison reforms in the succeeding period.

54. Another phase of prison reform was initiated in 2003 when the then Vice-President and Minister for Home Affairs, H.E. Moody Awori, took charge of the prisons docket. Under Awori’s leadership, the ‘*open door policy*’ provided a humane face and enhanced inmates’ participation in their rehabilitation programmes.
55. These reforms, which were carried out under the auspices of the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) Programme, a justice sector donor basket fund, saw concrete actions taken to remedy prison conditions -- including the provision of new uniforms, mattresses, blankets, and television sets for inmates. Buses, popularly known as ‘Moody Hoppers’, were introduced to give inmates some comfort whenever they commuted to and from courts. Further, for the first time, inmates were allowed to wear undergarments and shoes, and their diet was improved by incorporating sugar and rice. A special diet for HIV positive inmates was also introduced.
56. From 2005, prison reforms focused on improving the obtaining deplorable living conditions, which included improved sanitation in staff living quarters, proper dressing and recreational activities for inmates such as beauty contests, cultural activities, guidance and counselling of staff and inmates, as well as training of staff on human rights issues, among others.
57. In spite of these initiatives, the problems in the Prisons Service persisted, precipitating the unprecedented 2008 nationwide strike by prison warders, which had the full support of the prisoners. Key among the demands by officers was the improvement of their terms and conditions of service, improvement of their living and working conditions, demands for unpaid allowances⁷ and change in the leadership of the Service. This crisis led to the establishment of the country’s first taskforce specific to Prisons, the High-Level Committee on the Prisons Crisis led by Major (Rtd) Marsden Madoka. It was tasked to look into welfare and operational conditions in prisons. The committee concluded in its report that the picture that had emerged from its findings was one of an appalling Service characterised by “overcrowding, rottenness, omissions and commissions, looting, grabbing, lethargy, indiscipline, diseases, squalor, ineptitude and modern-day-slavery: in brief, a wild jungle in which prison staff in general and senior officers in particular, have literally run amok!”⁸
58. Key among the recommendations of the Madoka Committee was a change in the top leadership of the Service. The Committee recommended that the new leadership be brought in from outside the Service. As a result, a new Commissioner of Prisons and Deputy Commissioner were appointed from NPS. The committee also recommended a review of the Prisons Act, as well as a comprehensive review of officers’ salaries, provision of uniforms and improvement of housing and sanitation for officers.
59. After the 2008 crisis, KPS, yet again disappeared from public and policy discussions. While most institutions had their constitutive Acts reviewed to conform with the 2010 Constitution, this was not the case with the Kenya Prisons Service. While laws such as the Persons Deprived of Liberty Act (PDLA) were enacted to provide for the rights and better conditions for those in police and prison custody, regrettably, the Prisons Act, the Borstal Institutions Act and the

⁷ Report of the High-Level Committee on the Prison Crisis (Madoka Report) at p.2.

⁸ Madoka Report, pp. Executive Summary.

Prisons Standing Orders, to this day, remain unchanged, despite the expectation that the entire statute book would be reviewed to conform to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

The National Youth Service

60. The National Youth Service (NYS) was established in July, 1964 under the Ministry of Labour before it assumed an independent legal identity through the National Youth Service Act of September, 1964. At its creation, NYS was considered an important mechanism for addressing the challenge of a large number of unskilled and unemployed youth that confronted the independence government. NYS was also a mechanism for assimilation and reintegration into regular civilian life of the militant youth who had been involved in the independence struggle.⁹ In this regard, the roles of NYS then were, therefore, to engage those youth and others in nation building ventures through volunteerism and to support the military in addressing public emergencies and to enlist them in times of war, if need arose.
61. The legal framework thus classified NYS as a disciplined force that could be deployed with the police and military in the event of “war, insurrection, hostilities or public emergency.” It was, however, to remain a voluntary force, although all servicemen and women were expected to serve for a minimum of two years. As such, NYS equipped the youth with skills that could easily be applied to careers in the security organs. In a nutshell, NYS was a uniformed and disciplined Service with a clear ranking structure and disciplinary procedures similar to those of the military.¹⁰ As a voluntary Service, however, there were no penalties for desertion but a deserter would forfeit his or her mandatory savings of KSh. 8 that was deducted from their monthly stipend.¹¹
62. The primary aim of establishing NYS, however, was to create a pool of disciplined, organised and skilled youth who could be mobilised and deployed for important national development projects. NYS therefore targeted Kenyans between the ages of 16 and 30 for recruitment and its programme was designed as educational but voluntary. For the two years duration of the initial programme, the recruits were taught mathematics, civics and English to post-primary level. They were also provided with opportunity for training in general mechanics, electrical works, masonry, carpentry and motor mechanics. There were also courses in hospitality, typing, accounting, driving and plant operation, general mechanics, business courses, accounting, supply chain management, human resource management, Early Childhood Development and Education (ECDE), fashion and design and general agriculture, among others. Specifically, emphasis was placed on development of skilled manpower that could take up national manual labour tasks and enable others to engage in individual enterprises for a living.
63. In 1984, the Government introduced a pre-university training programme, the National Youth Service Pre-University Training (NYSPUT) into NYS as a mandatory requirement for students joining public universities. The three-and-a-half months programme was separate and distinct from that of the regular NYS servicemen and women and focused on citizenship education and paramilitary drills. The main objective of that programme was to instil discipline and encourage patriotism among the youth. In 1990, however, the NYSPUT was abandoned after the government realised that the programme had, contrary to expectations, helped and prepared the students to better organise and protest against the authorities whenever they felt they had cause to do so.

⁹ Phillip Mbithi and Joshua Olewe *Report to the United Nations on Youth Service Programmes in Kenya* (Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1971)

¹⁰ Mbithi and Olewe (1971).

¹¹ Mbithi and Olewe (1971).

64. Under pressure to provide for the annual youth bulge, NYS was in 2014 rebranded with a new strategic plan and focus that allowed it to recruit and engage hundreds of thousands of youth in livelihood projects without having to go through the regular programme for servicemen and servicewomen. By October 2017, this programme had engaged 236,250 community youth in 253 constituencies across all the 47 counties.¹² However, in 2018, the programme collapsed under the weight of corruption allegations, which gravely soiled the image of NYS.
65. The philosophy of inclusion for the disadvantaged or disenfranchised youth remains a driving agenda for NYS. In this regard, the Service, as stated, has over the years provided training, skills development and employment opportunities for youth who do not transit to higher education. Through its programmes, the role of the Service was, and remains, to re-socialise and through various forms of training, empower such youth to engage in individual economic endeavours and to re-integrate them into society. The servicemen and servicewomen are, on a self-help basis, engaged in economic projects, especially those that are too large for the community to handle. A key innovative feature at inception was the adoption of paramilitary training, needed to maintain a high level of character development among a large body of the nation's men and women. In this regard, the military type of discipline was instilled for cohesion, peace, and productivity. This aspect of discipline, coupled with skills development and volunteerism associated with the Service, contributes to enhancing the capabilities of NYS recruits, thereby making its graduates preferred in the job market.
66. The 2015 corruption crisis triggered efforts to change the governance structures of NYS. In September 2018, the government proposed the establishment of the Service as a corporate body so as to improve and strengthen financial management systems, operations and governance aspects. In February 2019, the National Youth Service Act, 2018 (the Act) was gazetted, repealing the NYS Act (Cap 208) of 1964. The Act vests policy formulation, control, oversight and supervision of the Service in the National Youth Service Council, with the Director General as the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer. This, it is hoped, provides the necessary *autonomy* for decision making as well as effective, efficient and economical management of resources for better service delivery. In addition, the NYS Act, 2018, provides for Service members to be deployed to serve with the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) or in the defence of the nation within or without Kenya in times of emergency. Further, the Act allows for the National Police Service to engage the service of NYS members in tasks as may be required.
67. Further, the National Youth Service Act of 2018 retains the core mandate of the institution as outlined under the Five-Point Vision of 2014, which restructures the Service and introduces the opportunity to undertake enterprises and commercial activities. For strategic reasons, the Service continues to use the five-pillar framework. The pillars are: paramilitary training and service regimentation; national service and youth re-socialisation; social transformation and vocational training; enterprise and youth economy; and bankable institutional architecture. The first four pillars involve programme restructuring while the fifth focuses on institutional restructuring and sustainability.

2.3 Reform Rationale

68. In spite of the many reform efforts, concerns over NPS, KPS and NYS performance and service to the public persist. The challenges and issues affecting the three Services go beyond the terms and conditions of service for officers working for the respective institutions. The issues are systemic and structural and require broad-based reform in order to realise wholesome transformation of these institutions and the attainment of their key and primary objectives.

^{12c}President directs NYS to commercialize, play key role in industrialization,” <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2018/02/president-directs-nys-commercialise-play-key-role-industrialisation/> February 16, 2018.

69. This undertaking takes place at a time when the situation is dramatically different from what obtained at the time the previous taskforces engaged with the same issues. The circumstances have changed in many aspects and this must be considered in any reform effort. The changing nature of crime and new technologies means that NPS, KPS and NYS officers now have to acquire and utilise different skill sets for effective performance of their duties. To put these issues in context and demonstrate the rationale for reform, the next section looks at several aspects of this changing social, economic and political environment as well as the emerging security challenges, all of which have made reform imperative.

Evolving Social, Economic and Political Context

70. It is important to underscore the fact that NPS, KPS and NYS are operating in a rapidly changing social, economic and political environment that has significant impact on how they deliver services to the public. These changes call for new competencies, skills, expertise, tools and technologies if these institutions are to deliver on their mandates as envisaged. The context also has implications for the terms and conditions under which the officers in these institutions serve.

Social Changes

71. Changes in a nation's demographics, cultures, lifestyles and diversity are likely to impact on crime and insecurity in that country's development. A country with a youthful population is much more vulnerable to crime, particularly where mitigating conditions are weak. This is because a youthful population means a higher dependency rate and large numbers seeking employment opportunities. That is the situation Kenya finds itself in. Kenya's population is predominantly youthful, with almost 70 per cent below 35 years and largely unemployed.¹³ With unplanned and expanding urbanisation in the context of limited employment opportunities and increased social tensions and crime in the country, the Kenyan youth bulge is a key concern. The changing nature of the family in Kenya and globally is also an important concern. Modern families are more susceptible to instability unlike the traditional rural families of the past decades.

Economic Environment

72. A secure environment is a necessary pre-requisite for economic development. The current economic environment provides opportunities to address the challenges in the sector. The national economic outlook is, therefore, key in determining what will be possible in the short and long term. The national economic context will have a huge impact on crime and significantly determine the level of resources available to support transformation of NPS, KPS and NYS.

Developments in Technology

73. Global technological changes are radically shaping service delivery as well as presenting new challenges and risks institutions such as NPS, KPS and NYS need to consider. Criminals are using advancements in technology to perfect their art. Additionally, technology is being used by inmates to perpetrate criminal activities while in prison. As such, leveraging on technology for socio-economic development is now an imperative rather than an optional choice. This environment calls for new technologies that NPS, KPS and NYS must adopt in their work to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, capacity for utilisation of such technologies is a critical aspect of reforms.

¹³ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics *Economic Survey 2023* at p.445.

Other Reform Processes

74. NPS, KPS, and NYS reforms are taking place within the context of broader public governance reforms. Public sector reforms in Kenya have seen efforts directed towards cost-saving, enhancing efficiency and improving productivity to ensure people-centered public service delivery. Key milestones include: the development of the National Capacity Building Framework (NCBF) in 2013; and the development of Public-Sector Transformation Framework (2017-2022), among others. Further, public participation provisions in the Constitution have now made public consultations a key aspect of policy formulation.
75. The reforms in the larger public sector impact on long-standing efforts in NPS, KPS and NYS aimed at administrative capacity building, strengthening of policy processes, institutional strengthening and right-sizing the civil service. In deepening administrative capacity building, notable progress has been made, including the introduction of results-based management, establishment of the Kenya School of Government, and the enhanced role of the Public Service Commission (PSC) and NPSC in the Constitution.

Emerging Security Challenges

76. The global socio-economic and technological changes continue to pose new security challenges for the country. A number of security concerns are of particular interest to NPS, KPS and NYS -- even as these institutions reorient their approaches to improved service delivery. A few of these challenges are highlighted hereunder.

Cyber Crime/Security

77. The growth and expansion of information and communication technologies have been accompanied by a notable increase in sophisticated and diversified forms of cyber-crimes such as cyber bullying, cyber fraud, exploitation of children and hate speech, among others. There is, therefore, a need to build capacities, underpinned by comprehensive institutional strategies to address such crimes.

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

78. Terrorism and violent extremism, as well as their transnational nature, remain key threats to Kenya's national security. These threats have been evolving, exploiting the country's diversity and new technologies. Consequently, NPS, KPS and NYS must, in particular, invest in capacities to respond to the sophisticated nature of these crimes.

Alcohol, Drug and Substance Abuse

79. There are growing public and policy concerns over widespread use, abuse, trade in and facilitation of alcohol, drugs and other substances among members of the three Services and the general population. The smuggling and production of second-generation alcohol, synthetic drugs and substances has compounded the problem. Some prescription drugs such as opioids are also widely abused in the country.¹⁴ All these developments, particularly the involvement of the untouchable political players, pose significant security risks and social challenges in the country, with reports that Kenya has become both a transit and destination point for drugs.

Human Trafficking

80. Human trafficking is a major challenge. In this regard, Kenya has now earned the ignominious status of being a major transit route for human trafficking from neighbouring countries to other destinations mainly South Africa and Europe. To a lesser extent, Kenya is also a destination

¹⁴ NACADA, 'Rapid situation in assessment of drug and substance abuse in Kenya' (2017) at pp. 1-2.

country for persons trafficked to work as beggars in the streets of urban areas such as Nairobi and Mombasa, and for various reasons such as organ harvesting, sexual exploitation, and cheap labour¹⁵

Political Intolerance and Negative Ethnicity

81. Political intolerance and incitement to ethnic hatred are key threats to the country's peace and diversity. There are many latent inter and intra-ethnic conflicts over resources that are often exploited and fanned by political incitement into ethnic violence. Kenya's experience with ethnic violence during general elections since 1992 suggests that the country is still vulnerable to such conflicts and violence. Inter-ethnic conflicts, in particular, continue to negatively impact on the country's regional and national security, development and stability.

Cattle Rustling and Banditry

82. In many parts of the country where pastoralism is the communities' mainstay, cattle rustling and stock theft are persistent security concerns. Cattle rustling appears to have evolved from the traditional small-scale incidents to sophisticated commercial and organised operations involving powerful operatives -- including political players. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons from neighbouring countries has exacerbated the problem. This has resulted in a situation where bandits have superior weapons than the national security agencies. The numerous multi-agency operations in the affected areas speak to the severity of the challenges.

Inter and Intra-communal Conflicts

83. Competition for scarce resources experienced especially in Arid and Semi-Arid lands (ASAL) is also a threat to national security. There have been ongoing incidents of inter and intra-communal conflicts in parts of Rift Valley, Eastern, Coast and the North-Eastern regions. The conflicts are largely driven by competition over pasture and water for livestock, longstanding land and boundary disputes, and divisive local politics. The situation is often compounded by the emergence of large-scale commercial herders moving their stock from their home regions to other parts of the country.

Political Transition

84. Political goodwill is important for any transformative reforms. The political transition in 2022 presented an opportunity to address long-standing concerns that affect service delivery by NPS, KPS and NYS. This resonates with the government's stated commitment to security sector reforms.
85. In light of all the foregoing challenges, the leadership of the three Services have, on their part, informed us that the Taskforce provides a golden opportunity for the comprehensive assessment of what needs to be changed in the welfare and terms and conditions of their members to boost their morale and ensure effective service delivery. Along with the officers' welfare, the Taskforce is also required to examine the state of equipment, logistical capacity to carry out operations and the need to leverage on technology in policing, correctional and vocational work, among other areas of the Services' respective mandates.

¹⁵ National Crime Research Centre, 'The problem of human trafficking in Kenya' (2022 revised edition, first edition in 2015) pp. 3-13.

PART II: NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

CHAPTER THREE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

3.1 Structure of the National Police Service

86. The National Police Service (NPS) is established under Article 243 of the Constitution and is headed by the Inspector-General (IG). NPS consists of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service, each of which are headed by a Deputy Inspector-General (DIG). Section 28 of the National Police Act (NPS Act) establishes the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) under the direction, command and control of the Inspector-General. The functions of the directorate are set out in section 35 of the NPSA.

Office of the Inspector-General

87. The office of the Inspector-General comprises uniformed and non-uniformed staff drawn from the Kenya Police Service (KPS), the Administration Police Service (APS) and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) who are deployed to serve in the various directorates within the NPS headquarters. The functions of the Inspector-General are stipulated in section 10 of the National Police Service Act, 2011. The following are the directorates under the Office of the Inspector-General:

- (i) Human Capital Development;
- (ii) Legal Affairs;
- (iii) Administration, Planning and Finance;
- (iv) Gender Affairs;
- (v) Reforms;
- (vi) Corporate Communications;
- (vii) Integrated Communication, Command and Control Centre (IC3);
- (viii) National Police Reserve (NPR); and
- (ix) National Police Air Wing.

The Kenya Police Service

88. The Kenya Police Service is operationally organised into different Formations and Units that enable it to perform its functions and implement its mandate as outlined in section 24 of the NPS Act, 2011. Kenya Police Service has the following directorates and departments:

- (i) Finance, Human Capital & Administration;
- (ii) Chaplaincy, Counselling and Psychological Support;
- (iii) Reforms;
- (iv) Planning;
- (v) Community Policing, Gender and Child Protection;
- (vi) Inspections;
- (vii) Logistics;
- (viii) Personnel;
- (ix) Operations; and
- (x) Quality Assurance – Complaints.

The Administration Police Service

89. The Administration Police Service is operationally organised into different Formations and Units that enable it to perform its functions and implement its mandate as outlined in section 27 of the NPS Act, 2011. The Administration Police Service has the following directorates and departments:

- (i) Chief of Staff and General Administration;
- (ii) Human Capital Management;
- (iii) Operations;
- (iv) Logistics;
- (v) Planning, Research External Linkages;
- (vi) Training and Reforms;
- (vii) Legal Affairs;
- (viii) Gender, Sports and Welfare; and
- (ix) Complaints and Inspections.

The Directorate of Criminal Investigations

90. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations is also operationally organised into different Formations and Units that enable it to perform its functions and implement its mandate as outlined in section 35 of the NPS Act, 2011. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations has the following directorates and departments:

- (i) Personnel;
- (ii) Investigations Bureau (IB);
- (iii) Operations;
- (iv) Forensics;
- (v) Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU);
- (vi) Planning;
- (vii) Public Complaints;
- (viii) Inspections;
- (ix) National Central Bureau (INTERPOL NCB);
- (x) Logistics;
- (xi) Reforms, Research, Innovation and Development (RRID);
- (xii) Legal & Crime Affairs;
- (xiii) Crime Research and Intelligence Bureau (CR&IB)
- (xiv) Training;
- (xv) Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU);
- (xvi) Homicide;
- (xvii) Liaison and Corporate Communication;
- (xviii) Counter Violent Extremism (CVE); and
- (xix) Administrative Support Services.

3.2 Organisation of the National Police Service

91. The functions and powers of the IG under section 10 include organising the Service at the national level into various formations, units and components. The IG's office has strength of 201 police officers drawn from the Kenya Police Service, Administration Police Service, and DCI. These officers are accounted for in the strength of their respective Services.
92. As at August 2023, Kenya Police Service had a strength of 74,747 officers, being 62,780 men and 11,967 women. Operationally, it is organised into 16 different Formations and Units. The Administration Police Service had a total strength of 26,992 with 23,767 men and 3,225 women. It is also organised into various Formations and Specialised Units. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations has a total strength of 5,518 police officers with 4,666 being men and 852 women. Operationally, it is organised into DCI headquarters, DCI Specialised Units, DCI Training School and DCI regional Police Formations.

Table 3. 1: National Police Service Formations and Units

Administration Police Service		
S/No.	Formations and Specialised Units	Strength
1	APS Headquarters	335
2	Security of Government Buildings (SGB)	3,834
3	National Police College Embakasi A Campus	727
4	Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit (CIPU)	972
5	NPS Senior Staff College, Emali Campus	72
6	Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU)	3,038
7	Border Police Unit	3,429
8	NPS Border Police Training Campus (NPSBPTC)	184
9	Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU)	1,474
10	Regional General Duty AP Formations (Regional, County, Sub County)	10,618
Directorate of Criminal Investigations		
1	DCI Headquarters	1,077
2	DCI Formations and Units	510
3	DCI Training School	80
4	DCI Regional Police Formations (Regional, County, Police Divisions, Sub County, Wards and Locations)	4,525
Internal Affairs Unit		
1	IAU Headquarters	97
2	Regional IAU Formations (Regional and County)	26
Kenya Police Service		
1.	KPS Headquarters	846
2.	General Service Unit (GSU)	8,509
3.	Police Air wing	87
4.	Diplomatic Police Unit	280
5.	Presidential Escort Unit	571
6.	Kenya Airports Unit (KAPU)	808
7.	Railway and Ports Police Unit	1,478
8.	Marine Police Unit	169
9.	National Police College, Kiganjo Campus	382
10.	Tourist Police Unit	333
11.	Kenya Police "K9" Unit	622
12.	Kenya Police Traffic Department	581
13.	Regional General Duty KPS Formations (Regional, County, Police Divisions, Sub County, Wards and Locations)	56,825
Inspector-General's Office		
1.	NPS Headquarters	201

Source: NPS

Operational Boundaries

93. The NPS geographic and operational boundaries are aligned with the national government administrative boundaries under a unified command as shown in Table 3.2 below:

Table 3. 2: Police geographic and operational boundaries

S/No.	Police Operational Boundaries	Number
1	Regional Command	8
2	County Command	46
3	Sub-County Command	193
4	Ward Command	1764

Source: NPS

3.3 Ranking Structure

94. The NPS operates under the ranking structure shown in Table 3.3 below:

Table 3. 3: NPS common ranking structure

S/No.	Rank
1	Inspector-General (IG)
2	Deputy Inspector-General (DIG)
3	Senior Assistant Inspector-General (SAIG)
4	Assistant Inspector-General (AIG)
5	Commissioner of Police (CP)
6	Senior Superintendent (SSP)
7	Superintendent (SP)
8	Assistant Superintendent (ASP)
9	Chief Inspector (CI)
10	Inspector (IP)
11	Senior Sergeant (SSGT)
12	Sergeant (SGT)
13	Corporal
14	Constable

Source: NPS

3.4 National Police Service Commission

95. The National Police Service Commission (NPSC) is established under Article 246 of the Constitution and given effect by the National Police Service Commission Act, 2011 (NPSC Act). The Commission was established to transform and manage the human capital of NPS for efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of quality policing services in Kenya. The functions and powers of the Commission are set out in Section 10 and 11 of the NPSC Act.

3.5 Independent Policing Oversight Authority

96. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) has been in operation since 2012. Established under the IPOA Act of 2011, the Authority is one of the police reform institutions that are expected to contribute towards transforming NPS into an efficient and accountable service with the highest standards of professionalism. IPOA derives its origin from the spirit and letter of the Constitution, Article 244 on objects and functions of NPS, which require the Service to prevent corruption, and promote and uphold transparency and accountability. The functions and powers of the Authority are set out in sections 6 and 7 of the IPOA Act.

3.6 Fundamentals of transformation of National Police Service

97. The Taskforce reviewed reports of previous commissions and taskforces and received views from the public, the police and stakeholders in the security sector. While many positive

changes have occurred, it is clear, regrettably, that there have been several reversals on some reforms, a slow-down in the pace of almost all reforms and in some cases a total collapse of some of the processes. In this regard, it is striking that many of the problems bedevilling NPS are the same ones that were identified by previous taskforces. It is not surprising, therefore, that some officers as well as members of the public expressed scepticism over whether the recommendations of this Taskforce would make any discernible difference.

98. On the basis of material placed before the Taskforce, it is clear that increased budgets, better salaries, equipment and tools alone will not improve morale in NPS or service delivery unless radical structural changes are undertaken to transform the leadership, culture and values of the institution.
99. This section details the conditions that are necessary for the envisioned systemic and structural changes to take place. We wish to state that these conditions constitute the North Star that should guide the implementation of reforms and the transformation process. These fundamentals are critical to the reform processes. If they are lost, then the rest of the reforms will be stillborn.

Leadership of the National Police Service

100. The lack of leadership that has a strategic vision and commitment to change is what has derailed progress and transformation in NPS. The Taskforce established that there is a serious disconnect between the NPS leadership and junior officers, which continues to undermine morale and performance. While there are some exemplary senior officers, most junior officers believe that their seniors do not appreciate their efforts or care about their welfare and the conditions under which they work.
101. Junior police officers categorically stated that their senior leadership rarely visited stations situated in forward and hardship areas, and hardly sought to understand their working or living conditions. Many of the officers noted that the situation is that of ‘management from a distance’ by leadership with limited understanding of the conditions on the ground and largely uninterested in finding out.
102. In spite of training on human rights and community policing, the gap between police officers and the communities they serve continues to widen, a factor that can be further linked to failure in police leadership. Consequently, while the number of police stations across the country might have increased the Service’s visibility, officers rarely go out to build relationships with the communities they serve. Lack of a deliberate and sustained leadership strategy of building partnerships with the community is a fatal flaw to current policing, which makes it ineffective. Police officers remain strangers in the communities they serve and only react after crimes are committed.
103. The desired shift in approach to community policing can only be made by the police leadership. It cannot be left to junior officers; neither can it be effected through training alone. It requires a complete change in how the police leadership translates the mission of the Service to all officers and the public as well as the adoption of clear steps to change how policing is performed.
104. On the legal framework, the Taskforce is of the view that there already exists many good laws, policies and guidelines that can help transform NPS. If the existing laws, policies and guidelines on areas such as recruitment, training, transfers and promotion were to be implemented to the letter, police performance, conditions and morale would be much higher.
105. The Taskforce notes that there have been recent leadership changes in the offices of Inspector-General, DIG (Kenya Police Service), and the Director of DCI. While these changes present an opportunity to rejuvenate the reform journey in the Service, a wholesome

transformation will require more than just a change of office bearers. There has to be a demonstrable commitment, backed with radical action, to transform police culture in the country, and ensure efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. This can only be achieved when there is a motivated Service whose members are ready to offer their best, across all ranks.

106. The Constitution envisions that the leadership of NPS and the process of appointing or selecting persons to positions of leadership in the Service will be underpinned by transparency, openness, public participation, and adherence to applicable constitutional values and principles. Furthermore, the persons appointed to positions of leadership should espouse the very values, principles and attributes that will facilitate the transformation of the Service in accordance with the Constitution and applicable laws.
107. It is with this in mind that the process of vetting police officers was undertaken, with the singular objective of providing NPS with a fresh start and an opportunity to address the challenges that have bedevilled the Service. The NPS Act, as originally enacted, provided for an elaborate and transparent manner for the appointment of the IG and DIGs as envisaged in the Constitution. The Constitution also anticipates a transparent and competitive selection and recruitment of the IG and DIGs by National Police Service Commission, followed by a process of parliamentary vetting and confirmation.
108. However, the vetting of serving police was halted, reportedly because of a lack of good-will and resources to support the process. Furthermore, the provisions in the NPS Act that provided for an open, transparent, and competitive recruitment of the IG and DIGs were repealed in 2014 following the enactment of the Security Laws Miscellaneous Amendment Act. These two events had the effect of denying Kenyans an opportunity to not only ensure reform of NPS but also provide a means of assurance that the leadership of the Service would reflect the values, principles, and expectations enshrined in the Constitution.

The role of the National Police Service Commission in leadership

109. The National Police Service Commission (NPSC) is established with the critical objective of promoting professionalism and responsibility in the management of human resources in the Service. NPSC is expected to streamline and provide leadership in vital processes such as recruitment, promotions, transfers, improvement in the terms and conditions of service for members of NPS, formulation of policies on training and capacity development, and exercise of disciplinary control, among others. These processes were and still are riddled with corruption, inefficiency, nepotism and general lack of professional management.
110. Instead of correcting these vices and steering the Service away from malpractices that necessitated its establishment, the NPSC leadership has failed to implement measures that would enable it to perform its constitutional and statutory obligations. For instance, NPSC has acquiesced to the continued usurpation of its functions by the leadership of NPS and has remained timid in the entire process, thereby exacerbating the vices that it was established to redress. Members of NPS, especially junior officers, perceive the leadership of NPSC as out of touch and uninterested in addressing their legitimate concerns.
111. While it has been necessary and practical to delegate the performance of some of its functions to the IG, the National Police Service Commission has failed to put in place and implement measures necessary to oversee the exercise and performance of delegated functions as is required by the law. As a result, there is no accountability in the manner in which the IG and, by extension, other leadership of NPS exercise or perform delegated functions. This lack of accountability in the execution of critical functions that impact on professionalisation of NPS, service delivery and morale, has amplified vices and malpractices such as corruption, incompetence, nepotism and favouritism in the Service.

112. The provision on quorum under paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule to the NPSC Act, which requires that at least two of the three NPS leaders (IG and the two DIGs) be present in order for the Commission to be legally constituted, has created challenges in conducting the business of NPSC. First, the Taskforce was informed of an alleged pattern where the three members deliberately cause a quorum hitch by non-attendance, especially when the issue or deliberation at hand does not enjoy their support. This reported practice potentially derails the Commission and precludes it from performing its constitutional and statutory functions.
113. Second, the composition of the Commission under Article 246 of the Constitution is heavily slanted in favour of NPS. The Commission is primarily meant to offer oversight and independent human capital development and management to NPS. However, the Commission is composed of three serving and two retired members of NPS. This brings to a total of five former and current members of NPS against four civilian members. It was reported that this has, in some instances, proved to be a challenge as both the serving and retired officers almost always vote together as part of the ‘blue code of brotherhood’.
114. Third, it would be unprecedented for any of the DIGs to differ with the IG on a matter under consideration at the Commission, more so, where the IG is of a divergent view from that of the majority of NPSC members. This would amount to gross insubordination in a command structured Service. Consequently, these eventualities have undermined decision making in critical matters of discipline and human capital management.
115. More critically, the leadership of NPSC can make all the difference in the direction the NPS takes regarding the critical space it occupies in providing leadership in the country. However, the current provisions regarding the qualifications, experience and skills required for the position of chairperson do not necessarily facilitate a process that can ensure the appointment of a suitable person. The NPSC Act does not specify qualifications for the chairperson that are different and distinct from the rest of the membership.

Endemic corruption

116. Reports of previous police taskforces identified corruption as endemic to the Service. The public, other stakeholders and even members of NPS stated that the situation has not improved and corruption is now embedded in the culture of the Service. This includes involvement in fraudulent land matters, conflict of interest, illicit brews and outlets, gambling, and forgery of documents among others. According to a survey conducted by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) in 2021, eight out of 10 Kenyans perceive NPS to be corrupt. Citizens reported that police officers demand bribes from those seeking even mundane services such as those relating to police abstracts, certificates of good conduct and police protection or intervention in safety or security related situations. A 2022 Afrobarometer Survey, noted that only one in five persons said police officers are professional and respectful in the manner they treat people. According to the survey, 66 per cent of people said that police officers engaged in illegal activities, and 68 per cent said that most or all police officers are corrupt. Other surveys by, among others, Transparency International, and human rights organisations have revealed a similar trend.
117. During county visits and public hearings, the Taskforce was informed of cases of rampant corruption during recruitment into NPS. In spite of the guidelines and policies that exist on recruitment, most police jobs are for sale to those who can afford or only offered to the relatives of the powerful and politically connected in the country. Transfers as well as promotions are also riddled with corruption and favouritism, a culture which undermines the morale of officers.
118. The Traffic Department was singled out for rampant corruption. The Taskforce received reports of conflict of interest which manifests itself in police officers owning matatus and breakdown vehicles, and nepotism in deployments, among others. In addition, there were reports of a

network of bribe collection in the Traffic Department where junior officers are allegedly tasked to collect bribes from road users (sometimes with targets) that are then shared with senior officers. This weakens police legitimacy, lowers public trust and impedes public-police cooperation that is critical in security work.

119. Police officers pointed out that internally, corruption deeply permeates various police processes such as transfers, promotions and even access by junior officers to some of the allowances. For instance, some officers never receive their transfer allowances even after reporting to their new stations. Some officers have been stuck in ‘forward’ or ‘operational’ areas for even up to 10 (ten) years while others never leave the comforts of urban areas and the so-called lucrative stations.
120. The Taskforce notes that overall, laws, policies, procedures, and guidelines are in place in NPS, including the *National Police Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 2016-2019*, which has remained largely unimplemented. The Taskforce was informed that deliberate failure by the NPS leadership to follow laid down policies and procedures is the foundation for corruption. It is clear that the only way to address the entrenched culture of corruption is for the leadership to take responsibility and lead on implementation. Issues regarding corruption in NPS are dealt with at greater length in the respective chapters and sections of the Report.

3.7 Political will to drive reforms

The role of the Cabinet Secretary in effective NPS leadership

121. Many members of the public as well as police officers who spoke to the Taskforce wondered whether the recommendations of the Taskforce would ever be implemented. This concern was predicated on the history of recommendations the government failed to implement or abandoned along the way. Transformation of policing services is a challenge in any country. Resistance to change within and without the institution is to be expected. Moreover, keeping the Service on the reforms path amid the many security demands on officers is challenging. The Taskforce has noted that pertinent and very practical recommendations made by the Mutonyi Committee and the Ransley Taskforce were either not given attention or partially implemented. The reforms envisaged by the Taskforce are unlikely to succeed unless there is political commitment to see them through. That commitment and oversight should come from the Executive.
122. It is the primary role of the Executive, through the Ministry of Interior as well as the leadership of the NPS, to reflect on the mission and values that should underpin and drive policing in Kenya. The Constitution sets out the vision on how policing and security should be delivered, managed and held to account.
123. The Constitution directs that the pursuit and promotion of national security must be ‘subject to the authority of the Constitution and Parliament’; must be in conformity ‘with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Article 238).
124. The Constitution has also prohibited security officers and the national organs from acting ‘in a partisan manner’ (Article 239(3) (a)), from furthering ‘any interest of a political party or cause’ (Article 239(3) (b)) and from prejudicing ‘a political interest or political cause that is legitimate under the Constitution’ (Article 239(3) (c)).
125. These values, directives and prohibitions seek to remedy a past where the police and other security agencies were politically misused to entrench the advantage of the government of the day and to punish political competition. The Constitution provides the tools for

transforming the entrenched culture of the Service bearing allegiance to the political elite rather than the Constitution and the Kenyan people.

126. Those principles have to be linked with the role of a police officer in a democracy such as Kenya. That mission clarification and articulation has never been spelt out by successive governments. Without this mission and values clarification and articulation, most police officers believe their role is only to fight crime. This explains why most of them suggested to the Taskforce that they prefer to be more like the military in terms of tools, equipment and gear, as well as in command structures.
127. There is no question that the core duties of an NPS officer are to protect life and property, maintenance of law and order, and to prevent, detect and investigate crime. However, this traditional role has evolved and the modern understanding is that police officers are much more than crime fighters. In practice, the majority of calls to the police are to address matters that do not rise to the level of crime but are about public safety. Police are called in to mediate domestic conflicts, assist the vulnerable, deal with antisocial behaviour and even mental health crises.
128. The Constitution and the NPS Act mandate the Cabinet Secretary responsible for the police to lead on NPS reforms and ensure adherence to policies, procedures and laws. The role of the Cabinet Secretary is further specifically spelt out under section 126 of the NPS Act, and includes policy guidance, monitoring and evaluation of NPS, the setting of standards and ensuring public participation in NPS processes, among other strategic roles. The Act further requires the Cabinet Secretary to establish a Police Reform Unit to ensure continuous and sustainable reform. As such, the Taskforce is of the view that the Cabinet Secretary holds the key to the realization of the reforms in the Service and should thus hold the leadership of institutions and agencies within NPS to account.
129. However, successive governments since the enactment of laws regarding police reforms have not come up with clear policies to guide the process of sustainable police reform. Instead, the country has in the past witnessed a pattern of micro-management of NPS and blurring of the line between policy-making or guidance and control or directing of police operations. This goes against the letter and spirit of the Constitution and erodes the operational independence of the IG and the Service. Furthermore, the control of NPS resources has all along been under the Ministry of Interior, which has posed major challenges to the operations of the Service.
130. There is an ongoing effort by the government to grant NPS autonomy over its finances and resources, as evidenced by the appointment of a Principal Administrative Secretary as the Accounting Officer for NPS. However, the process towards the establishment of this position and the subsequent appointment of the office holder lacked transparency. This position is critical for the operational independence of NPS, especially on financial management. The establishment of such a position, therefore, should be open and transparent, and the appointment of office holders should take into consideration factors such as security of tenure, which are germane to ensuring the independence operation of NPS.

The oversight role of the National Assembly

131. Parliament has a critical role with regard to oversight and ensuring accountability of the NPS leadership. Specifically, the Committee on Security has a duty to ensure that public concerns and accountability questions regarding policing services are adequately addressed. Parliament is also expected to ensure that NPS is facilitated with resources and appropriate legal and policy frameworks to ensure efficient operations.
132. However, Parliament and the relevant parliamentary committees have demonstrably failed to hold the IG and the National Police Service to account. The Taskforce recalls, for instance,

that Parliament has not taken the leadership of NPS to task over reported cases of disappearance of ‘persons of interest’, which could even have warranted a public inquiry. NPSC has also reportedly alerted the Committee on Security on the usurpation of its functions by the leadership of NPS but, as far as the Taskforce can tell, this has not been acted upon.

133. Furthermore, the amendments to NPS Act in 2014, which repealed the open, competitive and transparent recruiting process for the IG, and was clearly meant to control the IG, were passed hurriedly under the watch of the relevant parliamentary committee on security. The National Police Service and the NPSC have also reportedly decried perennial underfunding of their operations, which has seriously undermined their effectiveness in their roles. It is the view of the Taskforce that Parliament should take its role seriously and address these pertinent issues that have negatively impacted on the leadership and effectiveness of NPS.

A culture of learning and evidence-based policing

134. Previous taskforces have highlighted that policing in Kenya is not based on data and evidence, and that the NPS does not have a tradition of learning. The Ransley Taskforce in particular recommended that the NPS collaborates with institutions of higher learning, and research-based institutions, such as the National Crime Research Centre to generate quality studies to inform policing in the country.
135. It is evident to the Taskforce that NPS is yet to institutionalise a culture and practice of research, reflection and even use of data to inform policing. NPS keeps records of reported crimes across the country but these are not sufficient to guide strategic thinking and planning. There are limited institutional and research materials available to the police on levels and patterns of victimisation across the country, public confidence and trust in NPS, and the impact of police approaches to crime, among others. Without such data, research and analysis on recruitment, deployment, transfers, training and even police numbers, policing remains largely reactive. Even where such data, information and knowledge exist from oversight bodies or research institutions, such as IPOA and the National Crime Research Centre, there is no demonstrable effort to take up the recommendations from such studies and reports or to utilise them in decision-making.
136. The Taskforce is of the view that investment in learning, research and evidence-led policing will not only improve public security outcomes, but is also critical in the rationalisation of police personnel and financial decisions. If NPS invests in data and evidence, it will be insulated from frivolous and unfounded claims of partisanship, violations and corruption. Investment in continuous learning and use of evidence is also critical to building professionalism in the Service and rescuing it from the culture of incompetence.
137. The culture of delivering results in the short term and the hierarchical, command nature of the Service undermines the expression of new ideas. Senior NPS leaders need fora, for instance annual conferences, where they make evidence-based presentations on their work and critically reflect on policing. The Taskforce is of the view that such a culture of reflection can only be created from the top.

Performance standards and management

138. Systems, tools and policies to guide the assessment of the performance of employees are critical to the effective delivery of the mission of every institution. As public servants, police officers are expected to perform their duties in a manner that is satisfactory per the standards set out by their employer. Appraisal of the officers’ performance has to be based on clear and well-defined standards, with indicators specific to their jobs. The need for the development of performance standards and appraisal systems specific to the Service was underscored by the Ransley Taskforce.

139. The Service Standing Orders require the NPS and the Commission to establish performance appraisal systems for the Service. These appraisals are then to become mandatory and regular for all officers. All gazetted officers are supposed to be appraised by their commanders along the command structure, with the Inspector-General ultimately responsible for the entire Service.
140. There is no evidence of an operational performance management system in NPS.

Change management

141. How institutions approach and manage change significantly determines whether they remain effective, adapt to new contexts and embrace new ideas and approaches to their work. The challenge for the leadership of every institution is to manage change while simultaneously delivering on the core mission of the institution. The hierarchical and command structure of police institutions makes them particularly resistant to change. The many unimplemented recommendations on reforms by various taskforces are clear evidence that change management is a challenge to the Service.
142. The Taskforce is of the view that change management in NPS has to be driven by both internal and external leadership. Internally, the NPS leadership has to lead and take responsibility for driving the transformation of the Service. Externally, the Ministry of Interior and the Executive has to provide the support and benchmarks for the required change in the Service.

Recommendations

143. It is clear from the foregoing analysis and observations, that the transformation of NPS and achievement of the constitutional vision that Kenyans chose for themselves can only be realised when there is clear commitment and action, not only by the leadership of NPS but also by other institutions whose roles and mandates are critical to the pursuit of the constitutional objectives of NPS. As such, the institutions and offices mentioned in the preceding sections hold the key to wholesome transformation of NPS and policing services in the country. More fundamentally, the challenges and issues raised in the various sections of this Report show the systemic and structural challenges the country faces with regard to policing and police services. The Taskforce is, therefore, of the considered view that unless radical measures are taken and the systemic issues identified are effectively addressed to steer the police reform process and return NPS to its intended course of discharging its constitutional mandate, nothing much will come out of the current government's desired police reforms.
144. It is in this light that the Taskforce wishes to state that on the evidence placed before it, the National Police Service is bedevilled with myriad challenges, the major ones being: endemic corruption, incompetence, lack of professionalism and poor institutional image. Besides the country's failure to sufficiently invest in the State organs charged with the responsibility of maintaining internal security, including NPS, the Taskforce has established that the leadership of the National Police Service is the root cause of the challenges facing the Service. As stated, unless radical measures are taken to steer the police reform process back to its intended course, and the systemic issues identified effectively addressed, any reform efforts, including those of this Taskforce, will be otiose.

National Police Service leadership

145. In the circumstances, and to address the said challenges bedeviling NPS and in particular to ascertain whether the current senior officers of NPS have the competence, integrity, experience, suitability and attributes necessary to drive the requisite reforms and achieve the vision of NPS, the Taskforce recommends:

- (a) Parliament to immediately enact a law that will provide for an independent body, appointed by the President to carry out a fresh vetting of all serving officers of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) and above;
- (b) Cognisant of the High Court decision in *Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) and 2 Others v Republic of Kenya and 10 others*, the Taskforce recommends and urges the Cabinet Secretary to immediately develop a legislative proposal for Parliament to enact legislation to reinstate the constitutional requirement for an open, transparent and competitive recruitment of the IG, the Deputy Inspectors-General, and the DCI as was provided for under section 12, 13 and 30 of the NPS Act before the 2014 amendments. With respect to the appointment of DIGs and DCI, there should be strict compliance with the law as prescribed. This will guarantee professional selection and appointment of persons suitable for the position and further enhance public trust in the leadership of the Service;
- (c) To address the issue of corruption, the Taskforce recommends that NPS should review its anti-corruption and prevention of bribery, procedures and policies to ensure that they are effective in stemming the vice. Further, NPS should seek assistance from the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to put in place mechanisms to fully implement anti-corruption legislation and measures, including putting in place procedures for the prevention of bribery and corruption, as well as a mechanism for annual corruption risk assessment and management, performance contracting, customer satisfaction surveys, and reporting in conformity to the National Values and Principles of Governance;
- (d) The Taskforce recommends that the leadership of NPS develops a change management plan with clear milestones and indicators on the institutional and cultural transformation of the Service; and
- (e) While the Taskforce has established that a performance management system exists in NPS, it is not actually used to measure progress, productivity and accountability in the Service. The IG to monitor and ensure implementation and compliance.
- (f) The IG is the vision bearer of NPS. Therefore, at the commencement of his or her term, the IG should set out his or her vision for the Service and the milestones, and report annually on the achievement of the vision.

National Police Service Commission leadership

- (a) As outlined in this Report, the Taskforce takes the view that the current National Police Service Commission (NPSC) leadership has failed to oversee the effective pursuit of its mandate, which has affected the reform process in NPS, especially in the components or areas that NPSC is mandated to deal with. The Taskforce recommends, therefore, that the government considers initiating a negotiated or any other legally recognised modality to exit the current Chairperson and Commissioners of NPSC. This will pave way for fresh and revitalised leadership at the Commission that is committed to NPS reforms. The proposed new leadership should be one that will ensure the Commission reclaims its integral space in the management of the human capital in NPS, as required by the Constitution and as expected by Kenyans;
- (b) The Taskforce was informed of a pattern where three members of the NPSC representing the NPS (IG and the two DIGs) deliberately cause a quorum hitch by non-attendance, especially when the issue or deliberation at hand does not enjoy their support. This practice potentially derails the Commission and precludes it from performing its constitutional and statutory functions. Sabotaging the operations and

business of the Commission amounts to gross misconduct and violation of the law, and as such, constitutes a ground for removal from office under Article 251 of the Constitution;

- (c) To address this issue, the Cabinet Secretary and Parliament should immediately initiate an amendment to paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule to NPSC Act to repeal the requirement that at least two of the three NPS representatives in NPSC (IG and at least one DIG) be present for the Commission to conduct its business. The Taskforce recommends that the proposed law should provide for any five of the nine members to constitute quorum;
- (d) The Taskforce recommends that—separate and higher criteria specifying the qualifications, experience and attributes of the chairperson of NPSC, distinct from criteria that apply to other members of the Commission, be developed;
- (e) The Cabinet Secretary and Parliament should consider and address the concerns raised about the composition of NPSC being ‘police-heavy’, a factor that has reportedly undermined the Commission’s role in human capital management and development in NPS.

The role of the Cabinet Secretary

- (a) The role of policy making in policing matters is vested by law in the Cabinet Secretary. The Taskforce has established that rather than develop policy to guide NPS, past history reveals micro-management of NPS by previous Cabinet Secretaries that significantly eroded the operational independence of the Police. The Taskforce recommends that the Cabinet Secretary takes immediate and urgent steps to address the current policy and oversight gaps in the Service by developing appropriate policies and guidelines, in particular the National Policing Policy to guide the NPS;
- (b) The Cabinet Secretary should develop a Sessional Paper on policing and reforms to guide the long term transformation of NPS; and
- (c) The Cabinet Secretary takes urgent steps to operationalise the Police Reform Unit envisaged under section 126 (2) (b) of the NPS Act. This will not only provide a constant reference point and pulse-check on the reform journey but will also provide an avenue for active follow-up and ensure that all reforms envisaged are followed through to implementation by concerned institutions.

3.8 Command structure

146. The Taskforce was mandated to assess and propose the review of the reporting, command, governance and accountability framework within NPS; assess the implication of the restructuring or merger of the Administration Police Service and Kenya Police Service on command and good order; and to assess and recommend the establishment of clear guidelines on formation of specialised units within NPS.


Current context and practice

147. In 2018, NPS command and control at national, regional and county levels were reorganised through re-designation, harmonisation of command and reappointment of one Officer Commanding Station, one Sub-County Police Commander, one County Police Commander, and One Regional Police Commander.
148. The functions of DIGs and Director DCI were designated to eliminate overlaps and duplication of reporting on security matters. The distinct reporting functions required the DIG of the Kenya Police Service to focus on public safety and security, DIG of the

Administration Police Service to focus on protective and border security, and the DCI to focus on criminal investigations.

149. Consequently, NPS integrated general duty Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service to form one strengthened National Police Service. The merger/ reorganisation consolidated KPS and APS general duty police resources, including tooling and kitting, logistical and mobility capacity, armouries, physical infrastructure, land and other assets under one command of the DIG in charge of the Kenya Police Service.
150. The chain of command, on the other hand, is the line of authority from the Inspector-General to every member of the Service that facilitates effective decision-making and organisational communication. Police officers and members of the Service are expected to adhere to and respect the chain of command in all official actions as designated in the Order of Rank.
151. NPS performs operations under a unified chain of command in respective jurisdictions under the direct command of the IG.
152. The two Services (Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service) and the DCI, in the exercise of their administrative functions, draw their command from the respective Service and Directorate commands. A police officer is accountable to only one supervisor at any given time. Any officer or member of NPS is responsible or accountable to the immediate supervisor, except when working on a special assignment, incident, or temporary assignment to another unit.
153. Every organisational component of NPS is under the command of only one supervisor as shown in the NPS command structure. Where circumstances so require, a commanding officer may give a lawful order to a member or component that is outside their normal chain of command and such order should be obeyed.

Figure 3. 1: NPS command structure



Source: NPS

155. The focus of previous taskforces, most notably, the Ransley Report, recommended restructuring the police command to, among others, move it away from an over-centralised system and to devolve powers and responsibilities to police leaders at regional, county and station levels.

Submissions and findings

156. The Taskforce was informed of ambiguity with respect to the rank of the Director, DCI, in the command structure. While the Constitution provides for the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service, it is silent on the status of the DCI.

157. The position of Principal Assistant (PA) to the IG continues to elicit debate over the command structure in the Service. While it is not anchored in substantive law (it is provided for in the Service Standing Orders), the Principal Assistant is an administrative position. Effectively, there have been instances where the PA has, on the instructions of the IG, issued directions or instructions to the DIGs and the Director, DCI, officers who are obviously senior to the PA in rank. The Taskforce notes this is an anomaly and recommends that it be addressed.

158. The Taskforce was informed that there are ranks, such as that of the Assistant Superintendent, which do not have corresponding administrative duties, meaning that it is a rank with no portfolio, no office, duties or allowances. Similarly, the Taskforce was informed that sub-county commanders (Officers Commanding Police Divisions) have no oversight power on

expenditure management by Officers Commanding Stations (OCSs), who have Authority to Incur Expenses (AIE), which raises questions of accountability whenever complaints are directed to them.

159. Furthermore, while there is a clear command and reporting structure for police officers at the station level, in practice, there exist a parallel reporting structure for officers in the Traffic Police Unit. It was reported that Traffic Police are under the Base Commander at the police station, who reports directly to the County Police Commander. This creates a parallel command structure that the 2018 restructuring sought to cure. Effectively, service delivery is hampered as Kenyans who visit police stations find it difficult to access services where there are different centres of power. This mix-up in the command structure creates loopholes for corruption, which is most prevalent in the Traffic Police Unit.

Recommendations

160. In order to address the challenges related to the command and reporting structure in NPS, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) The Cabinet Secretary should introduce a three-tier classification system for NPS ranks as follows:

National Police Service Gazetted Officers Ranks

- (i) Inspector-General;
- (ii) Deputy Inspectors-General (DIG, Kenya Police Service, DIG, APS, and DIG, DCI);
- (iii) Senior Assistant Inspectors-General;
- (iv) Assistant Inspectors-General;
- (v) Commissioners of Police;
- (vi) Senior Superintendents;
- (vii) Superintendents; and
- (viii) Assistant Superintendents.

National Police Service Inspectorate Ranks

- (i) Chief Inspector; and
- (ii) Inspector (II and I).

Kenya Police Service, Administration Police Service and Directorate of Criminal Investigations Subordinate Officers Ranks

- (i) Senior Sergeant;
 - (ii) Sergeant
 - (iii) Corporal (III, II and I); and
 - (iv) Constable (III, II, and I).
- (b) Section 28 of the NPS Act, 2011(as amended), should be amended to establish the DCI as a Service – Criminal Investigations Service (CIS) under the direction, command and control of the Inspector-General. The Criminal Investigations Service should consist of the three-tier ranks published by the Cabinet Secretary;
- (c) The NPS Joint Service Board should introduce new distinct uniforms for National Police Service Gazetted Officers, National Police Service Inspectorate, and Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service subordinate officers;

- (d) To guide career progression, the Cabinet Secretary and NPSC should review and adopt common in-service training, promotion courses and police examinations for National Police Service Gazetted Officers, National Police Service Inspectorate, and Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service, DCI and Subordinate Officers;
- (e) The Cabinet Secretary and NPSC should review and adopt new entry and promotional requirements, rank specifications and qualifications for ranks in NPS; and
- (f) The NPS Joint Service Board should review and harmonise reporting command, staffing structure and personnel deployment in accordance with the revised structure as proposed above.

Table 3. 4: Command, operational and administrative structure of the NPS

Inspector-General		
DIG - APS	DIG - KPS	DIG - CIS
Mandate - Protective Security, Border Security and Support to Government Functions	Mandate - Public Safety and Security	Mandate - Criminal Investigations
Regional Police Commander (RPC) & Formation Commanders		
Protective Security, Border Security and Support to Government Functions	Public Safety and Security	Criminal Investigations
County Police Commander (CPC)		
Protective Security, Border Security and Support to Government Functions	Public Safety and Security	Criminal Investigations
Sub County Police Commander (SCPC)		
Protective Security, Border Security and Support to Government Functions	Public Safety and Security	Criminal Investigations
Officer-in-Charge Police Stations (Ward Commander and Traffic Management and Support to Government Functions) (OCS)		
APS Sections and NCOs	KPS Sections and NCOs	DCI Crime Branch
Police Constables – Service Providers		

Source: NPS

3.9 Specialised Units

161. The Taskforce was required to assess and recommend establishment of clear guidelines on formation of specialised Units within NPS. The range of crime, security and policing challenges has changed dramatically in recent years. This has led to an increase in the number of Formations, Units and components in NPS being established and deployed to deal with specific areas of policing and criminal investigations.
162. Section 10 (h) on functions and powers of the IG include organising the NPS at national level into various Formations, Units or components. Chapter 7 of the SSOs (Formations, Units and Components) established all the Formed and Specialised Units in NPS. No Formation, Unit, or component may be established, varied or abolished, without the authority of the IG. The IG assigns responsibility for the implementation and administration of any function of NPS to a Formation, Unit or component. No direction, function or mandate assigned to any Formation, Unit or component shall be inconsistent with the Constitution, the NPS Act or any written law.
163. The SSOs require all Formations, units and components to develop their own Operations Manual in accordance with the mandate assigned to each by the IG, consistent with the Constitution, the NPS Act, and the SSOs or any written law.

164. The NPS Command Structure and Chairperson of Command, including ranks, duties and responsibilities set out in the SSOs Chapter 8 and 9 applies to operations of all formations, units and components established in NPS.

Submissions and findings

165. The Taskforce noted that while there are clear guidelines and policies on the formation of specialised units on paper, in practice, there are challenges around the duplication of roles, competition between units, ambiguities in command as well as lack of accountability and oversight over their operations. The situation has created fertile ground for illegal activities and misuse of power by officers.
166. In some cases, there has been overreliance on Specialised Units even where the issues can be handled by General Duty police. For instance, there is an overbearing presence of specialised Units in some operation areas, and the Taskforce was informed that this had distorted laid down procedures for regular policing. In some instances, the use of specialised units has created a culture of lack of accountability in the areas where they operate. In many cases, the units are not accountable to the local police leadership, such as the area OCS thus weakening general accountability in policing.
167. The Taskforce received submissions from officers in these Units, who reported low morale and confusion due to this lack of clear systems. Some of the specialised Units are seriously under-resourced and feel that they have been neglected by their commanders.
168. The Taskforce was informed that the lack of clarity and criteria on deployment of officers for VIP protection and other non-core duties. There were reports of police officers detailed to guard former government officials and their homes, even in cases where these officers served over twenty years ago. This problem was identified by the Ransley Task Force which recommended that there is need to revisit the “practice which has removed police officers from core policing duties and rationalize the categories of persons strictly meriting this service.” In addition, there is need to review the categorization of protection of various facilities and buildings to ensure that this is guided by appropriate levels of risk and vulnerability.

Recommendations

169. There is no doubt that the IG requires the necessary powers and authority (provided by the law and regulations) to establish specialised Units in order to ensure effective policing and discharge of NPS duties. However, there is need for a number of measures to be taken to address the concerns that have arisen regarding the formation of specialised Units in NPS. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) The Joint Service Board of the NPS should review the current specialised Units in the Service with a view to rightsizing and streamlining the units to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Specialised Units with overlapping functions, expertise, resources or operations should be merged as sections under one existing specialised Unit.
 - (b) The IG should review the Service Standing Orders to ensure clear and objective criteria in the composition, membership, strength, command and accountability of specialised Units; and
 - (c) The IG should establish, in consultation and in accordance with the policies and guidelines laid out by the National Security Council, the various Formations, Units and components.

- (d) The Task Force recommends the development of a comprehensive policy to guide the determination of persons requiring VIP protection and deployment of necessary protection.

3.10 Police Air Wing

170. Since its inception in 1949 as a colonial air-support (transport, communication and reconnaissance), the National Police Service Air Wing (NPSAW) operations have evolved into multiple functions with modern aircraft to support the services of the entire Service and other public sectors. According to the SSOs, the NPSAW functions now include:
 - (a) Facilitating all forms of security-related aerial work by government agencies including observation, patrol, photography, aerial survey, dropping of supplies and security equipment, and search and rescue;
 - (b) Providing aerial reconnaissance;
 - (c) Providing communication flights;
 - (d) Rendering support to other government agencies;
 - (e) Facilitating crime detection and prevention;
 - (f) Transportation of security personnel;
 - (g) Protection and security of VIPs
 - (h) Casualty evacuation;
 - (i) Assistance to victims of disaster;
 - (j) Crowd control and dispersal;
 - (k) Air traffic control;
 - (l) Anti-poaching flights; and
 - (m) Any other functions as exigency may require.
171. Following the recommendations of the Ransley Report, the Police Air Wing Committee of Aviation Experts was appointed to assess the performance and viability of the Police Air Wing. It recommended upgrading of the aircraft fleet and equipment; and strategies for attracting, motivating and retaining qualified employees of the Kenya Police Air Wing.
172. In 2016, Kenya Police Air Wing was transformed into a Directorate, National Police Service Air Wing (NPSAW) in the Office of the Inspector-General.
173. In 2019, the National Police Service Air Wing was transferred to the National Air Support Department (NASD) through a presidential directive. The NASD is led by the Kenya Defence Forces and has the mandate to coordinate all aircraft to effectively respond to emergencies and security incidents in the country.
174. The Taskforce heard submissions from the Inspector-General as well as the head of NASD on the situation and practice in the administration of the NPS aircraft under NASD. The NPS leadership strongly called for the return of the Air Wing to NPS, citing reduced operational effectiveness under the current arrangement.
175. The Taskforce was informed by KDF that the decision to transfer the Police Air Wing assets to NASD was precipitated by a pattern of poor management, inept administration and technical failures to maintain service and operate the aircraft. Some stakeholders noted that the police had lost aircraft in crashes and failed to keep the rest in safe and airworthy condition, necessitating the transfer.

176. On their part, the NPS leadership rejected these assertions and noted that instead of transferring the Police Air Wing, legal and administrative actions should have been taken to address these alleged failures. In their presentation, NPS drew the attention of the Taskforce to its analysis of the state of the Air Wing after transfer to NASD, noting that in “the period between 2010 to date, we saw a sharp decline in aircraft serviceability status.”
177. Table 3.5 illustrates the status of aircraft from 2010 to 2022. For the year 2018, the serviceability status of the NPSAW aircraft was as tabulated. The analysis shows that a majority of the NPSAW aircraft were unserviceable due to various reasons while a significant number had crashed.

Table 3. 5: Status of aircraft from 2010 to 2022

S/No.	Aircraft	Status Report
1	CESSNA 310 (5Y KPA)	All unserviceable due to a service bulletin and were disposed in 2017
	CESSNA 310 (5Y PAZ)	Unserviceable due to a service bulletin and were disposed in 2017
	CESSNA 310 (5Y PAW)	Unserviceable due to a service bulletin and were disposed in 2017
2	CESSNA 402 (5Y KPF)	Unserviceable due to a service bulletin and was disposed in 2017
3	CESSNA 2088 (5Y GSU)	Unserviceable due to engine low power after overhaul
	CESSNA 2088 (5Y POL)	Unserviceable due to ongoing Certificate of airworthiness certification process
4	BELL 47 (5Y ANA)	Handed over to the Kenya National Museum in 2022
5	BO 105 (5Y BFW)	Owned by Ministry of Health – Unserviceable
6	BELL 206 (5Y COP)	Crashed during a routine training 2016
	BELL 206 (5Y BCF)	Unserviceable due to engine low power after a complete overhaul
7	AB 206 (5Y – TPU)	All unserviceable due to ongoing KCAA certification process
	AB 206 (5Y REC)	All unserviceable due to ongoing KCAA certification process
	AB 206 (5Y RPU)	All unserviceable due to ongoing KCAA certification process
	AB 206 (5Y NPX)	All unserviceable due to ongoing KCAA certification process
8	AS 350 (5Y CDT)	Crashed 2012
9	AW 139 (5Y NPW)	Crashed 2020
10	AW 139 (5Y PEU)	Unserviceable awaiting a 1200-hours and 4-year inspection
	AW 139 (5Y NPS)	Crashed in 2016
	AW 139 (5Y DIG)	Handed over to NASD in 2023 vide letter from the Head of Public Service
11	MI17 (5Y UKW)	Crashed in 2009
	MI17 (5Y EDM)	Unserviceable due to one engine having low power
	MI17 (5Y SFA)	Handed over to NASD for overhaul in 2021
	MI17 (5Y STA)	Unserviceable awaiting overhaul
	MI17 (5Y DCI)	Unserviceable awaiting overhaul

Source: NPSAW

Findings

178. It is not in doubt that NPSAW is a critical asset in the operations of NPS. Besides the air support transport and communication, the Air Wing was established for NPS reconnaissance operations, a critical component of police work. The transfer of the Air Wing to NASD has hampered its operations and affected capacity in flight operations.
179. Whereas the idea of pooling together for effective and economical utilisation of expensive national assets like aircraft - as other countries have done - is laudable, the Taskforce finds that NPS, an independent security organ with a clear and unshared constitutional mandate to maintain internal security, cannot effectively utilise the Air Wing when its operations are under or controlled by another organ.
180. As would be expected, placing the Air Wing under the National Air Support Department (NASD) led by a KDF officer has created control and command challenges. The Taskforce

was informed of instances when injured police officers have had to wait for hours for air rescue. The Taskforce also heard that, as a result of the merger, NPS pilots have been rendered redundant.

181. The Taskforce noted Gazette Notice Supplement No. 19 of February 18, 2022 stating that NPSAW aircraft be maintained and operated under the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) regulations. KCAA has been regulating NPSAW through its various stakeholders to make sure safety requirements are strictly observed. The Taskforce notes that NASD is not regulated by the KCAA, who issue licences held by police pilots and engineers who maintain facilities.
182. Moreover, the Taskforce notes that there is no established legal framework governing the structures and operations of NASD. It is unclear whether NASD is regulated by the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA), the body responsible for ensuring that all non-military aircraft adhere to the requisite safety standards.

Recommendations

183. While reports of poor management, technical failures to maintain and operate the Police Air Wing may have prompted the decision to transfer its management to NASD, appropriate measures should have been taken to address the said failures as opposed to transferring the Air Wing to another agency. The Taskforce, therefore, recommends that:
 - (a) The Police Air Wing should be restored to the exclusive control and management of NPS forthwith;
 - (b) In order to address the reported issues that led to the transfer of the NPSAW:
 - (i) NPS should review the policies and operations of NPSAW to be anchored in a specific legal framework, including the use of and access to police aircraft;
 - (ii) NPSAW policies should set out mandatory requirements to adhere to KCAA standards on maintenance and airworthiness, including qualification, training, and relevant accreditation of professionals working in NPSAW;
 - (iii) NPSC and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission should ensure proper and competitive terms of remuneration for professionals involved in the running and maintenance of police aircraft in)
 - (c) NPSAW should be decentralised to the regional level for purposes of supporting police operations;
 - (d) NPSAW should consider leasing of aircrafts to supplement its needs; and
 - (e) National Treasury and Parliament should ensure the provision of adequate resources and budget support for the effective and optimal operation of NPSAW.

3.11 Marine Police Unit

184. The Marine Police Unit is established under Chapter 7 of the Service Standing Orders as a Specialised Unit under Kenya Police Service. The functions of the Marine Police Unit as set out in the SSOs include:
 - (a) Gathering and assessing information with respect to security threats and exchanging such information with appropriate contacts in Government;
 - (b) Requiring the maintenance of communication protocols for ship and fort facilities;
 - (c) Preventing unauthorised access to ships, port facilities and other restricted areas;

- (d) Preventing the introduction of unauthorised weapons, incendiary devices or explosives to ships or port facilities;
 - (e) Providing means for raising the alarm in reaction to security threats or security incidents;
 - (f) Requiring ship and port facility security plans based upon security assessments; and Requiring training drills and exercises to ensure familiarity with security plans and procedures.
185. On November 16, 2018 the government established the Kenya Coast Guard Service (KCGS) through the Kenya Coast Guard Service Act, 2018. After the establishment of KCGS, the assets and personnel of the Marine Police Unit were transferred to KCGS, which in turn operates under the Ministry of Interior and National Administration.
186. The functions of KCGS as set out under section 8 of the KCGS Act 2018 include:
- (a) to enforce maritime security and safety;
 - (b) enforce pollution control;
 - (c) enforce prevention of trafficking of narcotic drugs, prohibited plants and psychotropic substances;
 - (d) enforce prevention of trafficking of illegal goods;
 - (e) enforce prevention of trafficking of illegal firearms and ammunitions;
 - (f) enforce sanitation measures;
 - (g) prosecute maritime offenders;
 - (h) port and coastal security;
 - (i) search and rescue;
 - (j) protection of maritime resources including fisheries;
 - (k) protection of archaeological or historical objects or sites; and
 - (l) perform any other function that may be conferred by this Act or any other written law.
187. The Act requires KCGS to cooperate with and assist other public authorities during emergencies or disasters, or in the execution of those public authorities' mandates in the territorial waters. The Act further states that the National Security Council may deploy the disciplined and uniformed component of the Service to support the Kenya Defence Forces in times of war.
188. The Taskforce heard submissions from NPS, KCGS, Ministry of Interior and National Administration and other stakeholders over the issue. NPS was of the view that the transfer of assets and personnel of the Marine Police Unit to KCGS has hampered police operations in combating crime as the Service no longer has any operable boats. NPS indicated that they had lost command of the coastal and inland waters as a result.
189. The Taskforce was also informed that the transfer has affected training as no marine training or capacity building has been conducted in the NPS Marine Training School, Mokowe, since 2019, leaving the trainers feeling redundant and demoralised. The Taskforce notes that there have been recent changes in the leadership of KCGS, which is now led by a senior police officer.
190. On the other hand, the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and National Administration informed the Taskforce that KCGS is a multi-agency Service with officers drawn from the

disciplined and uniformed component as well as the civilian component. Among the agencies from which the Service draws officers with requisite specialised skills are the KDF, National Intelligence Service, NPS, Kenya Revenue Authority, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service, and Kenya Maritime Authority, among others. The aim of establishing KCGS was to pool the resources held within various government agencies that have statutory responsibility over Kenya's maritime affairs. These agencies are in charge of various activities, including exploration and exploitation of marine living and non-living resources; maritime commercial activities; defence and security; conservation and management of the marine resources; and enforcement of customs, fiscal, immigration, shipping, and sanitation laws.

191. The Cabinet Secretary further submitted that the Government was in the process of enhancing the capabilities of KCGS to cover an expanded geographical area. Since the establishment of KCGS, there has been improved surveillance of Kenya's territorial waters. Additionally, there has been enhanced coordination and improved response in search and rescue operations. A functional and effective KCGS will secure Kenyan territorial waters, enhance safety and promote proper and optimal utilisation of maritime resources for the prosperity of Kenya's Blue Economy.

Findings

192. The Constitution vests in the National Police Service, the Kenya Defence Forces, and the National Intelligence Service with their respective roles. Specifically, the Constitution vests NPS with the role of enforcing the law against persons and investigating offences and under the command of the Inspector-General. On the other hand, Article 241 of the Constitution provides that KDF is responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. KDF may be deployed to restore peace in any part of the country or cooperate with other security agencies during situations of emergency or disaster. The Constitution also vests the National Intelligence Service with the responsibility for intelligence and counter-intelligence in order to enhance national security in accordance with the Constitution.
193. However, KCGS has been formed as a multi-agency unit consisting of the various security sector institutions. The KCGS Act states that the main purpose of this multi-agency approach is to coordinate and encourage cooperation with different agencies in the performance of functions in territorial waters.
194. The complex and multi-faceted nature of challenges faced by the State in territorial waters requires a multi-agency response from the institutions that have been brought together under the KCGS structure. This will ensure cohesive responses to threats and also provide a platform for international cooperation in areas of security and other commitments regarding the security of territorial waters against threats such as terrorism and drug trafficking. For instance, in 2021, the United States Government began a two-year funding programme to build the capacity of KCGS.
195. Accordingly, while the implementation of KCGS structures has rendered the Marine Police Unit redundant, the Taskforce notes that: one, the Marine Police Unit and the KCGS cannot exist concurrently; and two, formation of KCGS was necessary for effective security in Kenya's territorial waters and in meeting Kenya's regional and international commitments regarding the security of territorial waters.

Recommendations

196. Against this background, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) The Inspector-General and the Director General of KCGS should develop structures and procedures for engagement between the Border and Sea Operations Team (BORSOPTS), the Border Police Unit currently responsible for Kenyan sea and water borders and KCGS; and
- (b) KCGS should develop multi-agency standard operating procedures to be adopted by all law enforcement agencies in addressing insecurity in Kenya's brown and blue waters.

3.12 Traffic Police Unit

- 197. Section 54 of the NPS Act provides that the National Police Service shall regulate and control traffic and keep order. Specific responsibilities include prevention of obstruction in public places during assemblies, meetings and processions on public roads and streets, among other events. Section 65 of the Act further vests NPS officers with the general duty of maintenance and preservation of law and order along roads, streets or public places generally. The Act vests the head of the Kenya Police Service in the county with a duty of supervising law and order along roads, including keeping a record of the erection of road barriers, and accountability to the public in the performance of this function.
- 198. The Traffic Police Unit is established under Chapter 7 of the National Police Service Standing Orders. It undertakes functions including ensuring free flow of traffic; prevention of traffic accidents; investigation of accidents; enforcement of the law; and initiating public sensitisation on road safety. The SSOs provide, under Chapter 23, that traffic control is directly under the responsibility of DIG-KPS, while the responsibility to enforce and ensure traffic control duties are undertaken by the designated GD police officers under the County Commander.

Figure 3. 2: Traffic Department organisational chart





Figure 3. 3: Traffic Department command and control structure



199. On the other hand, the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA), established under the NTSA Act, 2012, advises and makes recommendations to the Cabinet Secretary on matters relating to road transport and safety, the implementation of policies relating to road transport and safety, plans, manages and regulates the road transport system, ensures the provision of safe, reliable and efficient road transport services, and administration of the Traffic Act.
200. The administrative functions of the NTSA under the Traffic Act, 2012, include the registration and licensing of motor vehicles and trailers, and the licensing of drivers. NTSA is also required to keep records of all motor vehicles and trailers registered in Kenya, and the persons licensed as drivers.

Submissions from the public and stakeholders

201. The Taskforce reviewed literature, conducted public hearings, and received memoranda from key stakeholders, including NTSA. The Taskforce notes, however, that there was no formal participation or submission of views by the Traffic Police Unit. Only one traffic police officer participated in one of the county fora during stakeholder hearings.
202. During the county public and stakeholder hearings and deliberations, there were overwhelming views and concerns expressed about corruption in the Traffic Police Unit and the harassment of motorists who refuse to “cooperate” with the unit on public roads. An example was cited of motorcycle or *boda boda* operators across the country. While many of the motorcycles are impounded on legitimate grounds, many more are impounded for failure to pay bribes to traffic police. This has led to a pileup of many motorcycles in many police stations across the country on trumped up charges against riders and other motorists.
203. The National Police Service Anti-Corruption Strategy of 2016 acknowledges the widespread corruption in the Service, generally, but also mentions the special case of the Traffic Unit. More significantly, the strategy noted that a vast majority of the officers deployed to the Traffic Police Unit have received no training and have limited knowledge of traffic management and operations.
204. Traffic Police has also, for a long time, remained a parallel Unit outside of the control of ward and sub-county commanders. While it was formally placed under the ward and sub-county commanders, there is still no clear command structure in the Traffic Police Unit, especially at the station level. In most cases, the practice is that the Traffic Base Commander reports to the County Commander, and the chain goes up to the Regional Traffic Commander and the Traffic Commandant at the Traffic Police Unit headquarters. This parallel chain of command is deliberate and is reportedly used for the channelling bribes all the way to the top echelons of the NPS leadership.
205. The Taskforce was informed that in some cases, the confusion in command, and the competition for bribes on the roads prompts the erection of roadblocks (always in close proximity to each other), which are manned by the local traffic unit and the station commander, respectively. It was noted that in many cases, the station commander surrenders the official station vehicle, which is usually parked at the roadblock and used to aid in the collection of bribes instead of performing other priority duties. This has led to the proliferation of roadblocks across the country, with reports that there are as many as 42 roadblocks along the Mombasa-Busia highway. In some regions, such as Busia, Taskforce members observed during the field visits that there was a police roadblock on the road after every 10 kilometres. It is also a matter of public notoriety that weighbridges across major roads are “toll stations” literally, with officers craving an opportunity to be deployed there.

206. At a typical police station, there is a separate Occurrence Book (OB) for traffic offences, and another for other offences reported, which further blurs the lines of accountability at the station level. Members of the public informed the Taskforce that police cash bail collected from motorists who are bonded on the roads to appear in court are hardly refunded even after conclusion of their matters.
207. The Traffic Police have lost credibility in the eyes of the public. During the police vetting exercise, members of the public heard about police officers in the Traffic Unit who had large sums of money in their bank accounts and whose mobile money transaction records had similarly huge sums that they could not account for. It is also significant that despite the reported cases of corruption in this unit, not a single officer has been dismissed from the Service for engaging in bribery on the roads. This very fact points to leadership failure or possible complicity of the NPS leadership in this vice.
208. IPOA noted that it has encountered hostility and resistance from all the levels of the NPS whenever it attempts to investigate corruption in the Service.
209. It was further submitted that drugs, counterfeit goods, and weapons trafficking is enabled by corrupt traffic officers who receive bribes and allow free passage of these items, which are not only outlawed but are harmful to the public.
210. In its submissions, NTSA noted that enforcement of traffic rules and regulations remains a major challenge, mainly because the enforcement is inconsistent, manual, and its actions are reactive.
211. NTSA specifically noted the limited use of technology by NPS in traffic law enforcement. Officers often do not have the means to verify the status of vehicles and drivers due to the lack of appropriate technology and equipment. It was further noted that the current enforcement approach is prone to corruption and inefficiency, which has resulted in poor road safety standards and performance.
212. Poor management of data and information has negatively impacted on the quality of decisions made on the management of road safety standards. NTSA noted, for instance, that the poor quality of data of road accidents has resulted in the characterisation of causes of over 90 per cent of road accidents as either “human behaviour” or “unknown”.
213. NTSA also noted that the heavily manual process results in delays and inconveniences at traffic checkpoints, thereby occasioning losses and high costs of business along transport corridors.
214. NTSA made the following proposals with regard to reform of the Traffic Police and management of road traffic generally:
- (a) The Traffic Police should be domiciled within the NTSA structure and be renamed the Traffic Enforcement Directorate of NTSA, and an officer in the rank of Inspector be seconded to the Authority to head the section and coordinate police officers assigned the role of traffic enforcement;
 - (b) There is need to automate the traffic and road safety enforcement procedures, including speed cameras installed along all the roads and highways to automatically pick violations relating to speeding, driving on the wrong side of the road, lane violations, stalled objects, and pedestrian detections;
 - (c) There is need to ensure that enforcement includes imposition of demerit points and instant fines to improve driver behaviour and compliance;

- (d) There is need to establish a Road Safety Fund, to be partly funded by vehicle registration, motor vehicle transfer, driver testing and licensing fees, as well as penalties and fines, among other sources, to be used to facilitate road safety programmes; and
- (e) There should be capacity building and training for enforcement officers who should be equipped with patrol cars and appropriate technology to enforce road safety rules and standards.

Findings

- 215. The Taskforce noted the serious concerns, especially the perception that the Traffic Police as corrupt and lacking in basic competencies for public service. Surveys and reports by Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), the Afrobarometer, and organisations such as Transparency International as well as media reports highlight cases of harassment and bribery on the roads from various parts of the country.
- 216. Abuse of power by traffic police officers who, without reason, arrest motorists, and impound their vehicles to extort bribes, is commonplace. Indeed, the Taskforce is alive to several incidents that have been reported in the media of officers harassing motorists openly collect bribes in the streets. It cannot be gainsaid that they have been the subject of memes in social media spaces. Indeed, the Taskforce noted the many vehicles and motorcycles impounded and parked at police stations in various parts of the country as emblematic of the menace. Studies and analyses show that corruption takes different forms, such as giving money and inducement to depart from the right course by means of words, threat, blackmail, and by friendship, among others. The problem is that corruption has taken root in the Traffic Police, leading to the widespread flouting of laws and rules, resulting in frequent accidents. The Taskforce further notes that there is no specific guideline on assigning officers traffic duties. There are no standards regarding essential aspects, such as training and deployment for traffic duty. Instead, deployment to the Traffic Unit is based on favouritism, with officers overstaying in this “lucrative” department.
- 217. The Taskforce further observes that the corruption allegations against the Traffic Police Unit are deeply rooted to the extent that high ranking officers in the unit obtain a ‘cut’ from the bribes collected. In the Taskforce’s view, the bribes collected on the roads are sanctioned by senior police commanders further compounding the issue of corruption. This, the Taskforce, notes, is of serious concern and needs urgent attention in terms of reforms. Otherwise, the transport sector will continue experiencing accidents because of non-adherence to the traffic law regime.
- 218. Officers also receive bribes to look the other way as weapons, counterfeit goods, and hard drugs are smuggled across the regions, all of which endanger the lives of many people and increase the levels of crime.

Recommendations

- 219. The transport sector is critical to the sustainable growth of any economy. It enables the mobility of essential goods, human capital, and other materials that enable economic and business activity. The current breakdown and crisis in road traffic management as a result of ineptitude and corruption not only continues to endanger lives but also affects the economy and development of the country. In view of this, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) The DIG Kenya Police Service should disband the current Traffic Unit, and reconstitute a Traffic Control Unit that will operate on the basis of integrated and automated intelligent traffic control system;
- (b) All officers under the current Traffic Police Unit, and those who have previously served under the Unit should not be redeployed to the new Traffic Control Unit or any other traffic management duties or functions.
- (c) The DIG should also integrate and align traffic management and operations under a unified command. Traffic management command and operations should be at the police station under the Officer Commanding Station (OCS), whose mandate should include commanding traffic bases within their respective area of operation;
- (d) NTSA and the Service should embrace an automated and integrated system of traffic management and operations. The system will entail components such as CCTV cameras, speed cameras, traffic lights, facial and number plate recognition, and associated smart technology on all public roads to monitor vehicle movements;
- (e) Other components of the system should include: e-tickets and automated payment of fines for traffic offences, as well as a system for tracking offences by drivers as done in some other jurisdictions; and
- (f) The NPS leadership should ensure removal of all static roadblocks in the country and their substitution with mobile police patrol.

3.13 National Police Reservists

- 220. The definition of a “police officer” under section 2 of the National Police Service Act, 2011, includes reservists. The Act further establishes the National Police Service Reserve, and provides for its composition, functions, command structure, its relationship with the regular Service, deployment and calling, issuance of certificates, duration of service, disciplinary powers, and payment of allowances, among others
- 221. The NPS Reserve may be deployed in Kenya to assist the Kenya Police Service or the Administration Police Service in their respective mandates, including the maintenance of law and order, preservation of peace, protection of life and property, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of offenders and enforcement of all laws and regulations with which the Service is charged
- 222. The NPS Act requires that police reserve officers be provided with proper uniform, service identity cards and weapons, and to be deployed in specific areas, with defined command and supervision structures, and to undergo vetting and training before deployment. A person serving as a NPR is bound by the same requirements as a police officer, and is supervised by the Service. The Act obligates the IG to train police reserve officers to ensure that they are conversant with the relevant provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws.
- 223. While NPSC is obligated by the NPS Act to keep, maintain and update a database of NPR Officers, all current records are maintained at the Office of the IG. Table 3.6 provides the NPR nominal roll as at August 30, 2023. There are over 6,013 NPR officers. Nairobi County has the lowest number of NPR officers (8), followed by Elgeyo Marakwet (30) and Kitui (68). Turkana County has the highest number of NPR officers (1,431) followed by Mandera County (1,123) and Wajir County (1,075).

Table 3. 6: Number of NPR per county

S/No.	County	Number
1	E/Marakwet	30
2	Garissa	616
3	Kitui	68
4	Lamu	420
5	Mandera	1123
6	Turkana	1431
7	Wajir	1075
8	Nairobi	8
9	Baringo	293
10	Laikipia	414
12	Samburu	535
	Total	6013

Source: Office of the Inspector-General, NPS

224. NPSC is required, under the law, to undertake the vetting of all existing NPR Officers to assess their suitability and competence, and any such officer who fails the vetting is to be discontinued from service. NPSC is also required to train the NPR officers and ensure that its members are conversant with the law and their operations. The National Security Council is obligated to determine the maximum number of NPR Officers. However, these measures have not been implemented.
225. During the public hearings, the overwhelming view from the public was in support of reservists and how a properly managed Reserve would, in a major way, support NPS curb insecurity especially in “forward” areas.
226. The NPS Reservists are currently paid an official figure of KSh. 5,000 per month. However, the Taskforce found that the actual figure paid to Reservists varies from one region to another. Ordinarily, the NPR members are paid after two or more months. Commanders usually collect the payment in cash, which is then paid to NPR members in parades in their respective counties. The Taskforce noted that there is no transparency in the handling of cash paid to Reservists.
227. The Taskforce was informed that NPR sometimes take sides in inter-communal conflicts and conduct themselves in an unprofessional manner.
228. In urban areas, NPR officers are mostly members of the business community and are issued with firearms to protect their businesses and families. The Taskforce was also informed that county governments sometimes take in trained NPR as members of their inspectorate without any clear structures.
229. There is no policy to guide recruitment, training, deployment, and management of NPR.

Recommendations

230. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations to address the challenges facing the National Police Reserve:
 - (a) The IG should develop, review, and assess NPR policies and regulations to ensure accountability and their effective management;
 - (b) The IG and the National Police Service Commission should consider automating the payment of allowances to members of the NPR in order to enhance transparency and accountability;

- (c) The IG should develop a clear structure for the NPS Reserve to provide for its command, disciplinary processes and measures;
- (d) The NPSC should immediately commence vetting of police reservists in line with the NPS Act to assess their suitability and competence;
- (e) The NPSC and Inspector-General should consider and implement the training programme for NPR designed by the Kenya National Focal Point for Small Arms; and
- (f) The IG should design, in line with the recommendations of this Report, appropriate uniform for the NPS Reserve, as well as issue and ensure adequate kitting of the Reserve.

3.14 Restructuring of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service

- 231. The Taskforce was required to assess the implication of the restructuring or merger of the Administration Police Service and Kenya Police Service on command and good order of the NPS and to further assess and propose the review of the reporting, command, governance and accountability framework within the Service.
- 232. The Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service are established under Article 243 of the Constitution as constituting the National Police Service. The National Police Service Act, on the other hand, spells out the detailed functions and responsibilities of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service under sections 24 and 27, respectively. Therefore, any reforms to the two Services, such as the one undertaken in 2018, should be guided by the constitutional and legal framework underpinning the existence and functioning of the two Services.

Historical aspects of the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service

- 233. The Kenya Police Service and APS trace their origins to the beginnings of colonial rule. While the Kenya Police Service was established to primarily focus on policing in urban centres and white settled areas, the APS, then originally known as the “Tribal Police”, was established to assist the colonial administration in policing and administration of native reserves.
- 234. At the end of colonial rule, the two Services were retained and maintained their separate functions. While APS remained closely tied to the Provincial Administration in the period after independence, Kenya Police Separate operated independently, and each had a separate command and governance structure.
- 235. Despite the separate structures and functions of the two Services, there were arrangements that allowed members of APS to join the ranks of KPS. In the years after independence, up to 1978, the highest rank for the APS was Senior Sergeant Major (SSM). This was later reviewed to the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police in 1987.
- 236. The foregoing conditions meant that for several decades after independence, no member of the APS could rise above those ranks. Any promotions beyond the capped ranks meant that any APS officer promoted beyond those caps automatically crossed over to the Kenya Police Service. This minimised command conflicts and rivalry since the Kenya Police Service officers were, in most situations, senior to those from the APS. At local levels, the APS officers worked closely with chiefs, providing police presence at community levels that was key to crime prevention, and also supportive of conflict resolution and peace building. While APS officers could arrest suspects, they did not have holding cells nor would they prepare charges for prosecution. Instead, they would hand suspects over to the Kenya Police Service officers, who would take up

investigations and possible prosecutions. This clear division of roles reduced conflict and rivalry between the two Services.

237. In the old Constitution, APS was under the command of the then Provincial Administration. Since the District Commissioner was the Chairperson of the District Security Committee, coordinating the APS and the Kenya Police Service did not present major challenges.

Constitutional reforms and unification of police services

238. As noted, the 2010 Constitution established the Kenya Police Service and APS as one Service - the National Police Service, under the unified command of the Inspector-General. Both Services are to be headed by Deputy Inspectors-General appointed in accordance with the Constitution and the enabling law.

239. Police reforms featured prominently during the entire constitution-making process. Kenyans called for a more accountable police service, and emphasised the need to have a Service independent and free from political interference, and a professional and capable police service that is citizen-focused in the delivery of services.

240. The command was, in particular, a key area of focus in the reforms process. Both the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (the Waki Commission) and the National Taskforce on Police Reforms (the Ransley Taskforce) had established that the command of APS by the then Provincial Administration had exposed the Service to personal and political misuse, and also compromised its professionalism.

241. The Waki Commission concluded that given “the revelations around the unlawful use of Administration Police (APs) around the elections, the fact that the current structure is inextricably linked to the provincial administration system, and many of the senior officers are not police professionals, integrating the APs into the Kenya Police Service is a priority activity.” (Waki Report, p.434) In other words, the Commission called for a complete merger of APS into the Kenya Police Service. The Ransley Taskforce delved further into the issue of APS command and took into account the analysis by the Waki Commission, among others. However, the Ransley Taskforce found that the public overwhelmingly opposed the merger of the Administration Police and Kenya Police. As the Ransley Report notes, the public views were based on their experiences with APS, which they cited:

“... as being friendly, less bureaucratic in dealing with complaints, more accessible to the people, among other positive attributes. Its grassroots nature that entails dealing with *wananchi* daily gives the Administration Police the unique advantage of policing with the community. Its role in conflict resolution as opposed to outright arrest and the supervision by the Provincial Administration officers who are trained in public administration has to a large extent influenced its less confrontational relationship with the people.” (Ransley Report, p.41)

242. As a result, the Ransley Taskforce concluded that “merging the two forces would be inappropriate given the fact that they have different mandates, training, face different policing needs and require different reforms.” (Ransley Report, p.42)

243. The constitution reform process found a solution to the relationship between APS and KPS. Under the 2010 Constitution, the two Services would remain functionally distinct but would constitute one national Service, the National Police Service under the command of the Inspector-General.

Post-2010 restructuring and 'merger'

244. The post-2010 policing architecture presented and revealed new challenges, however. The delinking of APS from the National Government Administration (formerly the Provincial Administration) meant that while the APS officers were present at administrative offices, they were no longer under the command of the chiefs. APS was now undertaking general duties parallel to those of the Kenya Police Service and were less often involved in their traditional areas of unique competence (community relations, conflict resolution and peace building, and general support to government functions).
245. The organisation of NPS constituent Services had created overlaps and duplication of functions from the national level, all the way to regional, county, sub-county, wards, and locations. The Office of the IG notes that this situation caused loss of synergy, competition, overlap, duplication, conflict of command and confusion to citizens.
246. The command structure had operational gaps at the regional level, which cascaded and replicated across the lower levels of command within NPS. There existed parallel and lateral commands of regional Kenya Police Service Commander, regional Administration Police Commander and regional Directorate of Criminal Investigations Commander that ran down the same way to the counties, sub-counties, wards and locations. Among the three commanders, it was not clear who took precedence as a majority were of the same rank.
247. At the community level, there were parallel police posts, patrol bases and camps separately run by the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service under the command of officers of the rank of Inspector, Senior Sergeant or Corporal, which overlapped and duplicated command. The allocation of resources was not optimal, and teams were operating in a disjointed manner.
248. To cure this, the government set out the National Police Service Transformation Policy, 2018, which formed the basis for restructuring policing. The restructuring was geared towards harmonising command and clearly defining responsibilities within the National Police Service. Specifically, it provided for the reorganisation of general duty police, reorganisation of police units and the reorganisation of command and control at national, regional and county levels, rationalisation and prudent utilisation of NPS resources, a programme for the accelerated development and modernisation of police stations, re-branding of National Police Service training institutions, facilities and police housing.
249. The Office of the IG states that the process of developing the policy was participatory and consultative, and included the participation of officers at all levels of the Service. The process also included relevant parliamentary committees. The restructuring and reforms were undertaken pursuant to the Transformation Policy and a presidential directive on July 17, 2018, which called for it in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
250. In summary, the restructuring/reorganisation integrated and merged all posts, camps and patrol bases formerly under the Administration Police Service and Kenya Police Service to come under one police station area of jurisdiction. It aligned police geographic/operational boundaries with administrative boundaries and created a unified command: Regional Police Commander (RPC); County Police Commander (CPC); Sub-County Police Commander (SCPC); Officer-in-Charge Police Station, and abolished the overlapping positions in the three services. Under the reorganisation of general duty police, 24,572 general duty APS officers were integrated into KPS under the command of the Deputy Inspector General, Kenya Police Service.

251. However, while the restructuring/reorganisation was undertaken, not all processes that were identified have been fully implemented. Majority of general duty officers are yet to undergo short refresher courses to equip them with police station work skills, building harmony of command, and strengthening bonding through joint passing-out parades and subsequent redeployment. Other issues such as the complete aligning of command and control among formed up units and the commands at various levels, modernisation, and recruitment to address identified establishment gaps in the Services. The Kenya Police Service was designated as the Public Safety and Security focal point while APS was designated as Protective Security lead.

Table 3. 7: APS and KPS formations and units policing focus area after restructuring/merger

S/No.	Formation/Specialized Unit	Policing Focus Area
1.	Security of Government Buildings and VIP Protection Unit	Protective Security
2.	Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit	Protective Security
3.	Anti- Stock Theft Unit	Protective Security
4.	Border Police Unit	Protective Security and Border Security
5.	Rapid Deployment Unit	Protective Security
6.	Presidential Escort Unit	Public Safety and Security
7.	Judiciary Police Unit	Protective Security
8.	General Service Unit	Public Safety and Security
9.	Diplomatic Police Unit	Public Safety and Security
10.	Railway and Port Police Unit	Public Safety and Security
11.	Marine Police Unit	Public Safety and Security
12.	Traffic Police Department	Public Safety and Security
13.	Kenya Police (K9) Unit	Public Safety and Security
14.	Tourist Police Unit	Public Safety and Security
15.	Kenya Airport Police Unit	Public Safety and Security

Source: NPS

Table 3. 8: Transformed strength of APS units following restructuring/merger

S/No.	New APS Unit	Strength
1	SGB/CIPU	8,280
2	RDU	4,000
3	BPU	6,000
4	ASTU	5,000
5	APTC/Training	1,500
6	Total (Inclusive of 2,500 former KPS Anti-Stock Theft Unit and exclusive to former APS who integrated to KPS General Duty)	24,780

Source: NPS

Table 3. 9: Transformed strength of KPS following restructuring/merger

S/No.	New KPS Units	Strength
1	General Duty Police (All units inclusive)	64,252
2	GSU	10,804
3	Total (Inclusive of 24,572 former APS General duty integrated into KPS General Duty)	75,056

Source: NPS

Findings

252. Despite the stated positive objectives of the restructuring, the Taskforce found widespread discontent among APS officers, who feel that the merger disadvantaged

- them at most levels. The officers from APS noted that the current ranking system (where Kenya Police Service heads are of the rank of Commissioner of Police while APS heads are Senior Superintendents of Police, and the same is replicated at lower levels in the county) disadvantages them. This is because the APS officers are essentially “outranked” at every level by KPS, giving the latter a bigger say in policing issues generally.
253. However, the Taskforce also heard from the Inspector-General that the current arrangement is meant to ensure good order, command and coordination between the two Services.
 254. Under the Restructuring Policy, APS was assigned Protection and Border Security while Kenya Police Service was given Public Safety and Security roles.
 255. With the public safety and security now principally a function of the Kenya Police Service, a policing gap has emerged at the community level, and more so in rural areas where the policing approach is not that traditionally associated with the Kenya Police Service of responding to crime incidents rather than the traditional APS approach of “policing with the community”. The absorption of a major fraction of members of APS into the Kenya Police Service and reduction of their mandate at county level to protection of critical infrastructure has significantly undermined the preventive (community-based) policing that APS has historically excelled in, leading to a significant escalation of crime thus undermining national security.
 256. While previous reports have called for a merger of police services, the restructuring caused confusion by effectively decimating the Administration Police Service as established in the Constitution. Relegating APS into formed up units equates it to the sub-units in other police services in the Kenya Police Service and the DCI. There is a feeling within APS that the Service has been reduced to units of the “Police” and has led to the loss of the identity of the Administration Police Service.
 257. While the IG has stated that the restructuring was consultative, the Taskforce was informed by many officers that they did not understand the purpose and process of restructuring and reorganisation.
 258. The Taskforce observes that unless the restructuring is revisited and APS finds its footing in the NPS as an equal partner in policing, the sibling rivalry that is currently prevailing shall continue to simmer, and may effectively hinder service delivery. In particular, the retention of all the ‘lucrative’ protective functions such as airports and the Central Bank by the Kenya Police Service continues to undermine the spirit and purpose of the restructuring.
 259. Indeed, under the NPS Act, the roles of the two Services are spelt out distinctly. Specifically, functions unique to the Administration Police Service (separate from those of the Kenya Police Service) include: provision of specialised anti-stock theft services; border patrol and security; protection of government property and critical installations; support to government agencies in conflict resolution and peace building; and support to government in the enforcement of administrative functions. Given its current establishment, APS is inadequately staffed to properly discharge these functions.
 260. The capacity of APS should be enhanced to enable the Service to perform these functions as envisaged under the current constitutional and legal framework.

Recommendations

261. The Constitution clearly establishes the two Services as separate and distinct, which together form the National Police Service. The so-called “merger” was, therefore, in

breach of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, which envisages distinct Services. Furthermore, the actual process of restructuring/merger was not subjected to public participation as required by the law. In the circumstances, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) The NPSC and the Inspector-General should carry out a reassessment of the roles and current capacity of the Administration Police Service in view of the significant numbers that were transferred to Kenya Police Service and to take appropriate remedial measures, including the redeployment of the over 24,572 APS General Duty officers who were integrated into KPS.
 - (b) NPSC and the Inspector-General should recalibrate the operations and duties of the Administration Police Service and the Kenya Police Service in order to align it with the relevant laws;
 - (c) The Inspector-General should establish structures (through regional, county, police divisions, sub-county, and ward/ location formations) to ensure that the NPS supports the National Government administration in the performance of its security functions through deployment of general duty officers with clear command and reporting structure as set out in paragraph 159(f) and illustrated by Table 3.4;
 - (d) This, and any future restructuring, should be guided by the Constitution and applicable laws, and should involve the National Security Council, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior, the NPSC and the Inspector-General.
262. Further to the earlier recommendations on reporting and the command structure, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations in order address the underlying issues:
- (a) The distinction between officers in the three Services should be maintained only up to the NPS inspectorate level. The coordination of the three Services at county and regional levels should be a matter of deployment/ allocation of duties that any NPS officer at that level can perform;
 - (b) NPS gazetted officers should be designated as NPS officers without affiliation to any particular Service;
 - (c) Gazetted officers should be subjected to the same training and standards and should, thereafter, be deployed for duty in any of the three Services; and
 - (d) Section 28 of the NPS Act, 2011, should be amended to establish the DCI as a Service – the Criminal Investigations Service (CIS) under the direction, command and control of the Inspector-General. The Criminal Investigations Service should further consist of the three-tier ranks published by the Cabinet Secretary.

CHAPTER FOUR: HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1 Introduction

263. It is common knowledge that human resource is the most important factor in all organisations. The importance of the human resource management and development cannot, therefore, be gainsaid. Professionalisation in any organisation depends on the handling of its human resource management and development. This is even more critical in the security agencies, which are labour-intensive.
264. Overall, the Taskforce has established that the handling of human resource management and development is at the root of most of the challenges facing the National Police Service (NPS), and especially corruption and poor service delivery. As such, a robust, effective and efficient management of human capital in NPS is critical to the performance, sustainability and growth of NPS. This entails the management and development of a stock of skills, attributes, knowledge and expertise critical to the optimal productivity of the Service. Effective human capital management entails the proper management of human capital from identification and selection, developing and maintaining skills, and proper facilitation to monitoring in order to have high levels of efficiency until eventual separation.
265. The Taskforce was required to review human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in recruitment, deployment, transfers, training, career progression, performance-based and competitive promotions, reward, exit and post-exit management; and recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy, professionalism and retention in the National Police Service.
266. The national values and principles of governance under Article 10 of the Constitution, Article 232 on values and principles of public service, and Article 244 on the objects and functions of NPS require the Service to maintain and demonstrate the highest standards of professionalism and discipline, to prevent corruption and to promote and uphold transparency and accountability. Furthermore, the provisions require NPS to comply with constitutional standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to ensure that its members are trained to the highest possible standards of competence and integrity, and have respect for human rights as well as fundamental freedoms and uphold dignity. NPS is further expected to foster and promote relationships with the broader society.
267. There is no doubt that the recruitment of the right persons as officers, provision of the initial and thereafter ongoing training and development, maintaining positive employee relations, managing performance, and ensuring compliance with relevant laws and regulations, can greatly enhance NPS service delivery.
268. The function of human capital management and development in NPS is vested in the National Police Service Commission (NPSC). Pursuant to the provisions of section 10 (2) of the NPSC Act, the Commission is authorised to delegate to the Inspector General the discharge of the functions of recruitment, appointment and promotion of officers below the rank of Superintendent. However, NPSC retains its primary constitutional mandate and is further required to oversee the exercise of those delegated functions.
269. There is a range of laws, policies and regulations that are critical to human capital management and development in NPS. These include the applicable provisions of the following:

- (a) The Constitution of Kenya;
 - (b) The National Police Service Act, 2011;
 - (c) The National Police Service Commission Act, 2011;
 - (d) The Employment Act, 2007;
 - (e) National Police Service Commission (Recruitment and Appointment) Regulations, 2015;
 - (f) National Police Service Commission (Promotions) Regulations, 2015;
 - (g) National Police Service Commission (Transfer and Deployment) Regulations, 2015;
 - (h) National Police Service Commission (Discipline) Regulations, 2015;
 - (i) National Police Service Commission (Vetting) Regulations, 2013;
 - (j) National Police Service Standing Orders;
 - (k) Career Progression Guidelines;
 - (l) Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual for the Public Service, 2016;
 - (m) Framework for Short Term Employment in Public Service, 2019;
 - (n) Guidelines on Establishment and Abolition of Offices in the Public Service, 2015;
 - (o) Guidelines on Managing Training in the Public Service, 2017;
 - (p) Human Resource Planning and Succession Management Strategy for the Public Service, 2017;
 - (q) Guidelines to the Staff Performance Appraisal System (SPAS) in the Public Service, 2016;
 - (r) Guidelines on Secondment in the Public Service, 2016;
 - (s) Induction Handbook for the Public Service, 2017;
 - (t) Discipline Manual for the Public Service, 2022;
 - (u) Human Resource Development Policy for the Public Service, 2015;
 - (v) Republic of Kenya, Public Service Commission, Performance, Rewards and Sanctions Framework for the Public Service, May 2016;
 - (w) Public Service Commission Guidelines for Implementation of Performance Rewards and Sanctions in the Public Service, June 2017;
 - (x) National Police Service Commission Training Policy;
 - (y) National Police Service Commission Examination Policy;
 - (z) National Police Service Commission Chaplaincy Policy;
 - (aa) National Police Service Commission Housing Policy;
 - (bb) National Police Service Commission Welfare Policy;
 - (cc) National Police Service Commission Counselling Policy; and
 - (dd) National Police Service Commission Conflict of Interest Policy.
270. The Taskforce received views from among others: the Ministry of Interior, the National Police Service Commission, the National Police Service, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, parliamentary departmental committees, the Public Service Commission, the Council of Governors (CoG), uniformed and non-uniformed officers, members of the public, and civil society

organisations. The Taskforce also reviewed the recommendations from previous taskforces and the status of implementation of those recommendations. In addition, the Taskforce considered HR practices in policing in comparable jurisdictions.

271. Additionally, the Taskforce received concerns that there is a serious failure in human resource management and development in NPS due to lack of leadership, corruption, lack of strategies or plans, poor or passive management practices, lack of motivation and ownership, and a communication breakdown within NPS. The Taskforce was further informed that where policies exist, they are largely ignored and are not implemented by those responsible. It was submitted that these issues have contributed to a decline in human capital management functions in NPS.
272. Indeed, despite many years of reforms, NPS has been unable to transform its complex bureaucracy, administrative services and managerial and policy decision making structures to redefine its role in the post-2010 constitutional dispensation. Modernising and reforming the administrative and managerial systems, including the management of human resources, is an essential component of the transformation of NPS.
273. The Taskforce was informed that the NPS institutional framework operates parallel and lateral policy planning and management, legal and administrative services, which have resulted in wastage of financial resources, human efforts and time due to overlaps in policy-making functions, duplication of administrative and managerial services, and lack of functional clarity. This malaise is occasioned by the lack of operational transparency between the directorates and departments in National Police Service, its twin services of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service as well as the Internal Affairs Unit. Majority of NPS organisational systems are yet to integrate or segment based on functions or administrative services, which has made the entire institutional framework complex, with multiple operations and management frameworks, reporting channels, authority, and accountability levels in the Service.
274. In the Human Resource Directorate, while NPS has retained HR professionals among its civilian staff, the Taskforce was informed that those officers perform a peripheral role. Critical human resource roles are left to uniformed officers with no special training. This has been a major contributor to the decline in human capital management in the Service.

4.2 Context and structure of human resource management

275. While the Constitution vests the human capital management and development function for the National Police Service in NPSC, the Service and its two constituent Services continue to carry out human resource functions. In its Strategic Plan (2019-2022), NPSC developed a structure for human capital management in NPS. That structure has, however not been implemented. NPSC has an approved establishment of 10,000 civilian staff to provide support to NPS, which has not been fully implemented. The current number of civilian staff at the NPS is about 1,313, which is insufficient to effectively perform the human resource function in NPS, necessitating the use of uniformed staff to perform non-core functions.
276. NPS has two parallel directorates dealing with human capital management and development functions. One is headed by a uniformed officer (who is not a human resource professional) of the rank of Senior Assistant Inspector-General and who is known as the Director of Human Capital Development based at NPS headquarters. The other is headed by a non-uniformed human resource professional who is referred to as Director of Human Capital Management and is answerable to NPSC but reports to the IG, as well as to Service commanders in NPS and the Director, DCI.

277. The uniformed director is responsible to the Inspector-General for all human resource matters, ranging from human resource development programmes, coordination of performance appraisals, interviews, goal-setting, preparation of action plans at the directorates, and welfare issues in the Services and directorates. The director represents NPS in agencies such as the National Police Service Commission, the Public Service Commission and Salaries and Remuneration Commission on human resource matters, and generally oversees the implementation of human resource policies and other administrative guidelines, strengthening linkages with stakeholders through various networking and collaborative mechanisms.
278. The uniformed director further guides staff development, including recruitment, training, performance management, discipline, welfare and other staff related matters. The Director also advises the IG and senior management on human resource policy and other statutory concerns, and responds to inquiries regarding policies, procedures and programmes. The uniformed director also partly manages pension matters for all staff.
279. The civilian director, on the other hand, manages the payroll for uniformed and non-uniformed members of NPS, and jointly with the uniformed director, manages medical insurance for uniformed and civilian members of the Service. The civilian director does not deal with matters of discipline, recruitment, promotions, transfers, and performance management.
280. The Kenya Police Service and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations both have directors of personnel, who are not human resource professionals but are uniformed officers from the rank of Assistant Inspector-General to Senior Assistant Inspector-General. The Administration Police Service has a Director of Human Capital Management of the rank of Assistant Inspector-General.
281. The Director, Human Capital Management and the Directors of Personnel in APS handle all duties related to human resource management, including transfers and deployment, preparation of promotion and interview boards, development, recruitments, retirement, resignation, removal and dismissal processing, discipline control, appeals to NPSC, secondment and attachments.
282. At the regional level, there is a uniformed officer in the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) or Superintendent of Police (SP), referred to as the Staff Officer, Personnel (SOP), who is expected to handle human resource matters. At the county level, the corresponding position is in the rank of either Superintendent of Police or Assistant Superintendent of Police, referred to as Staff Officer. The sub-county equivalent, referred to as the Staff Officer, Administration, is in the rank of either Assistant Superintendent of Police or member of the inspectorate.
283. These officers at the regional, county and sub-county levels usually implement the policies that have been formulated from the respective Services or the directorates at the Service headquarters. At the station level, the OCS oversees all human resource management matters. In practice, all these officers at the regional, county and sub-county levels only handle limited functions such as monthly returns. All substantive human resource matters are managed from headquarters, a practice that causes untold delays and suffering for officers and creates avenues for corruption and bribery.
284. In the course of performing these duties, issues emerge on recruitment, training, promotions, stagnation in the same rank for long periods, indiscipline, appeal cases,

issuance of certificates and remaining in a given area beyond what is provided for in the Standing Orders, Policies, and Regulations.

285. Human resource and administrative matters of non-uniformed staff, including retirees, are handled separately at the headquarters, a practice that also causes untold delays and suffering to officers and creates avenues for corruption and bribery.

Table 4. 1: Summary NPS Human Capital Development Directorate and its functions

Recruitment and Selection of Human Resource	Declaration of vacancies The budget Subsequent advertisement of such vacancies Short-listing
Employee Management	Placement Redeployment Records management Payroll management (IPPD.GHRIS) Welfare management medical, leave, discipline and conduct, secondments, attachments separation (exit, retirements).
Training and Development	Training needs assessment (gaps) Training projections Vetting and selection of trainees Induction, training and HR development Monitoring and evaluation (whether set objectives were achieved) Setting skill and competencies Identifying trainings with/without financial Implications
Career Management (growth)	Appointments Determining promotion requirements Establishment promotion vacancies Advertise Interview and selection
Performance management	Work planning (at all levels) Target setting (service and individual targets) Performance appraisals (Performance report) Rewards and sanctions
KPS, APS, DCI Directorate of Personnel	Managing personnel matters in regard to recruitment, appointments, secondments, confirmations, promotions, transfers, and discipline. Handling welfare of all officers of the Police Service. Preparing Career planning and development. Maintaining and reviewing strength and establishment in liaison with Human Resource Management section. Compiling and maintaining the Roll of Honour, Presidential and other Awards. Analysing administrative reports and preparing briefs for

	appropriate action. Coordinating and publishing Police Examinations Organising and coordinating the following events: Police Service Drill Competition Inter-provincial athletics competitions First Aid competitions (counties and regions) Other sporting events Dealing with legal matters. Coordinating Aids Control Programme within the Police Service Provide secretariat for: DIG's Conference Boards/Interviews Flag staff meetings Disciplined Services prayer day UN Peace Keeping Day
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Source: NPS

Recommendations

286. As stated, human resource is the most important factor in any organisation. The importance of the human resource management and development in NPS cannot, therefore, be gainsaid. The Taskforce, therefore, recommends that:
- (a) NPSC and the Inspector-General should develop proper policies for coordination and harmony between the directorates of personnel and human resource management;
 - (b) The officers in charge of personnel in NPS and its constituent Services must be certified HR Professionals to enable them carry out their HR management roles more effectively; and
 - (c) There is need to decentralise the HR function to the county and sub-county levels to take care of all HR matters such as pension processing.

4.3 Recruitment

287. The Taskforce heard that the recruitment process in the Police Service is largely based on corruption, cronyism, nepotism, and political influence rather than merit. A great percentage of slots in any recruitment process are allocated to the political elite, leaving only a few for merit selection. Those who enter through political influence sustain their places by remaining loyal to those 'they know' while those who are picked on merit sustain their place in the Service by granting favours to police bosses. This has resulted in cycles of exploitation and literally rendered NPS a cesspit for use, misuse and abuse at both institutional and personal levels.
288. Recruitment in NPS, which involves identifying, attracting, and selecting qualified individuals to serve as police officers is anything but legal. The requirements and procedures that are applicable in recruitment and are spelt out in the Constitution, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act, the Leadership and Integrity Act, the National Police Service Commission (Recruitment and Appointment) Regulations (herein after Recruitment Regulations), and the National Police Service Standing Orders (SSOs) are largely ignored.

289. NPSC was established, on the recommendation of the Ransley Report, to manage human capital in NPS, but as is evident from the recruitment practice in the country, the commission has not effectively dealt with the core issues regarding human capital management, including recruitment.
290. NPSC is responsible for the recruitment of all positions within the National Police Service, including filling vacancies for specific specialist positions and civilian functions within NPS. However, NPSC has often delegated the recruitment of all uniformed members of NPS to the Inspector-General of Police (the IG). In discharging that responsibility, the IG is bound by the values and principles of public service in the Constitution. These include: accountability, transparency, accurate information, appointments on the basis of merit and competitive recruitment, adequate and equal opportunities for men, women, and members of all ethnic groups, and persons with disabilities.
291. Even where the power to recruit is delegated to the IG, the process can only commence with the authority of NPSC, and is required to be carried out in accordance with strict criteria that are provided for in the regulations and the Service Standing Orders.
292. The Ransley Report recommended that the recruitment of police officers should be carried out by the Police Service Commission, with the District Security Intelligence Committees assisting in the vetting of potential candidates.
293. The Ransley Report prescribed a detailed process of recruitment that was to follow three stages of application to the NPSC: vetting at the district level, and passing of written and oral interviews. This was to be followed by a short-listing on the basis of the criteria for regional, ethnic, and gender balance. Medical tests would be completed at the Police College.
294. The regulations and SSOs require the National Police Service Commission to inform shortlisted candidates of their success and publish the results in the media, as well as invite complaints and comments on the suitability of the candidates. The regulations provide for a further verification of candidates' documents and admission into the college, and a certificate of appointment at the end of the training. As stated, the Taskforce heard that these procedural requirements are largely ignored.

Table 4. 2: NPS trends in total recruitment and exits from 2012 to 2022

	Year	Total Recruitment	Total Exits
1	2012	-	775
2	2013	6,947	666
3	2014	-	1,342
4	2015	9,730	1,050
5	2016	-	1,219
6	2017	9,542	1,323
7	2018	9,907	1,436
8	2019	-	1,796
9	2020	-	1,626
10	2021	5,089	1,696
11	2022	6,063	1,419
	Total	47,278	14,348

Source: NPS

Police, public and stakeholder views on recruitment

295. As a starting point, most stakeholders and some members of the public submitted that the current requirement of a KCSE grade D+ for recruitment as a constable in NPS is way too low. This has negatively affected the professional image and esteem of police officers and limited the quality of service that officers offer.

296. The Taskforce received views that athletes, sportsmen and sportswomen, musicians, and other similarly talented Kenyans are exempt from the minimum qualifications. Without a policy to regulate this process, it is prone to abuse during recruitment.
297. On the recruitment itself, the Taskforce received widespread concerns and complaints about the rampant corruption and bribery during selection exercises, with reports that slots are sold for up to KSh. 600,000 if not more. Specifically, the criteria for elimination during recruitment is not known to members of the public.
298. Other concerns included the need for standards during recruitment that can enhance sensitivity and professionalism. These include: failure of physical examination that is supposed to be carried out by recruiters of the same sex; lack of opportunities for raising complaints, and stickers for tracking the progression in the recruitment process.
299. Members of the public observed that the presence and participation of oversight bodies can greatly enhance the trust and credibility of the exercise. It was observed that in processes where the county security and intelligence committees provide oversight, recruitment exercises start on time, and there is a general adherence to laid down procedures, including access to emergency treatment and basic facilities and systems such as a complaints desk, light refreshments, and courtesy to candidates. Vices and malpractices were reported where there was no oversight on the recruitment process.

Findings and emerging issues in recruitment

300. Following the views received, the Taskforce is of the view that the current minimum requirement of KCSE grade D+ for recruitment as a Constable in the NPS is way too low. The complex security needs and the sophistication of today's criminals require a Service that is highly skilled, competent and professional.
301. The Taskforce notes that while NPSC is allowed to delegate some specified functions (including recruitment), its decision to donate the recruitment function to the IG wholesale without a mechanism for visible oversight of the process goes against the tenor and spirit of Article 246(3) of the Constitution.
302. The Taskforce has observed that the one-day manual recruitment process is extremely hurried and, in some instances, hinders transparency and promotes malpractices such as corruption, tribalism, and favouritism. On the other hand, the Taskforce acknowledges that a longer recruitment process without proper checks could facilitate further abuse. The current one-day process is, however, in violation of the provisions of the SSOs and the NPSC Recruitment Regulations. It is not well suited for the kind of careful and elaborate approach needed for a professional Service. The approach also goes against good practices as seen in other jurisdictions and is a regression from the comprehensive approach that had been established in the post-Ransley Report period.
303. The Taskforce found that the public as well as officers are convinced that recruitment into NPS is a corrupt affair with little regard for merit and aptitude. The Taskforce shares in this conclusion and is of the view that this corruption has significantly eroded professionalism and service delivery.
304. The Taskforce established that the National Police Service and NPSC do not undertake a pre-recruitment assessment of policing needs in the country. Yet security needs are always changing and the numbers and the kind of recruits and specialists needed should reflect those changes and be guided by data and analysis. Such an assessment may, for instance, determine that the country needs more criminal investigators than general duty officers and tailor the recruitment accordingly.

305. The Commission is required to ensure that the recruitment process takes into consideration gender, regional and ethnic balance in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the NPSC Act and the NPS Act, as well as the recruitment regulations that NPSC has developed on these diversity considerations.
306. The Taskforce notes that recruitment is conducted in every county and sub-county in the country to ensure geographical (and ethnic) diversity of those recruited. However, an analysis of available data by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) shows that the ethnic distribution of the numbers of officers in the Service is skewed in favour of some communities, a historical injustice that has led to the current disproportionate ethnic and regional profile of the Service. This is partly due to the fact that NPSC and the Service have not developed any strategy to enhance ethnic diversity despite the sensitivity of the issue.
307. The Taskforce notes that the questions of ethnic diversity in Kenya is always one of great public policy interest and a constitutional imperative. The NCIC data on the ethnic distribution of officers in the Service show that eight communities account for about 81.05 per cent of the Service members. This percentage is actually representative of the population of these groups to the country's population. NPSC and the National Police Service have developed a commendable criterion for recruitment to take into account the country's ethnic diversity. The concern in most of the public discussions is more about the perceived diversity gaps at the senior levels of the police leadership. The Taskforce is of the view that this is an area that speaks to the values of the Service as well as effectiveness in service delivery, and one where leadership is squarely expected from the IG, the police service commission and the Ministry of Interior.
308. A glaring illegality is that the recruitment process has not factored in the gender requirements as envisaged by the law and applicable rules. The 2022 gender composition of NPS shows that male officers were 86 per cent of the Service while female officers made up 14 per cent. There is no female in the top leadership of NPS as the Inspector-General, the Director of DCI, and the two Deputy Inspector-Generals are all male. The Taskforce noted that there is minimal representation of women in the senior levels of the police leadership, hence difficult to appoint them to the top ranks as IG, Director DCI, or DIGs. This could be attributed to the amendment of the former section 14 of the NPS Act, which deleted the requirement for having at least one person of the opposite gender among the three senior police commanders. Effectively, the Taskforce finds that the amendment was unconstitutional.
309. In a bid to strengthen the capacity of NPS, the Mutonyi Report had recommended the recruitment of university graduates who would follow a different curriculum and, on pass-out, be employed as inspectors. The report had also recommended the reestablishment of the national police cadet corps programme. Currently, three categories of members can be recruited: police constables, into higher ranks through a cadet entry scheme or as specialists, or civilian staff.
310. The recruitment of graduate cadets into the Service is riddled with controversy and has left many serving officers disgruntled. Whereas these cadets are expected to be the future leadership of the Service, the Taskforce heard that only the children and relatives of the powerful (including those of senior police officers) are picked through the cadet entry scheme, or as specialists, or civilian staff, thus undermining the vision of the Service.
311. The Taskforce has further established that the directors of human resource management and development (D/HRMD) in the National Police Service have minimal participation in the recruitment and selection process, and that recruitment has failed to take into

account the specific needs of various units within NPS. The DCI, for instance, recruits its officers from APS and the Kenya Police Service and not directly from the public. Given the areas of specialisation needed, such as forensic laboratory analysts, biochemists, lawyers, accountants, interpreters, procurement officers, document examiners, psychologists and ICT experts to deal with emerging crime issues, this presents a major challenge for the DCI.

312. There is a critical shortage of staff across the different cadres, units, and levels of NPS, and the shortage is more severe as more units are formed. For instance, the DCI is required to have 10,000 officers but has a strength of 6,000, and therefore works with a deficit of 4,000 officers. Eight (8) sub-counties do not have DCI officers. The non-uniformed staff and support services in the National Police Service are also understaffed and are virtually absent at the lower levels of the Service, especially at the county and sub-county levels.
313. National Police Reservists are recruited by the Kenya Police Service and deployed in counties prone to cattle rustling, banditry, and insurgency. There is no clear process for the recruitment, training, and supervision of NPR.

Recommendations

314. Any organisation is as good as the calibre of the personnel it recruits. To promote competence and address corruption and irregularities in the recruitment of NPS officers, the Taskforce recommends that:
 - (a) The entire recruitment process should be automated in order to minimise instances of corruption and abuse;
 - (b) The minimum grade for recruitment into NPS should be raised to C- in KCSE or its equivalent, in line with the views received by the Taskforce. The recruitment process should consider affirmative action in order to satisfy gender and ethnic/regional balance requirements;
 - (c) To address the challenges around immaturity prevalent in the entrants, the minimum recruitment age should be raised from 18 to 21 years.
 - (d) NPSC should withdraw its delegation to the IG of all the responsibility to carry out all recruitment processes. NPSC may, however, work with vetted NPS officers in carrying out recruitment;
 - (e) Recruitment should entail psychometric and aptitude tests in order to ensure the selection of suitable persons;
 - (f) Information on recruitment should be highly publicised in national and local information channels such community media, social media, and newspapers of national circulation, and the list of shortlisted and recruited persons published in a similar manner;
 - (g) Recruitment of cadet officers should be carried out with the objective of addressing future leadership needs of the NPS. In this regard, recruits for cadet training should have a minimum KCSE grade of “B”. Other officers from the Service may join the cadet training after attaining a degree and undergoing the requisite training in the Service;
 - (h) To be able to undertake relevant theoretical and practical training including field attachments to ensure competency in training and professionalism, the initial training for cadets should take not less than 15 months while the one for constables should not be less than 12 months.

- (i) The Auditor General should undertake a special audit immediately after every national recruitment process ;
- (j) The NPSC should develop a policy to guide the recruitment of sportsmen, artists and similarly talented officers; and
- (k) All recruitments should be based on approved staff establishment, staff plans, and succession management plans.

4.4 Posting, deployment and transfers

Current context and practice

315. The National Police Service has used the terms deployment and transfer interchangeably, as though they mean the same thing, apparently to avoid paying transfer allowances and to eschew having to seek the approval of NPSC as required by law. The NPS Act has not defined the term deployment. However, the NPSC, under its regulations, defines deployment as the temporary movement of an officer from one station to another to undertake a specific assignment for a period not exceeding three months. While the period of deployment can be extended by the IG, it cannot run for more than one year. This is a restrictive meaning that refers to operational deployment. The broad meaning of deployment includes HR deployment, where an officer is deployed for non-operational needs. On the other hand, ‘transfer’ refers to the relocation of an officer from the current duty station to a new one and the matters relating to the officer, including pay point, are moved to the new duty station.

Deployment practice

- 316. The NPS Act vests the Inspector-General with power to deploy officers of the rank of Superintendent and below, and does this with the help of the National Police Service Board, which consists of the Inspector-General, the two Deputy Inspectors-General, the Director of Directorate of Criminal Investigations and the Service’s head of human resources who advises the IG on matters related to distribution and deployment of staff.
- 317. The practice at NPS is such that the deputy Inspectors-General and the DCI effect the deployment on behalf of the IG. These functions are further delegated to the Director of Personnel within the Services while the civilian staff deployment is carried out by the Assistant Director, Human Resource.


Transfers

- 318. On the other hand, the power to transfer is exclusively vested in NPSC. The IG is mandated to ensure that all transferred officers are adequately facilitated and afforded adequate time to report to their new stations. The regulations provide for adequate notice for a transfer, proper timing of the month and year in order to allow for payment of allowances and other preparations for the officer. As a requirement, payment of transfer allowance is made before the transferred officer moves to new station.
- 319. An officer who applies for transfer on whatever grounds is not eligible for a transfer allowance. Regulations also provide that junior officers transferred to hardship areas at the management’s discretion ought to be issued with necessary clothing and equipment at the point of transfer and paid hardship allowance as per the Service Standing Orders. This is, however, rarely observed in practice.
- 320. Upon appointment into the Service, all ranks except the Inspector-General, the Deputy Inspectors-General, Director of Criminal Investigations, may from time to time be transferred from one station to another as the Commission may determine. But the SSOs and regulations are clear that neither transfer nor deployment shall be used as a

disciplinary sanction or as a reward. The Inspector-General and the Commission are required to ensure that, where possible, subordinate officers are not redeployed to operational areas after completion of their first tour of duty. Where a transfer is deemed to be a disciplinary measure or a reward, the Commission may revoke it and direct that appropriate disciplinary action be taken against any officer established to have participated in the transfer.

321. Further, transfers for non-uniformed staff are processed through a committee empanelled by the heads of human resources in the respective Services.

Figure 4. 1: NPS transfer and deployment rate per rank, 2016 to 2022



Source: NPS

Police, public and stakeholder views

322. Police officers informed the Taskforce that the NPSC Transfer and Deployment Regulations are not enforced in the Service and that transfers and deployment do not consider areas of specialisation within NPS. Many officers also noted that there are cases where officers have served in one station beyond the prescribed three years, with some remaining in hardship areas for as many as 15 years. The NPS records on transfers and deployments supplied to the Taskforce do not reflect this, a fact the Taskforce was informed is a deliberate omission or failure to keep proper records. The Taskforce observed that the long periods of service in hardship conditions have had a serious negative impact on the officers' social and mental wellbeing.
323. The Taskforce was told of the widespread misuse of the term "deployment", which is in actual sense a disguised transfer. This is reportedly done to bypass the payment of transfer allowances and other strictures in the law and regulations that apply to transfers. Police officers also advised that corruption and favouritism play a major role in determining who gets to be deployed to "lucrative areas". For instance, huge bribes are reportedly paid by officers who wish to be transferred to the Traffic Department. Corruption and nepotism in transfers and deployment have, in some cases, led to the posting of police officers to their communities where their work and objectivity are compromised.
324. While it was reported that there exists an automated HR management system that can facilitate fair deployment and transfers, it had not been implemented to achieve the desired results. Instead, transfers and deployments, especially to hardship areas, are used as a disciplinary measure, punishment or tool for sexual harassment in flagrant disregard of

laid down laws and rules. Again, there were reports of “transfer fraud” characterised by fictitious transfers that are manufactured purely for payment of allowances.

325. Furthermore, it was reported that deployment of officers from training schools to the field is not equally distributed and this has contributed to some regions being understaffed. There is a practice where new recruits are deployed to hardship or operation areas instead of seasoned officers who understand the terrain and conflict dynamics in such areas. The Taskforce found very disgruntled officers who have been kept in hardship or operation areas, such as Garissa and Lamu, for more than 10 years.
326. It was also submitted that the absence of transparent and well-documented deployment procedures for police officers during elections or unrest hampers positive community engagement and cooperation, which affects peace and good police-community relations. Furthermore, deployments of police officers as reinforcements, particularly during elections, is done on short notice without provision for funds to cater for the officers’ basic personal needs such as meals and change of clothes.
327. Police officers complained to the Taskforce that recruits with special skills are not always deployed to units or sections where their skills are needed. Female officers, it was added, are not equally distributed across the country but are, especially those who are willing to offer sexual favours, concentrated in urban areas.

Findings and emerging issues on deployment and transfers

328. The Taskforce notes that in spite of the regulations and policies developed to manage transfers and deployments, NPS has continued the practice of punitive and unfair transfers and deployments, consequently undermining professionalism and the morale of its officers.
329. The Taskforce was, in particular, shocked by the inhumane practice of keeping officers in hardship and operational areas beyond the prescribed period of three years, and in some cases for a decade -- if not longer. This is mainly because NPSC, which is mandated to approve the transfer of officers has effectively neglected its responsibility, leading to the current situation where officers feel abandoned by the Service.
330. From the field, the Taskforce received complaints that recruits with no experience are posted to hardship areas for prolonged periods. And some of those, due to their inexperience, have been killed in the line of duty. Further, such recruits do not get the opportunity to establish families, which affects their psychosocial and mental wellbeing.
331. The Taskforce has established that the failure to automate HR management process is a deliberate measure to allow for the unaccountable and unethical practices with respect to deployments and transfers.
332. There is no linkage between the performance of recruits during their training and their deployment. Trainers are not consulted on the talents and skills of recruits, leading to a mismatch in skills and undermining professionalism in the Service.

Recommendations

333. The National Police Service has used the terms ‘deployment’ and ‘transfer’ interchangeably as though they mean the same thing. The NPS Act has not defined the term deployment. However, NPSC regulations define deployment as the temporary movement of an officer from one station to another to undertake a specific assignment for a period not exceeding three months. While the period of deployment can be extended by the IG, it cannot run for more than one year. This is a restrictive meaning that refers to operational deployment. The broad meaning of deployment includes HR deployment. To

avoid this confusion, and the unaccountable and unethical practices in transfers and deployments, the Taskforce recommends that:

- (a) HR deployments should be done by NPS officers with the requisite competence, skills, training, and experience;
- (b) No person should serve in one county for a period of more than 3 years unless they are deployed in the specialized units;
- (c) Regulation 9 (1) of the NPSC (Transfer and Deployment) Regulations should be amended to limit operational deployments to a period not exceeding six (6) months;
- (d) To curb abuse of deployments, any other movement beyond six (6) months should be considered a transfer and dealt with as such;
- (e) All deployments and transfers should be carried out through an integrated automated system for proper audit and accountability;
- (f) NPSC should ensure strict implementation of the SSOs that align all transfers with the school calendar; and
- (g) Because of their specialised training, officers serving in specialised units or formations should not serve in operational or ‘forward’ areas for more than five (5) years;

4.5 Training

Current context and practice

- 334. The Taskforce was mandated to examine all capacity building measures, including training curriculum, syllabus, continuous development trainings, and reward measures in order to recommend reforms, including incorporation of incentives for police officers especially those in the lower cadres to address professionalism, motivation and retention.
- 335. Previous taskforces underscored the centrality of training in police transformation. The Ransley Report had proposed the overhaul of all aspects of police training, including the development of a new curriculum and a restructuring of police training colleges.
- 336. The Ransley Report raised concern that the nine-month training period for the Kenya Police and Administration Police is taken up by field drills and parades, with limited time allocated to “intelligent” police training, which inculcates professionalism and competence in the Service. The report noted that the nine-month period was hardly enough to train a competent and effective police officer. The report called for the overhaul of the training programme in order to enhance the technical and mental capacity of the recruits to handle field challenges in modern-day policing, with central emphasis being placed on mental fitness and character formation.
- 337. The Ransley Report had further recommended that Commanders’ Courses should be re-introduced immediately and any officers who have been deployed as Officer Commanding Station or Division (OCS/OCPD) without having undergone the Commanders’ Course should be redeployed from station management until they successfully complete the course.
- 338. The Service has implemented the foregoing recommendation by offering a senior management course for senior gazetted officers and a middle management course for the inspectorate cadre, as well as a strategic leadership command course for other senior commanders.

339. According to the NPS Training Policy, the Service implements a basic police training curriculum for ordinary recruits and another for specialists and technical officers who join the Service through direct entry. After the initial training, officers are supposed to undertake other trainings appropriate to their specific responsibilities.
340. The National Police Service Commission approved the training curriculum for the initial basic training, the DCI training curriculum, and for the strategic leadership command course. However, the training curricula for the in-service training of KPS and APS cadets and the specialists are yet to be tabled for the Commission's approval.
341. The Service has also reorganised its training institutions to avoid duplication of mandates. In the 2018 reorganisation, the training mandates were streamlined and institutions renamed as follows:
 - (a) Kenya Police Training College (KPTC) renamed National Police College, Kiganjo Campus, to train Kenya Police Service officers;
 - (b) Administration Police Service Training College renamed National Police Service College, Embakasi (A) Campus, to train Administration Police Service officers.
 - (c) General Service Training School renamed National Police Service College, Embakasi (B) Campus, to train GSU officers;
 - (d) Senior Staff College, Loresho, renamed National Police Service Senior Staff College, Loresho Campus, to train senior officers;
 - (e) Senior Staff College, Emali, renamed National Police Service Senior Staff College, Emali Campus, to train middle level officers;
 - (f) GSU Magadi Training School renamed National Police Service College, Magadi Field Campus for tactical GSU training; and
 - (g) Border Police Training School renamed National Police Service College, Border Police Training Campus, for tactical BPU, CIPU, ASTU and RDU tactical training.
342. In order to keep NPS instructors well equipped to effectively deliver on their mandate, the NPS colleges routinely collaborate with other external partners such as the American Embassy, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the British High Commission, GIZ and other development partners who conduct training on various aspects of policing. Plans to have international training for instructors have not been implemented due to resource constraints. Regional Training Centres designated for training officers remain idle due to lack of resources.
343. Courses offered include the National Police Service Basic Training Course (PBTC), which is the initial training offered to police recruits upon their enlistment in NPS and introduces recruits to police procedures and basic practices. The course has been improved to cater for emerging issues such as devolution, emerging crimes such as terrorism and electronic crimes. Other specialised courses include: the corporal promotional training; the National Police Service/Platoon Senior Sergeant course; the Subordinate Officers to Inspector of Police (SOIP) Course; the National Police Service Special Subordinate to Inspector of Police (S/SOIP) for supervisory skills; and the National Police Service Station/Platoon Sergeant course that is designed to train cadet sergeants.
344. There are also various capacity building courses offered by NPS colleges aside from the foregoing continuous promotional courses. Successful completion of in-service training is a pre-requisite for promotion. Currently, the in-service training is being undertaken in

the various NPS training institutions, with nomination coming through the NPS promotions board.

345. These are all provisions on paper. In practice, however, the prescribed trainings are not carried out due to failure to prioritise resources and the resultant lack of funds. Regional Training Centres have been closed and the NPS training colleges are unable to handle current training needs. It is common knowledge among police officers and key stakeholders that the NPS offers very limited training. The blame and criticism are, in most cases, laid on the NPS without considering all the external factors that have contributed to the current situation.

Police, public and stakeholder views

346. The Taskforce received views on training from members of the public and other stakeholders. The Ministry of Interior submitted that, in the current fast evolving environment, there is urgent need to review the curriculum for police training to bring it up to date with modern policing standards. Echoing the ministry's view, IPOA cited the lack of continuous refresher courses and training, and insufficient resources in training colleges, among other challenges.
347. On their part, police officers submitted that the nine months' recruit training should result in professional certification. They complained that they are only given mere certificates of attendance, and decried the lack of regular refresher training. They alleged that the only regular in-service course offered, and to only favour officers, is generalised promotional training that does not address needs in the officers' areas of expertise.
348. Officers from specialised units noted that at times there are unit-based trainings by development partners but only their seniors in Nairobi attend them, thus adding little value to service delivery to the public.
349. The Taskforce was informed that there are instances where some well-connected recruits never attend classes during the initial basic trainings but they are allowed to graduate. Officers cited instances of some recruited athletes and artists who have been allowed to graduate without completing the basic training.
350. The Taskforce was informed that there is also overreliance on actors such as development partners and civil society to organise, conduct and fund trainings, which is not sustainable. They pointed out that the implementation of career progression guidelines has been slow and that police training institutions lack capacity to conduct continuous training due to understaffing.
351. The Taskforce was informed that trainers and instructors in police training are seriously demotivated since most of them consider their deployment as punitive. There is no proper training for instructors, no scheme of service for trainers and no established process for their selection.

Findings and emerging issues on training

352. From the views received and the material placed before it, the Taskforce wishes to place on record that limited, and at any rate sub-standard, training is offered to police officers.
353. There are no established criteria for identification and selection of instructors and trainers. Some instructors the Taskforce met at police training colleges, including the main training college at Kiganjo, confessed that they had no specialised training to be able to train competent police officers. Some had been dumped in those colleges as punishment for

- being critical on various issues, resulting in little or no motivation at all for what they teach.
354. Fourth, the training colleges have no proper training facilities. Besides being in a derelict state, with not even a coat of paint for many years, the training colleges -- including the Main Campus, Kiganjo and the APTC Campus A and Campus B in Embakasi -- lack adequate accommodation, offices for instructors, classrooms, training materials, and other essential facilities to cater for the large numbers of recruits they are regularly saddled with.
 355. Lastly, regional Training Centres have been abandoned and are no longer operational. Even with the current technology, no effort is being made to offer online courses.
 356. The result of this sad state of affairs is lack of continuous training, which has left officers poorly equipped to respond to the challenges of a rapidly changing security environment. The capacities of officers in units such as the DCI are significantly undermined by the lack of training that is relevant to their skills needs in line with modern technology and trends. The Taskforce notes that the National Police Leadership Academy in Ngong is yet to start performing its functions.
 357. Though the top leadership shares the blame for the lacklustre training of police officers, as pointed out in other parts of this Report, the government has not invested in NPS training for effective service delivery. The Taskforce was informed that the resources and budgeted funds for training in NPS are routinely reallocated to other activities or returned without being utilised. As a result, the limited specialised training courses offered are funded by development partners and civil society organisations. This achieves little and is not sustainable.

Recommendations

358. A professional is only as good as the training they receive. The government must be ready to invest in the training of police officers if it desires a professional Service. The Taskforce recommends that government invest heavily in the training of NPS officers. Continuous training is standard practice across all professions. NPS officers, who deal with sophisticated crime patterns and handle dangerous weapons, require rigorous and continuous training. The Taskforce regrets that the regional training centres have all closed because of funding challenges. The Taskforce analysed stakeholders views and makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) Police training courses should be duly accredited and conform to applicable international standards;
 - (b) The police training curriculum should be reviewed every four years to address emerging needs and areas;
 - (c) Regional training centres, including all shooting ranges, should be revived and continuous training resumed for all cadres of NPS officers;
 - (d) Continuous training should be available in all cases and not limited to promotional purposes as is currently the practice;
 - (e) The training period for police recruits should be extended to 12 months or more in order to cater for theoretical and practical aspects of modern policing, including a practical attachment component;
 - (f) Assessment and examination should include a written component, and officers should be awarded certificates and diplomas;

- (g) To avoid overstretching the training facilities and to effectively train, NPSC should carry out recruitment of a manageable number of officers based on the authorised establishment;
- (h) NPSC should ensure proper training and competitive recruitment of trainers for the police training colleges;
- (i) NPSC should develop a policy or guidelines on the training and development of non-uniformed officers;
- (j) NPSC should consider and adopt the draft training policy for NPR; and
- (k) NPS should consider establishing a National Police University. In the meantime, the National Police Academy should progress to becoming a constituent college of the National Defence University.

4.6 Human rights training

Current context and practice

- 359. The Taskforce was mandated to consider the integration or otherwise of constitutional human rights and fundamental freedoms in the training and curriculum for NPS officers, including application of international instruments ratified by the State. In addressing this mandate, the Taskforce collected views, received memoranda, and reviewed documentation in regard to the inculcation of human rights training in the National Police Service.
- 360. The National Police Service has an obligation to ensure that its officers remain updated in terms of human rights training. This is specifically important after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010, which drastically changed the legal atmosphere within which the Service operates.
- 361. Most importantly, it is through the new Constitution that the Police Force were remodelled into a 'Service'. There is therefore need to inculcate the spirit of constitutionalism and human rights in NPS training to ensure a full appreciation of the prevailing constitutional order and in line with international standards of policing.

Submissions from the public and stakeholders

- 362. The Taskforce was informed that the basic Police Constable Recruit Training has integrated human rights into the curriculum. However, the Taskforce noted that continuous training on emerging issues of human rights is poor and largely haphazard since most officers never access such training opportunities. It was also submitted that although NPS has trained some of its officers on matters of constitutionalism and human rights, there is overreliance on actors such as development partners and civil society to organise, conduct and fund trainings, which is not sustainable.
- 363. The public, and other key stakeholders submitted that failure to train the officers on the current national and international human rights contributes to non-observance of human rights hence the many cases of violations by the members of the Service.
- 364. Specifically, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights submitted that some of the periodically reported cases of human rights abuses by the Service may be attributed to lack of training on human rights. On that issue, the Commission submitted that there is need to integrate a Human Rights-based Approach to policing within the training curriculum at the entry level as well as for all other cadres. This can be achieved by

collaborating with likeminded institutions like KNCHR, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority and the National Gender and Equality Commission.

365. Likewise, IPOA made notable observations on the limitations in the police training on constitutionalism and basic human rights training. IPOA noted that the poor training results in the many cases of abuse of firearms and use of force by some officers, arbitrary arrests during public assemblies, the tendency by officers to see every assembly as a riot, and in some cases the failure to protect human life and property during public assemblies.

Findings

366. The Taskforce has reviewed documentation, submissions, and memoranda from the various stakeholders regarding human rights training, and inculcating the same in the National Police Service. It is the finding of the Taskforce that there is minimal focus on sustained and regular training on human rights and constitutionalism for police officers.
367. The initial police training course only has a small component on human rights training for recruits. Continuous training for officers is haphazard and largely dependent on the goodwill and support of development partners.
368. Further, the Taskforce concurs with various observations that the lack of regular and continuous police training on human rights significantly contributes to their troubled relationship with the public and the many reported cases of police excesses.
369. The Taskforce has established that human rights and accountability are largely seen by officers as irritations and hindrances to their effectiveness rather than the routine way of policing, and integral aspects of police work.

Recommendations

370. Given the widespread reports of cases of human rights violations, the general attitudes of officers towards human rights as well as the constitutional requirements that human rights and values be promoted in policing and security, the Taskforce recommends that:
- (a) NPSC should ensure that curriculum reviews include human rights training for police officers;
 - (b) NPS and IG should integrate human rights in the change management strategy of the Service; and
 - (c) NPS and IG should ensure that officers have access to continuous training on human rights issues.

4.7 Career progression/Scheme of service, reward, and promotions

Current context and practice

371. The Taskforce was required to review human capital management and development of policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in career progression, performance-based and competitive promotions, and rewards and to recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in NPS.
372. Career progression refers to the advancement and growth of an individual's career over time. It involves the sequential development and movement of an individual through different stages and ladders, positions, or levels within their chosen profession or field. Career progression within the National Police Service follows a hierarchical structure, starting from the entry-level position of a constable and progressing through various

- ranks. Promotions within NPS are ideally based on merit, performance, and the availability of vacant positions. NPSC evaluates eligible officers based on their performance appraisals, professional competence, leadership skills, and discipline record.
373. Further, the guidelines define career structures that will attract, retain, motivate and facilitate career development of police officers from entry to exit. They also provide job descriptions and specifications with clear demarcations of duties and responsibilities for all ranks within the Service, while infusing contemporary industry standards for public security officers both nationally and internationally.
374. The guidelines apply to uniformed members of the Service deployed within the Kenya Police Service, Administration Police Service, Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and the Internal Affairs Unit (*see Appendix to this Part of the Report for summary of the Career Progression Guidelines*).
375. In terms of rewards, NPS provides various incentives and benefits to its officers. These include salary increments, allowances, medical benefits, pension schemes, and access to training and development opportunities. Other acts such as exceptional performance, bravery, and acts of valour may also be recognised through awards, letters of commendation and honours.

Promotions


376. Promotions are conducted through a competitive process that may include written examinations, interviews, and assessment. Police officers often need to meet certain criteria, such as having a minimum number of years in service, possessing relevant qualifications and training, demonstrating good conduct and discipline, and meeting the performance standards set by NPSC to be eligible for promotion. NPSC has determined 15,285 promotions for police officers of all ranks since 2013.
377. The NPS Career Progression Guidelines set out the academic and professional criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, appointment and advancement in the Service. The guidelines are used by the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) as tool to evaluate the management and succession within various ranks of NPS. The initiatives and guidelines are geared towards professionalising NPS. They also set out minimum requirements for the consideration of an officer for an appointment or promotion to a higher rank in NPS. Besides the existence of a vacancy within the authorised establishment, the guidelines specify that advancement from one rank to another depends on one's ability and performance, as reflected in one's work.

Table 4. 3: NPS promotions from 2012–2022

	Year	PC	CPL	SGT	S/SGT	IP	CI	ASP	SP	SSP	CP	AIG	SAIG
1	2012	-	1,102	411	107	122	5	-	42	3	-	-	-
2	2013	-	1,041	320	56	65	224	-	104	48	-	-	-
3	2014	-	-	-	49	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	2015	-	821	191	76	450	376	106	2	52	4	1	-
5	2016	-	259	232	43	1,035	226	14	0	109	146	34	5
6	2017	-	502	273	143	506	607	139	5	1	13	26	2
7	2018	-	561	414	79	143	705	160	1	4	2	1	-
8	2019	-	313	568	232	411	79	182	153	47	30	15	14
9	2020	-	1,661	45	5	23	39	1	-	-	-	-	-
10	2021	-	1,072	515	203	517	596	55	139	122	64	21	8
11	2022	-	606	191	77	1,064	6	171	246	160	72	37	5
TOTAL			7,938	3,160	1,070	4,336	2,876	828	692	546	331	135	34
Proportion			36.2%	14.4%	4.9%	19.8%	13.1%	3.8%	3.2%	2.5%	1.5%	0.6%	0.2%

Source: NPS

Figure 4. 2: NPS promotion rate by rank



Source: NPS

Police, public and stakeholders' views

378. From the field visits and submissions presented to the Taskforce, it was noted that the NPS is faced with career stagnation, with officers remaining in one rank for even up to 30 years. In some cases, officers retire in the lowest rank in the Service, as constables, even where such officers possess clean records that qualify them to be promoted from one rank to another.
379. Officers pointed out that corruption, bias, nepotism, favouritism, tribalism and sexual favours feature prominently during rewards and promotional boards interviews. One female officer disclosed to the Taskforce that she had to offer a bribe and sexual favours for her to secure a promotion. Generally, it was established that the criteria used by the promotional boards to promote officers was unmerited and lacks legal safeguards. The Ransley Report had recommended that all boards carrying out NPS promotions should be audited by the National Police Service Commission to restore in them public credibility and confidence. The report also proposed the adoption of clear guidelines on promotion anchored on merit so as to reduce the perception of bias in the process.
380. The DCI submitted that career progression guidelines were developed but were never implemented, hence there is need to review the existing guidelines and implement them to meet the expectations of NPS members, especially to facilitate their promotion and career advancement.
381. NPS submitted that lack of a robust reward and sanctions policy has led to subjective rewards and sanctions. They attributed this to lack of an established performance evaluation committee in the Service.
382. Officers and stakeholders noted that NPS Career Progression Guidelines are in place but they have been largely ignored and are not implemented. This has significantly contributed to career stagnation and the failure to attract and retain specialists in the Service.
383. NPSC highlighted the need for promotional boards to adhere to the two-thirds gender rule during the promotions.

Findings and emerging issues

384. The Taskforce has established that the NPS has failed to implement the 2018 NPS Career Progression Guidelines. Instead, career progression in NPS is riddled with corruption, and favouritism leading to low morale among officers.
385. Lack of promotion and reward schemes to motivate police officers has had implications that have and continue to dampen morale and also weaken the productivity of officers in the Service. There is, therefore, need to develop and implement a robust rewards and sanctions policy, along with establishing a performance evaluation committee in order to inculcate the culture of effectiveness and accountability in the NPS.
386. Officers pointed out that there was need to for SRC to separate the job groups for Inspector and Senior Sergeant, including through the payment of allowances. The rank of Inspector is senior to that of Senior Sergeant but they are currently in the same salary scale.
387. Further, NPSC has not provided career progression guidelines for non-uniformed officers, nor has the Public Service Commission. They are not governed by any schemes of service and no guidelines are provided on how to fill vacancies and competitive positions for these officers. As a result, this cadre of staff has no promotions or any manner of career progression and feel abandoned and excluded.
388. Likewise, since there is no policy, there is no recruitment of the non-uniformed personnel to fill gaps left by those exiting the Service; hence the practice of uniformed officers performing non-core duties, thereby weakening the strength of the uniformed officers.

Recommendations

389. Every organisation must have clear guidelines for career growth and development if it is to motivate its employees. The Taskforce has established that NPS has a comprehensive career progression framework and guidelines. What is problematic is the lack of commitment to fully implement the framework and attendant regulations. As a result, promotions are reportedly based on favouritism, patronage and corruption. This has precipitated discontent among the officers. In order to address these issues, the Taskforce recommends that:
 - (a) NPSC should recall authority delegated to IG to administer promotions, abolish the promotion boards, and establish suitable structures and systems to guarantee open, transparent and competitive promotions;
 - (b) NPSC should ensure the professionalisation of the management of HR services by demarcating human resource functions and establishing boundaries between the roles of uniformed and non-uniformed staff;
 - (c) NPSC should also develop career progression guidelines and policies to guide the process of promotions for non-uniformed staff;
 - (d) All vacancies should be declared openly and filled competitively based on factors such as performance, length of service (experience), academic qualifications, training, integrity and continuous professional development, among other criteria;
 - (e) Artists and similarly talented officers should be eligible for special promotions with no command responsibilities;
 - (f) NPSC should address the issue of inspectors and senior sergeants sharing the same job group; and
 - (g) There is need for leveraging on ICT on matters of promotion.

Career progression guidelines/Scheme of service

390. The Taskforce established that the NPS Career Progression Guidelines that were prepared by police service commission are in place but they have largely been ignored in practice. This has significantly contributed to career stagnation and the failure to attract and retain specialists in the Service. To make matters worse, in practice, career progression in NPS is riddled with corruption and favouritism, leading to low morale among officers.

Recommendations

391. Growth in a professional and motivated NPS should be based on a clear career progression and advancement path that takes into consideration factors such as competence, integrity, relevant qualifications, skills and experience. The Taskforce established that the stagnation of junior officers in one rank, in many cases until retirement, is the source of widespread discontent and low morale in the Service. Given the earlier recommendation that those entering the service on the strength of secondary school certification should be capped at Senior Sergeant, the Taskforce recommends:
- (a) Introduction of new grades of Inspector I and II, Corporal I Corporal II and III, Constable I, Constable II, and Constable III Corporal III Corporal II and I (with each remaining as one rank with different job descriptions while maintaining the 14-tier structure);
 - (b) Ranks of Inspector I and II are introduced to ensure that the cadets are trained to be career police officers;
 - (c) Movement of the two ranks should be subject to established criteria in the career progression guidelines and the available vacancies in the authorised establishment;
 - (d) The National Security Council should harmonise the ranking structures across the security sector;
 - (e) NPSC should amend the 2018 NPS Career Progression Guidelines to incorporate recommendations herein and the NPS should forthwith implement them;
 - For one to occupy the rank of Inspector and above in the Service, one must have a minimum relevant qualification of a recognised undergraduate degree;
 - For one to be appointed into management and leadership positions at the level of Deputy OCS and above, the officer must possess a relevant minimum qualification of an undergraduate degree and appropriate leadership training;
 - (d) NPSC should develop guidelines on the relevant qualifications for the different positions in the Service;
 - (e) Any promotional vacancy occurring as a result of natural attrition should be filled competitively; and
 - (f) Given the expanded mandate and responsibility of a ward commander (previously OCS), the Taskforce recommends that the position be occupied by an individual in the rank of SP and deputised by an ASP, subject to transitional arrangements for the duration of one year.

Reward

392. NPS submitted that lack of a robust reward and sanctions policy has led to subjective rewards and sanctions. They attributed this to lack of established performance evaluation committee in the Service.

393. Lack of promotions and reward schemes to motivate police officers has had implications that have and continue to dampen morale and weaken the productivity among officers in the Service. There is, therefore, need to develop and implement a robust rewards and sanctions policy, along with establishing a performance evaluation committee in order to nurture a culture of effectiveness and accountability within NPS.

Recommendations

394. The Taskforce provides the following recommendations:

- (a) NPSC should develop a suitable performance contracting and performance appraisal system with reward and sanctions embedded in it;
- (b) NPS should introduce a reward and recognition scheme and strategy for rewarding excellence and exemplary performance, including support to participate in regional and international fora;
- (c) There should be complete automation of the process of application for recognition of merit. The information should be retained in the website for a certain period; and
- (d) NPSC and the Service should ensure that identification and nomination of deserving officers involves public participation.

4.8 Exit and post-exit management

Current context and practice

395. The Taskforce was mandated to review the terms associated with the exit and post-exit management of officers in the National Police Service as established by Article 243 of the Constitution of Kenya. The NPS Act provides that any officer may leave the Service by the modes prescribed under the Act or the regulations. Modes of exit include retirement from the Service on various grounds such as upon attainment of the mandatory retirement age, or on medical grounds, public interest, resignation, dismissal, and death.
396. There is generally a high attrition rate in the National Police Service for uniformed and non-uniformed officers. For example, in the year 2022, attrition took away a total of 1,462: with 387 exiting through death, 857 through retirement, 81 through resignation, four (4) through transfer of service while 129 were dismissed, and nine (9) were removed.
397. The SSOs, in taking cognisance that a police officer may retire before reaching retirement age, provides for the retirement on completion of 12 or 20 years of service. This provision has assisted the police officers who would like to pursue other interests or work for other organisations to leave without losing their pension.
398. Upon the attainment of 50 years, the SSOs permit a police officer to apply for transfer to the officer's home sub-county to enable them prepare adequately for retirement. However, this provision is rarely activated and, where it is, most officers are not transferred in good time thus leaving many ill-prepared for retirement.
399. The nature of police work is such that officers join the Service at the prime of their lives and are posted to far flung areas, meaning that by the time they retire, they are detached from their communities and homes and maintain few or no friends. All these, compounded with lack of reasonable retirement benefits, make their post-exit lives short and solitary.
400. In order to take care of the welfare of retired officers during in retirement and post-exit, the NPS Standing Orders require the Inspector-General, in consultation with the National Police Service Commission, to formulate a written policy on welfare and re-integration

of police officers who exit the Service; and to provide for access to medical facilities and security for members of the inspectorate; for redress from any adverse administrative decisions which an officer may have made in good faith during their tenure; for legal aid to retired police officers; and for services to be procured from retired and willing officers for training in police training colleges, and county training centres following such officers' specialisations.

401. There is an association of retired officers of NPS. The National Association of Retired Police Officers, Kenya (NARPOK) is composed of police officers who retired honourably from the National Police Service and is registered under the Societies Act. It currently has Chapters in 41 counties, with a projection of reaching the remaining six (6) counties. The Chapters provide a platform for promotion of the welfare of retired officers. The association has created a sense of community, with members supporting each other to adjust and seamlessly settle into their respective communities after retirement.
402. However, retired police officers still face various challenges, including access to medical care after retirement as there is no guaranteed access to medical facilities dedicated to the Service, and long winding procedures for those seeking compensation for injuries they suffered in the line of duty.
403. A review of the NPS Act reveals that all these challenges are as a result lack of exit and post-exit and retention policies and procedures that clearly define programmes for officers upon exit or access to medical support schemes. Unlike in the public service, the benefits which accrue to NPS officers are often not clearly defined. With no guiding procedure to apply for the known ones, there is often inordinate delay in obtaining payment of monetary benefits.
404. The National Police Service Commission's policy on training and development advocates mandatory pre-retirement training for all members of the NPS who have attained the age of 45 years to prepare them for life after the Service. This age is meant to enable officers wishing to retire early to be part of the training. The IG is also required to develop a pre-retirement training programme tailored to address the unique demands of NPS members.
405. The Ransley Report proposed that on the death of a retired officer, the local Officer Commanding Station or Administration Police Service equivalent should take charge of the funeral arrangements to ensure an honourable send-off for the deceased officer. A budgetary provision should be made for this purpose. Unfortunately, this has not been established. While the PSC Human Resource Manual provides for the transport support for employees in case of bereavement, the Service Standing Orders do not have such provisions to support bereavement for police officers. Needless to say, this is an issue of great concern to serving police officers.

Police, public and stakeholder views

406. Despite previous attention focusing on this issue, a great percentage of officers have been caught unprepared for exit after serving for decades, regardless of rank. Many officers retire to rental houses since they do not own homes or are disconnected from the community from which they come. The Taskforce was informed that in many cases, such officers do not survive for long after retirement.
407. NPSC submitted that there were delays in processing pension due to corruption and lack of the required documentation. That is not all. The Taskforce was told that there are also reported cases of fraud in the payment of pensions, with officers either missing their pensions altogether or the amounts paid being less than what they deserve.

408. Despite clear guidelines in the Service Standing Orders for training to prepare officers psychologically, financially or on their health management upon retirement, this is not done and as a result many officers die soon after their service owing to the life changes they are unprepared for.
409. Many officers told the Taskforce that despite rendering diligent and long service to the nation, many retired officers languish in poverty and, as such, find it difficult to make ends meet. This is mainly because their pensions are meagre. While there is a policy to increase pensions for retired public servants by a margin of 3 per cent every two years, this increase is negligible and does not compensate for inflation. The case of officers who retired before 2005 is even worse because they were earning very low salaries.

Findings and emerging Issues

410. The lack of a policy on pre-exit and post-exit management and the welfare of police officers who exit the service means that many are not psychologically prepared for retirement. Further, there is currently no procedure on how retired police officers are supposed to be delinked from the Service. Some possess high rated skills, with some retiring at their peak, but there are few opportunities to put their skills to use after retirement.
411. The Taskforce was informed that NPS officers do contribute a monthly minimum amount towards a welfare fund and retired officers can access it. However, this is usually not sufficient to cover the needs of retired officers.
412. The Taskforce heard that there are about 787 police officers who cannot perform any police duties due sickness or injuries suffered in the course of their duties. The Service has not developed any mechanism for the exit of such officers in the form of a retirement package on medical grounds or post-exit medical insurance cover.
413. NPS has no existing endowment arrangement to meet the needs of officers and their dependents after retirement or loss of life in the line of duty. There is no post-retirement contributory medical cover, no support for orphans, widows or widowers or officers with disability who have left the Service.
414. The Taskforce noted that there is no post-retirement medical scheme for officers. The Taskforce heard from many officers that veterans face serious medical challenges owing to the nature of their work during active service. NARPOK officials provided the Taskforce with detailed accounts of the medical challenges that their members often face.

Recommendations

415. A number of issues touching on the exit and post-exit management of NPS officers are already provided for in the NPSC policy documents, the Service Standing Orders and the NPS Act. Based on these provisions, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding exit and post-exit management:
 - (a) NPSC and the Service should implement the requirements for pre-retirement training for all officers who are about to exit the Service. The training should target officers with five years to retirement, and notification of retirement issue two years before the date of retirement;
 - (b) NPSC should ensure that HR officers are deployed to the county level to assist police officers in processing their pensions;
 - (c) The processing of pensions for officers should start at least nine (9) months before the retirement date;

- (d) While the SSOs provide for a pre-retirement posting of officers to their home regions or location of choice after attaining the age of 50 years, this is hardly implemented. NPSC should take steps to implement this provision in order to assist officers to prepare for retirement;
- (e) NPS should put in place measures and policies to support and facilitate a contributory medical insurance fund that will assist police officers to access medical treatment in retirement. The fund should be designed and operated along the lines of the Defence Forces Medical Insurance Scheme (DEFMIS) for retired members of KDF; and
- (f) There is no provision in policy or regulations for an honourable send-off for ex-officers of NPS. The Taskforce reiterates the recommendation from the Ransley Report that in the event of the death of a retired police officer, the area Sub-County Commander should facilitate a dignified send-off for the departed officer.

CHAPTER FIVE: TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE FOR THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

5.1 Introduction

416. The terms and conditions of service for NPS officers play a key role in determining the effectiveness of the Service. The individual and collective terms under which NPS officers serve greatly determine the kind of skills that are retained to carry out the mandate, the rate of retention in the Service, and the motivation of officers in carrying out their duties.
417. The terms and conditions of service range from issues around salary and compensation determined and payable to all officers, to the kind of allowances payable, medical insurance provided, and the areas covered under the medical scheme.
418. Equally important are the working and living conditions of NPS officers and their families. This chapter evaluates the terms and conditions of service of NPS officers, explains the findings on the various issues and proposes measures to address the challenges in accordance with the terms of reference of the Taskforce.

5.2 Salaries and remuneration

419. The Taskforce was required to review the remuneration and allowances of NPS members and to make recommendations that will enhance the Service's professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness.
420. The remuneration and allowances payable to NPS officers have been a key issue of public debate and focus in past reforms. There is a perception that low salaries and deplorable living and working conditions of NPS officers are directly linked to the endemic corruption and bribery that afflicts the Service.
421. Written and verbal submissions to the Taskforce decried the poor salaries as well as working and living conditions of NPS officers, which were singled out as the main cause for low morale and a major contributor to depression and other mental health challenges within the Service.
422. In making recommendations on the remuneration and allowances payable to NPS officers as well as other recommendations on their welfare, the Taskforce was required to consider the views of the public, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, KNCHR, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, the Public Service Commission, and any other recommendation on the Service's welfare or reforms by any state organ.
423. The Taskforce received submissions from the National Treasury, SRC, the police service commission, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the Independent Policing and Oversight Authority, National Police Service itself, the public and other institutions on remuneration and allowances for members of the Service.
424. The Taskforce also evaluated the current economic situation in the country vis-à-vis the sustainability of the NPS remuneration structure and further reviewed the recommendations of previous taskforces and committees that touched on the remuneration of Service members.
425. Finally, the Taskforce carried out extensive consultations and public participation on the remuneration of members of NPS through public hearings and consultations. The section that follows briefly describes the context and factors that have hitherto shaped the remuneration and allowances payable to members of the NPS.

Historical aspects

426. The current remuneration structure and benefits paid to NPS officers is traceable to the history of the Service, specifically how the Service was established, the objectives that it was to serve and, therefore, the kind and calibre of people that it was meant to attract and retain in its early days.
427. The initial basic salary and remuneration structure for the police was established in 1902, and was tied to basic skills whose remuneration and compensation was pegged at slightly above the manual labour rates. The considerations at the time, which were contained in the Force Standing Orders (First Edition, 1907) had no relevance or link to a modernised and professional Service.
428. The Force established a graduated pay scale for junior police officers (six-point pay scale for constables and four-point scale for sergeants), which could, on paper, be topped after eight years of service in the respective ranks. There was a large gap between the top of the sergeants' scale and the bottom of the inspectors' scale, with inspectors earning about three times as much as sergeants.
429. Furthermore, the calibre of persons recruited were never expected to reach their maximum respective pay scales, even after 20 years of service. Despite this low pay scale and slow progression, officers worked 10-to 12-hours per day, seven days a week, with just a one-week holiday every year. The failure to address this historical flaw in the basic remuneration structure of the officers as enumerated has persisted and contributed to past and current challenges that officers face with regard to their salaries.
430. The report of the National Taskforce on Police Reforms (Ransley Report) noted that police salaries (Kenya Police and Administration Police) were equal to the salaries of the lowest cadre of employees (subordinate staff) in the public service. At the time, the salary of unskilled labour in the category of "tea girl" in one public institution was KSh. 40,000 compared to that of a police constable then, which stood at KSh. 11,000. The Ransley Taskforce was constrained to conclude that the kind of remuneration paid to police officers reflected the dismal value that the country attached to the services they offered.

Submissions by NPSC, Inspector-General and National Police Service officers

431. As stated, NPSC is established under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, and the NPSC Act, 2011, with the main mandate of overseeing the human resource function of the National Police Service. In its presentation to the Taskforce, NPSC made a raft of proposals regarding the remuneration and benefits payable to members of NPS.
432. First, in order to create a distinction between NPS and the mainstream public service, the police service commission recommended a change in the nomenclature for the police pay groups that is distinct from the current PSC one to reflect the uniqueness of the Service.
433. Second, NPSC proposed an increase in the basic salary of a police constable by 79 per cent from Ks 20,390 to KSh. 36,450 to compensate for the long period police officers have stagnated without a review of their basic salary.
434. Other recommendations by Commission on the salary and benefits of NPS officers included:
 - (a) The requirement for each rank to adopt a stand-alone salary scale to avoid an overlap of increments per rank;

- (b) The need to separate the job groups for the ranks of Inspector and Senior Sergeant;
 - (c) The need to harmonise NPS pay with other national security organs as the current pay structure does not reflect the uniqueness of the challenges, powers and privileges bestowed on NPS;
 - (d) The need to upgrade leave allowance to be commensurate to one month's basic salary;
 - (e) SRC should recognise (for comparable remuneration with those of the other two national security organs) NPS officers as experts who ought to attract higher pay comparable with other security providers in the UN peacekeeping missions;
 - (f) The need to harmonise the salary scales for the non-uniformed employees (who are no longer under the PSC), with those of uniformed officers since the NPS Act designates them as members of NPS;
 - (g) The need to delink NPS from the Governance, Justice Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) for budgeting as this affects funding to NPS due to ceilings that are not realistic for NPS as a security provider, and move it to the national security sector;
 - (h) The need to pay house allowance on the basis of rank across the board and not per region;
 - (i) The last date of promotion to be the effective date for pension calculation;
 - (j) Hardship allowances should be paid to all officers of formed-up units who, by the nature of their deployment serve only in hardship areas; and
 - (k) Compensable factors such as long and undefined working hours, separation from family, dangerous and heavy tools and equipment that cannot be left unattended, deprivation of conjugal rights, exposure to hazardous materials and situations, standing or walking for long hours and continuous strenuous training are not captured in the basic pay and should be compensated through allowances.
435. In his submission on behalf of NPS, the Inspector-General noted the complete mismatch between the kind of work carried out by police officers vis-à-vis their level of remuneration and benefits. The IG and senior officers who made oral and written submissions to the Taskforce proposed a **180 per cent** rise in basic salary
436. A review of the remuneration and allowances payable to members of NPS requires the Taskforce to evaluate not only the level of compensation to officers but also the approach to and the system of remuneration to officers, including the factors and criteria that are taken into account when setting the salaries, allowances, and other benefits. The Taskforce, therefore, examined the current system and approach to remuneration (in comparison to other disciplined Services and the general public sector salaries), the level of salaries across the different sectors and disciplined services, as well as the approach to allowances.

Establishing an appropriate system of remuneration for NPS

437. NPS consists of **108,414** uniformed officers spread across all the formations, units and components. Previously, non-uniformed staff of NPS were part of the Public Service Commission. However, they were delinked from the Public Service Commission in late 2019, thus making the **1,343** civilian staff or non-uniformed staff part of the members of NPS. Civilian staff offer technical support services to the uniformed officers at the headquarters, regional and county offices. The Taskforce has considered the terms and conditions of service for civilian staff alongside those of uniformed officers.

438. The classification of job groups assists in determining the level of remuneration and compensation that is payable, based on a determination of the nature of work or duties performed in a particular job group. The job group assigned to a particular institution finally determines the nature and level of remuneration and compensation for the office.
439. In the mainstream public service, the Civil Service Grade (CSG) were adopted in 2019 after departing from job groups (JG) that were used before. On the other hand, the disciplined services use pay grades (PG) while the Teachers Service Commission converted from job groups to what is known as the T-Scale.
440. However, while the disciplined services are delinked from the Civil Service Grades, the Pay Grades or Scales Rates remain linked to the Civil Service Job Groups U, T, S, R, P, N, L, K, J, H, G, and F. The job groups are assigned to NPS by the Public Service Commission in accordance with section 98 of the Public Service Commission Act, 2017. The import of this is that the value attached to the pay groups of the disciplined services remains essentially the same as that for jobs in the Civil Service.
441. As a result, and as the analysis in the tables shows, members of NPS receive relatively the same basic salaries as members of the Civil Service despite the differences in their job descriptions, job specifications or roles and responsibilities on the basis of similar job groups as allocated by the Public Service Commission. The only exceptions to this are the NPS weighting and specific NPS allowances.

Table 5. 1: Civil Service remuneration system based on job group classification

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	Job Group	Basic Min	Basic Max
National Police Service (Uniformed Personnel)					
Inspector-General -- Police (State Officer)	PG14	CC	U	459,113	
Deputy Inspector-General -- Kenya Police (State Officer)	PG13	CC	T	372,750	
Senior Assistant Inspector -- Police	PG12	CC	S	189,640	289,090
Assistant Inspector -- Police	PG11	CC	R	151,550	197,830
Commissioner -- Police	PG10	CC	P	103,360	144,090
Senior Superintendent -- Police	PG 9	CC	N	68,720	98,380
Superintendent -- Police	PG 8	CC	M	57,060	83,890
Assistant Superintendent -- Police	PG 7	CC	L	53,570	81,120
Chief Inspector -- Police	PG 6	AX	K	47,290	68,720
Inspector -- Police	PG 5	CC	J	42,940	62,750
Senior Sergeant -- Police	PG 4	AX	J	40,270	58,820
Sergeant -- Police	PG 3	CC	H	36,450	53,570
Corporal -- Police	PG 2	CC	G	26,500	50,330
Constable -- Police	PG 1	CC	F	20,390	38,975
Kenya Prisons Service					
Commissioner General of Prisons	PG14	AU	U	292,765	576,120
Deputy Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 13	AU	T	212,270	323,640
Senior Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 12	AU	S	167,250	212,270
Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 11	AU	R	126,370	198,730
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	PG 10	AU	P	78,510	138,910
Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	PG 9	AU	M	68,720	98,380
Senior Superintendent of Prisons	PG 8	AU	L	57,060	83,890
Superintendent of Prison	PG 7	AU	K	48,780	73,310
Chief Inspector - Prisons	PG 6	AX	K	47,290	68,720

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	Job Group	Basic Min	Basic Max
Inspector - Prisons	PG 5	AU	J	42,940	62,750
Senior Sergeant - Prisons	PG 4	AX	J	40,270	58,820
Sergeant - Prisons	PG 3	AU	H	36,450	53,570
Corporal - Prisons	PG 2	AU	G	26,500	50,330
Constable- Prisons	PG 1	AU	F	20,740	38,980
Civil Service (Non-uniformed Officers of NPS, KPS, NYS)					
Secretary	CSG4	AA	T	169,140	324,430
Director	CSG5	AA	S	133,870	197,800
Deputy Director	CSG6	AA	R	99,900	169,140
Assistant Director	CSG7	AA	P	87,360	121,430
Principal Officer	CSG8	AA	N	49,000	87,360
Senior Officer	CSG9	AA	L	42,970	59,120
Officer I	CSG10	AA	K	38,270	51,170
Officer II	CSG11	AA	J	31,270	41,260
Officer Assistant III	CSG12	AA	H	25,470	33,950
Technicians I	CSG13	AA	G	22,270	30,020
Technicians II	CSG14	AA	F	16,890	20,800
Senior Support Staff	CSG15	AA	E	15,670	17,570
Support Staff I	CSG16	AA	D	14,610	16,250
Support Staff II	CSG17	AA	C	13,280	15,120
National Youth Service (NYS)					
Director General -- NYS		AZ	U		
Director General -- NYS	PG15	AV	T	169,140	324,430
Deputy Director General - NYS	PG14	AV	S	133,870	197,800
Senior Deputy Director [1] - NYS	PG13	AV	R	121,430	169,140
Senior Deputy Director [2] - NYS	PG12	AV	Q	99,900	133,870
Deputy Director - NYS	PG11	AV	P	87,360	121,430
Senior Assistant Director -NYS	PG10	AV	N	66,500	90,550
Assistant Director - NYS	PG09	AV	M	58,600	83,180
Senior Superintendent -NYS	PG08	AV	L	49,780	71,050
Superintendent - NYS	PG07	AZ	K	43,250	62,190
Chief Inspector -NYS	PG06	AV	K	41,990	58,600
Inspector -NYS	PG05	AV	J	38,340	54,190
Senior Sergeant - NYS	PG04	AZ	J	36,240	51,250
Sergeant - NYS	PG03	AV	H	33,300	47,040
Corporal -NYS	PG02	AV	G	24,860	44,500
Private - NYS	PG01	AV	F	18,730	30,420
Teaching Service (TSC)					
Chief Principal	T-Scale 15	AB		131,380	157,656
Senior Principal	T-Scale 14	AB		118,242	141,891
Principal	T-Scale 13	AB		104,644	125,573
Deputy Principal III	T-Scale 12	AB		91,041	109,249
Senior Headmaster	T-Scale 11	AB		77,840	93,408
Head teacher	T-Scale 10	AB		62,272	77,840
Senior Lecturer IV	T-Scale 09	AB		52,308	65,385
Secondary Teacher I	T-Scale 08	AB		43,154	53,943
Secondary Teacher II	T-Scale 07	AB		34,955	43,694
Secondary Teacher III	T-Scale 06	AB		27,195	33,994
Primary Teacher II	T-Scale 05	AB		21,756	27,195

Sources: Computation from NPS, KPS, NYS, CS and TSC basic salary structures

442. A comparison of the specific job groups and grades across the Civil Service indeed confirms that the pay grades for NPS and the equivalent CSG in the Civil Service reveal a similar approach to remuneration.
443. To illustrate this, under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for the Police Constable, Prisons Constable, Clerical Officer II and NYS Private is determined by Job Group 'F'. Therefore, the minimum basic salary for a Constable of Police is KSh. 20,390 and a maximum of KSh. 38,975; minimum basic salary for a Constable of Prisons is KSh. 20,740 and a maximum of KSh. 38,980, while the minimum basic salary for a Private in NYS is KSh. 18,730 and a maximum of KSh. 30,420. In comparison, a Civil Servant at Job Group 'F' equivalent has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 16,890 with a maximum of KSh. 20,800. The Civil Service Pay Group assumes that the Police Constable, Prisons Constable and NYS Private share a job description or job specification with Clerical Officer II.

Table 5. 2: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades

Designation	Minimum Basic Salary	Maximum Basic Salary
Constable -- Police	20,390	38,975
Constable -- Prisons	20,740	38,980
Clerical Officer II -- CS	16,890	20,800
Private -- NYS	18,730	30,420

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

444. Similarly, under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, the pay for a Police Corporal, Prisons Corporal, NYS Corporal, Primary Teacher II, and Clerical Officer I is determined by Job Group 'G'. The minimum basic salary for a police corporal is KSh. 26,500 and a maximum of KSh. 50,330; a prisons corporal's minimum basic salary is KSh. 26,500 and a maximum of KSh. 50,330, while the minimum basic salary for an NYS corporal is KSh. 24,860 and a maximum of KSh. 44,500. In comparison, a Civil Servant at Job Group 'G' equivalent has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 22,270 with a maximum of KSh. 30,020 and in the teaching service, teachers at TScale5 earn a minimum basic salary of KSh. 21,756 with a maximum of KSh. 27,195. The Civil Service Pay Group assumes, therefore, that the Corporal of Police, Corporal of Prisons, and Corporal of NYS share job a description or job specification with Clerical Officer I and Primary Teacher II as shown on Table 5.3 below.

Table 5. 3: Basic salary comparison for Job Group "G" equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Corporal - Police	26,500	50,330
Corporal - Prisons	26,500	50,330
Clerical Officer I - CS	22,270	30,020
Corporal - NYS	24,860	44,500
Primary Teacher II	21,756	27,195

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

445. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, the salary for a Commissioner of Police, and his equivalent in KPS, the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, as well as the Assistant Director – CS, the Deputy Director – NYS, and the Senior Headmaster – TSC, is determined by Job Group 'P'.
446. The minimum basic salary for a Commissioner of Police is KSh. 103,360 and a maximum of KSh. 144,090; the minimum basic salary for a Deputy Commissioner of Prisons is KSh. 78,510 and a maximum of KSh. 138,910 while the minimum basic salary for the Deputy Director of NYS and a Civil Servant at Job Group 'P' equivalent have been harmonised

at KSh. 87,360 with a maximum of KSh. 121,430. In the teaching service, a Teacher at TScale11 has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 77,840 with a maximum of KSh. 97,408. This indicates that the Commissioner of Police at NPS earns a higher minimum and maximum basic salary than the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons who, in turn, earns more than the Deputy Director of NYS and a Civil Servant at Job Group 'P' equivalent grades. The teaching service has the least basic salary at Job Group 'P' equivalent grades.

Table 5. 4: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in the various services

Designation	Minimum Basic Salary	Maximum Basic Salary
Commissioner - Police	103,360	144,090
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	78,510	138,910
Assistant Director - CS	87,360	121,430
Deputy Director - NYS	87,360	121,430
Senior Headmaster - TSC	77,840	93,408

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

447. The Taskforce found that a number of factors are responsible for the current remuneration structure where NPS and other disciplined services are grouped together with other job categories in the public sector. SRC is mandated to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of State Officers and to advise on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. In pursuit of this mandate, SRC undertook a job evaluation (JE) exercise between 2015 and 2017 for the public service, including NPS.
448. A job evaluation process determines the relative worth of jobs. In the public sector, jobs are evaluated and graded to have the same value or worth for compensation purposes. JE and job grading results depend on job descriptions, and the job description manuals are the reference point for evaluating jobs. In this regard, the job description entails standardised documentation of the duties, responsibilities, reporting relationships, critical performance areas and working conditions of a position-holder performing a job. A job description also details the minimum qualifications, experience and competencies (skills, knowledge and behaviour) an incumbent is expected to possess. On the other hand, a job description manual is a document containing approved job descriptions signed off by the Head of Human Resource and the Accounting Officers.
449. Despite the importance of job descriptions and the job description manual as required by SRC's Guidelines on Conducting JE, the Taskforce established that NPS has never developed and approved its job descriptions or a JD Manual. Instead, SRC is said to have carried out a desk review of the material to conduct job evaluations in 2016. As a result, critical aspects and details of police responsibilities and work were not considered in the exercise. The process ended up placing a constable at par with a clerical officer at a job salary structure of B3, B4 and B5 in Job Group F.
450. A review of the Draft Career Progression Guidelines used to conduct job evaluations in NPS left out critical aspects and factors that should be considered in evaluating what NPS officers do. These include the nature of the jobs performed by officers and the risks they are exposed to, which are not comparable at all with those of employees in the mainstream public service.
451. Indeed, the documents and material relied on to place NPS members in the various job grades missed out on the essential components of the responsibilities bestowed on police. Besides the unique skills for handling and maintenance of sophisticated and dangerous weapons, tools and equipment, the nature of work for NPS officers and the kind of risks that they are exposed to, the intensity of some of the duties, the quick thinking and split-

second decisions required in some situations, all call for special consideration in their remuneration. Specific factors that the Taskforce considered in developing recommendations on remuneration of members of NPS include:

- (a) *Job risks*: NPS officers are exposed to the threat of real or perceived violence in a physically unsafe or uncomfortable environment and the danger of death or injury in the course of their duties is greater than that which most people in public service are exposed to;
- (b) *Specialised training and development*: Training for NPS officers takes on average a minimum of nine months and 22 hours of strenuous exercises per day. Recruits are taken through rigorous physical and mentally straining exercises and drills to prepare them for duty. The recruits are at the same time taken through theory classes such as public law, liberal studies, human rights, police station administration and police work;
- (c) *Discretionary powers and responsibility*: NPS duties entail the exercise of judicious thinking and decision-making in their work. This entails: decision to arrest or not, responding to distress, managing high-risk suspects, decision to use or not to use lethal force including use of firearms, among other “high pressure” duties. This nature of responsibility and discretion is unique to NPS and not to other categories or cadres in the public service;
- (d) *Upheaval of family life*: The nature of NPS duties has impact on the personal and family life of officers. It affects spousal or partner employment and even makes it hard for a partner to find or maintain a job due to frequent and unpredictable movements in the course of duty. In some cases, officers are deployed to operation areas and have no choice but to leave their families behind;
- (e) *Hours of work*: NPS personnel have a requirement underpinned by Service laws to be available for duty 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, including holidays and weekends, without overtime pay;
- (f) *Stress, personal relationships and impact of the job*: NPS personnel ordinarily experience greater levels of stress than the rest of the public service, and worse when deployed for special operations;
- (g) *Leave*: Leave may be forfeited for Service reasons. Furthermore, it may be difficult for Service personnel to take leave when they wish, or plan ahead as because of the unpredictability of Service commitments;
- (h) *Travel to work*: The nature of deployment and duties undertaken dictate the method of travel, time and cost involved. When armed or in uniform, officers cannot use public transport yet there is no official transport offered to NPS officers; and
- (i) *Limitation of labour rights*: By the nature of their work, certain rights and freedoms of NPS officers are limited by the Constitution. This means that NPS officers do not have access to mechanisms for negotiating their remuneration and benefits, which are available to other categories of public service.

452. After a review of the scope of responsibilities of NPS officers and considering all relevant factors as elaborated, the Taskforce concluded that the role of members of NPS cannot be compared with precision with any single job group in the Civil Service cadre for purposes of determining remuneration.

453. In determination remuneration, there should be a distinct nomenclature and variants or determinants for NPS members, separate from other categories of public servants.
454. The findings of the Taskforce are predicated on its understanding of the role and place of NPS in public governance and the comparative treatment of NPS and other security organs. Security, rule of law and order are the first conditions of every modern society. There cannot be an economy without security. Neither can there be prosperity without the rule of law. Under the Constitution and other written laws, NPS is assigned the duty of ensuring that security and safety are maintained. NPS is today confronted with new security environments that present enormous challenges. The expectations and demands from the public, the Constitution and laws are also onerous. Today's NPS officer must have a combination of skills and the capacity to use various technologies and the right tools and equipment.
455. NPS officers are tasked with the difficult task of keeping safe an open democratic society. Our laws confer on security officers immense powers and responsibilities that are necessary for the performance of their duties. The discretionary powers granted to NPS officers allow them to make life and death decisions on their own, and sometimes in a split second. This power and responsibility are unique.
456. The Taskforce heard from NPS officers, members of the public and various groups and experts. It saw firsthand the demands on NPS officers in their work, visited their stations, operational areas and their living accommodations. NPS officers are asked to go where others fear to tread. They are always on call -- day and night, weekends and over public holidays. Their remuneration and benefits, therefore, need to reflect this reality. The Taskforce notes that NPS is recognised in the Constitution of as a National Security Organ alongside KDF and NIS. In this regard, the salary and remuneration structure of KDF and NIS should form a basis for comparing and benchmarking the remuneration in the National Police Service. NPS officers who are seconded to constitutional commissions and other parastatal organisations receive a top-up allowance that is almost double the monthly basic salary they earn, which is in itself a further justification for a review of NPS salaries and benefits.

Recommendations

457. Upon these considerations, and having examined the job evaluation and job grading reports for NPS, the Taskforce recommends that:
- (a) The Salaries and Remuneration Commission should conduct new job evaluations for NPS staff using an approved Job Description Manual in order to make an accurate assessment of the duties of a police officer.
 - (b) The NPS should develop a Job Description Manual for all the jobs, posts, roles or designations in order to support an informed approach to remuneration;
 - (c) NPSC and the Inspector-General should establish an office/sub-directorate in the Service responsible for job evaluation and be the liaison point for SRC and other agencies involved in assessing police work.

Analysis of incremental notches

458. Upon examination of the incremental notches from minimum to maximum basic salary for uniformed officers in NPS, the Taskforce notes that under the current policy, SRC has advised public entities to align current salary structures in grades as evaluated, with salary structures of between eight (8) and 12 salary points.

NPS has a 14-tier grading structure from PG1 to PG14 as summarised in Table 5.5. However, P13 and P14 are for State Officers, whose salaries are determined by SRC. On the basis of this evaluation:

- (a) The police job grades PG10, PG11 and PG12 have a salary structure that is not in line with the SRC advice and policy on salary structuring, and are not in line with the minimum eight (8) salary points;
- (b) The NPS salary structure has police weighting calibration to what pertains in the wider Civil Service at equivalent job groups for grades up to Job Group ‘N’ equivalent. For higher grades, the salary structures are more or less similar; and
- (c) The increments accord the officers a relatively higher salary over time, which do not stagnate after a few years.

Table 5. 5: Incremental notches from minimum basic salary to maximum salary for uniformed officers in the National Police Service

Police Job Grade	Minimum Basic Salary	Number of Incremental Notches	Maximum Basic Salary
PG 12	207,714	7	355,351
PG11	161,994	6	237,341
PG10	113,211	7	185,260
PG9	107,334	11	146,629
PG8	94,266	12	133,003
PG7	58,676	13	95,686
PG6	51,135	12	75,979
PG5	42,940	12	66,412
PG4	40,270	12	62,557
PG3	36,450	12	57,138
PG2	26,500	19	53,767
PG1	21,463	19	41,686

Sources: SRC

Economic context and cost of living

459. The Taskforce also considered proposals for review of remuneration and allowances against other factors, which include: global and external factors that have caused economic shocks to the Kenyan economy including pandemics such as Covid-19, the worst drought in decades, as well as conflicts that have negatively affected international trade and finance systems. Factors such as climate change have compounded issues of food insecurity and a rising cost of living.
460. The Taskforce also considered inflation trends and the cost of basic commodities over the years. Despite low rates of inflation realised between 2012 and 2022, the prices of all basic commodities more than doubled between 2012 and 2022, without corresponding increases in real wages. The Consumer Price Index rose from 124.7 in 2012 to 228 in 2022. This, in effect, means that the cost of living rose by 104 points over the same period. It also means that the cost of living for members of NPS rose by 84 per cent without any productivity factor award over the same period.


Table 5. 6: Trends in inflation, consumer price indices and rise in the cost of living, 2012 – 2022

Year	Inflation Rate	Consumer Price Index	Rise in Cost of Living
2012	9.38%	124.7	0.0%
2013	5.72%	131.8	7.1%
2014	6.88%	140.9	16.2%

Year	Inflation Rate	Consumer Price Index	Rise in Cost of Living
2015	6.58%	150.2	25.5%
2016	6.30%	159.6	34.9%
2017	8.01%	172.4	47.7%
2018	4.69%	180.5	55.8%
2019	5.24%	190.0	65.3%
2020	5.40%	200.2	75.5%
2021	6.11%	212.5	87.8%
2022	7.66%	228.7	104.0%

Source: Computation from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Data

Figure 5. 1: Trends in inflation rate and rise in cost of living, 2012 - 2022



Source: Computation from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Data

Police Constable basic salary from 2013 to 2023

461. Although, the cost of living for the members of NPS has risen by 84 per cent since 2013 the growth in minimum basic salary for a police constable joining the NPS has only risen by 21 per cent (from KSh. 17,190 to KSh. 20,926) during the same period. Table 5.7 shows the basic salary amount of KSh. 17,190, Housing Supplementation of KSh. 3,000 and Police Allowance of KSh. 9,000 paid to a Police Constable on entry into the Service in January 2013.

Table 5. 7: Gross salary of a constable on joining the National Police Service in January 2013

S/No	Pay category	Amount
1	Basic salary	17,190.00
2	Housing supplementation	3,000.00
3	Police/Prison Allowance	9,000.00
	Gross Salary	29,190.00

Source: NPS

462. Table 5.8 outlines a Basic Salary of KSh. 20,390, Rental House Allowance of KSh. 9,500, Housing Supplementation of KSh. 3,000, Commuter Allowance of KSh. 3,000 and Police Allowance of KSh. 9,000 paid to a Police Constable on entry into the service in January 2022.

Table 5. 8: Gross salary of a constable on joining the National Police Service in January 2022

S/No	Pay category	Amount
1	Basic salary	20,390.00
2	Rental house allowance	9,500.00
3	Commuter allowance	3,000.00

S/No	Pay category	Amount
4	Housing supplementation	3,000.00
5	Police/ Prison Allowance	9,000.00
	Gross Salary	44,890.00

Source: NPS


463. Table 5.9 outlines the salary progression for a Police Constable over a period of 10 years. The progression takes into account salary and allowance reviews over that period and the annual increments.

Table 5. 9: Trends in increments in gross salary for a constable who joined the National Police Service effective January 2013 to January 2023

Year	Basic Salary	Remarks	Monthly Allowances	Gross Salary
2013	17,190.0	Minimum Basic Salary	12,000.00	29,190.00
2014	17,760.00	Annual Increment	12,000.00	29,760.00
2015	18,330.00	Annual Increment	12,000.00	30,330.00
2016	18,900.00	Annual Increment	12,000.00	30,900.00
2017	19,470.00	Annual Increment	12,000.00	31,470.00
2017	21,240.00	Salary review 2017	12,000.00	33,240.00
2018	21,860.00	Annual Increment	12,000.00	33,860.00
2018	22,810.00	Salary Review 2018	12,000.00	34,810.00
2019	23,450.00	Increment	24,500.00	47,950.00
2019	24,110.00	Salary Review 2019	24,500.00	48,610.00
2020	24,770.00	Annual Increment	24,500.00	49,270.00
2020	25,460.00	Salary review 2020	24,500.00	49,960.00
2021	26,500.00	Annual Increment	24,500.00	51,000.00
2022	27,570.00	Annual Increment	24,500.00	52,070.00
2023	28,640.00	Annual Increment	24,500.00	53,140.00

Source: NPS

Figure 5. 2: Trends in increments in gross salary for a constable who joined the National Police Service effective January 2013 to January 2023



Source: NPS

Recommendations

464. Having considered the uniqueness of the services offered by the members of NPS, their working conditions, duties and responsibilities, disrupted family life, and the potential risk they face in the course of their duties, the Taskforce recommends a basic salary increase of 40 per cent for the lowest rank or Pay Grade (PG 1) for uniformed officers reducing

progressively to 3 per cent for the highest rank or Pay Grade (PG12) as per the Tables below. The Taskforce recommends that the new remuneration structure should be implemented in three (3) phases from 1st July, 2024.

Table 5. 10: Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service as per FY 2022/2023

Police Officer		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowance					
Job Grade	Police Grade	Min.	Max.	House: Nairobi	House: Cluster 2	House: Other Areas	Commuter	Police	House Supplementation
T	PG12	189,640	289,090	60,000	56,000	52,000	20,000	18,000	
S	PG11	151,550	197,830	55,000	40,000	28,800	16,000	15,000	
R	PG10	103,360	144,090	45,000	34,200	24,600	12,000	15,000	
Q	PG9	68,720	98,380	36,000	28,000	21,500	8,000	15,000	
P	PG8	57,060	83,890	34,200	24,600	17,700	8,000	13,000	
N	PG7	53,570	81,120	33,500	23,700	17,000	6,000	11,000	
L	PG6	47,290	68,720	25,000	18,000	13,000	5,000	11,000	
K	PG5	42,940	62,750	15,700	11,300	8,150	4,000	11,000	
J	PG4	40,270	58,820	15,700	11,300	8,150	4,000	9,000	4,400
H	PG3	36,450	53,570	9,800	7,300	5,700	4,000	9,000	3,900
G	PG2	26,500	50,330	9,650	7,150	5,600	4,000	9,000	3,400
F	PG1	20,390	38,975	9,500	7,000	5,500	3,000	9,000	3,000

Source: SRC/NPS

Table 5. 11: Recommendation for New Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service by the Taskforce

Police Officer		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowance		
Job Grade	Police Grade	Min.	Max.	House: National Rate	Commuter	Police
T	PG12	204,637	345,850	70,000	24,500	18,000
S	PG11	163,535	262,020	60,000	20,500	15,000
R	PG10	112,617	181,531	50,000	16,500	15,000
Q	PG9	111,906	148,538	45,000	14,500	15,000
P	PG8	101,711	138,115	45,000	12,500	13,000
N	PG7	65,103	100,503	35,000	8,500	11,000
L	PG6	59,742	82,880	28,500	8,500	11,000
K	PG5	53,246	74,887	24,100	5,250	11,000
J	PG4	51,546	71,964	22,100	4,250	9,000
H	PG3	48,114	67,018	15,700	4,250	9,000
G	PG2	36,040	61,588	15,050	4,250	9,000
F	PG1	29,296	57,700	14,500	3,250	9,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

NOTE: Common National House Allowance rate for all NPS Uniformed Officers

Discontinue House Supplementation Allowance

Table 5. 12: Remuneration structure for Non-Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service FY 2021/22

None Uniformed Officers		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowance			
Job Group	Current Civil Service Job Grade	Min.	Max	House (Nairobi)	House Cluster 2	House Other Areas	Commuter
C	CSG 17	13,280	15,120	3,750	3,125	2,250	3,000
D	CSG 16	14,610	16,250	4,125	3,375	2,375	3,000
E	CSG 15	15,670	17,570	4,500	3,730	2,700	3,000
F	CSG 14	16,890	20,800	4,500	3,730	2,700	3,000

None Uniformed Officers		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowance			
G	CSG 13	22,270	30,020	6,750	4,500	3,200	4,000
H	CSG 12	25,470	33,950	6,750	4,500	3,200	4,000
J	CSG 11	31,270	41,260	10,000	7,500	4,200	4,000
K	CSG 10	38,270	51,170	16,500	12,800	7,500	5,000
L	CSG 9	42,970	59,120	28,000	22,000	13,000	6,000
N	CSG 8	49,000	87,360	35,000	25,500	15,400	8,000
P	CSG 7	87,360	121,430	45,000	28,000	16,800	12,000
R	CSG 6	99,900	169,140	50,000	35,000	20,000	16,000
S	CSG 5	133,870	197,800	60,000	56,000	48,000	20,000

Source: SRC/NPS

Table 5. 13: Recommended Remuneration Structure for Non-Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service to be implemented in FY 2024/2025

None-Uniformed Members of Service		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowance		
Job Group	Current Civil Service Job Grade	Min.	Max	House (National)	Commuter	Work Environment
C	CSG 17	15,580	17,420	9,500	3,000	4,050
D	CSG 16	16,910	19,220	9,650	3,000	4,050
E	CSG 15	18,000	19,900	9,800	3,000	4,115
F	CSG 14	19,920	23,130	9,900	3,000	4,125
G	CSG 13	23,700	31,450	10,100	4,000	4,250
H	CSG 12	26,900	35,380	10,750	4,000	4,250
J	CSG 11	32,700	42,690	15,700	4,000	4,500
K	CSG 10	39,700	52,960	16,500	5,000	5,000
L	CSG 9	44,400	61,110	28,000	6,000	6,000
N	CSG 8	50,610	90,200	35,000	8,000	8,000
P	CSG 7	90,200	124,630	45,000	12,000	10,000
R	CSG 6	102,860	172,350	50,000	16,000	10,000
S	CSG 5	143,640	262,420	60,000	20,000	11,000
T	CSG 4	180,160	335,458	80,000	24,000	12,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

NOTE: Common National House Allowance rate for all Non – Uniformed Officers and New “Work Environment Monthly Allowance” Non-Uniformed Officers in the National Police Service

Harmonisation of remuneration in the disciplined services (KDF, KPS, NPS and NYS)

465. The Taskforce isolated the salaries payable to comparable job groups in the disciplined services (Kenya Defence Forces, Kenya Prisons Service, National Police Service, and the National Youth Service). The patterns of remuneration reveal disparities and a lack of harmonisation of terms of compensation in the disciplined Services.
466. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, pay for a Police Constable, Prisons Constable, NYS Private and KDF Private is determined by Job Group ‘F’. Yet a Private in KDF has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 33,193 with a maximum of KSh. 34,772 in comparison with the minimum basic salary for a Constable of Police at KSh. 20,390 and a maximum of KSh. 38,975; minimum basic salary for a Constable of Prisons of KSh. 20,740 and a maximum of KSh. 38,980; a minimum basic salary for a Private in NYS of KSh. 18,730 and a maximum of KSh. 30,420. This indicates that a Private in KDF earns a higher minimum basic salary than the Constable in KPS, who in turn earns a slightly higher minimum basic salary than the Constable at NPS and the Private at NYS. However, the maximum basic salaries for Constables at NPS and KPS are higher than those for the Private at KDF.

467. The remuneration and allowances payable to the members of the three Services has also been one of the key grievances. The Taskforce notes that a major challenge in evaluating and determining the remuneration of the Services has been the Salaries and Remuneration Commission's use of inappropriate tools and its lack of recognition that the Services' mandate and nature of work is unique and different from that of mainstream public service in terms of decision-making, risks, and disruption of family life, among other factors.

Table 5. 14: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Constable -- Police	20,390	38,975
Constable -- Prisons	20,740	38,980
Private -- NYS	18,730	30,420
Private -- KDF	33,193	34,772

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

468. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, the remuneration of a Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, Deputy Director – NYS, and Warrant Officer 1 in KDF is determined by Job Group 'P'. While the minimum basic salary for a Commissioner of Police is KSh. 103,360 and a maximum of KSh. 144,090; the minimum basic salary for a Deputy Commissioner of Prisons is KSh. 78,510 and a maximum of KSh. 138,910; the minimum basic salary for a Deputy Director in NYS is KSh. 87,360 with a maximum of KSh. 121,430; the KDF Warrant Officer 1 has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 81,216 with a maximum of KSh. 84,415. This indicates that the Commissioner of Police at NPS earns a higher minimum and maximum basic salary than the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, who in turn earns more than the Deputy Director of NYS at Job Group 'P' equivalents. The Warrant Officer 1 at KDF has the least basic salary maximum at Job Group 'P' equivalent grades.

Table 5. 15: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Commissioner -- Police	103,360	144,090
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	78,510	138,910
Deputy Director -- NYS	87,360	121,430
Warrant Officer 1 -- KDF	81,216	84,415

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

469. The Ransley Taskforce recommended that the salary structure for NPS should be harmonised at all equivalent levels with that of KDF and be revised in tandem when the reviews are due.
470. The Taskforce noted that the pay review and increases for members of NPS, KPS and NYS have been closely linked to annual basic salary movement and incremental notches designed for the wider public service sector or Civil Service Job Groups, and not for KDF or Disciplined Services Pay Grades. As a result, NPS, KPS and NYS remuneration or average earnings do not take into account all aspects of changes in remuneration for disciplined services. Since 2012, NPS, KPS, and NYS members' remuneration and review have not broadly kept pace with members of KDF.
471. The Taskforce compared the basic salary structure between KDF, NPS and KPS. It found that average earnings for members of KDF were higher on the minimum basic salary scale while average earnings for members of NPS, KPS and NYS were higher on the maximum basic salary scale. The Taskforce observed that basic salary scale rates for members of

KDF minimum are generally 20 to 40 per cent higher than those of members of NPS, KPS and NYS for similar lower ranks or equivalent job groups and generally 8 to 10 per cent more for higher ranks or equivalent job groups. Some of the grades in KDF under comparison with NPS, KPS, and NYS have relatively short salary structures, meaning that officers must progress within a very short period otherwise they would stagnate if not promoted.

472. In conclusion, the Taskforce notes that there is lack of harmony across the grades in terms of minimum basic salary at comparable grades. Harmony is important, especially for grades that have similar entry qualifications and more or less similar training regimes in the disciplined services.

Table 5. 16: Remuneration gaps across disciplined services

Rank & Grade	Kenya Defence Forces			National Police Service			Kenya Prisons Service			
	Ranks	Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum
PC	Private	33193-34772	PG 1	20390-38975	12803 - (-4203)	39% - (-12%)	PG 1	20740-38980	12453 - (-4208)	38% - (-12%)
CPL	S/ Private	36541-39379	PG 2	26500-50330	10041 - (-10951)	27% - (-28%)	PG 2	26500-50330	10041 - (-10951)	27% - (-28%)
SGT	Land CPL	47502-48302	PG 3	36450-53570	11052 - (-5268)	23% - (-11%)	PG 3	36450-53570	11052 - (-5268)	23% - (-11%)
S/ SGT	CPL	49757-53672	PG 4	40270-58820	9487 - (-5148)	19% - (-10%)	PG 4	40270-58820	9487 - (-5148)	19% - (-10%)
IP	SGT	53989-60376	PG 5	42940-62750	11049 - (-2374)	20% - (-4%)	PG 5	42940-62750	11049 - (-2374)	20% - (-4%)
CIP	S/SGT	63420-68220	PG 6	47290-68720	16130 - (-500)	25% - (-0.7%)	PG 6	47290-68720	16130 - (-500)	25% - (-0.7%)
ASP	WO2	70400-73600	PG 7	53570-81120	16830 - (-7520)	24% - (-10%)				
SP	WO1	81216-84415	PG 8	57060-83890	24156 - 525	30% - 0.6%	PG 7	48780-73310	32436 - 11105	40% - 13%
SSP	2nd LT	87448 - 89197	PG 9	68720-98380	18728 - (-9183)	21% - (-10%)	PG 8	57060-83890	24156 - 525	30% - 0.6%
ACP	LT	97184-103132					PG9	68720-98380	28464 - 4752	21% - (-10%)

Source: Taskforce Computation

Recommendations

473. From the foregoing, and having examined the Civil Service Remuneration System, the Taskforce recommends as follows:
- The creation of “Security and Disciplined Services Sector” comprising the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Service (NIS), National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Prison Service (KPS), and National Youth Service (NYS) as a separate budgetary sector.
 - SRC should establish a system of remuneration for disciplined services completely delinked from the Civil Service Job Groups Classification System and Pay Determination;

- (c) NPSC should review job descriptions for members of NPS for all pay grades and restructure the salary grades for PG12, PG11 and PG10 to have a minimum of eight (8) salary scale points (notches);
- (d) NPSC should develop new pay grades and basic salary structure for non-uniformed members of NPS completely delinked from the mainstream Civil Service Job Groups Classification System;
- (e) The Government should establish a Remuneration Advisory Board for Disciplined and Security Services through an Act of Parliament; and
- (f) There is a difference in the naming of positions in NPS due to differences in grading structures, the nomenclature adopted for various managerial positions in the uniformed services differs at higher ranks, e.g., at Job Group 'P' equivalent to NPS has Commissioner of Police while KPS has Deputy Commissioner of Prisons. As such, there is need for harmonisation of nomenclatures in the various uniformed services to enable peer comparisons and interaction.

5.3 New and applicable allowances

474. The issue of allowances payable to NPS officers has been a subject of previous taskforce reports and reviews. Previous taskforces had also reviewed the various allowances and proposed specific changes. Some of the recommendations of the previous taskforces have not been implemented, and where increments have been effected, they have been minimal. The Taskforce notes that there is a wide range of allowances that are currently paid to NPS officers. These allowances are summarised in Table 5.17.

Table 5. 17: List of allowances currently payable to uniformed members of the Service and rate applicable per rank or job group.

S/No.	Type of allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
1	Rental House Allowance	All officers	Based on work station and rank, e.g., JG "F" (change to PG grades) KSh. 9,500.00 for Nairobi, KSh. 7,000.00 for former municipalities and KSh. 5,500.00 in other regions.
2	Hardship Allowance	Officers in designated hardship areas and Border Police Unit.	Based on rank for officers working in designated hardship areas ranging from KSh. 4,300.00 to KSh. 38,100.00
3	Commuter Allowance	All officers	Based on rank. JG "F"-KSh. 3,000 "G"- "J" KSh. 4,000 JG "K" KSh. 5,000 JG "L" KSh. 6,000 "M"- "N" KSh. 8,000 "P" KSh. 12,000 "R" KSh. 16,000 "S" KSh. 20,000
4	Extraneous Duty Allowance	-All officers -GSU- G Coy -DCI officers	-Officers working at Huduma Centres @ rate of KSh. 15,000.00 -Officers deployed at State House. JG "P" and above KSh. 20,000.00, JG "K" – "N" KSh. 15,000.00, JG "G" – "J" KSh. 10,000.00 JG "F" KSh. 7,000.00

S/No.	Type of allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
			-DCI Officers attached to CRO (Criminal Records Office) at a rate of 20% basic salary.
5	Animal Handler's Allowance	Officers at ASTU and K9 Camel Cavalry Unit??	Payable at a rate of KSh. 3,000.00
6	Police Coxswain Allowance	All officers attached to the Marine Police Unit	Payable at a rate of KSh. 2,500.00
7	Presidential Escort Allowance	All officers	Officers deployed at Presidential Escort Unit at a rate of KSh. 5,000.00 for JG "F", KSh. 5,500 for JG "G", KSh. 6,500.00 for JG "H"- "K" and KSh. 7,500.00 for JG "L" and above.
8	Plain Clothes Allowance	All officers	-DCI Officers -IAU Officer -Presidential Escort Officers. One-off @ KSh. 30,000.00
9	Instructors Allowance	All officers offering instruction at NPS colleges and campuses.	-Officers working at NPS Colleges and Campuses. @ 25% of the basic salary.
10	Transfer Allowance	All officers	-Officers transferred from one station to another and a distance that is more than 40 km, not provided with transport. (Officers' basic salary).
11	Housing Supplementation	-Constable -Corporal -Sergeant -Snr Sergeant	-Officers in the JG "F" to "J" -JG "F" KSh. 3,000 - "G" KSh. 3,400 - "H" KSh. 3,900 - "J" KSh. 4,400
12	Leave Travel Allowance	-All officers	Officers serving designated hardship areas are paid leave travel allowance twice in one F/Y and is based on the rank ranging from KSh. 4,000.00 JG "F"- "J", KSh. 6,000.00 JG "K"-JG "N" and KSh. 10,000.00 JG "P"-JG "S"
13	Police Field Allowance	-All officers	-GSU -ASTU -BPU -RDU @ KSh. 2,000.00
14	Police Allowance	-All officers	-Based on the rank JG "F"- "J" KSh. 9,000.00 JG "J"- "L" KSh. 11,000.00 JG "M"- "N" KSh. 13,000.00 JG "P"- "R" KSh. 15,000.00 JG "S" KSh. 18,000.00
15	Non-Practicing Allowance	-Officers admitted to the Bar to practice and attached to the Legal Unit. JG "K" and above. Qualified medical practitioners.	Paid at a rate of KSh. 15,000.00

S/No.	Type of allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
16	Special Legal Allowance	-Chief Inspector and above. Officers admitted to the Bar to practice and attached to the Legal Unit.	-Payable at a rate of KSh. 30, 000.00 per month.
17	VIP Protection Allowance	-Officers assigned VIP Protection duties. JG “F” –JG “J” (Constable-Snr Sergeant)	-Payable at a rate of KSh. 3,000.00 per month
18	Police Pilot Allowance	-Officers attached to Air Wing Unit working as pilots.	-Based on rank, flying hours, flying licence and payable at a rate ranging from KSh. 20,000 – KSh. 50,000.00 per month. Pilot trainee at a rate KSh. 10,000.00
19	Disability Allowance	Guide-Officers with disability (PWDs): Officers who are deaf, blind and physically disabled --wheelchair users.	Payable at a rate of KSh. 20,000.00 per month
20	Aircraft Engineering Allowance/ Aircraft cabin crew allowance	Officers attached to Air Wing Unit working as craft engineers and cabin crew.	Payable at a rate of KSh. 10,000.00 per month

Source: National Police Service

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for NPS, KPS, NYS, and the wider public sector FY 2022/2023

475. The Taskforce noted that the rates for house, commuter, hardship, and leave allowances paid to members of NPS, KPS and NYS are closely linked to the public sector allowances system and the rates are broadly determined equally for equivalent grades or job groups across the entire public sector. Table 5.18 provides a summary of allowances paid to employees at various grades and job groups across the services.

Table 5. 18: Comparison of allowances paid to NPS, KPS, NYS and the wider public sector FY 2022/2023

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
National Police Service							
Uniformed Personnel							
Inspector-General - Police (State Officer)	PG14	CC	U	-	-	-	50,000
Deputy Inspector-General Kenya Police (State Officer)	PG13	CC	T	-	-	-	50,000
Senior Assistant Inspector - Police	PG12	CC	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Assistant Inspector - Police	PG11	CC	R	55,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Commissioner - Police	PG10	CC	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Superintendent - Police	PG 9	CC	N	36,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Superintendent - Police	PG 8	CC	M	34,200	8,000	14,650	6,000
Assistant Superintendent - Police	PG 7	CC	L	33,500	6,000	12,300	6,000
Chief Inspector - Police	PG 6	AX	K	27,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector - Police	PG 5	CC	J	24,950	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant - Police	PG 4	AX	J	15,700	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant - Police	PG 3	CC	H	9,800	4,000	6,600	4,000
Corporal - Police	PG 2	CC	G	9,650	4,000	5,700	4,000
Constable - Police	PG 1	CC	F	9,500	4,000	4,300	4,000
Kenya Prisons Service							
Commissioner General of	PG14	AU	U	100,000	-	-	50,000

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Prisons							
Deputy Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 13	AU	T	80,000	24,000	60,000	10,000
Senior Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 12	AU	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 11	AU	R	55,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	PG 10	AU	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	PG 9	AU	M	34,200	8,000	14,650	6,000
Senior Superintendent of Prisons	PG 8	AU	L	33,500	6,000	12,300	6,000
Superintendent of Prison	PG 7	AU	K	30,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Chief Inspector - Prisons	PG 6	AX	K	27,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector - Prisons	PG 5	AU	J	24,950	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant - Prisons	PG 4	AX	J	15,700	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant - Prisons	PG 3	AU	H	9,800	4,000	6,600	4,000
Corporal - Prisons	PG 2	AU	G	9,800	4,000	5,700	4,000
Constable - Prisons	PG 1	AU	F	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Civil Service (Non-Uniformed Officers)							
Secretary	CSG4	AA	T	80,000	40,000	60,000	10,000
Director	CSG5	AA	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Deputy Director	CSG6	AA	R	50,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Assistant Director	CSG7	AA	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Principal Officer	CSG8	AA	N	35,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Senior Officer	CSG9	AA	L	28,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Officer I	CSG10	AA	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Officer II	CSG11	AA	J	10,000	4,000	8,200	4,000
Officer Assistant III	CSG12	AA	H	6,750	4,000	6,600	4,000
Technicians I	CSG13	AA	G	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000
Technicians II	CSG14	AA	F	4,500	4,000	4,300	4,000
Senior Support Staff	CSG15	AA	E	4,500	4,000	3,700	4,000
Support Staff I	CSG16	AA	D	4,125	3,000	3,300	4,000
Support Staff II	CSG17	AA	C	3,750	3,000	3,000	4,000
National Youth Service (NYS)							
Director General -- NYS		AZ	U	100,000	-	-	50,000
Director General -- NYS	PG15	AV	T	80,000	24,000	-	10,000
Deputy Director General -- NYS	PG14	AV	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Senior Deputy Director [1] -- NYS	PG13	AV	R	50,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Senior Deputy Director [2] -- NYS	PG12	AV	Q	45,000	14,000	31,500	10,000
Deputy Director -- NYS	PG11	AV	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Assistant Director -- NYS	PG10	AV	N	35,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Assistant Director -- NYS	PG09	AV	M	28,000	8,000	14,650	6,000
Senior Superintendent -- NYS	PG08	AV	L	28,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Superintendent-- NYS	PG07	AZ	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Chief Inspector -- NYS	PG06	AV	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector -- NYS	PG05	AV	J	10,000	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant Major -- NYS	PG04						
Senior Sergeant -- NYS	PG04	AZ	J	8,668	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant -- NYS	PG03	AV	H	-	4,000	-	4,000
Corporal -- NYS	PG02	AV	G	-	3,000	-	4,000
Private -- NYS	PG01	AV	F	-	3,000	-	4,000
Teaching Service (TSC)							
Chief Principal	T-Scale 15	AB		50,000	16,000	38,100	16,000
Senior Principal	T-Scale 14	AB		45,000	14,000	31,500	14,000

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Principal	T-Scale 13	AB		45,000	12,000	27,300	12,000
Deputy Principal III	T-Scale 12	AB		35,000	8,000	17,100	8,000
Senior Headmaster	T-Scale 11	AB		28,000	8,000	14,650	8,000
Head teacher	T-Scale 10	AB		16,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Senior Lecturer IV	T-Scale 09	AB		10,500	5,000	10,700	5,000
Secondary Teacher I	T-Scale 08	AB		6,750	4,000	8,200	4,000
Secondary Teacher II	T-Scale 07	AB		6,750	4,000	6,600	4,000
Secondary Teacher III	T-Scale 06	AB		4,500	3,000	5,700	4,000
Primary Teacher II	T-Scale 05	AB		4,500	3,000	4,300	4,000

Source: SRC/PSC/NPSC/TSC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

476. An analysis of the House Allowance paid to the various Services indicate that Constables of Police and Prisons earn KSh. 9,500, which is higher than that of civil servants in equivalent grades, who earn KSh. 4,500. Privates in NYS do not earn a house allowance as they are housed. It will be important to harmonise the House Allowance for the non-uniformed officers with that of the Police and Prisons while implementing the allowance for NYS personnel, hence allowing them to reside in private accommodation. The rates used to analyse the House Allowance are Nairobi City rates, which are the highest among all the regions.
477. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance of KSh. 3,000, which is uniform across all the Services. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 4,300, but NYS privates do not earn the allowance because they are provided for. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the Services as indicated in the Table 5.19 below.

Table 5. 19: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Constable - Police	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Constable - Prisons	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Clerical Officer II - CS	4,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Private - NYS	0	3,000	0	4,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

478. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various Services indicate that Corporals of Police and Prisons are paid KSh. 9,650, which is higher than that of civil servants and teachers in equivalent grades who are paid KSh. 6,750. Privates in the NYS do not get any house allowance at this level. It will be important to harmonise house allowance for the Police and Prisons with those of NYS, hence allowing NYS to reside in private accommodation.
479. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance of KSh. 4, 300 for Police and Prisons, while employees in the Civil Service, NYS and teachers earn KSh. 4,000. Hardship allowance is paid at a standard rate of KSh. 5,700 but the NYS privates do not get the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the Services as indicated in Table 5.20 below.

Table 5. 20: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Corporal - Police	9,650	4,300	5,700	4,000
Corporal - Prisons	9,650	4,300	5,700	4,000
Clerical Officer I - CS	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000
Corporal - NYS	0	4,000	0	4,000
Primary Teacher II	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

480. An analysis of the house allowance indicates that at this level employees in all the services earn a standard amount of KSh. 45,000. All employees across the various Services at this level earn monthly Commuter Allowance at KSh. 12,000; hardship allowance is paid at a standard rate of KSh. 27,300 and leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 10,000 as indicated in the Table 5.21 below.

Table 5. 21: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Commissioner - Police	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Assistant Director Officer II - CS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Director - NYS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Headmaster - TSC	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000

Source: SRC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23 (KDF included)

481. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various disciplined Services as compared to KDF indicates that Constables of Police and Prisons earn KSh. 9,500, which is lower than that of the KDF members at equivalent grades who earn KSh. 10,000. Privates in the NYS do not earn a house allowance at this level.
482. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance at KSh. 3,000 which is uniform across all the services. However, KDF officers do not draw this allowance. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 4,300. However, privates in NYS and KDF do not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the Services, except for KDF whose earning ranges from KSh. 25,000 to KSh. 45,000 as indicated in Table 5.22 below.

Table 5. 22: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23 (KDF included)

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Constable - Police	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Constable - Prisons	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Private - NYS	0	3,000	0	4,000
Private - KDF	10,000	0	0	25,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for JG 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23

483. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various disciplined Services as compared to that of the KDF indicate that officers in the Police, Prisons and NYS earn at a higher rate of KSh. 45,000 compared to KDF, who draw KSh. 36,000 at equivalent grades.
484. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance at KSh. 12,000, which is uniform across all the Services but KDF officers do not draw this allowance. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 27,300 for NPS and KPS officers but privates in NYS and the KDF do not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 10,000 to officers at this grade across all the Services, except for KDF, whose earning ranges from KSh. 25,000 to KSh. 45,000 as indicated in the Table 5.23 below.

Table 5. 23: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Commissioner -- Police	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Director -- NYS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Warrant Officer I -- KDF	36,000	0	0	25,000 – 45,000

Source: SRC

485. The Taskforce received submissions and views on the issue of allowances from key institutions (including the National Police Service and NPSC), various stakeholders and members of the public. The Taskforce also conducted field visits and heard from officers of various ranks as well as opinion leaders and the public.
486. Officers intimated to the Taskforce that there are no clear policy guidelines on allowances payable to police officers. They also explained that there are several allowances that should be considered but are currently not available. These include allowances that should be paid to units in operational areas who work under extremely difficult conditions.
487. The officers also indicated that there is disparity in the designation of hardship areas for payment of requisite allowances. For instance, areas designated by the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) as hardship areas are not categorised as such by NPS.
488. Officers in “forward” or “operational” areas noted that they face exceptional risks and conditions, and that most officers try to avoid serving in those areas. The Taskforce noted that in spite of the difficult conditions under which they serve, these officers do not receive any special allowance.
489. NPS officers stated that whereas they are entitled to seven days off duty after every quarter, the leave allowance issued to them is insufficient to allow them to travel home, particularly those who have to cross from one corner of the country to the other. The counties of Wajir, Migori, Mandera, Garissa, Lamu and Tana River were noted by the Taskforce to be particularly challenging.
490. The Taskforce was informed that NPS drivers do not receive a driver’s allowance to cover for miscellaneous expenses like car wash, punctures, and other road eventualities. The drivers argued that at times they are compelled to spend their personal funds for sustenance when they travel out of station on official duty.
491. The Taskforce was also informed that there are cases when allowances for junior officers are paid through senior officers. In such instances, the junior officers stated that they do not receive the allowances in full or sometimes do not receive the funds at all.

492. The Taskforce was further told that officers whose duties do not require them to be in police uniforms such as DCI, Recce and those in VIP protection, are given a suit allowance, which is often too little and does not reflect market realities. Civilian staff of NPS argued that they are often exposed to the same conditions and risks as uniformed officers yet they are not eligible for the same allowances where provided.
- (a) The Taskforce noted that housing allowances were not commensurate with market realities, forcing officers to find affordable houses far from their workstations and, therefore, making them unavailable for standby calls. Officers also spoke of the dangers they face by living out of station, especially where they have to live in the same area with suspects they arrest.
 - (b) The Taskforce was informed that the payment of allowances was not automated, thus occasioning delays in payment and inconvenience to officers.
 - (c) Stakeholders submitted that transparency in the disbursement of allowances was a primary concern, not to mention the fact that the allowances are low; such that the current leave allowances that cannot cater for transport costs to officers' home counties.

Recommendations

493. Having considered the submissions by three Services (NPS, KPS and NYS), the National Treasury, PSC, NPSC, and SRC as well as various groups of officers, and having reviewed relevant documents, the Taskforce concludes that *restructuring and review of the remuneration system of NPS is urgent*. Such restructuring and review must address the wide disparities and varied eligibility criteria for payments to achieve harmonisation and standardisation. The Taskforce therefore recommends that:
- (a) SRC should harmonise, standardise and review payable rates for monthly allowances for uniformed and non-uniformed officers in NPS.
 - (b) SRC and NPSC should introduce new allowances for uniformed and non-uniformed officers in NPS.

CHAPTER SIX: WELFARE REFORMS IN THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

6.1 Introduction

494. The Taskforce was required to review and recommend improvement of matters relating to welfare of officers for all cadres of NPS and on all other matters incidental to optimal service delivery by NPS.
495. Welfare includes anything that is done for the comfort and improvement of employees and is provided over and above the wages. Welfare helps in keeping the morale and motivation of employees high so as to retain them for longer durations and better performance.
496. Welfare measures need not be solely in monetary terms but may be in any kind or forms. Employee welfare may, therefore, include monitoring of working conditions, creation of harmony at work through infrastructure for health and insurance against disease and accidents for the employees and their families.
497. The Taskforce notes that NPSC has developed a Welfare Policy to address the concerns of Service members. The policy addresses various issues such as housing, health, recreation and employee assistance programmes, among others. NPSC has also developed a “Well-being Policy” that is expected to support the welfare of NPS officers and their families. However, these policies have not been followed up with operationalisation and implementation in NPS.
498. From the field visits and proposals submitted to the Taskforce, officers expressed the need for canteens in stations where they could meet for leisure, recreation and to socialise. The Taskforce established that the Service does not have a centralised canteen management organisation to support the welfare of officers. The Taskforce found that in many stations, particularly those outside major towns, officers had organised themselves to set up makeshift canteens. The need for canteens and places for socialisation is especially dire in security operations areas, where officers patronising civilian establishments may pose a security risk.
499. The Taskforce established that many police stations and police lines do not have any recreation facilities where officers can take part in sports and games during their time off from duty. Officers noted that this often forces many of them to go to bars, further compounding the problem of alcoholism in the Service.

Recommendations

500. The Taskforce recognises that the general welfare of officers plays a key role in their motivation and enhances a positive environment, both for the officers and their families. The lack of implementation of the Welfare Policy, among other measures, poses a challenge to achievement of an effective NPS. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) There is need to establish a centrally managed structure to oversee the establishment and running of police canteens across the country. Such a structure should be led by a senior officer and be facilitated with adequate resources to ensure that there are properly run canteens countrywide. This should be benchmarked on the DEFCO Welfare Canteens;
 - (b) The nature of services and facilities provided should depend on the practicalities and needs of various places. Security operation areas should have priority for the establishment and running of canteens;

- (c) NPSC and the National Police Service should arrange for the establishment of recreational and sports facilities for officers and their families. The designs of police stations should take into account these needs;
- (d) NPSC and the National Police Service should partner with county governments to develop Early Childhood Development and Education (ECDE) facilities within or in the vicinity of police premises to cater for the needs officers' children of within NPS facilities;
- (e) NPSC and the National Police Service should provide officers in operational areas with transport facilitation for purposes such as shopping and other basic social duties;
- (f) NPS should take steps to give effect to and implement provisions of sections 82 and 83 of the NPS Act and SSOs on police welfare associations, widows and widowers' welfare associations, and the Cabinet Secretary and NPSC should recognise those structures; and
- (g) The IG should recognise the necessity for, from time to time, and commission tournaments for the Service, and facilitation of the same. Where need be, the IG should establish welfare committees at the ward level.

6.2 Medical scheme

- 501. The Taskforce was mandated to assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current medical scheme for the National Police Service and recommend comprehensive reform or revisions to improve it.
- 502. The Taskforce analysed the current medical scheme, received submissions and views, and noted concerns and challenges the officers are facing in the transition from the previous medical insurance scheme to the current one. The Taskforce also explored the quality of services available under the scheme and access to accredited facilities.
- 503. The nature of work, and the risks that accompany policing, calls for proper measures to ensure that officers are well covered in the event of accidents, injury or other health risks that may confront them in the course of duty. The need for a comprehensive medical insurance scheme is primary when it comes to accessing quality health care. The availability of a medical scheme demonstrates that NPS values the health and welfare of its staff. This can significantly boost the morale and motivation of police officers, knowing that they have access to medical care and support when required. It can also enhance job satisfaction, contribute to higher productivity and improve the commitment of officers.
- 504. A well-functioning medical scheme ensures that NPS officers can receive medical treatment promptly, minimising the risk of complications and allowing them to return to duty as soon as they are fit. By providing timely healthcare, the medical scheme helps to reduce absenteeism and ensures the continuity of police operations.

Background

- 505. Prior to acquisition of medical cover for NPS, members of the Service had established and operated a self-help contributory medical fund from which officers borrowed in times of need. However, this was inadequate to cater for the needs of officers. In the event of emergency treatment, police officers would be admitted to the Forces Memorial Hospital in Nairobi and later transferred to a general hospital for treatment. It was thus recommended that a comprehensive medical insurance cover that takes care of the health

of officers on account of their high-risk exposure should be introduced. The Government of Kenya, through a Cabinet decision, approved the implementation of a comprehensive medical insurance cover on June 2, 2011.

506. Over the years, NPS has had different medical insurance covers from various providers. These include:
- (a) NHIF, which catered for Civil Servants, National Police Service officers, County Government staffs and public and private institutions between January 1, 2012 to September 30, 2016;
 - (b) AON, which provided comprehensive medical cover for members of the Service between October 1, 2016 and September 30, 2017;
 - (c) NHIF, which provided comprehensive cover for members of the Service between October 1, 2017 and June 30, 2022; and
 - (d) A consortium of underwriters comprising CIC, Old Mutual, and Britam, which was expected to provide comprehensive cover for members of the Service between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023.

Comparison of previous medical schemes and the current one

507. The Taskforce examined previous medical schemes from 2012 to 2023 to assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current one.
508. The medical scheme provided by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) for civil servants, national police, county governments, public, and private institutions from January 1, 2012, to September 30, 2016, offered a comprehensive range of benefits covering outpatient and inpatient care, dental and optical care, emergency services, specialised treatment, annual check-ups, and even had provision for overseas treatment in specific cases similar to the 2016-2017 medical scheme provided by AON. There were no major downgrades between the two schemes. Notable improvements in the 2016 – 2017 period included increased coverage limits for outpatient services for higher-grade officers.
509. The NHIF comprehensive medical cover from 2017 to 2022 represented a significant improvement on the previous AON scheme. There was the introduction of unlimited or significantly higher coverage limits, comprehensive outpatient and inpatient care, maternity and reproductive health services, dialysis, rehabilitation, and coverage for various medical conditions, including cancer. Major improvements included *increased coverage limits*, especially for inpatient and outpatient services. The coverage limits for various job groups (A to L, M & N, P, and R, S, T) were lifted or significantly raised from the previous scheme. *Comprehensive outpatient and inpatient care* were another improvement. This coverage was more comprehensive than the previous scheme.
510. The NHIF scheme included comprehensive *maternity and reproductive health coverage*, with facility for antenatal care, delivery, postnatal care, and family planning services. NHIF introduced coverage for *dialysis, including haemodialysis, nursing services, and counselling*. Additionally, there was a rehabilitation package for drug and substance abuse, which was not explicitly mentioned in the previous scheme. The NHIF scheme covers *orthopaedic appliances*. NHIF provides coverage for *all surgical procedures*, except for cosmetic surgeries, *organ donor testing* for up to a maximum of two, **oncology coverage** including radiotherapy and chemotherapy. For *specialised treatment*, the scheme explicitly mentioned coverage for renal dialysis and renal transplant, chronic illnesses, radiological tests, and pressure stockings.

511. NHIF provided coverage for *overseas treatment*, including travel and accommodation for the patient and a person accompanying them, travel and accommodation for organ donors, reimbursement of claims related to emergency treatment, and treatment costs.
512. The current medical scheme provided by the Consortium of Underwriters (CIC, Old Mutual and Britam) for members of the National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service for January 1, 2023 to December 31, 2023, introduces several changes and enhancements over the previous scheme, including:
 - (a) *Ex-gratia cover* of KSh. 200,000,000 for specific groups (M-T for non-uniformed officers, PG 8-13 for NPS, and PG 9-14 for KPS), which provides a safety net for individuals who may exhaust their inpatient and outpatient limits and require medical services outside the country.
 - (b) *Increased maternity cover*: The maternity cover has been substantially increased to KSh. s200,000.
 - (c) *Enhanced optical and dental cover*: Optical and dental covers have been increased. The optical cover has been raised to KSh. 100,000, and dental cover has been raised to KSh. 60,000. This represents a considerable improvement, providing members with more substantial support for their optical and dental needs.
 - (d) *Inpatient and outpatient limits*: Most job groups experienced an increase or maintained their inpatient and outpatient limits. Notably, Job Group P had a slight reduction in the inpatient limit to KSh. 3,200,000. The scheme provides coverage for Covid-19-related expenses, including inpatient and outpatient management within set guidelines.
 - (e) *Exclusions*: The scheme outlines various exclusions, among them treatments for obesity, non-prescription drugs, alternative medicine, self-inflicted injuries or illnesses, experimental treatments, cosmetic procedures, and more. These exclusions are standard in many medical insurance policies.

Submissions by officers

513. The Taskforce noted grave concerns of junior officers regarding the new medical insurance scheme for NPS. The Taskforce noted that the current medical insurance scheme is a source of pain and discontent among many NPS officers. The Taskforce registered numerous complaints about the scheme. These ranged from non-availability of records such as marriage certificates and information about officers and their families to bureaucratic delays in the approval of treatment or performance of urgent medical procedures.
514. While the current medical scheme is said to be unlimited for officers in job groups A to L, there are several practical limitations faced by officers in lower cadres. Junior officers stated that daily treatment ceilings are capped at between KSh. 800 and KSh. 1,500 per week for each family irrespective of whether or not one has exhausted their annual outpatient limit. The persons seeking treatment are thus compelled to pay out of pocket or in the alternative space out treatment after exhausting the prescribed daily maximum rates.
515. Junior officers also stated that despite there being a list of accredited facilities provided for in the cover; there are instances when they have been turned away because their low ranks exclude them from accessing treatment in such facilities.

516. The Taskforce also noted that some counties had very few accredited facilities and, in some instances, some of the said ‘hospitals’ were mere buildings without the necessary medical equipment, staffing and medication.
517. More alarming were incidents where junior officers or their dependants with special medical conditions could no longer access services in facilities that they had previously used. In one case, the Taskforce was alerted of a situation where colleagues had to raise funds to assist a fellow officer to secure treatment for a child who had sickle-cell anaemia.
518. The Taskforce also learnt that under the current scheme, the number of dependents per principal officer is limited to five (5) and one (1) spouse, thus presenting challenges to officers in polygamous unions or those with larger families. Significantly, the terms of the consortium exclude a cover for alcohol and substance abuse, which as the Taskforce has previously stated, is a major concern as cases of addiction have permeated the Service.
519. Officers decried the lack of information on rollout of the current medical cover. They felt that they were neither educated on the changes nor was clear information provided on what was expected of them once the new service provider came on board. This meant that officers and their families were left grappling whenever one fell sick. Some hospitals turned away officers, explaining that they only offer services to certain job groups. Such basic information would only become available to officers and their families on seeking medical attention.
520. Junior Officers submitted that they are limited to a certain level of hospitals while their senior colleagues are accommodated in superior facilities. The junior cadre argued that differentiating the type of hospitals they could attend *vis-a-vis* their seniors was discriminatory and in bad faith. Further, they explained that as the ones largely in operation areas, their risk exposure was way higher and, therefore, they needed to be able to access a wide array of facilities.
521. Junior officers further reported delays in payment of the Last Expense Benefits to bereaved families, especially where officers had died on duty. The officers were also concerned that overseas treatment is limited to specific hospitals with the authorisation being more tedious now than under the previous cover.
522. The Taskforce was informed that the transitional challenges in the insurance cover had precipitated loss of life among some officers. Particularly alarming was the case of an officer in Lamu Central Police Station who died after he could not get treatment in the nearest facility because the provisions of the cover precluded access to that facility.

Submission by the medical scheme committee

523. The Taskforce held consultations with the committee that was involved in the procurement of the current medical scheme. The committee pointed out that the previous NHIF scheme had become too expensive and was riddled with complaints from officers on the declining quality of service. The committee asserted that the current scheme was adjudged as providing better value for money after assessment. The committee informed the Taskforce that the cap on daily spending per officer was not part of the terms of the contract negotiated.
524. On transition challenges, the committee informed the Taskforce that arrangements to create awareness among the officers were in place and that information would be sent out.

525. At the time the Taskforce went to the field, in early 2023, the task of collecting and collating service providers was not complete. This process was completed in April/May 2023 and a list of over 572 facilities shared with NPS across the 47 counties. The Taskforce was also informed that a hotline had been established to assist officers who encountered challenges in accessing medical services.

Submission by the medical service provider

526. The Taskforce received submissions from the CIC managing director (MD) on the outlook of the service to NPS officers. On the issue of daily limits, the insurer informed the Taskforce that this was an arrangement with the various hospitals to ensure the viability of the scheme.

Findings

527. The Taskforce crystallised the key issues around the current medical scheme are as follows: First, the number and availability of accredited hospitals that are accessible to officers is a major concern. Second, there is need to establish a proper referral system for members of NPS. Third, there is need to sensitise the officers on the services available under the current medical scheme. Fourth, and last, there are surmountable procedural challenges due to the transition from one medical insurance provider to another.
528. The Taskforce determined that the current medical insurance cover for NPS, which commenced in January 2023, contains benefits that are graded according to job groups. Officers in Job Groups A to L and their dependents can access unlimited medical cover for inpatient and outpatient services as well as specialised treatments in accredited healthcare facilities. As opposed to this, officers in Job Group M to T have limitations that specify what they are entitled to under the outpatient and inpatient framework, as well as what is excluded from the medical insurance scheme. This can be explained by medical exclusion terms for these age groups.
529. Procurement of an insurance provider is based on the Public Procurement and Disposal Act, which requires that the lowest bidder is awarded the contract. This does not necessarily translate to quality services.
530. The current medical scheme benefits, as provided in the insurance cover, are as captured in Table 6.1.
- (a) All Job Groups/PGs have a standard Maternity benefit (KSh. 200,000), optical benefit (KSh. 100,000) and dental benefit (KSh. 60,000);
 - (b) Based on the inpatient benefits amount, the Job Groups/PGs that have better inpatient benefits are A-H (PG1-3), J (PG 4-5), K (PG6, PG6-7) and L (PG7, PG8) because they have unlimited cover compared to Job Groups M, N, P, Q, R, S, T which have a limited cover; and
 - (c) Based on the Outpatient benefits amount, the Job Groups/PGs that have better Outpatient benefits are A-H (PG1-3), J (PG 4-5), K (PG6, PG6-7) and L (PG7, PG8) because they have unlimited coverage compared to the Job Groups M&N, P, Q, R, S, T that have a limited coverage.

Table 6. 1: Summary NPS current medical scheme benefits

Job Group	PG NPS	PG KPS	Inpatient	Outpatient	Maternity	Optical	Dental
A-H	PG 1-3	PG 1-3	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
J	PG 4-5	PG 4-5	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
K	PG 6	PG 6-7	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
L	PG 7	PG 8	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
M&N	PG 8-9	PG 9-10	3,000,000	400,000	200,000	100,000	60,000
P	PG 10	PG 11	3,200,000	450,000	200,000	100,000	60,000
Q, R, S, T	PG 11-13	PG 12-13	3,500,000	500,000	200,000	100,000	60,000

Source: National Police Service

Analysis of medical service facilities for NPS

531. The total number of accredited CIC facilities is 572. These facilities are categorised into three types: mission, private, and Government of Kenya (GoK);

- (a) There are 70 mission facilities in the provided data, which represents 12 per cent of the total number of accredited CIC facilities;
- (b) There are 392 private facilities accredited by CIC, which accounts for 69 per cent of the total accredited facilities; and
- (c) There are 110 Government of Kenya (GoK) accredited facilities, which represents 19 per cent of the total accredited facilities.

Table 6. 2: Distribution of accredited CIC facilities by category

Facility	Overall Number	% of the Total
Mission	70	12%
Private	392	69%
GoK	110	19%
Total	572	100%

Source: NPS/KPS

- (d) There are 534 outpatient facilities, which make up 93.4 per cent of the total accredited facilities;
- (e) The number of facilities with inpatient services is 397. This represents approximately 69.4 per cent of the total accredited facilities;
- (f) The number of facilities with dental services is 168, which represents 29.4 per cent of the total accredited facilities;
- (g) The number of facilities with optical services is 103, which accounts for 18 per cent of the total accredited facilities;
- (h) The number of facilities offering maternity services is 374, which represents 65.4 per cent of the total accredited facilities;
- (i) Among the listed facility types, optical facilities have the lowest distribution at 103, accounting for only 18 per cent of the total accredited facilities; and
- (j) The outpatient department has the highest distribution among the accredited CIC facilities, with 534 facilities, which accounts for 93.4 per cent of the total accredited facilities.

Table 6. 3: Distribution of accredited CIC facilities by department

Facility	Overall Number	% facilities
Outpatient	534	93.4%
Inpatient	397	69.4%
Dental	168	29.4%
Optical	103	18%
Maternity	374	65.4%

Source: Taskforce Computation based on CIC Data

532. Nairobi City County has the highest number of CIC facilities, with 40 accredited. The implication of Nairobi City County having the highest number of facilities is that officers based in Nairobi have relatively better access to medical services than their colleagues stationed in other counties. This concentration of facilities in the capital city suggests that officers in Nairobi may have a more extensive network of healthcare providers to choose from and potentially shorter travel distances to access medical care; and
533. Isiolo County has the lowest number of CIC facilities, with only four (4) accredited. This implies that officers stationed in Isiolo may have more limited access to CIC-accredited medical facilities than in other counties. They may need to travel longer distances to access services, which could potentially lead to delays in receiving the necessary medical care, potential crowding in the few available facilities, and limited choices for specialised medical services. It can also lead to increased waiting times for medical care.

Table 6. 4: Distribution of accredited CIC facilities for NPS and KPS officers by county

S/No.	County	No. of CIC Facilities
1	Nyandarua	10
2	West Pokot	5
3	Samburu	8
4	Elgeyo Marakwet	7
5	Mombasa	15
6	Baringo	9
7	Bomet	5
8	Bungoma	12
9	Busia	9
10	Embu	12
11	Garissa	13
12	Homa Bay	13
13	Isiolo	4
14	Kajiado	15
15	Kakamega	20
16	Kericho	15
17	Kiambu	17
18	Kilifi	17
19	Kwale	10
20	Tana River	6
21	Lamu	9
22	Taita Taveta	9
23	Wajir	10
24	Mandera	14
25	Marsabit	6
26	Meru	14
27	Tharaka Nithi	9

S/No.	County	No. of CIC Facilities
28	Kitui	11
29	Machakos	13
30	Makueni	10
31	Nyeri	16
32	Kirinyaga	8
33	Murang'a	13
34	Turkana	9
35	Trans Nzoia	10
36	Nandi	15
37	Laikipia	14
38	Nakuru	21
39	Narok	5
40	Vihiga	10
41	Siaya	10
42	Kisumu	19
43	Migori	17
44	Kisii	14
45	Nyamira	8
46	Nairobi City	40
47	Uasin Gishu	15
Total		571

Source: CIC

534. While transition challenges are understandable and indeed normal, there is need to pay regard to emergencies and extreme situations. The Taskforce received reports of loss of lives among officers because of inability to access treatment. There were also complaints that authorisation of treatment and associated procedures can take up to seven (7) working days, which is inordinately long for a person seeking medical attention.
535. Besides the other challenges highlighted, lack of consultation in making the policy changes has adversely affected officers' welfare. Indeed, the disruption in the provision of medical services because of change of providers exposed officers, especially during the period they were unable to access medical facilities.
536. The Taskforce also had the opportunity to review the Medical Insurance Contract and Negotiation Minutes (which formed part of the contract) between NPS and the provider. After a careful analysis of the contract, the Taskforce makes the following findings:
- The contract negotiation period was short, with the contract signed on December 31, 2022 and the contract on-boarding scheduled for the following day, January 1, 2023;
 - The negotiation minutes, which formed part of the contract, had various inconsistencies with the main contract showing different figures of the number of officers covered. The Taskforce notes that the minutes inflated the number of people covered by 5,000;
 - There were issues that were not clearly defined in the contract, including capitation, sub-contracting and limits of the cover. It was also noted that there were missing pages in the contract documents. For instance, page 38, which ought to have had tables essential to the whole contract is missing from the soft copy of the contract document;
 - There was poor registration of officers into the new medical insurance scheme; and
 - While mental illness is covered in the medical scheme, officers are currently being referred to Mathari Hospital. Death by suicide is compensated in Group Life Cover.

Occupational psychiatric illness is compensated in WIBA, at 50 per cent of eight (8) years' gross earnings up to a maximum of KSh. 1 million.

537. The Taskforce analysed the views and submissions of NPS officers, stakeholders and the insurance provider and reviewed related documents including the contract of insurance and the negotiation minutes which form part of the contract. The current medical scheme is a source of great pain, frustration, and discontent in NPS and especially among junior officers. The Taskforce noted the following regarding the current medical insurance scheme:
- (a) Although the contract provides that the cover is unlimited for officers in Job Group A to L, the provider is implementing low daily capitation that is not in the contract.
 - (b) Furthermore, contrary to the list that was provided as the number of recognised health facilities, the actual number of facilities were fewer, and in some cases, non-existent.
 - (c) The contract states that non-disclosure of material facts is a ground for termination of the contract, yet, the 'capitators' (service providers) are not disclosed in the main contract;
 - (d) While the negotiation minutes contained an agreement to have mental health covered under the insurance scheme, it was not covered under the contract; even though mental health treatment is covered and there are NPS officers undergoing treatment under the scheme;
 - (e) Lack of communication on registration processes for the scheme; and communication was not early enough – nearly 30 per cent of officers in NPS and 20 per cent in KPS yet are to register with the Scheme; and
 - (f) There is no clear formula for evaluating the usage of the scheme as there is only one evaluation report for the implementation of the scheme and poor transition management between the service providers.

Recommendations

538. On the basis of the foregoing issues, the Taskforce recommends:
- (a) Non-renewal of the 2023 medical insurance contract of the Consortium;
 - (b) A forensic audit of the process and implementation of the 2023 medical scheme;
 - (c) The Taskforce further recommends that future medical insurance negotiations should have a six-month period from the date of advertisement to the on-boarding of staff to enable coverage of all the necessary areas and minimize teething challenges at on-boarding stage;
 - (d) The new service provider should have adequate, accessible and effective services taking into consideration the nature of the Service including "forward" areas. The service providers should provide proof of distribution of accredited service providers and facilities;
 - (e) The Taskforce recommends sensitisation of members and consultation with officers who are the beneficiaries in determining the medical cover that would be contracted and the terms of engagement;
 - (f) The Taskforce recommends that in future contracts, the contract and minutes should match and be consistent; and that key disclosures such as capitation should be included in the body of the main contract and involve relevant experts in the entire process of procurement of medical cover;

- (f) Independent Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the contractual performance and customer care should be done by the Services;
- (g) The Service provider should update beneficiaries and NPS every month as per the contract to provide an account on the usage of the cover.
- (h) The implementation committee should oversight negotiations and implementation of the medical scheme;
- (i) There should be proper accountability mechanisms for the members of the negotiating team from the Services and the medical providers, including negligent acts or possible malpractices that end up affecting members of the Service. NPSC and NPS should negotiate and provide comprehensive group life cover for all cadres; All insurance contracts negotiated on behalf of NPS officers should cover at least two years, to prevent regular disruptions and the constant transitional challenges;
- (j) NPS recruits should be covered in the medical scheme; and
- (k) Given that the World Health Organisation classifies drug abuse and alcoholism as a disease, future medical insurance should cover such cases as part of NPS's contractual obligations. The Ministry of Interior and NPSC should explore ways in which health services for members of the Service can be covered under the Ulinzi Prime Health Services (UPHS), including access to the health facilities of KDF and shared services between NPS and KDF health facilities.

6.3 Mental health

- 539. The Taskforce was required to assess issues of psychological support, guidance and counselling at station level and make any other recommendation to improve the mental wellbeing of NPS officers.
- 540. The Taskforce is cognisant of the fact that NPS officers operate in an ever-changing security environment where they have to deal with new challenges every hour, minute and second. While their aptitude and training prepare them to respond to these challenges in their professional life, the reality is that police officers are not superhuman; they also require help and support from time to time.
- 541. The nature of police work means that most of the NPS officers join the Service at a fairly youthful age and get posted to far flung areas away from home. They are thus detached from home and separated from their families as well as removed from their communities for a long time. Often, they retire to a solitary life back in their home areas, with few or no friends. Their quality of life is compounded by loss of privileges, including medical care and minimal personal investments due to the mobility of their working life.
- 542. Police work is often the source of severe trauma and stress. There have been many incidents of police officers committing suicide or using violence against others as a result of trauma and stress. The organisational culture of the Service also discourages discussions and openness about mental health. Police officers are expected to be “tough” and to continue their duties irrespective of trauma.
- 543. A survey by NPSC in 2022, indicated that 12 to 13 per cent (about 12,000 officers) of the total population of NPS officers were facing mental health challenges. The Mental Health Task Force, established in 2020, listed in its report the disciplined forces under special groups whose needs may not be fully addressed by primary health care service

providers. The report recommended that “[d]isciplined forces [must] ensure availability of psychological services and regular staff debriefing on mental health at all workplaces.”

544. There are many officers who are struggling with drug and substance abuse, and are still in the Services with no clear policy on how to handle them. Many have not responded positively to rehabilitative interventions and officers are compelled to keep watch over them so that they do not harm themselves or others. In one instance, in Wajir, the Service strength was reduced by a third because 30 out of 240 officers were suffering from substance abuse requiring another 30 officers to ensure their wellbeing.

Findings

545. In its countrywide consultations with NPS officers, the Service and NPSC leadership, the Taskforce discussed the issue of mental health in the Service.
546. The Taskforce was informed that in the Administration Police Service, 160 officers with mental health illness were admitted to rehabilitation, with 12 officers being treated.
547. DCI submitted that the number of their officers facing mental health issues may not be objectively identified as there has been no survey conducted on the situation. In 2022, however, the counselling section at DCI handled approximately 60 officers with mental health issues, with the number for the first quarter of 2023 alone being 38s. It should be noted that these are officers who are able to access counselling services. meaning the number could be higher.
548. The National Police Service submitted that there were high suicide rates in the Service attributed to mental health. A majority of the suicides occurred among officers aged about 25 years.

Table 6. 5: Number of reported suicide cases involving NPS officers

Year	Kenya Police	Administration Police
2018	10	8
2019	3	7
2020	4	3
2021	6	
2022	8	70

Source: NPS

549. Officers informed the Taskforce that mental health issues are compounded by addiction to alcohol and drug use, trauma from work, anger and frustration over working conditions, financial stress, and marriage and family problems. Officers with disabilities do not have access to psychologists or therapists, which compounds their mental health challenges.
550. The Taskforce noted that mental fitness for recruits is not emphasised as much as physical fitness and paramilitary training and drills. The Taskforce established that from January to December 2022, 179 officers were admitted into rehabilitation centres. It became clear to the Taskforce that there is lack of effective mechanisms to handle mental health issues despite there being an increase in cases. The Taskforce further noted that NPS has no capacity to deal with mental health cases from the outset, and as a result, cases end up in referral facilities in severe condition occasioning long-stay admissions.
551. The Taskforce established that referral facilities for mental wellness are only available in Nairobi County. This situation continues to be a great impediment to the provision of treatment needed.

552. The Taskforce established that the NPSC Psychological Counselling Policy provides for the establishment of counselling services at the regional level to provide psychosocial support, guidance and counselling to members of NPS. The Taskforce notes progress in implementation of the policy.
553. The Taskforce noted that NPS has 223 trained and qualified officers deployed to provide psychological support, guidance and counselling services across the country. The 223 are made up of 62 Counsellors; 100 Protestant Chaplains; 33 Catholic Chaplains and 28 Imams. For a Service of about 107,000 officers, these numbers are woefully inadequate.
554. The Taskforce further established that there are no offices for the counsellors and social workers, and where available, they are often within the police premises thus making it difficult for officers to seek psychosocial support services out of fear of confidentiality breaches, not to mention the lack of a conducive counselling environment such as counselling rooms and other related equipment or tools. It was established that more than 90 per cent of police stations countrywide lack chaplaincy, guidance and counselling offices or officers.
555. The Taskforce noted that although the chaplaincy was established to provide spiritual support to officers, the Chaplaincy Policy has not been fully implemented. Some officers have embarked on chaplaincy on their own initiative to guide and counsel their colleagues despite not having any formal training. Interestingly, the chaplains the Taskforce encountered provided both chaplaincy and guidance and counselling services despite the difference between the two disciplines.

Recommendations

556. The Taskforce notes that mental health is a major concern within NPS with cases of mental health steadily rising. This calls for implementation of the prescribed policies and regulations in order to arrest the growing trend.
557. The Taskforce therefore makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) Flowing from the recommendations made earlier (on the medical scheme), the Taskforce proposes that mental health should be comprehensively covered by the medical insurance scheme;
 - (b) There should be full implementation of the NPSC Counselling Policy, within six months, including appointment of a wellness champion in every sub-county; and
 - (c) The Taskforce further recommends that the Ministry of Interior should develop a policy on shared services within various institutions in its ambit as a cost-saving measure. For instance, NPS and KPS can use the services of the same professional counsellors, hospitals, training facilities among others.

6.4 Compensation Scheme

558. On compensation, the Taskforce was required to assess and recommend the establishment of funds or schemes to cater for loss of life or injuries in the line of duty, terminal illness including mental health illness, and a possible legal and administrative framework to cater for NPS officers' dependants.

Current practice

559. The Taskforce noted that compensation for accidents and occupational diseases for KPS officers is covered under the Work Injury Benefits Act, 2007 (WIBA). WIBA covers the hours the officer is at their place of work.

560. Besides the provisions of WIBA, the government has introduced the Group Personal Accident (GPA) Scheme, which is funded by the National Treasury and currently covered by Britam Insurance Company Ltd. The GPA covers permanent bodily injury or death arising from bodily injury, or death in the line of duty, and provides a 24-hour cover to employees whether within or outside the country.

Table 6. 6: Benefits payable under the GPA and WIBA

Cover	Benefit
Death under GPA	5 years Basic Salary
Death under WIBA	8 years Gross Salary (basic salary + regular allowances)
Permanent Total Disability under GPA	5 years Basic Salary x percentage awarded
Permanent Total Disability under WIBA	8 Years (Basic Salary + house allowance) x percentage awarded

Source: CIC

Findings

561. The Taskforce was informed that the legal and administrative framework to cater for the NPS officers' dependents after loss of life, terminal illness and injuries has some significant challenges. When officers are injured, processing compensation takes a fairly long time and, in some cases, officers complained that the awards are not commensurate to the injuries sustained.
562. The Taskforce established that the system for pursuing compensation claims in case of accidents and injury is all manual and centralised in Nairobi. Officers informed the Taskforce that in the circumstances, they are often compelled to travel to Nairobi from their duty stations to follow up on compensation benefits yet they usually operate on limited days off duty and low finances. Consequently, many of them are compelled to abandon legitimate claims for compensation. Further, many officers lack knowledge and information on how to initiate a compensation claim, resulting in time-barred applications.

Table 6. 7: NPS officers injured or killed in the line of duty, 2014-2022

Year	Injured	Killed
2014	169	26
2015	292	24
2016	519	42
2017	614	78
2018	423	69
2019	333	99
2020	289	36
2021	350	43
2022	549	29

Source: NPS

Table 6. 8: NPS officers' unpaid or pending claims (Group Life, Injuries, Disability, Terminal Illness, Mental Health Illness, and last expenses), 2014-2022

Year	(Number of Officers) Unpaid or Pending Claims
2014	4
2015	14
2016	409
2017	487

Year	(Number of Officers) Unpaid or Pending Claims
2018	353
2019	408
2020	480
2021	648
2022	1,040

Source: NPS

563. The Taskforce also received submissions on the condition of NPS officers living with disabilities. Most of these officers become disabled as a result of injuries in the course of their duties. The Task Force met officers who have lost their sight and others who are on wheelchair. These officers have been PWD officers. There is no policy at the moment to guide the needed professional support to these officers and are largely ignored even with respect to career progression. Those who have lost their sight do not have an aide assigned to assist them to get around.

Recommendations

564. The Taskforce is alive to the number of NPS officers exposed to unique risks associated with their nature of work. Having considered the submissions and public views, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) The Taskforce received complaints of delays in processing claims of by affected officers. The Taskforce recommends the automation of the process of filing and settling such claims, which will greatly reduce the turnaround time of payment of such claims;
- (b) The Taskforce further heard that officers are not aware of the processes and procedures of lodging claims in case of injuries or death. Consequently, the Taskforce recommends that the Service conducts impactful and sustained sensitisation on these procedures and processes to the officers; and
- (c) In the event of an injury or death, the Officer-in-Charge should alert the responsible HR office that shall immediately inform either the injured officer or his family and advise on the procedure of lodging claims for compensation.
- (d) The Taskforce recommends that the NPSC fast track the development of a policy on officers living with disability.

6.5 Housing

Context and practice

565. The Taskforce was required to assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current housing policy for members of NPS and, where appropriate, recommend a review of the same -- including recommendation for a housing mortgage for officers.

566. The need for a streamlined approach to address the housing challenges in NPS is immediate. In the past, police housing seemed to have been handled as an afterthought, which has increasingly impacted negatively on service delivery. Furthermore, recruitment of officers has continued without proportionate investment in housing and related infrastructure for the officers. Dignified housing has been identified as a critical factor in motivating members of the National Police Service.

567. The Ransley Taskforce identified “inadequate and poor housing” as one of the demoralising factors in the police Service.” A 2016 report by IPOA on housing in NPS

found that officers live in deplorable conditions, often sharing tents, mud-walled-and-tin shacks that pass for houses leading to low self-esteem.

- 568. There have been various efforts geared towards addressing the issue of poor and inadequate police housing over the years. In 2014, the government initiated a programme to construct houses for police officers and allocated KSh. 1.2 billion in the 2014/2015 budget. The programme began in 2016 under the State Department for Housing and Urban Development after some initial delays.
- 569. Further, in 2018, the government adopted the policy of providing house allowance to all officers as a way of addressing the housing challenge and ensuring integration of officers into the community. Under this policy, those housed in police lines would pay rent to the State Department for Housing and Urban Development, which was given the mandate of managing police houses.
- 570. In 2018, NPSC developed the National Police Service Housing Policy which provides for the management of housing in the National Police Service with a focus on provision, housing standards, allocation and maintenance to ensure that there is decent and dignified housing for members of the Service.

Findings

- 571. The Taskforce established that the current approach to police housing embraces a hybrid system, which combines provision of housing and payment of house allowances.
- 572. The practice of payment of house allowances in NPS is similar to that applicable to other employees in the public service who are paid house allowance depending on their grades. Employees occupying institutional houses pay rent equivalent to the value as determined by the State Department responsible for public housing or they may be required to surrender their house allowance, whichever is lower.
- 573. Housing Supplementation is paid to police officers in Job Groups F-J who are expected to reside within their respective Service lines for the purpose of quick mobilisation and close supervision. In this kind of arrangement, the officers are eligible for free housing facilities, including water and electricity.
- 574. The Taskforce established that the demand for housing in NPS far outstrips supply. The State Department for Housing puts the current housing shortfall for NPS at 90,000 units assuming NPS would have wanted to accommodate all its officers within the police lines. It was further noted that NPS, at full strength of 105,884 officers and spread across the country, can currently only adequately house less than 22 per cent of its personnel, thus leaving the rest (78%) facing housing challenges. This explains the shift to a hybrid system adopted by the Housing Policy, where some officers live in lines and others outside.
- 575. The hybrid system severely eroded the effectiveness of NPS. Officers who do not live within the police lines have caused difficulties in mobilisation by commanders in case of emergencies or disaster response. The Housing Policy provides for elaborate systems of constructing, allocation, and maintenance of police houses. However, the Inspector General, who is mandated to operationalize a directorate to monitor and maintain the houses has failed to do so. As such, most of the houses are in dilapidated conditions and lack the most basic social amenities.

Table 6. 9: Number of NPS officers currently living in institutional police housing and private housing within communities in each county

S/No.	County	Institutional police housing	Private housing arrangement
1	Mombasa	509	1,318
2	Kwale	218	605
3	Kilifi	252	1,114
4	Tana River	363	193
5	Lamu	159	338
6	Taita Taveta	252	483
7	Garissa	739	999
8	Wajir	414	1065
9	Mandera	279	1,104
10	Marsabit	263	472
11	Isiolo	335	344
12	Meru	637	1302
13	Tharaka -Nithi	125	529
14	Embu	556	583
15	Kitui	740	888
16	Machakos	318	1,795
17	Makueni	215	1,095
18	Nyandarua	310	801
19	Nyeri	632	880
20	Kirinyaga	230	785
21	Murang'a	1,012	500
22	Kiambu	1,164	2,613
23	Turkana	272	697
24	West Pokot	285	410
25	Samburu	244	265
26	Trans Nzoia	700	369
27	Uasin Gishu	475	1348
28	Elgeyo Marakwet	139	528
29	Nandi	305	623
30	Baringo	490	503
31	Laikipia	583	569
32	Nakuru	848	2772
33	Narok	271	818
34	Kajiado	451	1280
35	Kericho	288	869
36	Bomet	220	586
37	Kakamega	603	1313
38	Vihiga	245	504
39	Bungoma	526	1338
40	Busia	156	1011
41	Siaya	450	335
42	Kisumu	866	801
43	Homa Bay	426	510
44	Migori	315	797
45	Kisii	226	1394
46	Nyamira	266	556
47	Nairobi	1,982	8,353
TOTAL		21,354	48,355

S/No.	County	Institutional police housing	Private housing arrangement
Formations/ Units/Training institutions			
S. No	Unit/Training institution	Institutional police housing	Private housing arrangement
1	Maritime	64	104
2	GSU	3,953	1,285
3	Traffic	109	556
4	KAPU	337	539
5	Railways	756	713
6	K9	522	125
7	TPU	0	378
8	Presidential Escort	600	43
9	Airwing	0	155
10	NPC Kiganjo	312	195
11	DPU	0	290
12	Police HQS	1,024	17
13	SGB and APS HQS	604	3,230
14	ASTU	85	2,953
15	RDU	92	1,382
16	NPCE A Campus	134	593
17	NPSSSC (Emali)	31	41
18	BPU	46	3,383
19	BPTC	20	164
20	APLSC (MERU)	9	41
21	CIPU HQ	0	972
TOTAL		8,698	17,159
GRAND TOTAL		30,052	65,514

Source: NPS data, March 2023

576. The Taskforce noted that the State Department for Housing and Urban Development has also continued to construct police units under a programme initiated in 2014, although budgetary constraints have left many units incomplete across the country.

Table 6. 10: Phase 1 A — Completed project units: 850 units

No	County	Location	No of Units	Status of Completion
1.	Nairobi	Kamulu Police Station	100	100%
2.	Kisumu	Migosi Police Station	100	100%
3.	Nairobi	CID Training School	50	100%
4.	Nairobi	GSU Recce	300	100%
5.	Kiambu	Presidential Escort	300	100%

Source: State Department of Housing and Urban Development

Table 6. 11: Phase 2a & 2b — Completed units: 552 units

S/No.	County	Location	No. of Units	Status of Completion
1.	Embu	Siakago Police Station	60	100%
2.	Narok	Narok Police Station	60	100%
3.	Nairobi	Kenya Police Staff College, Loresho	72	100%
4.	Kitui	Kitui (Border Patrol School) APS	60	100%
5.	Baringo	Eldama Ravine APS	60	100%

S/No.	County	Location	No. of Units	Status of Completion
6.	Kiambu	Kiambu APS	60	100%
7.	Nairobi	Rapid Deployment Unit	60	100%
8.	Kitui	Kwa Vonza Police Station	60	100%

Source: State Department of Housing and Urban Development

Table 6. 12: Housing units at advanced stages: 630 units

S/No.	County	Location	No. of Units	Status of Completion
1.	Bungoma	Bungoma Police Station	50	90%
2.	Siaya	Bondo APS	60	94%
3.	Tana River	Garsen Police Station	50	92%
4.	Tharaka Nithi	Chuka Police Station	60	90%
5.	Makueni	Emali AP Camp	100	89%
6.	Uasin Gishu	Langas Police Station	60	85%
7.	Nairobi	AP Training College	150	84%
8.	Kajiado	Kajiado Police Station	100	82%

Source: State Department of Housing and Urban Development

577. The Taskforce observed that the general condition of police houses across the country was largely poor. In almost every station, there were officers living in condemned houses. The Taskforce gathered that officers assume the risk of staying in these dilapidated houses and uni-huts because they do not pay rent for them, thus saving their house allowances.
578. The Taskforce also noted that police houses managed by the State Department for Housing in respect of which officers paid rent were equally in poor shape as a result of lack of regular maintenance and repair. From leaking roofs, peeling paint to general lack of sanitation, these accommodations are singularly unsuitable for human habitation. Exposing officers to such living conditions injures their self-esteem, morale and violates the right to dignity and privacy.
579. The Taskforce observed that apart from the challenges already cited, it takes inordinately long for officers to clear from the houses provided within police lines in the event of transfers. The Taskforce encountered cases where officers are charged rent by the National Housing Corporation (NHC) despite transfer from a previous station and vacating their houses. Moreover, the houses are not usually renovated or repaired for the new occupants.
580. While the government introduced provision of house allowance to allow officers freedom to rent accommodation outside the police lines, the allowances are in most instances too low to secure decent housing as intended. As a result, officers are compelled to rent cheap houses in neighbourhoods that are unsafe for them and their families. The possibility of officers' uniforms being stolen in such circumstances and in turn used to commit crimes cannot be overemphasized.
581. The other disturbing trend the Taskforce observed was that where modern houses are available within police lines, especially in urban areas like Nairobi, it is the senior officers, some of whom are not attached to the station where the houses are situate, who occupy these houses at the expense of junior officers who consequently have to rent accommodation far away. The consequence of this anomaly is that police commanders now find it difficult to quickly mobilise officers in the event of an emergency since officers are scattered all over and away from the police lines. For officers in operation

areas, the housing challenge is dire. The Taskforce met Border Patrol and Special Operations officers in places such as Mokowe and Milihoi in Lamu, Muhuru Bay in Migori and Waugadud in Wajir living in and working out of low quality, leaking and tattered tents.

582. The Taskforce noted that under the current Housing Policy in NPS, the overall management of housing is under the Directorate of Housing, which is domiciled in the IG's office. However, the State Department for Housing and Public Works owns and manages police houses. The directorate is further mandated to inspect the houses after every six months and undertake necessary repairs. Such inspections also ought to be conducted before a new occupant takes possession of a police house. However, these inspections are not conducted, or if at all, renovations are never undertaken. Further, the twin roles played by the ministry and the directorate may create confusion as to who the duty bearer is for a specific activity. For instance, the ministry collects rent payable but does not have the mandate to undertake renovations, which duty falls on the directorate.

Recommendations

583. The Taskforce appreciates the good intentions that the Housing Policy had in creating a hybrid system of having officers reside both within the police lines and in the community. Indeed, the Taskforce notes that the hybrid system was informed by the need to have officers build relations with the community and boost proactive policing. It is also noted that such a move was based on the realisation of a progressive shift towards community policing and creating positive relationships between the police and the community. However, such a move has created great inefficiency in accessing and mobilising NPS officers for quick response as is the nature of police work. Resultantly, the effectiveness of police work has been diluted under the hybrid system, hence the need for review.
584. Further, the Taskforce noted that the houses in which the officers live are dilapidated and lacked basic amenities. Officers who operate from outside the police lines are compelled to live in informal settlements due to the low house allowance paid. As such, their security and the safety of their weapons can be compromised. Their uniforms too may be stolen and used to commit crimes. Taking the foregoing findings into consideration, the Taskforce recommends:
 - (a) That the NPS retains contributions from police housing units in order to apply the funds to maintenance of existing houses and expansion of housing for officers;
 - (b) That the management of NPS housing reverts to the directorate responsible for housing under the office of the Inspector-General as per the NPSC Housing Policy;
 - (c) There should be an increase in house allowance payable to NPS officers as already recommended in this Report;
 - (d) There is need to build more NPS houses for officers through public-private partnerships;
 - (e) There is need for retention of house allowance payable to all police officers, as recommended in this Report, as majority will not find a house within their work stations;
 - (f) The services of the directorate of housing should be devolved to the counties to enable closer supervision of the maintenance of the houses;
 - (g) NPS should develop a mortgage scheme in liaison with the National Treasury that is specific to police officers at 2 per cent per annum to enable junior officers access the facility;

- (h) The government should set aside a reasonable percentage of the affordable housing scheme for NPS officers;
- (i) NPS should address satisfactorily the issue of senior leadership of the Services occupying houses meant for junior officers;
- (j) Before building officers housing on police land, the IG should ensure the registration of such land as required in the NPSC Housing Policy; and
- (k) All dilapidated structures and condemned housing accommodation occupied by police officers in the lines should be vacated and demolished immediately and officers to seek appropriate accommodation in the community.

CHAPTER SEVEN: TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

7.1 Introduction

585. In line with the terms of reference, the Taskforce was obligated to assess various aspects of technical and operational capabilities of NPS with the aim of improving the Service's effectiveness and service delivery. The Taskforce assessed technology, ICT, tools and equipment, legislative frameworks, command structures and premises, among others. Previous taskforces identified gaps and challenges linked to inadequate tools, equipment and weak technological capacities to address evolving security challenges. This chapter builds on the invaluable lessons from previous taskforces' reports and in particular the John Mutonyi (2002-2003), the Philip Ransley (2003) and Titus Naikuni (2010-2015) reports. The chapter provides an assessment of the gaps, concerns established by the Taskforce during field visits, and consultations and recommendations.

7.2 ICT and digitisation

Current context and practice

586. The Taskforce was required to assess the necessity of adopting and operationalising ICT usage in all NPS operations, including adoption of digital occurrence books, and journals, body cameras, vehicles cameras, smart and intelligent surveillance equipment, among others in line with constitutional dictates.
587. Globally, new digital technologies have emerged as important tools in policing providing police services with innovative and advanced tools of surveillance, data collection and forensic analysis of incidents of crime as well as more efficient means of communication. No modern police agency can now ignore these technologies and effectively deliver on its mandate.
588. The Ransley Report highlighted sheer lack of basic ICT knowledge, skills, equipment and infrastructure in NPS. Presently, the Taskforce notes that there are some critical steps taken by NPS to improve on capacities as well as utilisation of information and communication technologies. In particular, one such key investment is the widespread use of CCTV surveillance in urban streets and along major highways as well as the establishment of the Integrated Command, Control and Communications (IC3) centre, which provides live monitoring from the CCTV cameras.
589. In spite of the growing sophistication of crime, the lessons from Covid-19 when physical interaction was significantly restricted, as well as the immense potential of new technologies, the NPS uptake of technology remains minimal.

Findings

590. The Taskforce established that while there are many policies and legislative frameworks governing the ICT sector, embrace of technology in NPS remains unenthusiastic.
591. In its submission to the Taskforce, NPS noted that the Service was keen to embrace technology in many of its operations including the management of recruitment, promotions and transfer of officers, and payment of allowances, among others. NPS noted that that technology will improve fairness in these processes.
592. NPS pointed out that there was need for regular updating and upgrading of radio receivers and telecommunications equipment for efficient operations. NPS also expressed commitment to embrace the use of social media as a way of enlisting citizen support in security management.

593. NPS supported more investment in technologies to facilitate virtual courts and investment in smart motor vehicle recognition technology to reduce motor vehicle theft. NPS further called for the use of smart facial recognition technologies to improve crime prevention and detection. These views were supported by various stakeholders such as IPOA and the police service commission.
594. While there was a pilot project for a digital Occurrence Book (OB) in some select police stations in Nairobi, the project has largely stalled. Police stations across the country continue to record huge volumes of incidents and complaints in Occurrence Books (OB) since digital occurrence books remain a mirage. Most police stations have tattered and old manual files used for record keeping, contrary to the government plan of digitising its services. Majority of the police stations visited lacked computers, printers, scanners and modern communication gadgets. Worse still is the absence of trained tech-savvy officers to man the few available ICT equipment.
595. The Taskforce noted that apart from the CCTV cameras installed on highways and the streets of Nairobi, there is no other meaningful progress by policing agencies in embracing the technology and digitisation plan as proposed by the Government of Kenya. The Taskforce further noted the absence of CCTV cameras in detention and lock up facilities, armouries, front offices and other critical spots within police stations. This poses a big challenge for enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the safety of officers manning the station reception desks.
596. The Taskforce established that there was lack of an effective electronic network and information sharing system in various NPS stations.

The use of analogue systems and processes in NPS in a rapidly growing digitalising world undermines police efficiency and effectiveness and facilitates corruption. Manual filing often leads to constant loss and ‘disappearance’ of files and documents, hence undermining delivery and administration of justice.
597. NPS facilities did not use CCTV cameras to enhance security, which was noted to be non-adherence to Justice Eric Ogolla’s Ruling on the safety of detainees in detention facilities.
598. Members of NPS lack basic training and knowhow on the use of technology in policing duties, which creates and perpetuates a culture of resistance to technology in the Service. Some NPS officers and leaders are active on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.
599. The Taskforce established that NPS is yet to digitise all its records and registers at police stations, starting with OBs, arms movement, prisoners’ property, criminal, petty crime and beats and patrol registers, among others.
600. This could assist in data analysis, monitoring of trends and patterns of crime, as well as provide for feedback mechanism and information sharing among security organs.
601. NPS has not embraced ICT in the issuance of orders and instead apply verbal or telephonic signals that may be abused or distorted when they are issued on a daily basis. Absence of station level HR metrics or software to assist in management of HR matters like leave, days off duty and other command-related activities can hamper service delivery in the Service.

Recommendations

602. The Taskforce notes the centrality that technology and ICT play in modern policing in surveillance, crime detection and prevention, and criminal investigation. The need to

adopt ICT is critical if the dynamics of policing are to be met and addressed. It is quite clear to the Taskforce that ICT must play a critical role within the Policing Reforms and modernization programme. Kenya must take a regional lead role in the implementation of State-of-the-Art technological advance and implement modern and futuristic management systems.

603. Whilst there are steps currently being taken by various actors in Government, there exists a huge fault line as a result of different institutions procuring separate and different systems that are not interlinked and which end up posing a challenge of inter-operability. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (i) The Government should invest in a single unified ICT Infrastructure platform that carries all security sector systems and one that delivers an end-to-end provision of all requirements. This will be more affordable to acquire or develop and maintain.
- (ii) The Ministry of Interior should initiate the development of legislation that can support and facilitate the gradual integration of all the services in the security sector.
- (iii) There is an urgent need for the establishment of an integrated case management system with all criminal justice actors that includes the connecting of all Police Stations, Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Prisons, Probation, Judiciary, NTSA, KRA, Registrar of Identity Cards, Civil Registrar, and all other necessary security actors within the Country with different access levels. This will enable seamless service delivery;
- (iv) The Inspector-General should make deliberate investment in ICT infrastructure in the Service and the Cabinet Secretary should provide the necessary support;
- (v) Given the availability of the National Fibre Optic Backbone in all the counties, the IG should undertake a reconstruction of the police voice-over-internet-protocol (VOIP) telephony;
- (vi) The Inspector-General and the NPSC should establish an ICT directorate and conduct a deliberate recruitment of ICT experts, offer competitive terms of service to ensure retention; and undertake capacity building of all officers on matters of ICT;
- (vii) NPS should develop a strategic plan and a policy paper(s) for the incorporation of ICT and digital technology in all its operations; and
- (viii) The development of a customised Enterprise Resource Systems which should run all the NPS operations.

7.3 Logistical capacity, tooling, and equipment

604. The Taskforce was mandated to assess adequacy, sufficiency or otherwise of NPS tools, equipment, gear, communication and surveillance measures including use of drones and make appropriate recommendations including modernisation and embracing technology in policing.

605. To efficiently and effectively discharge its mandate, it is imperative that NPS prioritises and utilises modern policing tools, techniques and equipment that match the highest international standards. This was underscored by the Ransley Taskforce, which recommended that tooling, logistical and technological capacity of the Service be reviewed to establish the exact needs and specification to bring policing to international standards.

606. Modernisation of policing is now an imperative in a world where crime is even more sophisticated and criminals have access to modern technologies, tools and equipment. Moreover, technological advancements offer innovative solutions to public safety challenges and improve police efficiency. Police agencies all over the world ought to acquire modern equipment, tools and technologies to transcend traditional limitations, enable useful and even real-time data sharing, collaborative investigations and improved communication within and across relevant agencies.

Findings

607. The Taskforce was informed that the Service continues to face serious challenges of adequate and quality equipment and tools as well as capacities for their efficient use and utilisation. The NPS leadership informed the Taskforce that budgetary challenges have severely constrained the Service's capacities to equip all its officers with the appropriate tools for professional policing. For instance, the Taskforce was informed that officers are routinely compelled to carry dead bodies in the same vehicles they use for official transport.
608. Modernisation of NPS was, in 2013, identified as a priority for the country and a commitment was made to allocate KSh. 144 billion to support the building of modern facilities and structures. The funds that were to be availed under the Modernisation Plan were to assist NPS to acquire: assorted mobility vehicles, weaponry and arms, police equipment, communications equipment, training infrastructure and facilities, intelligence gathering equipment and to support community policing structures and processes.
609. However, the Taskforce found out that the projected annual allocation of KSh. 10 billion from 2013 was not made available. To the contrary, annual allocations to NPS for modernisation have been declining, which has affected and disrupted the plans that were put in place to achieve the aims of modernisation. NPS has so far received **26.7 per cent** (KSh. 39.8 billion) of the KSh. 114 billion that was to be made available from 2013, with an annual deficit of around 40 per cent. Consequently, many of the projects that were initiated at the start remain incomplete due to insufficient budgetary allocations.
610. The Taskforce was informed that the Service has put in place guidelines on acquisition and management of various tools and equipment. For instance, with respect to vehicles, the Service has in place Fleet Management Guidelines for the management of vehicles. The procurement, distribution, and disposal of vehicles within the Service is guided by a Fleet Management Board.
611. NPS presented to the Taskforce a comprehensive analysis of the gaps with respect to tools, equipment and gear that the Service needs in the short, medium and long term. Currently, NPS has a shortage of key tools and equipment necessary for the execution of its mandate and efficient service delivery. This shortage cuts across all the service delivery units. Worst hit is the General Service Unit (GSU), owing to its critical nature of work. Tools such as office equipment, scene-of-crime kits, drones, technical vehicles, aircraft surveillance systems, among others, are seriously lacking within NPS. The Service lacks adequate support weapons and explosives ordinance, especially in volatile areas. (See Appendix 4, Part II of the report for details of requirements).
612. The NPS leadership informed the Taskforce that one key challenge in tooling and equipping of the Service is the procurement of requisitioned items, where by the Service as the end user, and more so the specific units and formations that require the specialised tools and equipment, do not get what they requisitioned. The Taskforce was informed that significant changes are habitually made to requests without regard to the end users'

requisitions leading to delivery of tools and equipment that do not meet the requisite specifications or serve the intended purpose. In the end, there is loss of lives, wastage of public resources and subsequently an ineffective NPS.

613. There exists a government vehicle leasing programme that facilitates transportation for NPS officers across the country. Although the leasing programme has significantly improved police logistics, the supply of vehicles is not sufficient to cover the unique needs of all stations across the country. In some cases, police officers are compelled to use public transport to respond to security incidents. There are also concerns over the choice of vehicles provided, which in the view of officers, do not always take into account their specific needs including terrain and specific use. For instance, officers in operational areas where there is a predominantly high risk of IEDs, require Land Cruisers that are converted for ease of disembarking.
614. Another key concern is the fuel allocation for the leased vehicles. The current fuel allocation is 450 litres per month per vehicle, irrespective of the operational needs of different areas or the vastness of some counties such as Marsabit. In addition, leased cars can only fuel at specific petrol stations, which increases wastefulness. Some counties do not have the specified stations that are designated for fuelling of leased vehicles. For example, it is increasingly wasteful for drivers in Lamu and Hola to travel over 200 kilometres to Malindi to fuel their cars and travel back another 200 kilometres. The same is the case with vehicles in Lodwar that have to fuel in Kitale.
615. NPS also retains some vehicles that are not leased. The Taskforce was informed that the maintenance and repairs of the non-leased vehicles has largely collapsed in most places, and NPS mechanics are idle. The issue of donated vehicles with no arrangements for maintenance is concerning. Worst hit is the GSU and other formations operating in harsh terrains.
616. The Taskforce established that there are serious challenges and needs unique to units in forward or operational areas that demand urgent attention given the levels of risk as well as the unique nature of threats from terrorists and armed bandits. Officers informed the Taskforce that they need specific protective gear as well as sophisticated and advanced modern weapons that are currently unavailable.
617. The Taskforce is of the view that avoidable gaps in service delivery as well as violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are linked to the failure to provide members of NPS with the right equipment and tools to undertake professional policing. For instance, officers deployed to restore public order or to manage crowds are not always provided with protective gear for their safety; neither are they issued with less lethal weapons designed to minimise injuries or deaths. The few equipment, tools and gear that exist are substandard, unnecessarily heavy, archaic, and obsolete and often unfit for modern day crowd management strategies. This is so due to failure of procurement entities and processes to factor in the needs of the end-users such as the GSU, which is often called upon to manage crowds. Lack of training on modern day approaches to crowd management compounds the matter.
618. The Taskforce notes that corruption, lack of working quality assurance systems and weaknesses in the entire oversight chain has significantly contributed to the poor state of police tooling and equipment. To a significant extent, the culture of command within NPS makes it difficult for officers in charge of quality assurance to provide the required controls in the procurement and management of NPS tools and equipment.

Recommendations

619. Logistical capacity, tooling and equipment are at the heart and core of policing, without which NPS will be rendered ineffective in the performance of its mandate. While inadequate resources and uncertainty of funds (despite commitments to modernise the Service) are major contributors to the current state of affairs in NPS, it is also true that some of the major challenges identified earlier are related to issues of leadership, integrity and a general lack of management strategies in the Service.
620. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding logistical capacity, tooling, and equipment:
- (a) There is need to establish and operationalise the Fleet Management Board under Chapter 36 paragraph 1 of the SSOs to assess adequacy or otherwise of current fuel allocations and rationalise the same;
 - (b) The Board should be cascaded all the way to the station level;
 - (c) There is need for automation and digitalisation of the Fleet Management System to include tracking, fuel consumption, geo-fencing and other components of fleet management;
 - (d) There is need to formulate and implement a fleet management strategy to assist in ensuring the optimal management of leased cars and government vehicles as well as the utilisation of resources set aside to manage transport in the Service, and include means or avenues for disposal of unserviceable vehicles;
 - (e) The IG should ensure that station or ward commanders do not demand fuel money from members of the public in order to respond to a crime report, and where there is donation to whatever level of the Service, such a decision should not translate to favours or preferential treatment;
 - (f) In order to ensure optimal levels of service, the government should provide resources necessary for acquiring tools and equipment for NPS operations. Specifically, the government should reinstate the Modernisation Fund for NPS to facilitate the realisation of the aims of the modernisation plan;
 - (g) The government should commit to, or at the point of negotiation, provide for spares and repairs to equipment donated to NPS;
 - (h) Officers handling specialised equipment should be continuously trained on the handling and use of the plant and equipment; and
 - (i) The IG should revive garages for the maintenance and repair of non-leased police vehicles.
621. With regard to NPS gear, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) The NPS quality assurance unit should be involved in all steps of procuring gear and uniforms in order to ensure that proper gear is acquired to support NPS operations. The Police Quality Assurance Unit should be empowered to assist in the control of processes for acquiring equipment;
 - (b) The IG should take personal responsibility for the quality of gear or equipment acquired for use in the Service, including taking responsibility for any loss of life or injury as a result of poor quality of gear and equipment;
 - (c) NPS should be adequately funded to acquire communication and smart surveillance equipment such as drones with geolocational and night vision capability;

- (d) NPS should be intentional about the use and deployment of body cameras, vehicle cameras, facial and number plate recognition systems, and other modern crime detection tools and equipment;
- (e) There should be continuous training for officers manning and operating the modern tools and equipment in the Service; and
- (f) NPS should acquire and gazette a yard for cars and motor cycles detained for purposes of investigation or court processes. Further, NPS should engage the Judiciary on the release of vehicles to owners whose examination for court purposes is complete.

7.4 Disaster management and joint operational preparedness


- 622. Apart from assessing, and reviewing tooling, equipping, logistical and technological capacity of the NPS, the Taskforce was also required to recommend changes necessary to sustain disaster management, conflicts and early warning, rapid response systems, and a joint operational preparedness strategy. Kenya has experienced many hazards and emergency events that have led to loss of lives, displacement of people and destruction of property. The major hazards and emergencies include: drought (water shortage and food insecurity), earthquakes and volcanic eruption, floods, tsunamis and cyclones, locust and pest infestation, landslides and mudflows, or rock falls or land subsidence, and communicable diseases and epidemics.
- 623. Kenya also routinely experiences wild fires and fires in urban and rural areas, road, rail and aviation accidents. Other disasters include: industrial and mine accidents as well as fires, marine accidents, environmental pollution, chemical or oil spills, terrorist attacks, hostage taking, stampedes and crowd-related accidents, as well as intra and cross-border conflicts. (see details of previous disaster activities in Appendix 6, Part II of the report)
- 624. NPS has a directorate referred to as the National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU). The unit is an interagency outfit that was established in 2013 through a presidential directive communicated through the Cabinet Memo Ref. CAB/NSC/14/2/32 dated August 8, 2013, after the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) fire as an effective and competent Disaster Management Unit, with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), clear management command structure, and a budget benchmarked with the world's best practices to provide overall leadership, coordination, command and control before, during and after emergencies and disasters in collaboration with stakeholders.
- 625. At the start, a senior NPS officer was appointed to head the initiative under the leadership and operational guidance of the Inspector-General (IG) on the understanding that every disaster site is a crime scene, and issues of emergency and disaster management (civil protection the world over) are best handled by the National/Federal Police.
- 626. The objective of the NDMU is to administer a comprehensive emergency or disaster programme in collaboration with stakeholders in order to save lives, protect property and safeguard development gains. It is charged with the following functions:
 - (a) Overall leadership, coordination, control, monitoring, response management of the disaster effort;
 - (b) Mobilisation of resources and fostering collaboration and partnership with other agencies on disaster risk management;
 - (c) Planning and budgeting;

- (d) Training and capacity development of personnel;
- (e) Facilitating research on different aspects and trends of disaster management issues;
- (f) Monitoring and evaluation of disaster risk reduction programmes and activities; and
- (g) Liaison with line ministries on national response efforts on private companies' equipment hiring and compensation.

Approach to disaster management

- 627. NDMU adopted an Incident Command System (ICS) coupled with the joint working principles (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme) to provide leadership and coordination of disaster events in the country. NDMU has appointed county police coordinators to monitor and coordinate responses at the county level, depending on the level of response.
- 628. One of the biggest challenges of disaster or emergency management is the need to be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. Disaster management is about organising and directing resources to cope with a disaster and coordinating the roles and responsibilities of responders, private sector organisations, public sector agencies, non-profit and faith-based organisations, volunteers, donations, etc.
- 629. The ultimate goal of the disaster-management is to minimise the event's impact, something that involves preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. NDMU is involved in all the phases of the Disaster Management Cycle (DMC) as shown Figure 7.1. below.

Figure 7. 1: Disaster management cycle



- 630. Mitigation aims to minimise the loss of human life that would result from a disaster. Both structural and non-structural measures may be taken. A structural measure means changing the physical characteristics of a building or an environment to curb the effects of a disaster. For example, clearing trees away from a house can ensure that dangerous storms do not knock down the trees and send them crashing into homes and public buildings. Non-structural measures involve adopting or amending building codes to optimise safety for all future building construction.

631. Preparedness is an ongoing process in which individuals, communities, businesses and organisations can plan and train for what they will do in the event of a disaster. Preparedness is defined by ongoing training, evaluating and corrective action, ensuring the highest level of readiness. Fire drills, active-shooter drills and evacuation rehearsals are all good examples of the preparedness stage.
632. Response refers to events that occur after the disaster. It involves short- and long-term responses. Ideally, the disaster-management leader will coordinate the use of resources (including personnel, supplies and equipment) to help restore personal and environmental safety, as well as to minimise the risk of any additional property damage. During the response stage, any ongoing hazards are removed from the area, for example, in the aftermath of a wildfire, any lingering fires will be put out, and areas that pose a high flammability risk will be stabilised.
633. Recovery can take a long time, sometimes years or decades. It involves stabilising the area and restoring all essential community functions. Ultimately, this stage is about helping individuals, communities, businesses and organisations to return to normal, or a new normal, depending on the impact of the disaster.
634. The National Emergency Response Plan and Standard Operating Procedures were prepared by the National Disaster Management Unit under the Ministry of Interior and National Administration's in 2014. Though outdated, it was built on past experience, with new initiatives aligned to technological advancements. It sets out standardised functions of various actors on how to handle the hazards and disasters. Its objective was to ensure that the country is well prepared to respond to emergencies and disasters and to provide appropriate guidelines for the management of disasters. It addresses disaster management functions for which the Ministry of Interior and National Administration and the NDMU has primary coordination responsibility, e.g., relief, shelters, county and sub-county emergency operation centre, damage assessment and needs analysis. Finally, the plan sets out specific roles and responsibilities of government ministries and other stakeholders.

Findings

635. Kenya has in the recent past experienced various disasters, including terror attacks, floods and landslides. The response to these disasters has been largely uncoordinated, resulting in more deaths due to infighting among the various agencies. This has also resulted in some victims receiving excess aid while others receive none due to the uncoordinated approach of responding to disasters.
636. There is also lack of critical skills necessary for each stage of disaster management among various government agencies that have primary and secondary responsibilities to provide emergency assistance. The Taskforce observed:
 - (a) Lack of strong analytical skills to identify potential threats, hazards and high-risks areas;
 - (b) Lack of problem-solving abilities in identifying the best ways to avoid or diminish the likelihood of catastrophic events;
 - (c) Lack of planning skills during the mitigation stage; and
 - (d) Lack of skills for training government agencies and people to respond to disasters.
637. The specific requirements of NDMU are provided under Appendix 7, Part II of the Report.

Recommendations

638. A National Disaster Management Authority should be established through an Act of Parliament. The Authority should perform the following functions:
- (a) implement national government institutional arrangements and administrative functions for disaster risk management;
 - (b) coordinate and control the response to and management of disaster;
 - (c) build capacity at both levels of government in crisis response and disaster resilience;
 - (d) serve as the command centre for all communication and information relating to response operations;
 - (e) coordinate disaster management efforts between various government agencies to ensure there is a seamless response operation;
 - (f) undertake public awareness on disaster preparedness and response;
 - (g) establish and operate an effective and efficient National Early Warning Disaster Monitoring Information System;
 - (h) facilitate disaster management contingency process that will result in the formulation of contingency plans to be updated regularly;
 - (i) document, publish and disseminate all relevant disaster management data and information to all stakeholders;
 - (j) operate a functional and effective monitoring and evaluation system for programming and management of activities in disaster management.
639. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating to Internal Security and National Administration functions, in consultation with the county governments, should develop a national policy on disaster management.
640. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating to finance should establish a National Disaster Emergency Contingency Fund in accordance with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act.
641. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating to Internal Security and National Administration should review existing policies and plans in emergency and disaster management to align to the two levels of government in order to have a unified approach to emergency and disaster management.

CHAPTER EIGHT: OTHER REFORMS IN THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

8.1 Introduction

642. The Terms of Reference required the Taskforce to assess, consider, review and make recommendations on a number of other reforms and issues affecting NPS. These included: uniforms, the administration of the forensic laboratory, and community policing. The Taskforce was also mandated to assess and recommend general reforms and improvement of NPS premises and modernisation of the systems and infrastructure of the NPS. Finally, the Taskforce was also required to assess issues of gender mainstreaming, sexual harassment, gender-based violence in NPS and make appropriate recommendations.
643. The Taskforce reviewed available information and the current status regarding the issues above in the Service and this chapter provides an analysis of the issues, as well as recommendations of the Taskforce to address the issues identified.

8.2 Uniforms

644. The Taskforce received oral and written submissions on uniforms from the NPS leadership, the National Uniforms Committee, officers of various cadres, key stakeholders and members of the public.
645. The Taskforce was informed that in 2018, the NPS uniform was changed as part of the broader reforms and restructuring programme by the Ministry of Interior and the Service. The Taskforce was informed that the change was seen as necessary in light of the restructuring that involved the transfer of a large number of officers from the Administration Police Service to Kenya Police Service and the reassignment of roles and duties to various units in the Service. To ensure smooth transition and integration and to avoid sibling rivalry, NPS decided to adopt a new uniform.
646. The National Uniforms Committee, though not established by law, is charged with the responsibility of approving all uniforms in the disciplined Services in Kenya to distinguish one from the other. New uniforms and any changes are supposed to be presented by the Services to the committee for approval. The committee informed the Taskforce that the current NPS uniform was not approved by the committee.
647. During the hearings and consultations across the country, NPS officers informed the Taskforce that they were not consulted or involved in any way before the decision on the change of uniform was communicated.
648. The Taskforce noted a number of concerns regarding uniforms for NPS. Most of the officers raised concerns about inadequate supplies of uniform kits and accompanying items. They lamented that the uniforms supplied are inadequate and do not reach junior officers who are usually at the tail-end of distribution lines. Since they are not allowed to be in civilian attires when on duty, NPS officers are compelled to buy their own uniforms and items, which sometimes are not of the approved quality, colour and standards.
649. Officers of NPS and the public overwhelmingly expressed their displeasure with the current uniform. Many noted that the colour and quality of the uniform does not communicate professionalism, confidence and pride in the Service. The Taskforce was informed that the new uniform had left NPS officers looking like civilian guards.
650. Officers therefore overwhelmingly preferred reverting to their old uniform, of which they spoke with professional pride. This view was affirmed by members of the public.

651. NPS officers responsible for the issuance of uniforms informed the Taskforce that they had approved a particular quality and colour to the three suppliers contracted.
652. The Taskforce noted, however, that officers across the country were kitted in uniforms of varying shades and quality. It was established that due to shortages in the supply of uniforms, officers now buy their own fabric and pay tailors to sew uniforms for them. This is one key reason for the variety in shades, quality and even fit.
653. Furthermore, it was submitted to the Taskforce that there are uniforms worn by different special units of NPS whose use has not been approved by the National Uniforms Committee. These include the uniforms worn by the Special Operations Group of the APS.

Findings

654. The failure to follow due process in the change of uniforms, the haste and lack of oversight in the entire process by NPS has led to the current unacceptable situation of a poorly kitted Service. The problem of uniforms has significantly contributed to the poor morale of NPS officers across the country. The current situation where officers are tailoring their own uniforms also poses a security risk as police uniforms can now be easily available to criminals. Moreover, the public is often confused and does not easily recognise officers, thus undermining one of the key functions of police uniforms.
655. The Taskforce confirmed that the National Uniforms Committee was not consulted for approval of the new police uniforms, neither were officers, as the users, consulted.
656. Uniforms worn by specialised units such as the Special Operations Groups have also not been approved by the National Uniforms Committee.
657. The Taskforce was also informed that the National Police Reservists do not have a prescribed uniform and are not supplied with uniforms by the Service. Instead, they are sometimes supplied with whatever surplus uniforms and kits such as belts and shoes that are available in stores, or used ones. The Taskforce observed and was informed that these officers are often dressed in mismatched and worn-out police uniform and kits. This portrays a poor image of these officers, who play a key role in supporting NPS work and providing community security wherever they are based.
658. The lack of standardisation of uniforms across the Service and even with other institutions such as the National Government Administration officers has led to confusion in the kind of uniforms that are worn by the respective Services and units. It was noted that sometimes one cannot tell the difference between NPS officers and the military. The Taskforce was informed of situations where one meets a combat dressed officer with a G3 rifle in the middle of a street, which is not appropriate for regular and every-day policing. (*See Appendix in this Part of the Report for details of distribution of uniform*).

Recommendations

659. Appropriate and smart official attire for NPS not only enhances the confidence of officers but also earns members of the Service the public respect they require to enable them to discharge their functions. Indeed, the kind of uniform worn by NPS can influence the attitudes and behaviour of both the officers and the citizens they serve. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding NPS uniform:
 - (a) The Cabinet Secretary for Defence, in consultation with the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration are urged to develop and propose legislation

for the establishment of a National Uniforms Committee composed of representatives from the Disciplined and Security Services whose mandate will be to approve standards, colours and qualities of uniforms for use by each Service.

- (b) The Uniforms Quality and Assurance Committee of NPS should be empowered to make final and binding recommendations regarding the quality of uniforms to be procured for the Service, and procurement processes should include mandatory inspection and acceptance of uniforms to be delivered. In the event the uniform is not accepted, the officers who approved such procurement should be held accountable, including bearing a surcharge of the cost involved;
- (c) The IG should take personal responsibility for the quality of uniforms procured and adherence to prescribed standards and conditions for NPS uniforms;
- (d) The IG should ensure that all officers have adequate and regular supply of all uniforms and kitting they require to carry out their work. Specifically, the IG should address concerns raised about the quartermaster and lack of transparency and integrity in the distribution of uniforms and accessories.
- (e) The process of determining uniforms should be subjected to public participation, and approved uniforms gazetted after approval by the Uniforms Committee proposed above;
- (f) The IG should provide for a mechanism for Service members to raise complaints related to the procurement and supply of uniforms;
- (g) Any new uniforms for NPS or specialised Units should go through the process prescribed in these recommendations, including public and officer participation;
- (h) In line with the overwhelming views of members of the public, NPS officers, and the leadership of NPS, the Taskforce recommends that NPS reverts to its old uniform for a period of three years, during which a process of designing a new uniform can be commenced in accordance with the foregoing recommendations
- (i) Maternity dresses should be included in the issuance of uniform and trousers for female officers;
- (j) Automation of the entire process of supply, issuance, and distribution of uniform in the Service should be undertaken;
- (k) NPS should design uniform for NPR and ensure its distribution nationally; and
- (l) Parliament should enact a law or amend existing laws to expressly prohibit use of police or security uniforms and gazette other matters related to police uniform.

8.3 Forensic laboratory

660. The main objective of forensic laboratories worldwide is to assist in analysing various samples of evidentiary material found in scenes of crime. Laboratories are, therefore, equipped with expertise from different sciences with sophisticated and technological skills in handling and detecting crime.

Police, stakeholders and public views

661. In Kenya, the National Forensic Laboratory is established as a unit or department of DCI via section 35(g) of the NPS Act, which vests the function of forensic analysis on the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. In his submissions to the Taskforce, the DCI, noted that the role of the forensic laboratory in policing service delivery is: to provide a

one-stop solution to forensic matters such as cybercrime, ballistics, fingerprints, imaging and acoustics, bomb and hazardous material disposal and crime scenes investigations; document examinations, evidence management, quality assurance, biological tests and analysis, chemical analysis, and data centre and training of experts, and other forensic needs.

662. The DCI has organised the National Forensic Laboratory into various sections consisting of: Forensic biology lab, Chemistry lab, Imaging and Acoustics lab, Crimes Scenes Investigations, Digital Forensics and Cybercrime, Forensic Document Examination Section, Forensic Ballistics, Bomb and Hazardous Material Disposal, Evidence Management Unit, Forensic Fingerprints Identification Bureau, Quality Assurance and Data Centre and Training. These are largely police functions as outlined by the NPS Act.
663. NPS routinely receives criticism regarding bungled investigations and the integrity of their forensic analyses and reports have been questioned on various occasions. The integrity and independence of a forensic laboratory that is housed by the police has been a key concern of relevant stakeholders in the criminal justice chain. However, in his submissions to the Taskforce, the DCI allayed these concerns and cited the case of the killing of lawyer Willie Kimani where NPS officers were convicted based on investigations and forensic analysis used in the case.
664. The DCI made a range of proposals on how to build public trust and confidence in investigations and forensic processes, which included: the enactment of legislation on forensic science, certification of forensics professionals, establishment of a results validation system to build confidence among users and the public, and ISO certification.
665. Further contentions are that access to and utilisation of this national asset by other government agencies and even members of the public are matters of public interest and concern. In this regard, key stakeholders in the justice sector such as IPOA made submissions to the Taskforce that being an important national resource the laboratory should be placed under an independent management separate from DCI to build public confidence in the results and to ensure access to various agencies. However, NPS submitted that the laboratory was established as a police facility after benchmarking with similar institutions in the United States and Germany.
666. The leadership of NPS and the DCI noted that the main challenge facing the Laboratory is limited funding, rendering it unable to procure some key equipment, tools, and reagents necessary for its scientific work. Units such as biological and chemical labs are not operational because they lack reagents despite only being installed in 2019.
667. The DCI submitted that because of the same challenge of funding, the laboratory lacks enough specialised and skilled professionals with the right expertise. Even among the ones it recruits, the DCI faces a significant challenge of retaining them because of the poor terms it offers and lack of resources for continuous training.
668. To guarantee the handling and security of exhibits, the National Police Service and DCI made a strong case for the management of the laboratory remaining under DCI citing similar practices in other countries as well as the need to ensure timely investigation of criminal cases in the country.

Findings

669. The Taskforce visited the premises of the National Forensic Laboratory and witnessed the systems and processes that have been established to make the laboratory effective. While there is a range of services that the laboratory is designed to provide, the facility

lacks equipment and adequate qualified specialists in the various sections, a situation that is traceable to a lack of resources as was submitted to the Taskforce.

670. Though all the specialists are NPS officers as DCI does not have a mechanism for recruiting civilian specialists, the National Police Service and DCI submitted that the laboratory was established as a police facility and the nature of its work currently is related to police investigations. Save for a few countries, the practice in many other countries is that police have their laboratories for the forensic analyses.

Recommendations

671. As a country, it is important to remember that institutions whose roles are considered critical should be empowered by adequate funding to enable them to perform their expected roles. This will lay the grounds to enable Kenyans demand effective performance and strict accountability. Forensic investigation is an expensive venture and for the effective and optimal utilisation of the laboratory, other justice sector agencies should continue to access services from the laboratory while adequate funding is provided to enable effectiveness.
672. While concerns were expressed about the independence of the laboratory and the integrity of the processes under the laboratory, the appropriate response is not to transfer some functions to a separate body. Indeed, the pattern of moving functions from institutions that have failed (sometimes due to lack of facilitation) to other agencies is a ridiculous, escapist and defeatist strategy.
673. For these reasons, the Taskforce recommends that:
- (a) Parliament should enact a law establishing the National Forensic Laboratory under DCI but keep it open to other justice sector institutions;
 - (b) The law should provide that the DCI is personally accountable for the professional integrity and quality of the administration and services of the National Forensic Laboratory;
 - (c) The National Forensic Laboratory should be headed by either a uniformed or non-uniformed person that is highly trained and qualified in forensic science;
 - (d) In order to ensure that the National Forensic Laboratory remains independent and is effectively utilised, the Taskforce recommends that the proposed law establishes an Advisory Board for the laboratory to advice on policy, standards, quality and operations. The proposed legislation will determine the composition of the Advisory Board;
 - (e) Any complaints regarding the operations of the National Forensic Laboratory should be addressed through the structures of IPOA and the Internal Affairs Unit;
 - (f) Parliament should ensure that the DCI is allocated sufficient funding to run and administer the National Forensic Laboratory. The Taskforce further recommends that the government undertakes a modernisation of equipment in the laboratory and provides additional resources;
 - (g) DCI should ensure that all professionals working in the laboratory are in good standing with their respective professional regulatory bodies; and
 - (h) DCI should endeavour to decentralise the services of the National Forensic Laboratory.

8.4 Community policing

674. Under section 96 of the National Police Service Act, 2011, and in order to achieve the objects contemplated in Article 244 of the Constitution, the Service is required to liaise with communities through community policing initiatives with a view to (a) establishing and maintaining partnership between the community and the Service; (b) promoting communication between the Service and the community; (c) promoting co-operation between the Service and the community in fulfilling the needs of the community regarding policing; (d) improving the rendering of police services to the community at national, county and local levels; (e) improving transparency and accountability of the Service to the community; and (f) promoting policing problem-identification and policing problem-solving by the Service and the community.
675. Community policing, as an approach, recognises voluntary participation of the local community in policing, police responsiveness to the communities and their needs, joint problem-identification and problem-solving, while respecting the different responsibilities the police and the public have in the field of crime prevention and maintaining order.
676. Community policing is based on several broad principles that are relied on for the successful operationalisation. They are outlined as follows:
- (a) building trust and legitimacy;
 - (b) commitment to problem-solving;
 - (c) partnership; and
 - (d) police transformation.

Current context and practice

677. Kenya has experimented with community policing since the 1990s when a pilot project was established in Nairobi by the Nairobi Central Business District Association in partnership with the Vera Institute of Justice and the Kenya Human Rights Commission. Community policing became part of the national policing policy in 2004 as part of the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector reform programme proposed under the government's Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation.
678. The Ransley Taskforce recommended that the police should adopt community policing not only as a way of building public trust but also improving effectiveness in prevention of crime and promotion of public safety, and further recommended fast-tracking policies and establishment of community policing agencies.
679. Article 244(e) of the Constitution obligates NPS to foster and promote relationships with the broader society. This style of policing is further provided for under section 96 of the National Police Service Act, 2011, which also provides for the objectives of community policing.
680. National Police Service Standing Orders (SSOs) provide for community policing as an obligation of every member of the Service. Further, the Service Standing Orders provide for the development of a Community Policing Policy and implementation guidelines to prescribe the strategies and initiatives to be employed by the Service in engaging the broader society. The Service Standing Orders provide the structures for implementing community policing to include formation of community policing committees.

681. The County Policing Authority, established under the NPS Act, has the responsibility to among others promote community policing initiatives. The operationalisation of the County Policing Authorities, has, however, been fraught with policy, legislative and operational challenges.
682. In spite of these legal provisions, in practice, community policing has not taken off across the country. Partnership between the police and the public, joint problem-identification and problem-solving as well as trust remain weak. Where community structures exist, they are largely haphazard, with no structured mechanisms for implementation.

Findings

683. In 2013, challenges in policing and the limited effectiveness of community policing prompted the government to initiate the “Nyumba Kumi” model of community security under the auspices of the Office of the President, with the leadership of the National Government Administration officers. The Nyumba Kumi model was an adaptation of the Tanzania Nyumba Kumi local security organising and was designed around a cluster of dwellings (residential court, an estate, a house block, a *manyatta*, village, a street, a community of interest, or a gated community, among others).
684. There are now two state-initiated community policing models being implemented, with community policing led by NPS and Nyumba Kumi by NGAO. The Taskforce received submissions from the Ministry of Interior with respect to community policing. The Cabinet Secretary submitted that the operationalisation of the County Policing Authorities has been fraught with policy, legislative and operational challenges.
685. In particular, the Cabinet Secretary notes that the NPS Act, in providing for the Governor or his/her representative to be Chairperson of the CPA offends Article 245(2) (b) of the Constitution as security and by extension, policing services, is a National Government function. Moreover, the ministry informed the Taskforce that there is a real risk that an elected leader at that level may bring partisan interests into security matters.
686. The ministry informed the Taskforce that the NPS Act bestows upon the County Policing Authority functions that are constitutionally assigned to the Inspector-General, thus eroding the operational independence of the Service as constitutionally envisaged. Consequently, the Ministry recommended that the NPS Act be reviewed to address these anomalies before its full implementation. On its part, NPS informed the Taskforce that it was working on changing the perception held by its officers who refer to the public as their enemy, and seeking ways to avert the same.
687. The Taskforce received several other submissions from government officials and agencies. The Chief of Staff in the Deputy President’s Office submitted that the guidelines for community policing in the NPS Act are clear and have never been implemented. In his view, policing in a democracy is a shared responsibility and not the burden of a “professional” group. Communities must identify and participate in selection of their policing priorities and police must leverage on other agencies to address the causes of criminality, otherwise they risk remaining as a response or reactive force. In his view, informed by his experience as a former senior police officer, there is no need for further regulations community policing as participatory policing will be discouraged by introducing rafts of rules and procedures.
688. Though NPS has developed Community Policing Guidelines, it is clear to the Taskforce that there is no ownership by members of the public. The Taskforce was informed that

part of the reason for this is that NPS took over the initiative and only invites members of the public to join. As a result, this had a profoundly negative impact on its implementation.

- 689. The Taskforce notes that NPS officers do not see value in the *Nyumba Kumi* approach and have limited respect for the elders involved in its initiatives. This poor relationship speaks to the disconnect between National Government Administration and NPS officers at county and local levels.
- 690. The Taskforce established that community policing as envisaged by the Constitution and the National Police Service Act is yet to be implemented in Kenya. The Community Policing Policy has never been developed, in spite of the recommendations of the Ransley Taskforce and the National Police Service Act and Service Standing Orders providing for it.
- 691. The Ministry of Interior as well as NPS have not provided the required leadership for the implementation of this approach to policing. It is clear to the Taskforce that community policing has been seen as peripheral, a luxury and non-priority by the ministry and the NPS leadership.
- 692. There are no incentives for NPS officers to build better community relations, and community engagements are often seen as taking time away from core policing business. The Taskforce is of the view that community policing will only succeed if it is seen as part of the core of how policing is carried out.
- 693. The Taskforce established that in practice, community policing only exists as a patchwork of largely dysfunctional committees and a few volunteers who support NPS officers in some parts of the country. Where these volunteers exist, the level of interaction with the police depends on the interests and initiatives of individual local police commanders. There is no financial facilitation for these community policing leaders and volunteers, where they exist.

Recommendations

- 694. The overall purpose of community policing was to give effect to the Constitution, which requires under Article 244 (e) that NPS fosters and promotes relations with the broader society. This very provision signified the shift in policing culture from one of fear and control to a culture of positive relations and a citizen-led model of policing and provision of police services. Consequently, culture change required a transformative police leadership that would oversee the change in approach to policing in accordance with the constitutional precepts.
- 695. However, and as observed earlier in this Report, there is a demonstrable lack of commitment by the NPS leadership to implement community policing structures provided for by the law. This is evidenced by the failure to allocate resources to establish and sustain operations for the community policing processes, and the persistence of vices such as the victimisation of whistleblowers, and the lack of accountability for failure by the different levels of police leadership to establish the requisite structures for community policing. The Taskforce was also informed that where there were attempts to set up community policing committees, Officers Commanding Stations chose police informers and other persons not representing the voices of the communities into the structures. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) Section 98(1) of the NPS Act should be amended by including criteria for the selection of community policing committees. Specifically, the criteria should

ensure that the legitimate community leadership is chosen and that the committees further the national values and principles of governance set out under Article 10 of the Constitution;

- (b) NPS should utilise the skills and training of APS officers to promote community policing and build community partnerships in line with section 27 (h) and (i) of the NPS Act being functions of APS as recommended in the Report.;
- (c) The IG should develop and implement a change management strategy that will assist NPS to transform the culture of policing to the one that is envisaged under the community policing model;
- (d) The requirement to operationalise and effectively manage community policing structures and processes should form a core part of appraisal, performance review, and even promotions and reward systems in the NPS;
- (e) The NPS Act should be amended to introduce penalties for failure to comply with requirements under the Act regarding community policing structures;
- (f) There's need to consider youth, retired members of NPS, retired members of the other security organs in the composition of the committees;
- (g) The IG should ensure adequate facilitation of community policing structures including training of its members; and
- (h) The IG should commit to addressing challenges of non-cooperation by members of the Service with the community and victimisation of whistleblowers.

8.5 Improvement of NPS premises and titling of land

- 696. The Taskforce went round the country and noted the dilapidated structures that are used as premises and offices by police officers. As noted earlier in the Report, the Modernisation Fund for NPS was meant to ensure modern buildings and infrastructure for NPS to operate in. However, the planning and resources allocated for this process have not been provided.
- 697. The National Government Constituency Development Fund (NG-CDF) has been used to construct police stations. However, the Taskforce observed that the structures put up with the support of the NG-CDF are not compliant with the requirements of a model police station as prescribed by the Service Standing Orders. In other cases, police stations have been built without the consultation and participation of the police leadership, and this has resulted in the buildings falling into disuse.
- 698. The Taskforce was informed that most pieces of land belonging to NPS have not been issued with titles. It is approximated that NPS has a total of total 2,353 parcels of land of which 1,726 pieces, amounting to 73 per cent of the NPS land, have not been issued with title deeds. Only 159 (around 7 per cent) have title deeds while 468 (20 per cent) have allotment letters.
- 699. There are many cases currently in court claiming ownership over NPS land and many are cases of land grabbing. The lack of title deeds was said to hamper development projects within the stations as the building approvals by county governments and other relevant bodies require the crucial document.
- 700. Various actors and stakeholders called for the processing of all NPS land title deeds and the creation of a central land documentation (title deeds) registry to avert further loss of land belonging to the Service.

Table 8. 1: Summary of status of NPS land

S/No.	Region	Total No. of parcels	With title deeds	With allotment letters	Undocumented
1	Coast	116	9	26	82
2	Rift valley	701	30	111	563
3	Eastern	484	12	110	362
4	North eastern	47	0	5	42
5	Central	318	15	60	246
6	Nairobi	106	5	39	62
7	Western	146	30	31	103
8	Nyanza	299	44	57	201
9	Formations	108	14	29	65
	Grand Total	2,325	159	468	1,726

Source: NPS

Recommendations

701. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding the improvement of police premises and titling of NPS land:

- (a) The IG should, within six months, appoint a committee to carry out an inventory of all NPS land and ensure titling, and provide funding to the committee and the relevant state agencies and institutions to extend the requisite cooperation and facilitation to the committee;
- (b) Parliament should provide for a procedure for the compulsory acquisition of land of interest to NPS and provide parameters for invoking this process;
- (c) NPS should plan for the progressive securing of NPS land by fencing all land belonging to NPS;
- (d) All court cases involving NPS land should be fast-tracked and any other disputes involving NPS land should be settled through ADR processes;
- (e) The Inspector-General should take measures to regularise NPS facilities constructed on contested land or on private land;
- (f) There should be a waiver on stamp duty and other charges for speedier registration of titles of NPS land;
- (g) Approved framework of modern police stations and model police stations should be gazetted, published and publicised;
- (h) The construction of police stations facilitated by philanthropists, NG-CDF, and any other entities should follow the laid down guidelines and standards of a model police station, receive the approval by the IG's office for the construction, and adhere to design and other conditions in the construction of the police station;
- (i) Parliament should allocate sufficient funds to NPS to continuously improve police premises;
- (j) The IG should be held accountable for continuous modernisation and improvement of police premises;
- (k) The IG should ensure construction and improvement of training institutions;
- (l) The IG should address the plight of police camps, especially in 'forward areas', to ensure that they are habitable;

- (m) The IG should rationalise the gazettement and de-gazettement of police stations across the country; and
- (n) The IG, in liaison with the relevant government agencies, should ensure the completion of housing and police premises projects.

8.6 Gender mainstreaming

702. Gender mainstreaming seeks to integrate “the gender perspective into every phase of policy, from design to implementation, monitoring and assessment in order to promote equality between men and women.” Section 5 of the NPS Act provides for gender, ethnic and regional balance. It provides that the Service shall uphold the principle that not more than two-thirds of its appointments shall be of the same gender; and shall reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya. In its Annual Report to the President and the National Assembly, the NPSC is required to report on, among others, the gender, county, regional and ethnic diversity in the Services. NPSC has also adopted regulations on recruitment and transfers, which obligate the Commission to take into account gender considerations.
703. Women were recruited into the Kenya Police Force (KPF) for the first time in 1927, and into the Administration Police in 1987. As of 2015, women stood at 12.7 per cent of the Kenya Police Service and 9.8 per cent of APS with a 22.5 per cent presence in NPS in general. While the numbers of women recruited in the Service have continued to grow over the years, the figures remain low, standing at 14 per cent as of 2022.

Table 8. 2: National Police Service gender distribution by rank

Rank	Male		Female		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	NPS Total	Total %
DIG/DIR DCI	3	0.00	0	0.00	3	0.00
S/AIG	12	0.01	3	0.00	15	0.01
AIG	76	0.07	6	0.01	82	0.08
CP	184	0.18	47	0.05	231	0.22
SSP	411	0.40	66	0.06	477	0.46
SP	373	0.36	80	0.08	453	0.44
ASP	344	0.33	51	0.05	395	0.38
CI	2,024	1.97	315	0.31	2,339	2.28
IP	3,987	3.88	987	0.96	4,974	4.84
S/SGT	1,375	1.34	159	0.15	1,534	1.49
SGT	4,167	4.05	616	0.60	4,783	4.65
CPL	12,949	12.60	1,919	1.87	14,868	14.46
PC	62,261	60.57	10,382	10.10	72,643	70.67
TOTAL	88,166	85.77	14,631	14.23	102,797	100.00

Source: Taskforce computation

Table 8. 3: Gender composition in the Kenya Police Service, APS and DCI

S/No.	Rank	JG	KPS		APS		DCI	
			Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1	PC	F	45,801	8,990	17,805	2,304	2,366	303
2	CPL	G	9,090	1,397	2,537	381	1,197	239
3	SGT	H	2,469	450	1,277	151	400	84
4	SSGT	J	781	90	535	63	64	11
5	IP	J	2,648	641	841	257	393	119
6	CI	K	1,150	234	479	30	38	56
7	ASP	L	187	40	122	11	81	1
8	SP	M	225	51	59	11	66	19
9	SSP	N	274	41	63	13	36	7
10	CP	P	113	26	25	3	19	12

S/No.	Rank	JG	KPS		APS		DCI	
			Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
11	AIG	R	38	4	18	1	3	2
12	SAIG	S	4	3	6		3	

Source: Taskforce Computation

Findings

704. The Taskforce established that NPS does not have a strategic office for overseeing gender equality in the Service. There is no one charged with the responsibility of overseeing the enforcement of compliance with the gender requirements of the Constitution, the law, and the various rules. Moreover, there is limited data on gender progress and measures to improve the situation.
705. In their submission to the Taskforce, NGEK noted that there was need to apply the two-thirds gender rule at all levels within all NPS ranks as envisaged in the Constitution. The Taskforce was informed that as of December 2022, only 14.2 per cent of the 102,797 officers in the Service were women. This had led to gender imbalance in the NPS leadership. Of the 8,969 officers with the rank of Inspector of Police (IP) and above, 82.7 per cent are men while 17.3 per cent are women.
706. The Taskforce was informed that in spite of the laws and regulations, recruitment, transfers and promotions remained skewed against women officers. It was noted, however, that most of the women officers are deployed in urban areas, thus shielding them from the most difficult operational areas. These deployments are, however, not based on a written policy, which leaves many women officers vulnerable.
707. The Taskforce was informed that the infrastructure at work and in training institutions does not accommodate lactating mothers. Additionally, the Service has no provision for maternity-wear for expectant officers. The Taskforce was also informed that the current maternity leave of 90 days does not allow mothers time to sufficiently breastfeed and bond with their infants.
708. The Taskforce received submissions from NPS that a Draft Gender Policy has been developed to address imbalance and discrimination within the Service, but this is yet to be adopted.
709. The Taskforce notes that NPS is not only dominated by men, but is also modelled as a masculine institution. This has implications for its daily work in terms of gender abuse as the Service tends to be more protective of male as compared to female interests. Despite significant improvements in gender mainstreaming, the perception Kenyans have of the National Police Service is that of an unfriendly set of uniformed men.
710. It was also mentioned that the formation of specialised units that are mostly composed of male police officers, and which have taken over policing operations in whole regions, is in itself unconsciously making women peripheral to the workings of the Service.

Recommendations

711. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) NPSC and the Inspector-General should consider gender in all recruitments and promotions as provided by Article 232 (1) (i);
 - (b) The NPS Gender Policy, still in draft, should be adopted and implemented within six (6) months;
 - (c) NPS should take steps to provide facilities for lactating mothers and set aside daycare centres in police workplaces;

- (d) NPS and the National Uniforms Committee should prepare and approve maternity uniforms for female officers;
- (e) NPS should consider a framework that allows lactating and expectant female officers to carry out lighter duties suitable to their situations for at least a year;
- (f) The IG should set up a fully-fledged Gender Directorate and decentralise its services and further empower the directorate to provide oversight; and
- (g) Affirmative action measures should be taken during recruitment and promotions to ensure that the gender composition of NPS complies with the relevant constitutional provisions.

8.7 Sexual Harassment and Gender-Based Violence

- 712. The Taskforce was required to assess the issue of gender sexual harassment or gender-based violence at station level and offer any other recommendation to improve the mental wellbeing of NPS. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is a matter of national concern and despite the existence of laws and policies to deal with the issue, NPS statistics report a growing trend and pattern.
- 713. NPS has a mandate to protect all persons from sexual violence, offer protection and care for victims, and ensure punishment for sexual violence through judicial process. Chapter 67 of the Service Standing Orders provides for sexual violence and harassment. Paragraph 1 of this Chapter provides that matters relating to sexual violence and harassment concerning any member of the Service shall be dealt with in accordance with the Standing Orders, including accompanying regulations and operational manuals and the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act, the Sexual Offences Act, the Public Officer Ethics Act, the Leadership and Integrity Act, and any other relevant law. Paragraph 2 makes sexual violence and harassment an offence.
- 714. Sexual harassment and gender-based violence are reported to be rampant against female NPS officers, with no clear mechanisms of addressing the problem.

Findings

- 715. From all the stations visited by the Taskforce, female police officers decried rampant instances of sexual harassment and gender-based violence. They reported instances of harassment from both junior and senior officers. In spite of the widespread nature of the problem, NPS does not have a clear mechanism for addressing the issues around sexual harassment. Across the country, no police officer was aware of any sexual harassment policy in the Service.
- 716. Between 2018 and 2022, there were 22 cases of sexual harassment recorded in NPS. Given the widespread nature of the problem, it is clear that there is overwhelming underreporting of cases in the Service.
- 717. Table 8.4 shows the data on sexual harassment and gender-based violence involving NPS officers between 2017 and 2022.

Table 8. 4: Sexual offences cases recorded by IAU between 2017 and 2022

Year	Reported cases
2017	Nil
2018	4
2019	Nil
2020	8
2021	5
2022	5

Source: NPS/IAU

718. NPS has established a POLICARE centre to address external cases of SGBV. The overall objective of Policare is to strengthen the capacity of NPS to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence cases through establishment of a One-Stop victim support centre incorporating the synergy of multiple agencies. These POLICARE centres are, however, still in their infancy and are donor-supported, calling their sustainability and rollout into question.
719. NPS gender desks are found in most police stations across the country. However, some stations do not have these desks, and where present, some had no personnel to run them. In some cases, officers at the desks did not have specialised training on handling gender-related cases, hence impacting the conduct of effective investigations and sensitive handling of victims of the crimes.
720. Trained police officers are often not stationed at gender desks making gender-related crime to be perceived as low priority in comparison to crimes such as homicide. Police officers deployed to manage the gender desks often view it as a demotion or being assigned light duties, a notion that has been reinforced by the practice of, for example, deploying police officers with health concerns or those who are expectant to the gender desks.
721. The gender offices in the police stations also lack necessary tools for service delivery. It was noted that most gender offices lacked P3 Forms, pens, police abstracts and even adequate space to ensure privacy in handling gender-based violence and other gender-related issues. In most cases, the gender offices were being shared with other offices. Therefore, there is no privacy in handling sexual and gender-based violence cases.
722. NPS has developed various training materials and standard operating procedures for handling gender-related crimes; and provided ad-hoc refresher and continuous training on gender-related crimes to police officers, often with the support of civil society organisations and development partners.

Recommendations

723. On sexual harassment, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) NPS officers should undergo core training modules on sexual harassment that cover institutional aspects as well as the role of the police in handling reported cases of sexual harassment;
 - (b) NPS should consider developing a stand-alone Sexual Harassment Policy as a matter of law and best practice;
 - (c) The definition of sexual harassment in the NPS policy documents should be aligned to related offences set out in the Sexual Offences Act;
 - (d) Sexual harassment in NPS should also be approached as an aspect of human resource management as it affects the productivity of officers concerned;
 - (e) NPSC and the Inspector-General should take responsibility for the mainstreaming of measures to address sexual harassment in NPS and ensure the full roll-out of the necessary structures;
 - (f) NPS and the police service commission should ensure that there is adequate investment in psychosocial support for victims of sexual harassment. The rising cases of police suicide and family violence are evidence of the need to address the issue of SGBV and domestic violence in the Service;
 - (g) The wellness centres proposed in this Report will provide additional support to families;

- (h) NPSC and the Inspector-General should provide for a grievance handling mechanism that can give confidence to officers to report cases of sexual harassment without fear of reprisal;
- (i) NPSC and the Inspector-General should put in place measures such as training to change the mindset and culture that perpetuates sexual harassment in NPS and transform the collective attitudes of officers to be more gender sensitive and aware;
- (j) Officers in charge of police stations should ensure that facilities are friendly for the handling of SGBV victims, including respect for privacy and confidentiality, and having suitable holding facilities and necessary tools;
- (k) All officers should be trained on handling of SGBV matters to avoid reported situations where victims are told to wait endlessly for officers in charge of gender desks at police stations; and
- (l) Station commanders should be facilitated with resources specifically for victims of SGBV who report cases to police stations and require urgent support.

8.8 Strengthening oversight in National Police Service

- 724. The Taskforce notes that there is overlap in some investigative functions between DCI, the Internal Affairs Unit and the Independent Policing and Oversight Authority. In order to have meaningful oversight over NPS, these statutory overlaps ought to be addressed. The Taskforce was informed by officers across the country that they are subjected to investigations by multiple entities, which can be antagonising, dehumanising and confusing.
- 725. To address these challenges and other unjust and unfair practices, the Taskforce recommends that the Cabinet Secretary, IPOA and Parliament forthwith initiate review of the National Police Service Act and the IPOA Act to ensure statutory consistency and harmony, for instance clarify which entity is responsible for the investigation of complaints against members of NPS, clearly demarcating the jurisdiction of inquiries by the three actors, clarifying the scope, parameters, and providing for mandatory cooperation and collaboration among them.
- 726. The Taskforce notes that IPOA has made several recommendations following its inspections and monitoring exercises throughout the Republic, but regrettably those recommendations have not been taken up or implemented. This is partly due to lack of commitment from the NPS leadership. Further, the Taskforce notes that there has been persistent conflict between IPOA and NPS. It is important for NPS to appreciate the oversight role that IPOA plays and co-operate.

Recommendations

- 727. In order to strengthen oversight, the Taskforce recommends that the Cabinet Secretary factors IPOA recommendations into the formulation and improvement of policies and administrative measures that affect NPS. The IG should commit to implement IPOA recommendations in so far as they affect service delivery, effectiveness and efficiency of the Service; and Parliament and National Treasury should prioritise continuous NPS reforms by allocating sufficient resources to support and ensure implementation of IPOA recommendations. The Taskforce further recommends that:
 - (a) The Inspector-General, the DIGs and respective members of the Service should adhere to, and comply with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the NPS Act on mandatory notification of death and serious injuries that occur within police premises;

- (b) The IG should facilitate civilian oversight processes as set out in the Constitution and statute, and ensure honouring of summons issued by IPOA in execution of its mandate;
 - (c) The IG should similarly allow unconstrained access to police premises, including training institutions by officers of IPOA to enable them carry out inspections and monitor police operations;
 - (d) Resources and support should be provided in order to facilitate IPOA to decentralise oversight operations to the county level;
 - (e) The curriculum and syllabus for training police officers should be revised to include oversight, the IPOA mandate, and to inculcate critical aspects of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the execution of the Service mandate.
 - (f) The NPS leadership must regularly sensitize its officers on the role and mandate of IPOA and direct them to co-operate.
728. In order to remedy the shortcomings facing the IAU, the Taskforce recommends specific measures to strengthen internal accountability and promote uniform standards of discipline and good order in the NPS as follows:
- (i) The Director IAU should be appointed after a competitive recruitment process run the by NPSC, and must have security of tenure. The practice now is to leave it to the IG to decide who would occupy the office and for how long;
 - (ii) Prioritise increasing funding for the Internal Affairs Unit to enable it meet its statutory obligations. Further, the unit should be allowed to control its finances by making its Director an AIE holder like other regional, county, unit and formation commanders;
 - (iii) The Cabinet Secretary should pursue legislative review to facilitate enforcement mechanisms for the IAU's recommendations and enhance its operations. Currently, the Unit's recommendations are implemented at the discretion of the IG, who decides which cases the unit should deal with. This has depressed the unit's performance to below par especially where it fails to resolve many complaints directed to it;
 - (iv) The unit should exercise its mandate and deal with all complaints reported to it rather than refer some to DIGs or regional commanders. Complaints are referred to field commanders mainly on the instructions of the IG, but this has been a source of disquiet for both officers and the public, who argue that some senior commanders use referred complaints to settle scores or deny the public deserved services;
 - (v) The unit's capacity should be enhanced through recruitment and effective placement of technical staff in key areas such investigations, complaints management, intelligence gathering and ICT. Vetting of IAU staff, which was first carried out by NPSC at the outset should continue in order to restore confidence in the unit;
 - (vi) There is need to procure more vehicles for the unit to facilitate work-related programmes. The unit has only 13 motor vehicles. Out of these, two are grounded, 10 are awaiting major servicing and only one is operational;
 - (vii) There is need for a Training Needs Assessment and subsequent facilitation of staff training and development. In order to retain and attract more staff, officers

working in IAU should be considered for a special allowance to boost their morale and avoid unnecessary temptations;

- (viii) There is need to enhance the complaints handling infrastructure and digitisation of the unit's complaints handling processes;
- (ix) There is need for robust awareness programmes so that the public and members of the Service can distinguish the role of the Internal Affairs Unit from that of IPOA. It should be mandatory that both internal and external accountability mechanisms are included in the NPS training curriculum for all cadres, starting from Basic Recruits Training to Higher Training Course (HTC);
- (x) There is need to establish and operationalise IAU regional and specific county offices as envisaged in the NPS Act. This will enhance accessibility for the unit's services and also allow for prudent use of resources. Further, the offices established should operate away from the rest of the Services as dictated by the NPS Act;
- (xi) The Inspector-General should ensure that the subordinate disciplinary committee, which is tasked with undertaking disciplinary proceedings against members of the Inspectorate and below is constituted to reflect the face of NPS, as is the case with the National Disciplinary Committee under the purview of police service commission. The current arrangement is for each Service and the directorate to constitute its own committee to discipline junior officers. This, in most cases, has compromised discipline because each Service tries to protect its own;
- (xii) In order to engender cohesiveness and foster good working relationships within the unit, the members of IAU should be issued with one staff identity card. IAU members are drawn from different Services, thus they carry different staff ID cards;
- (xiii) As recommended by (Rtd) Justice Ransley, the unit should investigate both criminal and disciplinary offences. On criminal prosecution of officers, the unit should liaise directly with the ODPP, and on administrative matters, it should channel its recommendations to the IG and the police service commission (*in case of Senior Officers*). This is because a complaint can only be determined to be criminal or disciplinary after thorough investigations. However, it does not make sense to use limited resources and later on hand over a complete file to another entity
- (xiv) In order to avoid overlaps, the National Police Service and IPOA should develop a Memorandum of Understanding as envisaged in the Service Standing Orders;
- (xv) IPOA should concentrate and exercise its oversight role over the Service, including IAU but only investigate police misconduct and deal with serious human rights violations and serious cases; and
- (xvi) DCI should deal with cases involving civilians and institutions, and leave matters of criminal investigation on police misconduct to IAU. However, because of its technical capabilities and expertise in critical areas such as ballistics, forensics, cybercrimes and finger prints, the DCI should offer support to IPOA and the Internal Affairs Unit.

CHAPTER NINE: NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE BENCHMARKING AND MODERNISATION

9.1 Introduction

729. The Taskforce was obligated to assess and consider opportunities and platforms for benchmarking on regional and international standards and exchange programmes with a view to modernising policing. It is in light of this mandate that the Taskforce considered the necessity of continuously exposing members of NPS to benchmarking and exchange programmes to enable the Service to keep up with emerging policing changes and trends in other jurisdictions, exchange ideas and improve their knowledge and skills.

9.2 Benchmarking

730. “Benchmarking” is an efficiency tool, which is based on the principle of measuring the performance of one organisation against a standard, whether absolute or relative to other organisations. It can be used to: Assess performance objectively; expose areas where improvement is needed; identify other organisations with processes resulting in better performance, with a view to their adoption; and test whether improvement programmes have been successful.
731. Benchmarking has three main aspects:
- (a) Standards benchmarking: This means setting a standard of performance that an effective organisation could be expected to achieve. The publication of a challenging standard can motivate staff and demonstrate a commitment to improve the service provided. Information on an organisation’s performance against the standard can be used as a monitoring tool by its commanders. (Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector-Generals, and the Director of the Criminal Investigations). This can only be achieved if field officers are enabled to do what is expected of them. For example, actualising the community policing initiative. This is a noble initiative that can go a long way in halving crimes committed in the neighbourhood if it is well-embraced. The idea of performance contracting can also come in handy if the set objectives are “SMART”. This can be done in the context of the previous performance and the resources required to achieve the set objectives;
 - (b) Results benchmarking: This means comparing the performance of a number of organisations providing a similar service. In police work, this technique can serve to allow the public to judge whether their local police make effective use of its resources, compared to other similar providers. This is a real test for the Services and particularly the command. One can look at what is done by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), for example. Why is it that KWS is doing very well in terms of its objective? Is it a leadership issue or about motivation?
 - (c) Process benchmarking: This means undertaking a detailed examination within a group of organisations of the processes that produce a particular output, with a view to understanding the reasons for variations in performance and incorporating best practices. There are a number of service providers within the Republic that one can look at and introspect to unleash the potential of NPS officers. The officers are performing below their potential and there are varied reasons that result in the outcome of underperformance.

732. In the context of the foregoing, the following areas are worth benchmarking with other institutions and countries:

- (a) *Promotion policy*. Although it is in the NPS policy guidelines, it has never been implemented or observed in practice. The idea of promotion as a motivation tool is key to officers' output. One can look at what KDF is doing in terms of promotions;
- (b) *Capacity building courses*: This is very important to any organisation. One can still borrow a leaf from KDF to capacitate Service officers. One cannot expect much from an officer who has not trained for over 10 years;
- (c) *Professional courses*: The officers taken for professional courses should be aligned in respect of subsequent deployment. Unknowingly or knowingly, there are professionals performing other duties other than what they were trained for. Still, one can benchmark with the Kenya Defence Forces; and
- (d) *Leadership*: This is a thorny but critical area that needs benchmarking. Why do certain companies still excel even after those leaders who were thought to be key to their performance exit? For example, Safaricom. It is because the structures that were put in place exist even after they leave. One can benchmark with Safaricom, KWS, and even the military on how one can leave an organisation still breathing even after exit.

Cooperation agreements/ arrangements between Kenya/NPS and countries and entities (governmental and non-governmental organisations) on policing – training, skills and knowledge transfer

- (a) Seychelles;
- (b) China (MOU in the process of ironing out key areas before signing);
- (c) United States of America;
- (d) United Kingdom;
- (e) Germany through GIZ;
- (f) Rwanda through the Rwanda Staff College – Musanze;
- (g) The East African Community through EAPCCO member states;
- (h) Japan through JICA;
- (i) Cooperation agreement with the United States Diplomatic Security Service's (DSS) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programme, which focuses on antiterrorism training and equipment;
- (j) Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) of USA (MOU in place);
- (k) Home Office International Operations (HOIO) of British High Commission (letter of intent in place) MoU in progress;
- (l) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC);
- (m) Italian Police of the Government of Italy (MOU in progress);
- (n) Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
- (o) BKA of The Federal Republic of Germany;
- (p) National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA);

- (q) There is an agreement between ATPU and BHC (British High Commission) in terms of training here in Kenya and UK;
- (r) There is an agreement between ATPU and the US in terms of training and supply of equipment, especially for the Emergency Response Unit;
- (s) NPS also cooperates with Germany, Canada and Israel though they do not have a formal agreement;
- (t) United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF);
- (u) Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI);
- (v) GIZ;
- (w) East African Police Chiefs Cooperation EAPCCO;
- (x) INTERPOL;
- (y) Bureau of International Narcotic and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL);
- (z) Japanese Agency for International Cooperation (JICA);
- (aa) International Justice Mission;
- (bb) Korean Agency for International Corporation (KOICA);
- (cc) CIVIPOL; and
- (dd) Lawyers Without Borders (LWOB).

Areas of policing practices where NPS should benchmark with other policing agencies or organisations around the world

- (a) Protection of critical infrastructure;
- (b) Maritime border security;
- (c) VIP Protection;
- (d) Peace support operations;
- (e) Counter terrorism;
- (f) FBI training in Quantico Academy in Virginia USA;
- (g) International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) in Ghana, Botswana, San Salvador, etc.;
- (h) Rwandan Investigations Bureau (RIB);
- (i) Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) of USA where an MoU is already in place;
- (j) Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
- (k) BKA of the Federal Republic of Germany; and
- (l) INTERPOL.

Specific countries or police organisations that NPS should have knowledge exchange programmes with

- 733. This recommendation is based on a report by the World Internal Security and Police Index (WISPI) of 2017. WISPI measures police Services on their ability to address internal security.

- (a) *Police Force of England*: The standard of discipline of the Metropolitan (Scotland Yard Police) is unparalleled;
 - (i) They are the most transparent police force in the world;
 - (ii) It is an inclusive and flexible system of policing. This method of policing was founded by Robert Peel; and
 - (iii) They are proactive in carrying out of their duties.
- (b) *Canadian Police Force (RCMP)*: For over 100 years, the RCMP has provided exceptional law enforcement services. This reputation has conferred respect on the Canadian Police Force. This police force is aptly prepared to act proficiently in unpredictable situations, and structures are put in place to prepare the force in advance.
- (c) *The Police of Netherlands (Royal Marechaussee, The Gendarmerie)*: The third on the list of the top ten is the Dutch police.
 - (i) They are extremely well disciplined and strategically trained;
 - (ii) The units of the Dutch police are well positioned to consist of primarily the Central Regional Police Services and these units are under the Dutch Commissioner's command;
 - (iii) The harmony with which these units work together is incredible;
 - (iv) These officers are deployed to oversee the day-to-day affairs of citizens and to combat crime and they perform this duty with cheerfulness;
 - (v) The method of policing employed by the officers is that of proactivity to prevent crime even before it happens.
- (d) *Police Force of France*: The fourth on the list is the National Police of France.
 - (i) The country of France is said to have experienced the largest bloodbath in history, thus, the common police officer is equipped and trained to disarm a bomb; and
 - (ii) France deliberately planned in advance before setting up their law enforcement squads. Each squad is given trainings attuned to their duties, like the municipal police are trained to combat minor crimes such as mugging, vehicle accidents, speeding fines, petty theft, etc. In the France policing system, each team is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the country's glory is upheld at all times.
 - (iii) The Gendarmerie Nationale and Municipal Police are two squads of the France police units. Besides these units, France has also set up tactical forces charged with doing things slightly differently than the other two units, who undergo different trainings and are reserved backups to assist the Gendarmerie Nationale and Municipal Police on request.
- (e) *Japan (Japanese National Police)*:
 The Japanese police force receives training similar to that of the US military:
 - (i) The Japanese Training Institute, which dates back to the 1960s, is the highest training institute for leaders;
 - (ii) The Japanese policing structure is intense, flexible and versatile;
 - (iii) Almost every known aspect of law enforcement and crime prevention is covered by them;

- (iv) The Japanese National Police Force is one of the world's best-trained. As a result of its amazing performance, they are ranked as the world's fifth best police force; and
 - (v) Their willingness to go above and beyond the call of duty to help victims of natural catastrophes such as earthquakes and police disturbances is absolutely extraordinary and honourable.
- (f) *US Police Force*: There are several police departments in the United States.
- (i) However, the New York Police Department (NYPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), California Highway Patrol (CHP), are localised and standard forces;
 - (ii) The New York Police Department is considered to be one of the best;
 - (iii) They have achieved outstanding success in the area of crime prevention and law enforcement;
 - (iv) The speed by which they rush to the rescue is highly commendable.
- (g) *Australian Police Force (AFP)*: AFP is known to uphold the highest standards in law enforcement.
- (i) The AFP has employed strategies to practically and effectively enforce the practice of gender equity by equipping women to combat crime; and
 - (ii) This strategy has gone a long way in eliminating the problem of women molestation by training and equipping more women into the force.
- (h) India;
 - (i) South Africa;
 - (j) China;
 - (k) South Korea;
 - (l) Italy (Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units-COESPU).);
 - (m) Belgium;
 - (n) Turkey;
 - (o) China; and
 - (p) Israel.

Regional police services

- (a) *Botswana Police Service*: The Botswana Police Service has been ranked first in Africa in terms of being the most efficient and high performing, with significant inroads into fighting drugs.
- (b) *Algerian Police*: The Algerian Police is well resourced and equipped and has been able to deal with the challenges to the security of the country.

Recommendations

734. The Taskforce therefore recommends that:

- (a) through existing international relations frameworks, the Cabinet Secretary and IG should engage other policing services within the region, Africa and globally with a

view to securing appropriate strategies to network and engage in exchange programmes;

- (b) The Inspector-General should ensure that there is a structured framework for the leadership and members of NPS to join relevant regional and international policing fora with a view to broadening the scope of engagement and advancement of the Service;
- (c) The IG should, within 12 months, formulate a detailed policy to regulate benchmarking and exchange programmes;
- (d) The policy should ensure equity and fairness in offering opportunities to all members of the Service, including junior officers in the forward areas;
- (e) Those who attend benchmarking or exchange programmes should mandatorily be required to prepare and submit reports and where possible, sensitise other members of the Service on knowledge gained;
- (f) the leadership of the Service should prohibit misuse of benchmarking opportunities where the same people are over-exposed at the expense of others;
- (g) The IG should establish, maintain and keep an updated database of those who have been previously exposed to benchmarking and exchange programmes; and
- (h) The IG should establish a monitoring and evaluation strategy to assess the efficacy of the benchmarking and exchange programme, and ensure its continued improvement.

9.3 Modernisation

735. The Taskforce notes that modernisation of NPS will not be achieved in a limited time frame and should be an evolving process with a long-term vision. Modernisation should focus on strengthening infrastructure to be at the cutting-edge by constructing buildings and premises, equipping the Service with the required level of mobility, modern weaponry and machines, communication systems, computerisation and digitisation, other equipment, forensic tools, training and sufficient housing for officers.

Recommendations

736. Establish a modernisation programme for NPS (2024 – 2035) that will have the following components:
- (a) Organisational development, including restructuring and streamlining of units and efficiency to avoid the overlapping of functions, as well as simplify procedures;
 - (b) Rationalisation of systems, standards and procedures in the administration of NPS
 - (c) Professionalisation of human resources management and transformation of personnel;
 - (d) Infrastructure development, i.e. upgrade basic and support systems;
 - (e) Upgrading equipment and facilities;
 - (f) Construction, improvement and upgrading of buildings, facilities or offices; and
 - (g) Undertaking reforms – in all areas; and

737. Establish NPS Modernisation Fund (2024 – 2035) that will facilitate the modernisation programme in the following areas:

- (a) Construction;
- (b) Upgrading of infrastructure;
- (c) Mobility;
- (d) Weapons;
- (e) Training;
- (f) Computerisation and Digitisation;
- (g) Equipment;
- (h) Forensic; and
- (i) Reforms

See Appendix in this Part of the Report for details of Modernisation

CHAPTER TEN: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX (NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE)

10.1 Summary of Recommendations

National Police Service Leadership

737. The Taskforce recommends a fresh round of vetting, by an independent panel to be appointed by the President, for all officers of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) and above;
738. Cognisant of the High Court decision in *Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) and 2 Others v Republic of Kenya and 10 others*, the Taskforce recommends and urges the Cabinet Secretary to immediately develop a legislative proposal for Parliament to enact legislation to reinstate the constitutional requirement for an open, transparent and competitive recruitment of the IG, the Deputy Inspectors-General, and the DCI as was provided for under section 12, 13 and 30 of the NPS Act before the 2014 amendments. With respect to the appointment of DIGs and DCI, there should be strict compliance with the law as prescribed. This will guarantee professional selection and appointment of persons suitable for the position and further enhance public trust in the leadership of the Service.
739. To address the issue of corruption, the Taskforce recommends that NPS should review its anti-corruption and prevention of bribery, procedures and policies to ensure that they are effective in stemming the vice. Further, NPS should seek assistance from the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to put in place mechanisms to fully implement anti-corruption legislation and measures, including putting in place procedures for the prevention of bribery and corruption, as well as a mechanism for annual corruption risk assessment and management, performance contracting, customer satisfaction surveys, and reporting in conformity to the National Values and Principles of Governance;
740. The Taskforce recommends that the leadership of NPS develops a change management plan with clear milestones and indicators on the institutional and cultural transformation of the Service; and
741. While the Taskforce has established that a performance management system exists in NPS, it is not actually used to measure progress, productivity and accountability in the Service. The IG to monitor and ensure implementation and compliance.
- (a) The IG is the vision bearer of NPS. Therefore, at the commencement of his or her term, the IG should set out his or her vision for the Service and the milestones, and report annually on the achievement of the vision.

National Police Service Commission Leadership

742. As outlined in this Report, the Taskforce takes the view that the current National Police Service Commission (NPSC) leadership has failed to oversee the effective pursuit of its mandate, which has affected the reform process in NPS, especially in the components or areas that NPSC is mandated to deal with. The Taskforce recommends, therefore, that the government considers initiating a negotiated or any other legally recognised modality to exit the current Chairperson and Commissioners of NPSC. This will pave way for fresh and revitalised leadership at the Commission that is committed to NPS reforms. The proposed new leadership should be one that will ensure the Commission reclaims its integral space in the management of the human capital in NPS, as required by the Constitution and as expected by Kenyans;

743. To address the issue of quorum hitch by non-attendance of NPSC meetings, the Taskforce recommends that the Cabinet Secretary and Parliament should immediately initiate an amendment to paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule to NPSC Act to repeal the requirement that at least two of the three NPS representatives in NPSC (IG and at least one DIG) be present for the Commission to conduct its business. The Taskforce recommends that the proposed law should provide for any five of the nine members to constitute quorum;
744. The Taskforce recommends that separate and higher criteria specifying the qualifications, experience and attributes of the chairperson of NPSC, distinct from criteria that apply to other members of the Commission, be developed;
745. The Cabinet Secretary and Parliament should consider and address the concerns raised about the composition of NPSC being 'police-heavy', a factor that has reportedly undermined the Commission's role in human capital management and development in NPS.

The role of the Cabinet Secretary

746. The Taskforce recommends that the Cabinet Secretary takes immediate and urgent steps to address the current policy and oversight gaps in the Service by developing appropriate policies and guidelines to guide the NPS, in particular the National Policing Policy.
747. The Cabinet Secretary should develop a Sessional Paper on policing and reforms to guide the long term transformation of NPS.
748. The Cabinet Secretary takes urgent steps to operationalise the Police Reform Unit envisaged under section 126 (2) (b) of the NPS Act. This will not only provide a constant reference point and pulse-check on the reform journey but will also provide an avenue for active follow-up and ensure that all reforms envisaged are followed through to implementation by concerned institutions.

Command structure

749. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations that the Cabinet Secretary should introduce a three-tier classification system for NPS ranks as follows:

National Police Service Gazetted Officers Ranks

- (i) Inspector-General;
- (ii) Deputy Inspectors-General (DIG, Kenya Police Service, DIG, APS, and DIG, CIS);
- (iii) Senior Assistant Inspectors-General;
- (iv) Assistant Inspectors-General;
- (v) Commissioners of Police;
- (vi) Senior Superintendents;
- (vii) Superintendents; and
- (viii) Assistant Superintendents.

National Police Service Inspectorate Ranks

- (i) Chief Inspector; and
- (ii) Inspector (II and I).

*Kenya Police Service, Administration Police Service and Directorate of Criminal Investigations
Subordinate Officers Ranks*

- (i) Senior Sergeant;
 - (ii) Sergeant
 - (iii) Corporal (III, II and I); and
 - (iv) Constable (III, II, and I).
750. Section 28 of the NPS Act, 2011(as amended), should be amended to establish the DCI as a Service – Criminal Investigations Service (CIS) under the direction, command and control of the Inspector-General. The Criminal Investigations Service should consist of the three-tier ranks published by the Cabinet Secretary.
751. The NPS Joint Service Board should introduce new distinct uniforms for National Police Service Gazetted Officers, National Police Service Inspectorate, and Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service subordinate officers.
752. To guide career progression, the Cabinet Secretary and NPSC should review and adopt common in-service training, promotion courses and police examinations for National Police Service Gazetted Officers, National Police Service Inspectorate, and Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service, DCI and Subordinate Officers.
753. The Cabinet Secretary and NPSC should review and adopt new entry and promotional requirements, rank specifications and qualifications for ranks in NPS.
754. The NPS Joint Service Board should review and harmonise reporting command, staffing structure and personnel deployment in accordance with the revised structure as proposed above.

Specialised units

755. The Joint Service Board of the NPS should review the current specialised Units in the Service with a view to rightsizing and streamlining the units to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. Specialised Units with overlapping functions, expertise, resources or operations should be merged as sections under one existing specialised Unit.
756. The IG should review the Service Standing Orders to ensure clear and objective criteria in the composition, membership, strength, command and accountability of specialised Units
757. The IG should establish, in consultation and in accordance with the policies and guidelines laid out by the National Security Council, the various Formations, Units and components.
758. The NPS to develop a comprehensive policy to guide the determination of persons requiring VIP protection and deployment of necessary protection.

National Police Service Airwing

759. The Police Air Wing should be restored to the exclusive control of NPS forthwith;
760. NPS should review the policies and operations of NPSAW to be anchored in a specific legal framework, including the use of and access to police aircraft;
761. NPSAW policies should set out mandatory requirements to adhere to KCAA standards on maintenance and airworthiness, including qualification, training, and relevant accreditation of professionals working in NPSAW;
762. NPSC and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission should ensure proper and competitive terms of remuneration for professionals involved in the running and maintenance of police aircraft

- 763. NPSAW should be decentralised to the regional level for purposes of supporting police operations;
- 764. NPSAW should consider leasing of aircrafts to supplement its needs; and
- 765. National Treasury and Parliament should ensure the provision of adequate resources and budget support for the effective and optimal operation of NPSAW.

Marine Police Unit

- 766. The Inspector-General and the Director-General of KCGS should develop structures and procedures for engagement between the Border and Sea Operations Team (BORSOPTS), the Border Police Unit currently responsible for Kenyan sea and water borders and KCGS.
- 767. KCGS should develop multi-agency standard operating procedures to be adopted by all law enforcement agencies in addressing insecurity in Kenya's brown and blue waters.

Traffic Police Unit

- 768. The DIG of the Kenya Police Service should disband the current Traffic Unit, and reconstitute a Traffic Control Unit that will operate on the basis of integrated and automated intelligent traffic control system;
- 769. All officers under the current Traffic Police Unit should not be redeployed to the new Traffic Control Unit or any other traffic management duties.
- 770. The DIG should also integrate and align traffic management and operations under a unified command. Traffic management command and operations should be at the police station under the Officer Commanding Station (OCS), whose mandate should include commanding traffic bases within their respective area of operation;
- 771. NTSA and the Service should embrace an automated and integrated system of traffic management and operations. The system will entail components such as CCTV cameras, speed cameras, traffic lights, facial and number plate recognition, and associated smart technology on all public roads to monitor vehicle movements;
- 772. Other components of the system should include: e-tickets and automated payment of fines for traffic offences, as well as a system for tracking offences by drivers as done in some other jurisdictions;
- 773. The NPS leadership should ensure removal of all static roadblocks in the country and their substitution with mobile police patrol.

Restructuring of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service

- 774. The NPSC and the Inspector-General should carry out a reassessment of the roles and current capacity of the Administration Police Service in view of the significant numbers that were transferred to Kenya Police Service and to take appropriate remedial measures, including the redeployment of the over 24,572 APS General Duty officers who were integrated into KPS.
- 775. NPSC and the Inspector-General should recalibrate the operations and duties of the Administration Police Service and the Kenya Police Service in order to align it with the relevant laws;
- 776. The Inspector-General should establish structures (through regional, county, police divisions, sub-county, and ward/ location formations) to ensure that the NPS supports the National Government administration in the performance of its security functions through deployment of general duty officers with clear command and reporting structure as set out in paragraph 159(f) and illustrated by Table 3.4;

777. Any future restructuring, should be guided by the Constitution and applicable laws, and should involve the National Security Council, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior, the NPSC and the Inspector-General.
778. Further to the earlier recommendations on reporting and the command structure, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations in order to address the underlying issues:
- (i) The distinction between officers in the three Services should be maintained only up to the NPS inspectorate level. The coordination of the three Services at county and regional levels should be a matter of deployment/ allocation of duties that any NPS officer at that level can perform;
 - (ii) NPS gazetted officers should be designated as NPS officers without affiliation to any particular Service;
 - (iii) Gazetted officers should be subjected to the same training and standards and should, thereafter, be deployed for duty in any of the three Services; and
 - (iv) Section 28 of the NPS Act, 2011, should be amended to establish the DCI as a Service – the Criminal Investigations Service (CIS) under the direction, command and control of the Inspector-General. The Criminal Investigations Service should further consist of the three-tier ranks published by the Cabinet Secretary.

Context and structure of human resource management in NPS

779. NPSC and the Inspector-General should develop proper policies for coordination and harmony between the directorates of personnel and human resource management;
780. The officers in charge of personnel in NPS and its constituent Services must be certified HR Professionals to enable them carry out their HR management roles more effectively.
781. There is need to decentralise the HR function to the county and sub-county levels to take care of all HR matters such as pension processing.

Recruitment

782. The entire recruitment process should be automated in order to minimise instances of corruption and abuse;
783. The minimum grade for recruitment into NPS should be raised to C- in KCSE or its equivalent, in line with the views received by the Taskforce. The recruitment process should consider affirmative action in order to satisfy gender and ethnic/regional balance requirements;
784. To address the challenges around immaturity prevalent in the entrants, the minimum recruitment age should be raised from 18 to 21 years.
785. NPSC should withdraw its delegation to the IG of all the responsibility to carry out all recruitment processes. NPSC may, however, work with vetted NPS officers in carrying out recruitment;
786. Recruitment should entail psychometric and aptitude tests in order to ensure the selection of suitable persons;
787. Information on recruitment should be highly publicised in national and local information channels such as community media, social media, and newspapers of national circulation, and the list of shortlisted and recruited persons published in a similar manner;

788. Recruitment of cadet officers should be carried out with the objective of addressing future leadership needs of the NPS. In this regard, recruits for cadet training should have a minimum KCSE grade of “B”. Other officers from the Service may join the cadet training after attaining a degree and undergoing the requisite training in the Service;
789. To be able to undertake relevant theoretical and practical training including field attachments to ensure competency in training and professionalism, the initial training for cadets should take not less than 15 months while the one for constables should not be less than 12 months.
790. The Auditor-General should undertake a special audit immediately after every national recruitment process;
791. The NPSC should develop a policy to guide the recruitment of sportsmen, artists and similarly talented officers;
792. All recruitments should be based on approved staff establishment, staff plans, and succession management plans.

Posting, deployment, and transfers

793. HR deployments should be done by NPS officers with the requisite competence, skills, training, and experience;
794. No person should serve in one county for a period of more than 3 years unless they are deployed in the specialized units;
795. Regulation 9 (1) of the NPSC (Transfer and Deployment) Regulations should be amended to limit operational deployments to a period not exceeding six (6) months;
796. To curb abuse of deployments, any other movement beyond six (6) months should be considered a transfer and dealt with as such;
797. All deployments and transfers should be carried out through an integrated automated system for proper audit and accountability;
798. NPSC should ensure strict implementation of the SSOs that align all transfers with the school calendar;
799. Because of their specialised training, officers serving in specialised units or formations should not serve in operational or ‘forward’ areas for more than five (5) years;

Training

800. Police training courses should be duly accredited and conform to applicable international standards;
801. The police training curriculum should be reviewed every four years to address emerging needs and areas;
802. Regional training centres, including all shooting ranges, should be revived and continuous training resumed for all cadres of NPS officers;
803. Continuous training should be available in all cases and not limited to promotional purposes as is currently the practice;
804. The training period for police recruits should be extended to 12 months or more in order to cater for theoretical and practical aspects of modern policing, including a practical attachment component;

805. Assessment and examination should include a written component, and officers should be awarded certificates and diplomas;
806. To avoid overstretching the training facilities and to effectively train, NPSC should carry out recruitment of a manageable number of officers based on the authorised establishment;
807. NPSC should ensure proper training and competitive recruitment of trainers for the police training colleges;
808. NPSC should develop a policy or guidelines on the training and development of non-uniformed officers;
809. NPSC should consider and adopt the draft training policy for NPR;
810. NPS should consider establishing a National Police University. In the meantime, the National Police Academy should progress to becoming a constituent college of the National Defence University.

Human rights training

811. NPSC should ensure that curriculum reviews include human rights training for police officers;
812. NPS and IG should integrate human rights in the change management strategy of the Service;
813. NPS and IG should ensure that officers have access to continuous training on human rights issues.

Promotions

814. NPSC should recall authority delegated to IG to administer promotions, abolish the promotion boards, and establish suitable structures and systems to guarantee open, transparent and competitive promotions;
815. NPSC should ensure the professionalisation of the management of HR services by demarcating human resource functions and establishing boundaries between the roles of uniformed and non-uniformed staff;
816. NPSC should also develop career progression guidelines and policies to guide the process of promotions for non-uniformed staff;
817. All vacancies should be declared openly and filled competitively based on factors such as performance, length of service (experience), academic qualifications, training, integrity and continuous professional development, among other criteria;
818. Artists and similarly talented officers should be eligible for special promotions with no command responsibilities;
819. NPSC should address the issue of inspectors and senior sergeants sharing the same job group; and
820. The NPS should adopt and use ICT in matters of promotion.

Career progression guidelines/ Schemes of Service

821. Introduction of new grades of Inspector I and II, Corporal I Corporal II and III, Constable I, Constable II, and Constable III Corporal III Corporal II and I (with each remaining as one rank with different job descriptions while maintaining the 14-tier structure);

822. Ranks of Inspector I and II are introduced to ensure that the cadets are trained to be career police officers
823. Movement of the two ranks should be subject to established criteria in the career progression guidelines and the available vacancies in the authorised establishment;
824. The National Security Council should harmonise the ranking structures across the security sector;
825. NPSC should amend the 2018 NPS Career Progression Guidelines to incorporate recommendations herein and the NPS should forthwith implement them
826. For one to occupy the rank of Inspector and above in the Service, one must have a minimum relevant qualification of a recognised undergraduate degree;
827. For one to be appointed into management and leadership positions at the level of Deputy OCS and above, the officer must possess a relevant minimum qualification of an undergraduate degree and appropriate leadership training;
828. NPSC should develop guidelines on the relevant qualifications for the different positions in the Service;
829. Any promotional vacancy occurring as a result of natural attrition should be filled competitively;
830. Given the expanded mandate and responsibility of a ward commander (previously OCS), the Taskforce recommends that the position be occupied by an individual in the rank of SP and deputised by an ASP, subject to transitional arrangements for the duration of one year.

Reward

831. The NPSC should develop a suitable performance contracting and performance appraisal system with reward and sanctions embedded in it;
832. NPS should introduce a reward and recognition scheme and strategy for rewarding excellence and exemplary performance, including support to participate in regional and international fora;
833. There should be complete automation of the process of application for recognition of merit. The information should be retained in the website for a certain period.
834. NPSC and the Service should ensure that identification and nomination of deserving officers involves public participation.

Exit and post-exit management

835. NPSC and the Service should implement the requirements for pre-retirement training for all officers who are about to exit the Service. The training should target officers with five years to retirement, and notification of retirement issue two years before the date of retirement;
836. NPSC should ensure that HR officers are deployed to the county level to assist police officers in processing their pensions;
837. The processing of pensions for officers should start at least nine (9) months before the retirement date;
838. While the SSOs provide for a pre-retirement posting of officers to their home regions or location of choice after attaining the age of 50 years, this is hardly implemented. NPSC

should take steps to implement this provision in order to assist officers to prepare for retirement;

839. NPS should put in place measures and policies to support and facilitate a contributory medical insurance fund that will assist police officers to access medical treatment in retirement. The fund should be designed and operated along the lines of the Defence Forces Medical Insurance Scheme (DEFMIS) for retired members of KDF; and
840. There is no provision in policy or regulations for an honourable send-off for ex-officers of NPS. The Taskforce reiterates the recommendation from the Ransley Report that in the event of the death of a retired police officer, the area Sub-County Commander should facilitate a dignified send-off for the departed officer.

Salaries and remuneration

841. A basic salary increase of **40** per cent for the lowest rank or Pay Grade (PG 1) for uniformed officers reducing progressively to **3** per cent for the highest rank or Pay Grade (PG12). The Taskforce recommends that the new remuneration structure should be implemented in three (3) phases from 1st July, 2024.

Establishing an appropriate system of remuneration

842. The Salaries and Remuneration Commission should conduct new job evaluations for NPS staff using an approved Job Description Manual in order to make an accurate assessment of the duties of a police officer;
843. The NPS should develop a Job Description Manual for all the jobs, posts, roles or designations in order to support an informed approach to remuneration;
844. NPSC and the Inspector-General should establish an office/sub-directorate in the Service responsible for job evaluation and be the liaison point for SRC and other agencies involved in assessing police work;
845. The creation of “Security and Disciplined Services Sector” comprising the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Service (NIS), National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Prison Service (KPS), and National Youth Service (NYS) as a separate budgetary sector;
846. SRC should establish a system of remuneration for disciplined services completely delinked from the Civil Service Job Groups Classification System and Pay Determination;
847. NPSC should review job descriptions for members of NPS for all pay grades and restructure the salary grades for PG12, PG11 and PG10 to have a minimum of eight (8) salary scale points (notches);
848. NPSC should develop new pay grades and basic salary structure for non-uniformed members of NPS completely delinked from the mainstream Civil Service Job Groups Classification System;
849. The Government should establish a Remuneration Advisory Board for Security and Disciplined Services through an Act of Parliament; and
850. There is a difference in the naming of positions in NPS due to differences in grading structures, the nomenclature adopted for various managerial positions in the uniformed services differs at higher ranks, e.g., at Job Group ‘P’ equivalent to NPS has Commissioner of Police while KPS has Deputy Commissioner of Prisons. As such, there is need for harmonisation of nomenclatures in the various uniformed services to enable peer comparisons and interaction.

General welfare

- 851. There is need to establish a centrally managed structure to oversee the establishment and running of police canteens across the country. Such a structure should be led by a senior officer and be facilitated with adequate resources to ensure that there are properly run canteens countrywide. This should be benchmarked on the DEFCO Welfare Canteens;
- 852. The nature of services and facilities provided should depend on the practicalities and needs of various places. Security operation areas should have priority for the establishment and running of canteens;
- 853. NPSC and the National Police Service should arrange for the establishment of recreational and sports facilities for officers and their families. The designs of police stations should take into account these needs;
- 854. NPSC and the National Police Service should partner with county governments to develop Early Childhood Development and Education (ECDE) facilities within or in the vicinity of police premises to cater for the needs officers' children of within NPS facilities;
- 855. NPSC and the National Police Service should provide officers in operational areas with transport facilitation for purposes such as shopping and other basic social duties;
- 856. NPS should take steps to give effect to and implement provisions of sections 82 and 83 of the NPS Act and SSOs on police welfare associations, widows and widowers' welfare associations, and the Cabinet Secretary and NPSC should recognise those structures; and
- 857. The IG should recognise the necessity for, from time to time, and commission tournaments for the Service, and facilitation of the same. Where need be, the IG should establish welfare committees at the ward level.

Medical scheme

- 858. Non-renewal of the 2023 medical insurance contract of the Consortium;
- 859. A forensic audit of the process and implementation of the 2023 medical scheme;
- 860. The Taskforce further recommends that future medical insurance negotiations should have a six-month period from the date of advertisement to the on-boarding of staff to enable coverage of all the necessary areas and minimize teething challenges at on-boarding stage;
- 861. The new service provider should have adequate, accessible and effective services taking into consideration the nature of the Service including "forward" areas. The service providers should provide proof of distribution of accredited service providers and facilities;
- 862. The Taskforce recommends sensitisation of members and consultation with officers who are the beneficiaries in determining the medical cover that would be contracted and the terms of engagement;
- 863. The Taskforce recommends that in future contracts, the contract and minutes should match and be consistent; and that key disclosures such as capitation should be included in the body of the main contract and involve relevant experts in the entire process of procurement of medical cover;
- 864. Independent Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the contractual performance and customer care should be done by the Services;
- 865. The Service provider should update beneficiaries and NPS every month as per the contract to provide an account on the usage of the cover.

866. The implementation committee should oversight negotiations and implementation of the medical scheme;
867. There should be proper accountability mechanisms for the members of the negotiating team from the Services and the medical providers, including negligent acts or possible malpractices that end up affecting members of the Service. NPSC and NPS should negotiate and provide comprehensive group life cover for all cadres; All insurance contracts negotiated on behalf of NPS officers should cover at least two years, to prevent regular disruptions and the constant transitional challenges;
868. NPS recruits should be covered in the medical scheme; and
869. Given that the World Health Organisation classifies drug abuse and alcoholism as a disease, future medical insurance should cover such cases as part of NPS's contractual obligations. The Ministry of Interior and NPSC should explore ways in which health services for members of the Service can be covered under the Ulinzi Prime Health Services (UPHS), including access to the health facilities of KDF and shared services between NPS and KDF health facilities.

Mental health

870. Mental health should be comprehensively covered by the medical insurance scheme;
871. There should be full implementation of the NPSC Counselling Policy, within six months, including appointment of a wellness champion in every sub-county;
872. The Taskforce further recommends that the Ministry of Interior should develop a policy on shared services within various institutions in its ambit as a cost-saving measure. For instance, NPS and KPS can use the services of the same professional counsellors, hospitals, training facilities among others.

Compensation scheme

873. Automation of the process of filing and settling such claims, which will greatly reduce the turnaround time of payment of such claims;
874. The Service should conduct impactful and sustained sensitisation on these procedures and processes to the officers;
875. In the event of an injury or death, the Officer-in-Charge should alert the responsible HR office that shall immediately inform either the injured officer or his family and advise on the procedure of lodging claims for compensation;
876. The NPSC should fast-track the development of a policy on officers living with disability.

Housing

877. NPS should retain contributions from police housing units in order to apply the funds to the maintenance of existing houses and expansion of housing for officers;
878. The management of NPS housing should revert to the directorate responsible for housing under the office of the Inspector-General as per the NPSC Housing Policy;
879. There should be an increase in house allowance payable to NPS officers as already recommended in this Report;
880. The NPS should construct more houses for officers through public-private partnerships;
881. There is need for retention of house allowance payable to all police officers, as recommended in this Report, as majority will not find a house within their work stations;

882. The services of the directorate of housing should be devolved to the counties to enable closer supervision of the maintenance of the houses;
883. NPS should develop a mortgage scheme in liaison with the National Treasury that is specific to police officers at 2 per cent per annum to enable junior officers access the facility;
884. The government should set aside a reasonable percentage of the affordable housing scheme for NPS officers;
885. NPS should address satisfactorily the issue of senior leadership of the Services occupying houses meant for junior officers;
886. Before building officers housing on police land, the IG should ensure the registration of such land as required in the NPSC Housing Policy.

ICT and Digitization

887. The Government should invest in a single ICT Infrastructure platform that carries all Government systems and one that provides an end-to-end provision of all requirements;
888. The Ministry of Interior should initiate the development of a law that can facilitate the gradual integration of services in the security sector;
889. There is an urgent need for an established integrated case management system with all criminal justice actors including connecting all Police Stations, Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Prisons, Probation, Judiciary, NTSA, KRA, Registrar of Identity Cards, Civil Registrar, and all other necessary security actors in the Country sector with different access levels. This will enable seamless service delivery;
890. The Inspector-General should make deliberate investment in ICT infrastructure in the Service and the Cabinet Secretary should provide the necessary support;
891. Given the availability of the National Fibre Optic Backbone in all counties, the IG should undertake a reconstruction of the police voice-over-internet-protocol (VOIP) telephony;
892. The NPSC and the Inspector-General should establish a fully-fledged directorate to provide leadership;
893. The Inspector-General should establish an ICT directorate and conduct a deliberate recruitment of ICT experts, offer competitive terms of service to ensure retention; and undertake capacity building of all officers on matters of ICT;
894. NPS should develop a strategy and policy for the incorporation of technology in all its operations;
895. NPS should develop a customised Enterprise Resource Systems which should run all the NPS operations.

Logistical capacity tooling and equipment

896. The NPS should establish and operationalise the Fleet Management Board under Chapter 36 paragraph 1 of the SSOs to assess adequacy or otherwise of current fuel allocations and rationalise the same;
897. The Board should be cascaded all the way to the station level;
898. The NPS should automate and digitalisation of the Fleet Management System to include tracking, fuel consumption, geo-fencing and other components of fleet management;

899. The NPS should formulate and implement a fleet management strategy to assist in ensuring the optimal management of leased cars and government vehicles as well as the utilisation of resources set aside to manage transport in the Service, and include means or avenues for disposal of unserviceable vehicles;
900. The IG should ensure that station or ward commanders do not demand fuel money from members of the public in order to respond to a crime report, and where there is donation to whatever level of the Service, such a decision should not translate to favours or preferential treatment;
901. In order to ensure optimal levels of service, the government should provide resources necessary for acquiring tools and equipment for NPS operations. Specifically, the Government should reinstate the Modernisation Fund for NPS to facilitate the realisation of the aims of the modernisation plan;
902. The Government should commit to, or at the point of negotiation, provide for spares and repairs to equipment donated to NPS;
903. Officers handling specialised equipment should be continuously trained on the handling and use of the plant and equipment;
904. The IG should revive garages for the maintenance and repair of non-leased police vehicles.
905. The NPS quality assurance unit should be involved in all steps of procuring gear and uniforms in order to ensure that proper gear is acquired to support NPS operations. The Police Quality Assurance Unit should be empowered to assist in the control of processes for acquiring equipment;
906. The IG should take personal responsibility for the quality of gear or equipment acquired for use in the Service, including taking responsibility for any loss of life or injury as a result of poor quality of gear and equipment;
907. NPS should be adequately funded to acquire communication and smart surveillance equipment such as drones with geolocational and night vision capability;
908. NPS should be intentional about the use and deployment of body cameras, vehicle cameras, facial and number plate recognition systems, and other modern crime detection tools and equipment;
909. There should be continuous training for officers manning and operating the modern tools and equipment in the Service;
910. NPS should acquire and gazette a yard for cars and motor cycles detained for purposes of investigation or court processes. Further, NPS should engage the Judiciary on the release of vehicles to owners whose examination for court purposes is complete.

Joint disaster management and preparedness

911. A National Disaster Management Authority should be established through an Act of Parliament. The Authority should perform the following functions:
 - (a) Implement national government institutional arrangements and administrative functions for disaster risk management;
 - (b) Coordinate and control the response to and management of disaster;
 - (c) Build capacity at both levels of government in crisis response and disaster resilience;
 - (d) Serve as the command centre for all communication and information relating to response operations;

- (e) Coordinate disaster management efforts between various government agencies to ensure there is a seamless response operation;
 - (f) Undertake public awareness on disaster preparedness and response;
 - (g) Establish and operate an effective and efficient National Early Warning Disaster Monitoring Information System;
 - (h) Facilitate disaster management contingency process that will result in the formulation of contingency plans to be updated regularly;
 - (i) Document, publish and disseminate all relevant disaster management data and information to all stakeholders;
 - (j) Operate a functional and effective monitoring and evaluation system for programming and management of activities in disaster management; and
912. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating to Internal Security and National Administration functions, in consultation with the county governments, should develop a national policy on disaster management.
913. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating to finance should establish a National Disaster Emergency Contingency Fund in accordance with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act.
914. The Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating to Internal Security and National Administration should review existing policies and plans in emergency and disaster management to align to the two levels of government in order to have a unified approach to emergency and disaster management.

Uniforms

915. The Cabinet Secretary for Defence, in consultation with the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration, are urged to develop and propose legislation for the establishment of a National Uniforms Committee composed of representatives from the Disciplined and Security Services whose mandate will be to approve standards, colours and qualities of uniforms for use by each Service;
916. The Uniforms Quality and Assurance Committee of NPS should be empowered to make final and binding recommendations regarding the quality of uniforms to be procured for the Service, and procurement processes should include mandatory inspection and acceptance of uniforms to be delivered. In the event the uniform is not accepted, the officers who approved such procurement should be held accountable, including bearing a surcharge of the cost involved;
917. The IG should take personal responsibility for the quality of uniforms procured and adherence to prescribed standards and conditions for NPS uniforms;
918. The IG should ensure that all officers have adequate and regular supply of all uniforms and kitting they require to carry out their work. Specifically, the IG should address concerns raised about the quartermaster and lack of transparency and integrity in the distribution of uniforms and accessories;
919. The process of determining uniforms should be subjected to public participation, and approved uniforms gazetted after approval by the Uniforms Committee proposed above;
920. The IG should provide for a mechanism for Service members to raise complaints related to the procurement and supply of uniforms;

921. Any new uniforms for NPS or specialised Units should go through the process prescribed in these recommendations, including public and officers participation;
922. In line with the overwhelming views of members of the public, NPS officers, and the leadership of NPS, the Taskforce recommends that NPS reverts to its old uniform for a period of three years, during which a process of designing a new uniform can be commenced in accordance with the foregoing recommendations;
923. Maternity dresses should be included in the issuance of uniform and trousers for female officers;
924. Automation of the entire process of supply, issuance and distribution of uniform in the Service should be undertaken;
925. NPS should design uniform for NPR and ensure its distribution nationally;
926. Parliament should enact a law or amend existing laws to expressly prohibit use of police or security uniforms and gazette other matters related to police uniform.

Forensic laboratory

927. Parliament should enact a law establishing the National Forensic Laboratory under DCI but keep it open to other justice sector institutions;
928. The law should provide that the DCI is personally accountable for the professional integrity and quality of the administration and services of the National Forensic Laboratory;
929. The National Forensic Laboratory should be headed by either a uniformed or non-uniformed person that is highly trained and qualified in forensic science;
930. In order to ensure that the National Forensic Laboratory remains independent and is effectively utilised, the Taskforce recommends that the proposed law establishes an Advisory Board for the laboratory to advice on policy, standards, quality and operations. The proposed legislation will determine the composition of the Advisory Board;
931. Any complaints regarding the operations of the National Forensic Laboratory should be addressed through the structures of IPOA and the Internal Affairs Unit;
932. Parliament should ensure that the DCI is allocated sufficient funding to run and administer the National Forensic Laboratory. The Taskforce further recommends that the Government undertakes a modernisation of equipment in the laboratory and provides additional resources;
933. DCI should ensure that all professionals working in the laboratory are in good standing with their respective professional regulatory bodies; and
934. DCI should endeavour to decentralise the services of the National Forensic Laboratory.

Community policing

935. Section 98(1) of the NPS Act should be amended by including criteria for the selection of community policing committees. Specifically, the criteria should ensure that the legitimate community leadership is chosen and that the committees further the national values and principles of governance set out under Article 10 of the Constitution;
936. NPS should utilise the skills and training of APS officers to promote community policing and build community partnerships in line with section 27 (h) and (i) of the NPS Act being functions of APS as recommended in the Report;

937. The IG should develop and implement a change management strategy that will assist NPS to transform the culture of policing to the one that is envisaged under the community policing model;
938. The requirement to operationalise and effectively manage community policing structures and processes should form a core part of appraisal, performance review, and even promotions and reward systems in the NPS;
939. The NPS Act should be amended to introduce penalties for failure to comply with requirements under the Act regarding community policing structures;
940. There's need to consider youth, retired members of NPS, retired members of the other security organs in the composition of the committees;
941. The IG should ensure adequate facilitation of community policing structures including training of its members;
942. The IG should commit to addressing challenges of non-cooperation by members of the Service with the community and victimisation of whistleblowers.

Improvement of NPS premises and titling

943. The IG should, within six months, appoint a committee to carry out an inventory of all NPS land and ensure titling, and provide funding to the committee and the relevant State agencies and institutions to extend the requisite cooperation and facilitation to the committee;
944. Parliament should provide for a procedure for the compulsory acquisition of land of interest to NPS and provide parameters for invoking this process;
945. NPS should plan for the progressive securing of NPS land by fencing all land belonging to NPS;
946. All court cases involving NPS land should be fast-tracked and any other disputes involving NPS land should be settled through ADR processes;
947. The Inspector-General should take measures to regularise NPS facilities constructed on contested land or on private land;
948. There should be a waiver on stamp duty and other charges for speedier registration of titles of NPS land;
949. Approved framework of modern police stations and model police stations should be gazetted, published and publicised;
950. The construction of police stations facilitated by philanthropists, NG-CDF, and any other entities should follow the laid down guidelines and standards of a model police station, receive the approval by the IG's office for the construction, and adhere to design and other conditions in the construction of the police station;
951. Parliament should allocate sufficient funds to NPS to continuously improve police premises;
952. The IG should be held accountable for continuous modernisation and improvement of police premises;
953. The IG should ensure construction and improvement of training institutions;
954. The IG should address the plight of police camps, especially in 'forward areas', to ensure that they are habitable;

955. The IG should rationalise the gazettelement and de-gazettelement of police stations across the country; and
956. The IG, in liaison with the relevant government agencies, should ensure the completion of housing and police premises projects.

Gender mainstreaming

957. NPSC and the Inspector-General should consider gender in all recruitments and promotions as provided by Article 232 (1) (i);
958. The NPS Gender Policy, still in draft, should be adopted and implemented within six (6) months;
959. NPS should take steps to provide facilities for lactating mothers and set aside daycare centres in police workplaces;
960. NPS and the National Uniforms Committee should prepare and approve maternity uniforms for female officers;
961. The NPS should consider a framework that allows lactating and expectant female officers to carry out lighter duties suitable to their situations for at least a year;
962. The IG should set up a fully-fledged Gender Directorate and decentralise its services and further empower the directorate to provide oversight; and
963. Affirmative action measures should be taken during recruitment and promotions to ensure that the gender composition of NPS complies with the relevant constitutional provisions.

Sexual and gender-based violence

964. NPS officers should undergo core training modules on sexual harassment that cover institutional aspects as well as the role of the police in handling reported cases of sexual harassment;
965. NPS should consider developing a stand-alone Sexual Harassment Policy as a matter of law and best practice;
966. The definition of sexual harassment in the NPS policy documents should be aligned to related offences set out in the Sexual Offences Act;
967. Sexual harassment in NPS should also be approached as an aspect of human resource management as it affects the productivity of officers concerned;
968. NPSC and the Inspector-General should take responsibility for the mainstreaming of measures to address sexual harassment in NPS and ensure the full roll-out of the necessary structures;
969. NPS and the Police Service Commission should ensure that there is adequate investment in psychosocial support for victims of sexual harassment. The rising cases of police suicide and family violence are evidence of the need to address the issue of SGBV and domestic violence in the Service;
970. The wellness centres proposed in this Report will provide additional support to families;
971. NPSC and the Inspector-General should provide for a grievance handling mechanism that can give confidence to officers to report cases of sexual harassment without fear of reprisal;
972. NPSC and the Inspector-General should put in place measures such as training to change the mindset and culture that perpetuates sexual harassment in NPS and transform the collective attitudes of officers to be more gender sensitive and aware;

973. Officers in charge of police stations should ensure that facilities are friendly for the handling of SGBV victims, including respect for privacy and confidentiality, and having suitable holding facilities and necessary tools;
974. All officers should be trained on handling of SGBV matters to avoid reported situations where victims are told to wait endlessly for officers in charge of gender desks at police stations; and
975. Station commanders should be facilitated with resources specifically for victims of SGBV who report cases to police stations and require urgent support.

Strengthening oversight in NPS

IPOA

976. Inspector-General, the DIGs and respective members of the Service should adhere to, and comply with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the NPS Act on mandatory notification of death and serious injuries that occur within police premises;
977. The IG should facilitate civilian oversight processes as set out in the Constitution and statute, and ensure honouring of summons issued by IPOA in execution of its mandate;
978. The IG should similarly allow unconstrained access to police premises, including training institutions by officers of IPOA to enable them carry out inspections and monitor police operations;
979. Resources and support should be provided in order to facilitate IPOA to decentralise oversight operations to the county level;
980. The curriculum and syllabus for training police officers should be revised to include oversight, the IPOA mandate, and to inculcate critical aspects of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the execution of the Service mandate.
981. The NPS leadership must regularly sensitize its officers on the role and mandate of IPOA and direct them to cooperate.

IAU

982. The Director, IAU, should be appointed after a competitive recruitment process run the by NPSC, and must have security of tenure. The practice now is to leave it to the IG to decide who would occupy the office and for how long;
983. Prioritise increasing funding for the Internal Affairs Unit to enable it meet its statutory obligations. Further, the unit should be allowed to control its finances by making its Director an AIE holder like other regional, county, unit and formation commanders;
984. The Cabinet Secretary should pursue legislative review to facilitate enforcement mechanisms for the IAU's recommendations and enhance its operations. Currently, the Unit's recommendations are implemented at the discretion of the IG, who decides which cases the unit should deal with. This has depressed the unit's performance to below par especially where it fails to resolve many complaints directed to it;
985. The unit should exercise its mandate and deal with all complaints reported to it rather than refer some to DIGs or regional commanders. Complaints are referred to field commanders mainly on the instructions of the IG, but this has been a source of disquiet for both officers and the public, who argue that some senior commanders use referred complaints to settle scores or deny the public deserved services;
986. The unit's capacity should be enhanced through recruitment and effective placement of technical staff in key areas such as investigations, complaints management, intelligence

- gathering and ICT. Vetting of IAU staff, which was first carried out by NPSC at the outset, should continue in order to restore confidence in the unit;
987. There is need to procure more vehicles for the unit to facilitate work-related programmes. The unit has only 13 motor vehicles. Out of these, two are grounded, 10 are awaiting major servicing and only one is operational;
 988. There is need for a Training Needs Assessment and subsequent facilitation of staff training and development. In order to retain and attract more staff, officers working in IAU should be considered for a special allowance to boost their morale and avoid unnecessary temptations;
 989. There is need to enhance the complaints handling infrastructure and digitisation of the unit's complaints handling processes;
 990. There is need for robust awareness programmes so that the public and members of the Service can distinguish the role of the Internal Affairs Unit from that of IPOA. It should be mandatory that both internal and external accountability mechanisms are included in the NPS training curriculum for all cadres, starting from Basic Recruits Training to Higher Training Course (HTC);
 991. There is need to establish and operationalise IAU regional and specific county offices as envisaged in the NPS Act. This will enhance accessibility for the unit's services and also allow for prudent use of resources. Further, the offices established should operate away from the rest of the Services as dictated by the NPS Act;
 992. The Inspector-General should ensure that the subordinate disciplinary committee, which is tasked with undertaking disciplinary proceedings against members of the Inspectorate and below is constituted to reflect the face of NPS, as is the case with the National Disciplinary Committee under the purview of Police Service Commission. The current arrangement is for each Service and the directorate to constitute its own committee to discipline junior officers. This, in most cases, has compromised discipline because each Service tries to protect its own;
 993. In order to engender cohesiveness and foster good working relationships within the unit, the members of IAU should be issued with one staff identity card. IAU members are drawn from different Services, thus they carry different staff ID cards;
 994. As recommended by (Rtd.) Justice Ransley, the unit should investigate both criminal and disciplinary offences. On criminal prosecution of officers, the unit should liaise directly with the ODPP, and on administrative matters, it should channel its recommendations to the IG and the Police Service Commission (*in case of Senior Officers*). This is because a complaint can only be determined to be criminal or disciplinary after thorough investigations. However, it does not make sense to use limited resources and later on hand over a complete file to another entity;
 995. In order to avoid overlaps, the National Police Service and IPOA should develop a Memorandum of Understanding as envisaged in the Service Standing Orders;
 996. IPOA should concentrate and exercise its oversight role over the Service, including IAU but only investigate police misconduct and deal with serious human rights violations and serious cases; and
 997. DCI should deal with cases involving civilians and institutions, and leave matters of criminal investigation on police misconduct to IAU. However, because of its technical capabilities and expertise in critical areas such as ballistics, forensics, cybercrimes and finger prints, the DCI should offer support to IPOA and the Internal Affairs Unit.

Benchmarking

998. Through existing international relations frameworks, the Cabinet Secretary and IG should engage other policing services within the region, Africa and globally with a view to securing appropriate strategies to network and engage in exchange programmes;
999. The Inspector-General should ensure that there is a structured framework for the leadership and members of NPS to join relevant regional and international policing fora with a view to broadening the scope of engagement and advancement of the Service;
1000. The IG should, within 12 months, formulate a detailed policy to regulate benchmarking and exchange programmes;
1001. The policy should ensure equity and fairness in offering opportunities to all members of the Service, including junior officers in the forward areas;
1002. Those who attend benchmarking or exchange programmes should mandatorily be required to prepare and submit reports and where possible, sensitise other members of the Service on knowledge gained;
1003. the leadership of the Service should prohibit misuse of benchmarking opportunities where the same people are over-exposed at the expense of others;
1004. The IG should establish, maintain and keep an updated database of those who have been previously exposed to benchmarking and exchange programmes; and
1005. The IG should establish a monitoring and evaluation strategy to assess the efficacy of the benchmarking and exchange programme, and ensure its continued improvement.

Modernisation

1006. Establish a modernisation programme for NPS (2024 – 2035) that will have the following components:
 - (a) Organisational development, including restructuring and streamlining of units and efficiency to avoid the overlapping of functions, as well as simplify procedures;
 - (b) Rationalisation of systems, standards and procedures in the administration of NPS
 - (c) Professionalisation of human resources management and transformation of personnel;
 - (d) Infrastructure development, i.e. upgrade basic and support systems;
 - (e) Upgrading equipment and facilities;
 - (f) Construction, improvement and upgrading of buildings, facilities or offices; and
 - (g) Undertaking reforms – in all areas; and
1007. Establish NPS Modernisation Fund (2024 – 2035) that will facilitate the modernisation programme in the following areas:
 - (a) Construction;
 - (b) Upgrading of infrastructure;
 - (c) Mobility;
 - (d) Weapons;
 - (e) Training;

- (f) Computerisation and Digitisation;
- (g) Equipment;
- (h) Forensic; and
- (i) Reforms.

10.2 Implementation Matrix

S/No.	Recommendation/Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
Leadership and Management			
1	1.1 Develop legislation for a transparent recruitment process for the Inspector General (IG), Deputy Inspectors General, and Director of Criminal Investigations (DCI) as recommended in this report.	Within three months In phases, starting FY 2023/2024 to 2028/2029	CS Interior, National Treasury, Parliament, IGP
	1.2 Conduct fresh vetting of police officers from the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police and above as recommended in this report.	- 3 months to enact the law - 3 months for vetting	Independent Vetting Board/Panel appointed by the President
	1.3 Develop and implement a structured Change Management Plan as recommended in this report.	One year	NPSC, IGP
	1.4 Consider and implement the recommendations on NPSC as provided in this report.	Within 2 (Two) Years	Presidency, Parliament,
	1.5 Review and operationalize the Legislation, Policies, Regulations and Service Standing Orders (SSOs) for effective guidance to the NPS as recommended in this report.	Immediately (not later than three months)	CS Interior, Parliament, NPSC, IGP,
	1.6 Develop appropriate guidelines to guide NPS in particular the National Policing Policy	Within Two (2) Years	CS Interior
	1.7 Develop Sessional Paper on Policing and Reforms	Within Two (2) Years	CS Interior
	1.8 Operationalise the Police Reform Unit within the Ministry of Interior	Within Six (6) Months	CS Interior, PSC
Human Resource Management			
2	2.1 Review and develop new staffing establishments for uniformed and non-uniformed officers	Immediate	NPSC, IGP
	2.2 Save for operational matters related to personnel deployment and training, assign the performance of all Human Resource Management and Development functions to appropriately trained and experienced personnel at NPS up to the County and Su-County levels as recommended in this report.	Three months	NPSC, IGP
Recruitment			
3	3.1 Implement recommendations on recruitment as per this report	Within One (1) Year	NPSC, IGP
	3.2 Auditor General should undertake a special audit after every recruitment as recommended in this report.	After every National Recruitment process	Auditor General
Transfer and Deployment			
	4.1 Review and Implement Transfer and deployment policies and regulations as recommended in this report.	Immediate (not later than three months)	NPSC, IGP
	4.2 Audit all personnel in-post duty stations to ensure that no officer has served in the same County/ duty station for a period more than three (3) years.	Immediate	NPSC, IGP

S/No.	Recommendation/Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	4.3 Transfers/ Deploy all personnel who have served in the same County/duty station for more than three (3) years to new Counties.	Immediate	NPSC, IGP
	4.4 Audit all personnel serving in Specialised Units/formations to ensure that no officer has served in operation or forward areas for more than three (3) years	Immediate	NPSC, IGP
Training			
	5.1 Review and Implement the recommendations on training as recommended in the report.	Within One Year –	CS Interior, NPSC, IG
	5.2 Develop appropriate training and capacity development programmes for NPS leadership including strategic leadership	One year	CS Interior, NPSC, IG
	5.3 Expand and decentralize the current training and in-service continuous training infrastructure at the NPS to cater for all Cadres of the service and establish strategies for collaboration with other institutions of higher learning.	Within One (1) Year	CS Interior, NPSC, IGP
Human Rights Training			
	6.1 Review and implement the curriculum for Human Rights training as recommended.	Immediate. Within Three (3) months	CS Interior, NPSC, IGP
Promotions			
	7.2 Review and Implement promotion policies and regulations for Uniformed and non-uniformed officers as recommended.	Within Six (6) Months	NPSC, IGP
	7.3 Recall authority delegated to IGP, abolish all promotion boards and establish a new merit-based system for promotions.	Within Six (6) Months	NPSC, IGP
Career Progression			
	8.1 Develop job description manuals for NPS uniformed Officers.	One year	NPSC, IGP
	8.3 Review and implement career progression guidelines as recommended in this report.	Six months	NPSC
Reward			
	9.1 Develop and implement an automated performance management and reward system that involves public participation and cascaded to the station level.	One year	NPSC, IGP
Exit and Post-Exit Management			
	10.1 Develop and implement an exit and post-exit Policy and programs as recommended in this report.	Six months	NPSC IGP
	10.5 Establish a contributory insurance fund to assist retired officers' access to medical and social services develop a proper succession policy and cease the renewal of retired officers contracts	Two years	NPSC IGP National Treasury
Salaries and Remuneration			
	11.1 Create Security and Disciplined Services Sector as a separate budgeting sector for NPS planning and budgeting. .	Immediately, within two months	CS Interior, CS National Treasury
	11.2 Implement recommendations on NPS basic salaries structures for uniformed and non-uniformed officers as provided in this report	Within One (1) Year	CS National Treasury SRC
	11.3 Establish remuneration and advisory board for Security and Disciplined Services.	Within One (1) Year	CS Interior, Parliament

S/No.	Recommendation/Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	11.4 Conduct Job Evaluations based on new job description manuals.	Within One (1) Year	SRC, NPSC, NPS
NPS Allowances			
	12.1 Review, standardize and harmonize allowances for NPS members as recommended in this Report.	Within One (1) Year	SRC CS Treasury NPSC National
	12.3 Implement new allowances for NPS members as recommended in this report.	Within One (1) year	SRC CS Treasury NPSC National
	13.3 Undertake automation of all allowance's payments including during multi agency operations	Within One (1) year	NPSC, NPS
General Welfare			
	13.3 Restructure and facilitate the Welfare Directorate to establish and manage police canteens, Creche and recreational and sports facilities for officers and their families.	Within one year	NPSC, IG
	13.4 Partner with county governments to establish ECDE centres and schools	Two years	NPSC NPS County Government
	13.5 Provide transport facilitation for officers in operational and inaccessible areas for basic social and recreational activities.	Immediately	NPSC, NPS
Medical Scheme			
	14.2 Non –renewal of the current service providers. Adhere to legal provisions and comprehensive procurement guidelines for negotiation, procurement and rollout of medical scheme to ensure that it takes into account the unique needs of NPS officers as recommended by the report.	Immediately	NPSC IG /Accounting Officer
	14.2 Non-renewal of the current service providers and audit the implementation of the 2023 medical scheme	Immediately	NPSC, IG
Compensation Scheme			
	15.1 Negotiate group life cover based on actuarial risk with the new service provider.	Immediately	NPSC IG CGP
	15.2 Automate the claims process to reduce the turnaround time. (automate section)		
	15.3 Conduct sensitisation and customer awareness on procedures.	Immediately	NPSC IG CGP
	15.4 Settle all unpaid claims including past insurers	Immediately	NPSC IG CGP
Mental Health			
	16.1 Implement the NPSC policy on mental health and Counselling as recommended in this report and comprehensively cover issues of mental health in medical scheme	Within six months	CS Interior NPSC
	16.2 Adequately support infrastructure medical cover and shared services on mental health issues	Within six months	CS Interior NPSC
	16.2 Customization of the wellness program. and implementation of psycho-social support policy.	Within six months	NPSC IG CPG
Housing			

S/No.	Recommendation/Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	17.2 Review and implement the national Police Service housing policy as recommended.	One year	NPS NPSC CS Housing CS Interior
ICT Digitisation			
	18.1 Develop and implement legislation and policies to anchor digitization and automation of services with gradual integration with security and disciplined sector	One year	CS Interior State Law Office Parliament
	18.2 Digitize all police services as per recommendations in the report	Within two years	CS Interior CS ICT
	18.3 Establish an integrated case management system and complaints mechanism.	Within two years	NCAJ
Logistical Capacity, Tooling and Equipment			
	19.2 Develop and Operationalize the Fleet Management strategy to station level and in consideration to task force recommendation in the report	Within one (1) Year	IGP
	19.3 Government to reinstate the Security services modernization fund	Within six (6) months	CS, National Treasury, CS, Interior IGP, Parliament
Command Structure			
	20.1 Establish DCI as a separate service responsible to the IG.	Within One Year	Parliament
	20.2 Implement service command structure as per recommendations of the report	Within Six Months	IG NPSC
	Introduce a three -tier classification system for NPS Ranks	Within Three (3) months	CS, Interior
Specialised Units			
	21.1 Establish a committee to review the existing specialized units.	Within three (3) months	IG
	21.2 Develop clear and objective criteria for unit formulation composition.	Within three (3) months	IG
	21.3 Develop guidelines for the formation and management of specialized units and in concurrence with the National Security Council	Within six (6) months	IG
	21.4 Development of a policy to guide determination of persons requiring VIP	Within one (1) year	CS, Interior, IGP
Police Airwing			
	22.1 Establish and enforce policies, operations of NPSAW including decentralization and standards	Within six (6) months	CS Interior
	22.2 Restore exclusive control of NPSAW to the NPS	Within three (3) months	CS, Interior, CS Defence
	22.3 Provide adequate resources and budget support for the effective and optimal operation of NPSAW	Within three (3) months	CS, Interior, CS, National Treasury
Marine Unit.			
	23.1 Develop SOPs and Standing Orders to regulate the operation of the unit.	Immediate	IG
	23.2 Dissolve Marine Unit and merge with KCGS	Immediate	CS NPS
Police Traffic Unit			
	24.1 Embrace an automated traffic management system and operations.	Within Six (6) Months	NTSA, NPS
	24.2 Restructure the current unit and establish a technology-reliant traffic management unit with completely new officers with no traffic experience	Within three (3) Months	NTSA, IPOA

S/No.	Recommendation/Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	24.3 Revive police road patrols to replace static road blocks	Within (6) Six months	NPS CS Interior
	24.5 Integrate and align traffic management and operations under a unified command at the police station under the OCS	Within (6) Six months	NPS CS Interior
National Police Reservists			
	25.1 Review and formulate policies for NPR, inventory and assessment of NPR.	Within (6) Six months	IG
	25.2 Automate payment and allowances of NPR	Within (6) Six months	NPSC IGP
	25.3 Vetting of police reservists	Immediate Within three (3) months	NPSC
Kenya Police Service /APS Restructuring			
	26.2 Reassess the roles and current capacity to ensure a capacitated APS.	Within (6) Six months	NPSC IGP
	26.3 Rationalise and recalibrate the respective functions of KPS and APS to address the current confusion in the roles.	Within (6) Six months	NPSC IGP
	26.4 Establish a police Unit to support the National Government Administration functions.	Immediate Within three (3) months	NPSC IGP
Uniforms			
	27.1 Enact a law providing for the establishment of a national Uniform Standards Committee.	Immediate	Parliament CS Defense CS Interior
	Introduce new distinct uniforms for National Police Service Gazette officers, NPS inspectorate, KPS, APS.		Parliament CS Defense CS Interior
Forensic Laboratory			
	28.1 Enact and operationalize a law establishing the National Forensic Laboratory under DCI, but open to other justice sector institutions	Within One year	Parliament Joint service board NPS
Community Policing			
	29.1 Initiate amendments to the NPS Act as per report	Six months	IGP CS Interior
	29.4 Incorporate community policing in performance management, appraisal and promotion of officers.	Within Six (6) Months	IGP
	29.5 Develop and implement a culture change management strategy	Within Six (6) Months	NPSC IGP
Improvement of NPS Premises and Titling of NPS Land			
	30.1 Appoint a Multi-agency committee to carry out inventory and titling of NPS land.	Within one year	CS interior CS Lands AG
	30.7 Gazette, publish and publicize the approved framework on construction of modern police stations.	Within one year	CS Interior CS Housing and Public works
Gender Mainstreaming			
	31.2 Adopt and implement the NPS Gender Policy with consideration to taskforce additional recommendations	6 Months	NPS CS Gender CS Interior
Sexual Harassment and Gender Based Violence			
	32.2 Develop and implement a comprehensive NPS sexual harassment policy	Six months	NPS
	32.3 Establish a SGBV Directorate in the NPS to handle all matters of GBV	Immediately	NPS
Strengthening Oversight in the NPS			
	33.1 Restructure and facilitate the IAU as per recommendations in the report	Within Three (3) Months	CS Interior NPSC

S/No.	Recommendation/Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	<i>33.2 Pursue legislative review to facilitate enforcement and discretion mechanisms and powers for the IAU recommendations and not left solely at the IGP discretion</i>	Within (6) Months	Parliament NPSC
	<i>33.3 Director IAU be made an AIE holder like other police regional, county unit and formation commanders</i>	Within Three (3) Months	CS Interior NPSC
Benchmarking			
	<i>34.1 Develop , formulate and implement detailed policy guidelines to regulate benchmarking and exchange programs in the service as recommended</i>	12 Months	CS Interior IGP
Modernisation			
	<i>35.1 Review and implement the NPS Modernization Plan and provide corresponding funding</i>	Immediate	CS Interior IG CS National Treasury
Disaster Management and Joint Operational Preparedness			
	<i>36.1 Establish a National Disaster management Authority</i>	Within Three (3) Months	Parliament
	<i>36.2 Implement National Government institutional arrangements, capacity building, Coordination, facilitation, public awareness documentation and management of disaster</i>	Within Three (3) Months	CS Interior

10.3 APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Summary of Roles and Responsibilities

No.	Rank/Designation	Roles and Responsibilities
1	Principal Assistant to the Inspector-General	Coordinating the work of directorates at the Office of the Inspector-General and ensuring efficiency in the administration of National Police Service.
2	Personal Staff to the Inspector-General	Work under the Inspector-General's immediate instruction and control in performing its specific tasks; and May, through the Principal Assistant to the Inspector-General, be tasked to coordinate actions and issues with other staff members.
3	Directors at the NPS Headquarters	Managing their respective directorates in a manner consistent with their mandate and policies and programmes of the National Police Service as directed by the Inspector-General from time to time.
4	Personal Staff to the Deputy Inspector-General	Work under the Deputy Inspector-General immediate instruction and control in performing specific tasks; and May be tasked to coordinate actions and issues with other staff members, and in such instances, they shall perform the duties through the Principal Assistant to the Deputy Inspector-General.
5	Directors at the Service Headquarters	Managing their respective directorates in a manner consistent with their mandate and policies and programmes of the Services as directed by the respective Deputy Inspector-General from time to time.
6	Regional Police Commander	Effective and efficient day-to-day administration and operations of the Service at the regional level.
7	Regional APS Commander	Undertaking the supervision of APS officers in the region in the performance of protective security and rendering support to government agencies in the enforcement of administrative functions and exercise of lawful duties.
	Regional Criminal Investigation Officer	Guiding and directing police officers in the investigation of a crime; Maintaining liaison with other County Directorate of Criminal Investigations in the region; and Coordinating the investigation of serious crimes, which are committed by the same person.
8	County Police Commander	Effective and efficient day-to-day administration and operations of the Service at the county level; Providing operational guidance and direction for the county police services;
9	County Criminal Investigation Officers	Guiding and directing police officers in the investigation of a crime; and Maintaining liaison with other sub-county Directorate of Criminal Investigations in the county.
10	County APS Commander	Undertaking supervision of APS officers at the county in the performance of protective security and rendering support to Government agencies in the enforcement of administrative functions and exercise of lawful duties.
11	Sub-County Police Commander	The effective and efficient day-to-day administration and operations of the National Police Service at the sub-county level.

No.	Rank/Designation	Roles and Responsibilities
12	Sub-County Criminal Investigation Officers	Guiding and directing police officers in the investigation of a crime; and Maintaining liaison with other sub-county Directorate of Criminal Investigations in the county.
13	Sub-County APS Commander	Undertaking supervision of APS officers at the sub-county in performance of protective security and rendering support to government agencies in the enforcement of administrative functions and exercise of lawful duties.
14	Officer Commanding Station/Ward Commander	Efficient administration of the station; and Providing room for operational creativity to the police officers from all the services under his station area.
15	Officer Commanding Police Post	Efficient administration of his post; Prevention and detection of crime; and the apprehension of offenders in his area.
16	Unit Commander or Commandant	Effective and efficient day-to-day administration and operations of the Unit; and Providing operational and tactical guidance and direction for the Unit.
17	Company Commander	Efficient and effective administration of the company;
18	Platoon Commander	Efficient and smooth administration of the platoon; and Prevention and detection of crimes and enhancement of patrols.
19	Section Commander	The efficient management of the section; Conducting parade inspections; and Conducting patrols.

Appendix 2: NPS Formed/Specialised Units and functions

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
Kenya Police Service		
1.	The National Police Service College, Kiganjo Campus	Train recruits and officers of all cadres in the National Police Service nationally and internationally as provided in Chapter 11 and 71 of Service Standing Orders.
2.	National Police Service Leadership Academy	(a) Train staff to the highest possible standards of competence and integrity and to respect human rights and dignity as provided for under Article 244(d); (b) Enhance the capacity of police officers in all fields of policing; (c) Research on policing techniques (d) initiate the development and evaluation of a training curriculum; (e) incorporate all contemporary technologies in policing; (f) provide senior officers leadership and command training; (g) set senior staff in-service trainees examinations; (h) undertake research on policing matters; and (i) manage rehabilitation programmes for police office.

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
3.	National Police Service College, Embakasi ‘B’ Campus	The mandate of the National Police College, Embakasi “B” Campus shall be to— (a) train staff to the highest possible standard of competency and integrity and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and dignity; (b) offer basic training to General Service Unit recruits; (c) offer promotional courses to General Service Unit officers; (d) review General Service Unit training curriculum; (e) offer capacity building to General Service Unit personnel; (f) be a research centre for emerging crimes; (g) be a liaison centre with other training institutions; (h) offer police science programs in collaboration with institutions of higher learning; (i) manage rehabilitation programmes for police officers; and (j) establish, manage and utilize the existing satellite training centres in the counties for use by the Service.
4.	National Police Service Magadi Field Campus	The National Police College, Magadi Campus is under National Police College, Embakasi “B” Campus. National Police College, Embakasi “B” Campus. Kenya Subsidiary Legislation, 2020 2313 The Mandate of the National Police College, Magadi field Campus shall be to— (a) to train officers to the highest standards of professionalism, competency and integrity in operational Policing; (b) offer basic Para-military training to GSU recruits; (c) offer operational command and leadership training to GSU officers; (d) offer range work training and practices to police officers; (e) offer advanced combat and tactical operational training to GSU Officers; (f) train on exercise, planning and multi-agency approaches to policing; (g) train on team work within the GSU companies, platoons and paramilitary (h) offer Standardization Courses for GSU companies;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(i) offer Command and leadership training to the security agencies; (j) offer specialized training to other security agencies; and offer any other training as may be directed by the Inspector General- NPS from time to time
5.	The Tourist Police Unit	(a) Provision of security and ensuring safety and welfare of tourists; (b) Detection and investigation of tourist- related crimes; (c) Assist in the prosecution of offenders; (d) Address claims and complaints by tourists and assist tourists in need of help; (e) Patrolling beaches, hotels and other tourist facilities including tourist circuit roads; (f) Provision of escort to tourists; (g) Protection of tourists from any form of harassment; and (h) Generally advice and guide tourists.
6.	The Railway and Ports Police Unit	(a) Prevention and detection of crimes; (b) Ensuring safety and security of railways property and persons conveyed over railways; (c) Investigation into offences related to property or person conveyed over railways; (d) Inquiries into rail-related accidents; and (e) Provision of escort duties in connection with transit of goods by rail.
7.	The Presidential Escort Unit	(a) Provide security and protection to the President; (b) Provide security to the First Family; (c) Provide security to retired Presidents; (d) Provide security to the Deputy President; (e) Provide security to visiting Heads of State and Government; and (f) Provide security to any other Very Important Person as may be directed by the Inspector-General.
8.	The Marine Police Unit	(a) Gathering and assessing information with respect to security threats and exchanging such information with appropriate contacts in Government; (b) Requiring the maintenance of communication protocols for ships and port facilities; (c) Preventing unauthorised access to ships, port facilities and other restricted areas; (d) Preventing the introduction of unauthorised weapons, incendiary devices or explosives to ships or port facilities; (e) Providing means for raising the alarm in reaction to security threats or security incidents;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(f) Requiring ship and port facility security plans based upon security assessments; and (g) Requiring training drills and exercises to ensure familiarity with security plans and procedures.
9.	The Kenya Airports Police Unit	(a) Preventing and detecting crimes against property or persons within all airports; (b) Investigating claims, complaints and irregularities in the conveyance of goods and passengers, lost and found property and missing goods within the airports; (c) Safeguarding airlines and private aircraft parked within the apron area of the airports; (d) Maintaining law and order, crowd control and undertaking security duties in accordance with the recommended and established standards of civil aviation security; (e) Checking passengers and luggage before boarding or loading onto aircraft; (f) Controlling all entry points into the airports and restricted areas; (g) Escorting valuables, explosives, arms and ammunition, wanted and extradited persons (h) Investigating accidents within airports; (i) Guarding and protecting vital installations within airports. (j) Guarding Very Important Persons facilities; and (k) Generally ensuring security and coverage within the airports.
10.	The “K9” Unit	(a) Caring and maintaining police dogs; (b) Procuring and breeding police dogs; (c) Training police dogs and dog handlers; (d) Deploying officers and police dogs for crime detection and prevention; and (e) Detecting and preventing crime by use of police dogs.
11.	The General Service Unit	(a) Providing security to the President, State Houses and lodges; (b) Providing security for selected foreign airlines; (c) Providing security to vital installations and strategic points; (d) Controlling riotous mobs and civil disturbances; (e) Carrying out anti-poaching operations; (f) Countering terrorism activities and insurgencies; (g) Providing security to VVIPs; (h) Conducting special operations; (i) Escorting sensitive cargo and high-risk prisoners;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(j) Offering support in disaster and emergencies; and (k) Any other duty as may be directed by the Deputy Inspector-General or the Kenya Police Service, from time to time.
12.	The Diplomatic Police Unit	(a) Providing specialised security for diplomats; (b) Liaising with diplomatic missions on security matters; (c) Coordinating all rapid responses; (d) Providing static and mobile security for diplomatic missions; (e) Providing foot and mobile security patrols; (f) Ensuring traffic control and investigating accidents; and (g) Providing static guards to diplomatic facilities.
13.	The Kenya Police Traffic Department	(a) Ensuring of the free flow of traffic; (b) Prevention of road accidents; (c) Investigation of accidents; (d) Enforcement of all laws with which the department is charged; and (e) Initiation of road safety sensitisation to the members of the public.
Administration Police Service		
1.	The Security of Government Buildings & VIP Protection Unit	(a) Protection of Government buildings and offices; (b) Maintaining law and order, preventing and detecting crimes against property and persons within all government buildings and offices; (c) Rendering support to government agencies in the enforcement of administrative functions and the exercise of lawful duties; (d) Provision of security for cash and other valuables in transit; (e) Provision of static security to financial institutions and selected private facilities on request; (f) Render personal protective security to Very Important Persons, private individuals and dignitaries; (g) Provision of security to government institutions and parastatal organisations; (h) Providing static and mobile security for very important persons, dignitaries and their places of residence; (i) Complementing other law enforcement agencies in security operations; and (j) Emergency response.
2.	The Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU)	(a) Coordinating all security rapid responses services;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(b) Providing critical security operations during conflicts, national emergencies and international events; (c) Coordinating with other Government agencies in conflict management and peace building; (d) Restoration of peace; (e) Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations; (f) Public order management; (g) Disaster and emergency response; and (h) Complementing field commands and other specialised units in high level security operations.
3.	The Border Police Unit	(a) Assistance to immigration officers in enforcing lawful duties along the borders; (b) Detecting and deterring illegal entries and related activities including human trafficking, illegal arms and smuggling of contraband or un-costumed goods; (c) Reduction of crime across border communities; (d) Conducting surveillance and reconnaissance along the border entry points to enhance border security; (e) Counter-terrorism and counter insurgency; (f) Conducting impromptu Vehicle Check Points on roads classification Class A International Trunk Roads and Class B National Trunk Roads; and (g) Collaborating with other security agencies in security operations.
4.	The Anti-Stock Theft Unit	(a) Anti-stock theft operations; (b) Stock-theft investigations; (c) Prevention of stock-theft; (d) Crowd-control by use of horses; (e) Breeding of horses; (f) Training of horses; (g) Training of horse riders; (h) Tracing and identifying owners of the recovered stock; (i) Overseeing the implanting of tracking chips or other traceability devices into the livestock; (j) Breeding camels; (k) Training camel riders; and (l) Training camels.
5.	Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit	(a) Protect upstream oilfields; (b) Protect crude oil pipeline networks, refined petroleum pipeline and bulk storage; (c) Protect electricity energy generation, bulk transmission and key distribution nodes;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(d) Provide security to water mass, dams and wastewater (sewerage) systems; (e) Protect Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) projects, railways and roads; (f) Provide security to Standard Gauge Railway and its affiliated projects; (g) Protect all critical ICT installations, data centres and telecommunication apparatus; (h) Provide security to all public and private medical and agricultural research centres; (i) Provide security to critical medical and Central Radio-active Waste facilities; and (j) Provide security to selected chemical and industrial facilities; (k) Protect vital installations and strategic points; (l) Provide escort duties in connection with critical infrastructures and strategic points; (m) Detect and prevent crimes related to critical infrastructures; (n) Provide security to any other critical infrastructure as may be designated from time to time; (o) Be the linkage between private security service providers and the National Police Service; (p) Collaborate with private security; and (q) Regulatory authority to set standards and accredit institutions offering training of security service providers and prospective security service providers to ensure a high quality of training.
6.	The National Police College, Embakasi "A" Campus	Train recruits and officers of all cadres in the National Police Services nationally and internationally as provided in Chapters 11 and 71 of these Standing Orders.
7.	National Police Service Senior Staff College, Emali Campus,	Training middle level officers;
8.	National Police Service College, Border Police Training Campus,	BPU, CIPU, ASTU and RDU tactical training.
Directorate of Criminal Investigations		
1.	The Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Unit (TPIU)	(a) Prevention, detection, disruption and interdiction of terrorist activities within the country; (b) Investigation of terrorism and terrorism related cases; (c) Securing evidence related to terrorist activities; (d) Maintenance of profiles for suspected terrorists and establishment of a data-bank; (e) Sharing intelligence with other security related agencies; and

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(f) Reviewing and monitoring security of foreign missions accredited to Kenya.
2.	Regional Counter Terrorism Centre of Excellence	(a) research, analysis and timely dissemination of counter-terrorism related intelligence (b) co-ordinated planning and action against terrorism; (c) sharing of experience and best practices among the member countries and other INTERPOL regions
3.	Anti-Counterfeit Investigations Unit	(a) investigate cases of proliferation of counterfeit goods into the country (b) deter importation of counterfeit goods into the country; and (c) work with Kenya Bureau of Standards to rid of manufactured and sale of counterfeit goods
4.	Land Fraud Investigations Unit;	(a) investigate cases involving land fraud; (b) liaise with National Land Commission and recover public land acquired illegally; (c) put mechanism in place to deter theft of public land
5.	(i) Economic and Commercial Crimes Unit; (ii) Banking Fraud Investigations Unit; (iii) Capital Market Fraud Investigations Unit; (iv) Serious Crime Unit; (v) Kenya Revenue Protection Services; (vi) Anti-Human Trafficking and Child Protection Unit; (vii) Insurance Fraud Investigation Unit (viii) Financial Investigations Unit; (ix) Transnational Organized Crimes Unit; and (x) (xi) SACCO Fraud unit	
6.	The Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU)	(a) Investigation of drug-related cases; (b) Detection and prevention of drug-related offences; (c) Dissemination of drug intelligence to other law enforcement agencies locally and internationally; (d) Maintenance of data bank of drug cases; (e) Liaison with local and international organisations dealing with drug-related issues; (f) Provision of public education and sensitisation programmes to the public on dangers of drug abuse;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(g) Identification and elimination of drug production and conveyance systems; and (h) Preservation of exhibits in its custody.
7.	The Criminal Research Intelligence Bureau (CRIB)	(a) Oversee and coordinate matters related to criminal intelligence; (b) Evaluate, analyse and disseminate criminal intelligence received from the field; (c) Establish and maintain a criminal record data bank; (d) Facilitate the National Police Service in intelligence-led policing strategy; (e) Initiate the process of criminal intelligence collection, development and dissemination to the end user on need-to-know basis; (f) Evaluate and analyse criminal data reports received from the field; (g) Facilitate investigators with the necessary equipment and intelligence in criminal investigations; (h) Facilitate the National Police Service in crime prevention and detection strategy; (i) Provide liaison to the Service and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies both local and international through dissemination of criminal intelligence; (j) Overseeing all matters relating to the collection of criminal intelligence; and (k) Storage and retrieval of criminal intelligence.
8.	The Forensic Science Unit (i) Digital Forensic Unit; (ii) Forensic Ballistics; (iii) Forensic Fingerprint Identification Bureau; (iv) Forensic photographic imaging and acoustics unit; and (v) Biology and Chemistry Unit	Provide the following services— (a) photographic services; (b) ballistic services; (c) explosive response management services; (d) document examination services; (e) finger, palm and foot print identification services; and (f) crime scene support services; (g) carry out cyber-crime analysis; and (h) Store and maintain criminal records. (i) Forensic Document Examination; Bomb/Hazardous Material Disposal; (j) Forensic Crime Scene Investigation Services;
9.	The National Central Bureau (INTERPOL)	(a) Receive criminal intelligence from other INTERPOL member countries and disseminates to other competent government authorities; (b) Facilitate extradition of fugitives to and from Kenya in accordance with the existing extradition treaties and through diplomatic channels;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(c) Coordinate with INTERPOL member countries, the Secretariat, regional bureaux and other Government agencies on request made to the Bureau; and (d) Liaise with National Police Service and other Government agencies on cooperation and promotion of INTERPOL initiatives.
10.	The DCI Academy (i) ATPU; (ii) Railway and Port Police; and (iii) KAPU	(a) Training of personnel in investigations and intelligence gathering; (b) Develop the curriculum of the various courses at the academy; (c) Undertake research; (d) Undertake study tours and research to keep up with the best practices; (e) Collaborate with other learning or training institutions; and (f) Monitor and evaluate Director of Criminal Investigation training programmes.
11.	The Kenya Airports Criminal Investigation (KACI)	(a) Investigation of criminal activities in Airports; (b) Collection of criminal intelligence; and (c) Liaise between the Directorate and the airport management.
12.	The Kenya Railways Criminal Investigation Office (RAILWAYS)	(a) Investigation of criminal activities within the railways corporation in the Republic of Kenya; (b) Collection of criminal intelligence; and (c) Liaison between the Directorate and the railways management.
13.	The Special Services Unit (i) Anti-narcotics units; (ii) Special services unit; (iii) Crime research and intelligence bureau; (iv) National central bureau (INTERPOL); and (v) Counterterrorism centre of excellence.	(a) Prevention of illegal trafficking of firearms and ammunition; (b) Crack down on robberies with violence where firearms are used; (c) Crack down on members of criminal organisations; (d) Prevention of human trafficking; (e) Dealing with cases of motor vehicle theft and manipulation of number plates; (f) Prevention of theft of goods on transit; (g) Prevention of trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; (h) Prevention of recurrence of cases of abduction or kidnapping; (i) Investigation of digital technologies crime against the state and the public; and (j) Any other duty that the director deems necessary for the unit to prevail on or investigate.
14.	The Economic and Commercial Crime Unit	(a) Banking fraud investigations; (b) Financial investigations; (c) Revenue protection services;

No.	Formed/Specialised Units	Functions
		(d) Insurance fraud investigations; (e) Kenya Revenue Authority fraud investigations; (f) National Registration Bureau fraud investigations; (g) Communication Authority fraud unit; (h) Kenya Power fraud investigations; and (i) Immigration fraud investigations.
15.	The Serious Crime Unit	(a) Investigate the following offences— (b) Homicide; (c) Sexual offences; (d) Cyber-crime; (e) Organised crimes; (f) Juvenile delinquency; and (g) Trafficking humans.
16.	The Regional Counter Terrorism Centre of Excellence	(a) Research, analysis and timely dissemination of counter-terrorism related intelligence; (b) Coordinated planning and action against terrorism; and (c) Sharing of experience and best practices among the member countries and other INTERPOL regions.
17.	The Anti-Counterfeit Investigations Unit	(a) Investigate cases of proliferation of counterfeit goods into the country; (b) Deter importation of counterfeit goods into the country; and (c) Work with Kenya Bureau of Standards to rid Kenya of manufacture and sale of counterfeit goods.
18.	The Anti-Land Fraud Unit	(a) Investigate cases involving land fraud; (b) Liaise with National Land Commission to recover public land acquired illegally; and (c) Put mechanisms in place to deter theft of public land.
19.	National Criminal Investigation Academy. (NCIA)	(a) training of personnel in investigations and intelligence gathering; (b) develop the curriculum of the various courses at the academy; (c) undertake research; (d) undertake study tours and research to keep up with the best practices; (e) collaborate with other learning or training institutions; and (f) monitor and evaluate Director of Criminal Investigation training programmes

Appendix 3: NPS Career Progression/Scheme of Service

Rank	Requirements
Police Constable (Entry Point)	• Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) mean grade of D+ (Plus) and above from Kenya National Examination Council or its equivalent qualification from a recognised examining body • Be a Kenyan citizen; • Be physically and medically fit; • Be between the age of 18 and 28 years and 30 years for graduates; • Be in possession of a National Identity Card; • Have no criminal record; • Passed an aptitude test
Police Corporal	• Must have served in the rank of a Constable for a minimum of five (5) years; • Passed relevant Police Law Examination; • successfully completed Police Constable to Corporal course lasting not less than three (3) months; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months.
Police Sergeant	• Must have served in the rank of a Corporal for a minimum of three (3) years; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months; • Must have passed relevant Police Law Examination; • Successfully completed Police Corporal to Sergeant Course or its equivalent lasting not less than three (3) months.
Police Senior Sergeant	• Must have served in the rank of Sergeant for a minimum period of three (3) years; • Has successfully completed Sergeant to Senior Sergeant Course/Platoon Senior Sergeant Course lasting not less than three (3) months; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months.
Inspector of Police (Entry Point)	• Served in the rank of Sergeant for a minimum of three (3) years or Senior Sergeant for a minimum period of two (2) years; • Passed relevant Police Law Examinations; • Successfully completed Station Commanders Course/Platoon Commanders Course/Inspectorate (Subordinate to Inspectorate) Course lasting not less than five (5) months; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months.
Chief Inspector of Police	• Must have served in the rank of Inspector for a minimum period of three (3) years;

Rank	Requirements
	• No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months; • Demonstrated Listening Skills, Problem Solving, Weapon Handling Skills, Investigating Skills, Public Relation Skills, Intelligence Collection Skills, Counselling Skills, ICT Skills, Analytical Skills, Intuition Skills, Reporting Skills, Mentoring Skills, Crime Scene Management Skills, Communication skills and Decision-Making Skills; • Meets the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution on Leadership and Integrity and Article 232 on Values and Principles of Public Service; and shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; • Attended relevant Supervisory/Management Courses.
Assistant Superintendent	• Served in the rank of Chief Inspector of Police for a minimum of three (3) years and has served in National Police Service for a period not less than six (6) years. • Bachelor's degree in any of the following fields: Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Human Resource Management, Peace Building Conflict Management, Physical Education, Music, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management, or any other course related to police work, Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Molecular Biology, Chemistry, Analytical Chemistry, Industrial Chemistry, Biochemistry, Microbiology, Public health, Genetics, Computer Science, Electronic Engineering, Forensic Science, Fingerprint Science, Software Engineering, Geographical Information Systems, Information Communication Technology, or any other relevant and equivalent qualification from a recognised institution; OR • Diploma in any of the following fields:- Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Human Resource Management, Peace Building and Conflict Management, Physical Education, Music, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management, Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Molecular Biology, Chemistry, Analytical Chemistry, Industrial Chemistry, Biochemistry, Microbiology, Public health, Genetics, Computer Science, Electronic Engineering, Forensic Science, Fingerprint Science, Software Engineering, Geographical Information Systems, Information Communication Technology, or any other relevant and equivalent qualification from a recognised institution. • Successfully completed higher Training Course (HTC)/ Training Course (STC) lasting not less than 6 months. • Middle level Management Course/Senior supervisory Course/Company Commanders Course.

Rank	Requirements
	• No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months • Shown merit and ability as shown in work performance and results
Superintendent of Police	• Served in the rank of Assistant Superintendent (ASP) of police for a minimum period of three (3) years, • Bachelor's degree in any of the following fields: Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Human Resource Management, Peace Building Conflict Management, Physical Education, Music, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management, or any other course related to police work, Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Molecular Biology, Chemistry, Analytical Chemistry, Industrial Chemistry, Biochemistry, Microbiology, Public health, Genetics, Computer Science, Electronic Engineering, Forensic Science, Fingerprint Science, Software Engineering, Geographical Information Systems, Information Communication Technology, or any other relevant and equivalent qualification from a recognised institution; OR Diploma in any of the following fields: Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Human Resource Management, Peace Building and Conflict Management, Physical Education, Music, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management, Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Molecular Biology, Chemistry, Analytical Chemistry, Industrial Chemistry, Biochemistry, Microbiology, Public health, Genetics, Computer Science, Electronic Engineering, Forensic Science, Fingerprint Science, Software Engineering, Geographical Information Systems, Information Communication Technology, or any other relevant and equivalent qualification from a recognised institution. • Served for a minimum of three (3) years in senior management and 8 years of service in the National Police Service; • Must have passed all Gazetted Officers exams; • Must have undertaken a Senior Management course lasting not less than four (4) from a recognised institution; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the last six (6) months.
Senior Superintendent of Police	• Served in the rank of Superintendent (SP) of police for a minimum period of three (3) years; • Served for a minimum period of five (5) years in senior management and ten (10) years of service in the National Police Service; • Bachelor's degree in any of the following fields:- Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Human Resource Management,

Rank	Requirements
	Peace Building Conflict Management, Physical Education, Music, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management, or any other course related to police work, Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Molecular Biology, Chemistry, Analytical Chemistry, Industrial Chemistry, Biochemistry, Microbiology, Public health, Genetics, Computer Science, Electronic Engineering, Forensic Science, Fingerprint Science, Software Engineering, Geographical Information Systems, Information Communication Technology, or any other relevant and equivalent qualification from a recognised institution; • Must have undergone either of the following professional courses • Certificate in Strategic Leadership Development Programme lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; • Certificate in Senior Management Course; • Certificate in Strategic Leadership and Command Programme lasting not less than three (3) months from recognised institution; • Shown proven merit and ability in work performance and results; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months.
Commissioner of Police	• Served in the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) for a minimum of three (3) years; • Served for a minimum of five (5) years in senior management and ten (10) years of service in the National Police Service; • Must be in possession of bachelor's degree in any of the following fields: Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Human Resource Management, Peace Building and Conflict Management, Physical Education, Music, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management, or an equivalent qualification from a recognised institution; • Must possess certificate in Strategic Leadership and Command Programme lasting not less than three (3) months or Certificate in Strategic Leadership and Development Programme lasting not less than six (6) weeks or its equivalent from recognised institution. • Demonstrated high degree of professional competence and administrative capability required for effective planning, direction, control and coordination of the National Police function; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report for the past six (6) months.
Assistant Inspector General of Police,	• Served in the rank of Commissioner of Police (CP) for a minimum of three (3) years;

Rank	Requirements
	• Served for a minimum of eight (8) years in senior management and twelve (12) years of service in the National Police Service; • Must be in possession of bachelor's degree in any of the following fields: Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Human Resource Management, Peace Building and Conflict Management, Physical Education, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management, or an equivalent from a recognised Institution; • Must have undergone the following professional courses: National Security and Strategy Course at National Defence College(K); or Strategic Command and Leadership Course; or Certificate in Strategic Leadership and Development Programme; • Demonstrated high degree of professional competence and administrative capability required for effective planning, direction, control and coordination of the National Police function; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six (6) months.
Senior Assistant Inspector General of Police	• Must have served in the rank of Assistant-Inspector General of Police (AIG) for a minimum period of three (3) years; • Must have served for a minimum period of eight (8) years in senior management and twelve (12) years of service in the National Police Service; • Master's degree in any of the following fields: Criminology, Law, Police Science, Education, Security Management and Police Work, Public Administration, Strategic Management, Leadership and Security Management, Human Resource Management, Peace Building and Conflict Management, Physical Education, Media and Public Relations, Sociology, Risk and Disaster Management or an equivalent from a recognised Institution. OR A Bachelor's Degree in any of the following; criminology, law, police science, education, security management and police work, public administration, strategic management, human resource management, peace building and conflict management, physical education, media and public relations, sociology, risk and disaster management, or an equivalent from a recognised institution. • Must have undergone the following professional development courses: • National Security and Strategy Course at National Defence College (K); or • Strategic Leadership and Command Course; or • Certificate in Senior Leadership and Development Programme or its equivalent from a recognised institution; • No disciplinary conviction or adverse report in the past six months.

Appendix 4: Operational Requirements (tools and equipment that requires modernization and upgrading)

Kenya Police Service

- (i) Modern Assault Rifles for each and every officer;
- (ii) Modern and adequate SMGs or short barrelled Rifles for Close Quarter Battle (CQB) suitable for urban and built-up areas operations;
- (iii) Modern and reliable support weapons e.g., RPG7, Multi-Grenade Launchers, Commando Mortars, HMG, GPMGs and LMGs for support purposes in security operations;
- (iv) Sufficient explosive ordinances/bombs and grenades for operations support as well as reliable Small Arms Ammunition;
- (v) Suitable and reliable MRAPs, APCs and specially designed pick-up trucks (Technicals) for reliable and protected mobility in security risk areas;
- (vi) Suitable and reliable crowd management and riot control vehicles and equipment;
- (vii) Suitable and reliable surveillance and assault support Drones for tactical fighting units and specialized forces;
- (viii) Suitable and reliable assault support (Helicopters Gunship);
- (ix) Suitable and reliable Personal Protection Equipment (Ballistic vests, Ballistic Helmets, Anti-Riot Body Protection Armour);
- (x) Any other security operations support equipment e.g., Navigation Equipment, Night Vision Cameras, and Thermal Imagers for night time observation/visual assistance during night operations;
- (xi) Construction of modern simulations rooms with requisite equipment to reduce the cost of training;
- (xii) Procurement of the following modern weapons:

Personal weapons

- (a) Primary & assault weapon (M4 carbine rifle, Gilboa rifle or MZ4P)
- (b) Secondary weapon (GLOCK 19, APX, Barretta pistol).
- (c) Gas guns; for use in room entry during Close Quarter Battle (CQB).

Support weapons;

- (a) DUSHKA HMG
- (b) PKM
- (c) GPMG (CQ7, MGM2, CZ, NEGEV)
- (d) M107 Sniper Rifle
- (e) 60MM Commando Mortar
- (f) RPG 7
- (g) 81MM Mortar

Appendix 5 Acquisition of modern equipment

S/No.	Item Description	
1.	Surveillance Drones	
2.	Assault Support Drones	
3.	Thermo Imaging Cameras	
4.	Night Vision Goggles	
5.	Binoculars (Nikon 10x42 Aculon A211)	
6.	Hf Radio (Envoy Codan Base Station) (Type 2310 And 2230)	
7.	Hf Mobile Codan Radios	
8.	Hf Manpack Codan Radio (2110)	
9.	Hf Barret Radio 4000	
10.	Vhf (Pocket Phones) Vx Std-264 Series	
11.	Vhf (Pocket Phones) Motorola	
12.	Vhf (Pocket Phones) Huawei (Ep 680, 681, 682 & cv 750)	
13.	Vhf (Espace Radio Phones) Huawei	
14.	Thuraya Satellite Phones (to include ones used in enclosed places)	
15.	GPS & Updated Maps	
16.	Computers & Printers	
17.	Mobile Phones	
18.	CCTV Cameras	
19.	Hand Drilling Bits Makita B-49373	
20.	WEP 995d-Hot Air Soldering Gun	
21.	Solar Panel (120 Watts & 345 Watts)	
22.	Solar Charge Controller	
23.	Smart solar Charge Controller Vitron Energy (MPPT 150/70-Tr)	
24.	Soldering Iron Weller (Whs40d)	
25.	Digital Telephone Heads (Kx-T7665)	
26.	Analogue Telephone Heads (Kx-T2371mxw)	
27.	Solar Battery Free Maintenance (100ah & 200ah)	
28.	Drop Wire (Standard) 500m	
29.	Inverter 500w & Inverter (Vitron Energy Phoenix 24v/1200w)	
30.	Integrated Street Lights	
	Item description	Approx. Quantity Required
1.	Assault rifles 7.62 x 51mm (mpt76 – sh)	2,000
2.	Assault rifle 7.62 x 39mm (CZ Bren 2)	2,000
3.	Assault rifle 5.56 x 45mm (m4, cmz4, sar56)	2,000
4.	Sub-Machine Gun 9x19mm (Scorpion Berreta, Berreta PMX, Samurai Stribog)	4,000
5.	FN P90 5.7x28mm	300
6.	81mm mortar	100
7.	60mm COMMANDO MORTAR	100
8.	RPG 7v Launcher (ATGL-l 40mm)	100
9.	Dushka HMG (12.7 x 108mm)	100
10.	GPMG (AKM, CQ7, MGM2, PKM)	600
11.	LMG (NEGEV, CZMG, FN MINIMI)	400
12.	MULTI GRENADE LAUNCHER (MSG-L 40 x 46MM)	400
13.	Auto pistol (Glock, Beretta APX, czp10) 9mm	3,000
14.	Multi-purpose riot gun 37/38mm	2,000
15.	M107 sniper rifle	50
	Ammunition	
1.	12.7x108mm API linked	300,000

	Item description	Approx. Quantity Required
2.	5.56×45mm balls	3,000,000
3.	2.7 x 28MM BALLS	200,000
4.	9×19mm parabellum	4,000,000
5.	7.62×51mm linked	3,000,000
6.	7.62×51mm balls	3,000,000
7.	7.62×51mm Blankstar	4,000,000
8.	7.62×39mm balls	3,000,000
9.	5.56 x 45MM BLANKSTAR	1,000,000
10.	7.62 x 39mm Blankstar	1,000,000
11.	9 x 19MM BLANKSTAR	1,000,000
12.	12 bore Superslug	400,000
13.	Sniper ammo(12.7×99mm)	10,000
14.	40×53mm he	10000
15.	60mm he bombs	3,600
16.	60mm smoke	3,600
17.	60mm para illuminating	3,600
18.	81mm h.e bombs	1,800
19.	RPG 40mm heat/AP	6,000
20.	FRG 40mm (AP/heat)	8,000
21.	Hand grenades	8,000
22.	Smoke grenade	3,600
23.	GRENADES 40 x 46 MM (LOW VELOCITY)	8,000
24.	Stun grenades	3,000
25.	Tear gas grenades (model 2020)	100,000
26.	Tear gas 37/38mm cs burning	100,000
27.	Teargas37/38	100,000
28.	37/38 mm rubber bullets	60,000
29.	12-gauge rubber bullets	20,000
30.	Thunder flashes	3,600
31.	Demolition kits(complete)	100
32.	Detonator(non-electric)	2,000
33.	Detonator(electric)	2,000
34.	Safety fuse(metres)	3,000
35.	Demolition blocks (c41/4lb)	6,000
36.	Demolition block (TNT ½lb)	6,000
37.	Det cord(metres)	6,000
38.	Trip flare (complete assembly)	3,000
39.	Light/sound flash grenade	3,000
40.	Blank firing attachment (BFA-AK 47)	800
41.	Blank firing attachment (CMZ4, M4)	400
42.	Anti-riot CS liquid (10 litre drum)	100
Tactical equipment		
1.	Tactical ballistic vests	4,000
2.	Tactical vest police camouflage	20,000
3.	Tactical ballistic helmets	4,000
4.	Tactical thigh holster	2,000
5.	Tactical concealed waist holster	2,000
6.	Tactical shoulder holster with double magazine pouches	1,000
7.	Individual first aid kits (IFAK)	10,000
8.	Mass casualty response kit	150

	Item description	Approx. Quantity Required
9.	Transport helicopters	5
10.	Helicopters gunship	3
11.	Surveillance drones	50
12.	Assault support drones	30
13.	Thermo imaging cameras military specs	300
14.	Night vision gadgets – military specs	300
15.	GPS	300
Crowd management/ anti-riot equipment		
1.	Anti-riot baton	10,000
2.	Anti-riot helmets	10,000
3.	Anti-riot shields	10,000
4.	Hand guard and shin guards	10,000
Gun cleaning materials		
1.	Gun oil (litres)	30,000
2.	Flanelette rolls 4” x 2” x 50 metres	20,000
3.	Gun cleaning solvent (spray)	10,000
4.	Rifle cleaning kit g3	10,000
5.	Rifle cleaning kit universal	10,000
Assorted firearms spare parts and arms accessories		
1.	Spare magazine g3	6,000
2.	Spare magazine ak47	6,000
3.	Spare magazine cz807	3,000
4.	Spare Magazine Beretta ARX 200	3,000
5.	Spare magazine – Gilboa, m4	3,000
6.	Spare magazine Galil ace 52	3,000
7.	Spare magazine SMG Scorpion	3,000
8.	Rifle slings – assorted	50,000
9.	Chest rig triple mag pouches – ak47	4,000
Other equipment		
1.	Hand cuffs – chain link type	5,000
2.	Hand cuffs – hinge type	5,000
3.	Armoury steel boxes with security padlocks (EU standard)	3,000

Transport (Short Term)

Each sub-county to have 1 lorry, each Police Station and Police Post to have a pick up

Type	No. Required	Unit Price	Fuel In Millions	Total M/V Cost In Millions
Pickups	2,140	@7M	317.790	14,980
Lorries	280	@12.5 M	41.580	3,500
Double cab	76	@5.15M	11.286	391.4
Caravan	60	@7.5M	8.910	450
Hearse	2	@8M	0.297	16
Motorcycle [BMW]	49	14@5.0M	2.079	70
Motorcycle [Yamaha, 900cc]		35@2.5M	5.1975	87.5
APC	47	@45M	6.97950	2,115
MRAP	46	@110M	6.831	5,060
Tactical	141	@7M	20.9385	978
Excavator	2	@21M	0.297	42

Type	No. Required	Unit Price	Fuel In Millions	Total M/V Cost In Millions
Recovery vehicle	2	@15M	0.297	30
Buses [62-seater]	14	6@13.156M	0.891	78.936
Mini buses [29/33]		8@4.984M	1.188	39.869
Water bowzers	33	@12M	4.9005	396
Ambulance	5	@6.17M	0.7425	30.85
Total	2,897		424.2645	28,265.555

Medium term

Each Sub-county to have 1 lorry, each Police Station to have 2 pick-ups and a lorry, each Police Post and Patrol base to have a pick up.

Type	No.	Cumulative No.	Unit price	Fuel in millions	Total m/v cost in millions
Pickups	1,994	4,134	@7M	613.899	13,958
Lorries	593	873	@12.5 M	88.0605	7,412.5
Double cab	0	76	@5.15M	11.286	0
Caravan	0	60	@7.5M	8.910	0
Hearse	0	2	@8M	0.297	0
Motorcycles	0	14	14@5.0M	2.079	0
		35	35@2.5M	5.1975	0
APC	0	47	@45M	6.97950	0
MRAP	0	46	@110M	6.831	0
Tactical	0	141	@7M	20.9385	0
Excavator	0	2	@21M	0.297	0
Recovery vehicle	0	2	@15M	0.297	0
Buses & mini buses	0	6	6@13.156M	.891	0
		8	8@4.984M	1.188	0
Water bowzers	0	33	@12M	4.9005	0
Ambulance	0	5	@6.17M	0.7425	0
	2,587			772.794	21,370.5

Long term

Each Sub-county to have 1 lorry, each Police Station to have 3 pick-ups and a lorry, each Police Post and Patrol base to have a pick up.

Type	No.	Cumulative No.	Unit Price	Fuel in Millions	Total M/V Cost in Millions
Pickups	1488	5,622	@7M	834.867	10,416.0
Lorries	0	873	@12.5 M	129.6405	0
Double cab	0	76	@5.15M	11.286	0
Caravan	0	60	@7.5M	8.910	0
Hearse	0	2	@8M	0.297	0
Motorcycles	0	14	14@5.0M	2.079	0
		35	35@2.5M	5.1975	0
APC	0	47	@45M	6.97950	0
MRAP	0	46	@110M	6.831	0

Type	No.	Cumulative No.	Unit Price	Fuel in Millions	Total M/V Cost in Millions
Tactical	0	141	@7M	20.9385	0
Excavator	0	2	@21M	0.297	0
Recovery vehicle	0	2	@15M	0.297	0
Buses & mini buses	0	6	6@13.156M	.891	0
		8	8@4.984M	1.188	0
Water bowzers	0	33	@12M	4.9005	0
Ambulance	0	5	@6.17M	0.7425	0
	1,488	6,972		1,035.342	10,416

4.2 Formations and Units

S/No.	Item/Service	Unit of Issue	QTY
1.	Isuzu 4x4 Lorries (Troop Carriers)	NOS	361
2.	Isuzu Buses (62-Seater)	NOS	6
3.	Isuzu Mini Buses (29/33-Seater)	NOS	8
4.	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick Up (Heavy Duty 4x4, 4000 – 4200 Cc)	NOS	1218
5.	Toyota Land Cruiser Prado	NOS	15
6.	Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV)	NOS	34
7.	Double Cabin Pick Up	NOS	76
8.	Double Cabin Pick Up Dog Carrier	NOS	8
9.	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulances (Heavy Duty 4x4, 4000 – 4200 Cc)	NOS	5
10.	Isuzu 6x4 Water Bowser (15,000 Litres)	NOS	29
11.	Toyota Land Cruiser Hearse (Heavy Duty 4x4, 4000 – 4200 Cc)	NOS	2
12.	Mercedes Benz (1800 Cc)	NOS	15
13.	Motorcycles (BMW)	NOS	30
14.	Motorcycles (Yamaha)	NOS	320
15.	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle	NOS	30
16.	Armoured Personnel Carrier	NOS	30
17.	Tactical Vehicles	NOS	120
18.	Excavators [Cat 320]	NOS	2
19.	Toyota L/C Caravan	NOS	40
20.	Recovery Vehicle	NOS	2
	Total	NOS	2351

Fuel

Requirement at the rate of 30 litres per day per vehicle for 30 days at market rate.

Equipping Central Workshop

The underlisted tools and equipment are required to improve the efficiency of the workshop.

S/No.	Item Description	Technical Specifications
1.	Vehicles Stand (3 Tons)	Capacity- 3tonns Minimum working height – 200mm Maximum working height – 455mm
2.	Vehicles Stand (6 Tons)	Capacity – 6tonns Minimum working height – 245mm Maximum working height – 355mm

S/No.	Item Description	Technical Specifications
3.	Mobile Hydraulic Cranes (3 Tons)	Fixed frame engine crane 3tonns with rollers Lifting capacity – 3tonns Maximum lift – 2720mm
4.	Mechanical Tool Kit	To contain sets of spanners, feelers, and all tools (metric) for both diesel- and petrol-powered modern motor vehicles repair
5.	Electrician Tool Kit	To contain sets of all tools meeting modern mechatronic vehicle repair
6.	Trolley Jack 12 Tons	Capacity – 12tonns Minimum saddle height – 170mm Minimum chassis height – 240mm Length – 1605mm
7.	Mig Welding Equipment	Super MIG welder 30-230a, 5-15kg
8.	Engine Stands	Capacity – 550kg -- 1000kg Width – 845mm 820mm Length – 1000mm – 1105 mm Height – 930mm 910mm
9.	Grease Bucket	Heavy duty direct high pressure manual greasing unit 12.5kg
10.	Portable Angle Grinder (230mm)	Disc size – ø230mm Spindle size – m14x2mm Motor power – 2000w Supply- 230v No. Load speed – 800rpm Weight – 5.5kg
11.	Panel Beating Tool Kit	See attached page shown as 287pc advance auto body tool set
12.	Torque Wrench, ¾ Inch with Protractor	Drive – ¾ inch sq Length – 1230mm Range – 150-800nm(111-590lbft)
13.	Oil Filter Wrench	Oil filter claw wrench ø43-10zmm
14.	Steering Wheel Pulley Set	Steering wheel & harmonic balancer puller (18pcs)
15.	Oil Pressure Tester	Oil pressure test kit 12pc ø65mm gauge with heavy duty cover fitted with quick 90degree coupling adaptors and 1.3m hose pipe
16.	Vehicle Jacks, (Bottle Type) 12 Tons (Telescope)	Capacity – 12tonns Minimum height – 240mm Maximum height – 590mm Hydraulic lift – 270mm Screw ext – 80mm
17.	Vehicle Jacks, (Bottle Type) 15 Tons	Capacity – 15tonns Minimum height – 230mm Maximum height – 497mm Hydraulic lift – 154mm Screw ext – 113mm
18.	Creeper Board	Mechanic's creeper/seat – 6wheels Heavy duty steel frame work with powder code, finish, fitted with six ø60mm smooth rolling castors on ball bearing swivels
19.	Battery Charger	Output – 12/24v Output charger peak (en) – 45a(30a)

S/No.	Item Description	Technical Specifications
		Output start peak (en) – 200a(180a) Battery range – 20-700ah
20.	Telescopic (Magnetic Pick Up) Inspection Mirror	Pick up min/max length – 175/885mm Mirror min/max length- 225/700mm
21.	Digital Multi-Meter	To measure - Ac/dc voltage - Ac/dc current - Resistance - No conduct voltage - Diode test - Continuity - Forward facing work light - Detention NCVD
22.	Automatic Tyre Removing Kit	Wheel diameter min/max Internal clamping – ø11”-20” External clamping – 012”-24” Wheel depth min/max – ø12” (305mm) Turnable diameter – ø26” (660mm) Dead breaking force – 2500kg Tyre inflator – 0-10bar Operating pressure – 8-10bar Motor – 1.1kw
23.	Electronic Wheel Alignment Kit	Four-wheel laser wheel aligner Rim diameters 330mm (13”) -560mm (22”) Supplied with: - steering clamp Portable mounting storage rack with castor wheels, laser alignment heads, wheel alignment hangers dished turning plates electronically controlled
24.	Pressurized Car Washer Equipment	Max. Pressure – 140bar Effective cleaning power- 257bar Water flow – 402l/hr Motor power – 1700w Supply- 230v-13a Total stop system – general Rotor blast nozzle – general Hose length – 5m Weight – 19.5kg
25.	Battery Tester	Digital battery tester with a printer Rated battery voltage – 6/12v Rating systems- din, en, iec, jis, sae Test ranges – 25-130cca din Replacement printer rolls- pack of two
26.	Spot Welder	Supply – 230v Capacity – 1+1mm Max. Absorbed power – 6kw Max. Welding current – 3800a Mains fuse – 16am Duty cycle – 1.5% Insulation class – b Weight – 10.5kg
27.	Transmission Jack	Vertical transmission jack Capacity – 1000kg

S/No.	Item Description	Technical Specifications
		Ram ext. – 1 Max. Saddle height – 1100mm
28.	Hydraulic Hub Puller Set	Chromed heat-treated puller yoke with hydraulic ram suitable for 4 and 5 stud hubs
29.	Cooling System Tester	Heavy duty pressure test and suitable for wipe range of vehicles
30.	Heavy Duty Lazy Tongs Riveter	Nozzle 4.8mm -6.4mm
31.	Piston Rings Compressor Kit 3pcs	Piece 1 – depth – 100m capacity – ø(50-150mm) Piece 2 – depth – 150m capacity – 80mm-150mm Piece 3- depth – 75mm capacity – ø80mm-175mm)
32.	Valve Lifter	Multi-valve spring compressor suitable for use on petrol and diesel engines OHC, OHV and CVH engines jaw(55-350mm)
33.	Gravity Feed Finishing Spray Gun	Professional feed refinishing spray gun 1.8mm set up
34.	Force Feed Oil Cans	Capacity 1000ml
35.	Electronic Battery Charger	Output – 12/24v Output charge peak (en)-60a/40a Battery range – 4-350ah Input charge – 1kw Input start – 6kw BSU supply – 25a-13.5v
36.	Four Way Rim Wrenches	Sizes ½”, 7/8”, 3/4”, 5/8”
37.	Four Way Rim Wrenches	Size 24mm, 27m,32m,38mm
38.	Body Jack Complete with Body Alignment 10 Ton	10tonne hydraulic super snap body repair kit
39.	Gas Welding Twin Hose	4.5 length
40.	Belt Drive Air Compressor	3hp 100lts
41.	Belt Drive Duplex Air Compressor	2stage, 2x2.5hp 3phase
42.	Bench Grinder	Disc diameter 200mm
43.	Metal Turning Lathe	Length 500m
44.	Automotive Diagnosing Oscilloscope	4channel for both EFI, VVTI etc
45.	Fuel Injector Test Device	Gauge 0-145psi 0-1000pa Hanging hook Protective bumper
46.	Lambda Sensor Testor	Tests zirconia, titania sensors and ecu, suitable for 1,2,3 and 4wire sensor
47.	600a AC Clamp Test	600amps
48.	Ø150mm Random Orbital Dual Action Sander	Sander power 600w/230v
49.	Dust Free Sanding Bluck	Stone diameter 70x210mm
50.	Engine Lifting Crane	Folding type – 2tonne
51.	Garp Oil Dispensing	Capacity 20lts
52.	Gear Oil Pump	Capacity 10.5lts
53.	Heavy Duty Direct High Pressure Greasing Bucket 12.5kg	High pressure gun 12.5kg

S/No.	Item Description	Technical Specifications
54.	Hydraulic Press 20tonne	Rectangular frame
55.	Hydraulic Pipe Bender (12tonne, Ø50mm)	Bending capacity – 12tons ø- 50mm
56.	Industrial Hydraulic Pipe Bender with Stand (9tonne, Ø50mm)	Bending capacity – 9t ø- 50mm
57.	Farm Jack 2.5tonne	Tanganyika jack 2.5tonne
58.	Professional Soldering Kit (To Contain 30/100w, Dual Powered Pistol Type Soldering Gun Etc)	30/100w, dual powered pistol type
59.	Electronic Volt Meter	To measure voltage drop electronically
60.	6kg Dry Powder Fire Extinguisher	Capacity 6kg
61.	Pocket Multi-Meter	Ac/dc voltage dc current resistance, continuity
62.	Professional Digital Multi-Meter Ncvd-7 Functions	Digital multi-meter NCVD – 7 functions
63.	Heavy Duty C.I Engineer Vice	Jaw size – 150mm Jaw open – 150mm
64.	Heavy Duty All Steel Vice	Jaw size – 100mm
65.	Dove Tail Hobby Vice	Jaw size – 50mm
66.	Oxyacetylene Welding/Cutting Torch Set	2gauges for bottle and working pressure complete set
67.	Gas Welding Goggles with Flip Up Lense	Heavy duty welding type with flip lenses
68.	Electrical Grease Gun	
69.	2 Hand Grinding Machine	
70.	2 Pop Rivet Gun	
71.	2 Pullers [Jaw Bearing Pullers	

Fleet management

Short Term

Description	Vat	Rate	No. of units	Amount in millions
Provision of fleet management system (fully GSM based)	VAT	28,000/-	2897	81.116
Installation and testing of FMS tracking devices	VAT	1,000/-	2897	2.897
Support and maintenance fleet management system (per annum) VAT exclusive	VAT	19,200/-	2897	55.6224
VAT	16%			22.341664
Total				161.977064

Medium term

Description	VAT	Rate	No. of units	Amount in millions
Provision of Fleet Management System {Fully GSM Based}	vat	28,000/-	2587	72.436
Installation and Testing of Fms Tracking Devices	VAT	1,000/-	2587	2.587
Support and Maintenance Fleet Management System [Per Annum] Vat Exclusive	VAT	19,200/-	2587	49.6704
VAT	16%			19.95094
TOTAL				144.64434

Long term

Description	VAT	rate	No. of units	Amount in million
Provision of Fleet Management System {Fully GSM Based}	vat	28,000/-	1488	41.664
Installation and Testing of FMS Tracking Devices	vat	1,000/-	1488	1.488
Support and Maintenance Fleet Management System [Per Annum] Vat Exclusive	vat	19,200/-	1488	28.5696
VAT	16%			11.475456
TOTAL				83.197056

- The provision of Fleet Management System [FMS] fully GSM based, installation and testing of Fleet Management System tracking devices is a one-off payment.
- Support and maintenance of Fleet Management System is paid annually and VAT exclusive.

Appendix 5: Uniforms distributed to the NPS Officers

5.1 Summary of medium blue uniform distributed since 2018

S/No	Region/formation	Ceremonial dress	M/blue trousers & shirts	Medium blue t-shirts	M/blue jackets	M/blue great coats	M/blue rain coat	M/blue jersey
1	NPS Headquarters	59	1,215	397	556	120	185	176
2	KPS Headquarters	614	5,404	3,384	2,531	523	1,291	847
3	NPC Kiganjo Main Campus	1,364	5,626	4,092	2,114	1,200	700	700
4	NPSSSC Loresho	339	435	158	157	120	70	160
5	Police Air Wing	47	129	112	91	-	40	25
6	KAPU	120	3,086	1,982	1,327	400	702	759
7	PEU	156	1,480	367	172	340	213	226
8	IAU	14	282	152	56	75	50	155
9	TPU		661	538	54	90	140	144
10	DCI	220	1,161	762	373	350	296	413
11	DPU	131	973	700	456	390	190	290
12	GSU QM Stores		194		86			86
13	K-9 Police Unit	58	639	192	199	-	179	316
14	CDT RAILWAYS	146	2,054	1,472	2,498	350	838	824
15	CDT [TRAFFIC]	191	1,561	621	481	612	342	300
16	Coast	596	6,837	2,857	356	-	655	377
17	Nairobi Area	627	18,684	13,859	2,534	750	2,915	1,835
18	Western	386	5,183	2,576	332	107	596	709
19	Nyanza	374	5,646	2,047	372	170	582	701
20	Central	371	9,543	4,646	1,656	1,608	812	1,258

S/No	Region/formation	Ceremonial dress	M/blue trousers & shirts	Medium blue t-shirts	M/blue jackets	M/blue great coats	M/blue rain coat	M/blue jersey
21	Rift Valley	651	11,872	4,213	2,315	1,210	866	1,434
22	Eastern	389	13,536	6,237	793	670	1,074	1,328
23	North eastern	141	665	376	114	5	111	97
	Total Issued	6,994	96,866	51,740	19,623	9,090	12,847	13,160
	Total Required	64,282	128,564	128,564	128,564	64,282	64,282	64,282
	Gap	57,288	31,698	76,824	108,941	55,192	51,435	51,122

5.2: Status of distribution of the new General Duty Police uniform to members of the Service

	Item	Total No. of Officers	Scale of Issue	Total Cost (KSh.)	Total No. of Officers Kitted	Pending Officers to be Kitted	Cost of Officers Pending to be Kitted
1	Medium blue trouser/ shirt	64,282	2 Pairs	368,335,860	35,947	28,335	162,359,550
2	Medium blue T-shirt	64,282	2 Pieces	51,425,600	25,400	38,882	23,329,200
3	Medium jacket	64,282	2 Pieces	412,047,620	6,242	58,040	360,915,936
4	Midnight blue ceremonial dress	64,282	1 Pair	748,047,062.70	6,578	57,704	671,499,138
	Total			1,579,856,142.70			1,218,103,824

5.3 Summary of medium blue uniform distributed since 2021

S/No.	Item	QUANTITY
1	Ceremonial dress	578
2	Medium blue shirts/trousers	3,894
3	Medium blue T-shirts	799
4	Medium blue jackets	433
5	Medium blue great coats	0
6	Medium blue rain coats	309
7	Medium blue jersey	409

Appendix 8: NPS Modernisation Programme (Modernisation Fund 2024 – 2035)

S/No.	Priority Programme Activities/Projects	Implementing/ Lead Agency
1	Construction of Non-Residential Buildings, i.e., Police Stations, Outposts, Camps, Sub-County Police HQs, Firing Range, etc.	NPS
2	Construction of Residential Buildings i.e., Quarters for Lower Constables, Upper Cadre (Inspectors and Commissioners).	NPS
3	Mobility, i.e., Heavy vehicles (Trucks), Medium vehicles (4 x4), Buses, two wheelers (car/ s/wagon), Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) Mobile Screening Vehicle fitted with scanning machine, etc.	NPS
4	Weaponry/Arms, i.e., 9mm automatic pistols, 9mm SMG, 7.62 SLRS, Target rifles 7.62mm, AK-47 rifles, GPMG 7.62mm, Anti-Riot Guns, Sniper Rifles C and W case and telescope, 5.56mm Assault rifles, Multipurpose Riot gun MPRG 1 land2", Pistol Signal 1-1/2" etc.	NPS
5	Ammunition/Munitions, i.e., 5.56 SA ball, 5.56 blank, 7.62 x 39mm	NPS

S/No.	Priority Programme Activities/Projects	Implementing/ Lead Agency
	ball, 7.62 SA ball BDR, 7.62 SA ball blank, 9 x 19mm Balls, Rubber bullets, Demolition Block H.E, Bomb illuminating 60mm, Plastic Explosives PE, Trip Flare Wire, Bomb Disposal Suits, etc.	
6	Police Personnel Kitting, i.e., Police uniforms.	NPS
7	Running and Maintenance, i.e., Fuel and Lubricants, Maintenance.	NPS
8	Utilities, i.e., Water and Electricity.	NPS
9	Office Furniture and Equipment, i.e., Furniture, Computers & Accessories, Assorted Cabinets.	NPS
10	Critical Police Stationary i.e., Paralegals Documents & Stationery	NPS
11	Police Animals, i.e., Procurement, Health and Maintenance, Training.	NPS
12	Police Equipment, i.e., Bomb Disposal Kits, Mine Detectors & Motion Sensors, Digital Cameras, Minesweepers, Explosive detector, Fingerprint Biometric Scanner, Snake Camera Recorder, Movable Barricades, Reflective Hand Gloves, Hand held Metal Detectors, Binoculars, APFIS Networking and Servers, etc.	NPS
13	Communication, i.e., Static Set (HF), Static Sets (VHF/UHF), Tetra Handheld Sets, Solar Panel 80 Watts, GSM Monitoring and Tracking System, etc.	NPS
14	Training Infrastructure, i.e., Forensic Training Lab, Training Gyms, Auditoriums, Assault or Obstacle infrastructure, Modern Training Lecture Rooms with Audio Visual Facilities (Fully Equipped) etc.	NPS
15	Equipment for Special Branches/Intelligence Gathering i.e., Bugging and Debugging Devices, Portable X-Ray Scanner, Minute Sound Hearing Transmitter, Intelligence Analytical Software ibase 2 (extension to 5 counties) etc.	NPS
16	Equipping of Forensic Laboratory.	NPS
17	Community Policing and Partnership, i.e., Supporting County Policing Authorities, Implementation of Community Police Partnerships Programme, Police Culture, Attitude and Change Management Training, National Police Service Corporate Communication and Image Building, Police Stations & Posts Facelift (Painting, Signage and Direction Sign Boards.	NPS
18	Police Recruitment and Training, i.e., Recruit Allowances, Curriculum Materials, Recruit Internship, Food and Rations.	NPS
	GRAND TOTAL	NPS

Appendix 6: List of details of recent disasters experienced in Kenya since 2008

Year	Type of disaster	Region/County	Magnitude
2008	Floods	Rift valley, Kitale, Makueni, Mwala/Kibwezi, Bundalang'i	24 people killed 2,396 people affected
2010	Floods Landslides	Budalang'i, Tana River, Turkana Mt. Elgon Samburu	73 people killed 14,585 people affected 3000 people buried; Property worth millions destroyed
2011	Drought	Garissa, Isiolo, Wajir, Mandera,	4.3 million people were in dire need of food

Year	Type of disaster	Region/County	Magnitude
		Mombasa, Marsabit, Nairobi, Turkana, Samburu Turkana	
2012	Drought	Widespread	3.75 million people in dire of food by July 2012
2012	Floods	Nyanza, Western	84 people killed 30,000 people affected 10 people killed, 10,000 people displaced
	Landslides	Elgeyo Marakwet County	
2012	Four hand grenades hurled at Machakos bus station in Nairobi	Machakos	6 people killed
2012	Suspected Al-Shabaab militants kill six people in Gerille camp, Wajir District and kidnapped two government officials.	Lamu	6 people killed
2012	Road Accident (Two minibuses collided)	Kisumu- Kakamega Highway	26 people killed
	Boda boda Accidents	Country wide	415 people killed 1985 people injured
2012	Twin church attacks in Garissa town	Garissa	17 people killed
2013	Floods	Tana River County	82,000 people displaced
	Landslides	Nyeri, Murang'a, Kisii	2,000 people displaced
2013	Road accident	Ntulele, Narok	42 people killed 44 people injured
2013	Armed gunmen attacked the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi	Nairobi	69 people killed
2014	Floods	Narok Town, Nairobi City	Property and infrastructure destroyed
	Landslides	Murang'a County	
2014	Suspected Al-Shabaab militia attacks Mpeketoni	Lamu	50 people killed
	Suspected Al-Shabaab militants attacked and killed a further 36 quarry workers		36 people killed 28 people killed
	Gunmen attacked a bus traveling from Mandera to Nairobi		48 people killed
	Suspected Al-Shabaab militants launched a major assault on a police station, hotels and government offices in Kenyan coast		
2015	Floods	Widespread	15 people killed 10,000 people displaced Infrastructure destroyed
2015	Cholera outbreak	21 counties in Kenya	131 people killed 6529 reported cases

Year	Type of disaster	Region/County	Magnitude
2015	Building collapsing	Kiambu, Nairobi Mombasa	21 reported cases 299 people killed 670 people injured
2015	Suspected Al-Shabaab militants attacked Garissa University College	Garissa County	147 people killed
2018	Fire	Nairobi	15 people killed 70 people injured
2019	Floods Landslide	Most parts of the country	18,000 people displaced countrywide 120 people killed
2019	Building collapsing	Nairobi Kiambu Kajiado Machakos, Kakamega Mombasa	32 reported cases 87 people killed 103 people injured
2019	Dusit D2 terror attack	Nairobi	21 people killed 30 people injured
2020	Covid-19 pandemic	Major cities and Towns in Kenya	343, 955 reported cases 337, 309 people recovered 5,689 people killed
2021	Floods Landslides	Tana River, Busia, Kisumu, Garissa, Marsabit	4,493 households (26,958 people) people displaced
2021	Fuel tanker exploded killing 13 people in Gem,	Siaya County	13 people killed 32 people injured
2021	Drought	Most parts of the Country	Over 2.8 million people were facing food insecurity by December 2021
2022	Floods	Nyanza, Wester, Eastern	Over 980,000 people affected
2022	Seven vehicles reduced to ashes in Mai Mahiu tanker explosion	Nakuru	5 people killed 7 people injured
2022	Fire blazes	Kiambu Nairobi	12 reported cases 21 people killed 92 people injured
2023	Cholera outbreak	Garissa Mandera Nairobi Kajiado Kiambu Machakos Mombasa	10,886 reported cases
2023	Fuel tank accidents	Molo Nairobi Webuye Eldoret	12 reported cases 111 people killed 200 people injured
2023	Four people died after an oil tanker was involved in a road accident with a matatu in Magut	Uasin Gishu	4 people killed

Appendix 7: List of requirements for NDMU

The NDMU is inadequately staffed, not well-equipped, and is generally not well-resourced financially to undertake its mandate effectively. It requires a pool of well-trained personnel in different field of DRM. These include:

- (a) Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN)
- (b) Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)
- (c) Air and Maritime Search and Rescue Mission Coordination (SARMC)
- (d) Incident Command System (ICS)
- (e) Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Disaster Risk Management (DRM)
- (f) Improvised and Explosive Devices (IED)
- (g) Emergency Operation Centre (EOC)
- (h) Sign Language
- (i) Extrication
- (j) Medical (Nurse) and Emergency Medical Technician (EMT)
- (k) Articulated Machine Mechanics and Drivers
- (l) Experts in Management of the Dead during disasters

Generally, there is lack of basic tools and equipment for the NDMU. Currently the NDMU has the following assets:

- (a) One transport vehicle (Ford Ranger p/up-single cabin) for day-to-day operation.
- (b) Five-acre piece of land at National Police Service Embakasi 'B' Campus ready for development
- (c) Two sets of heavy-duty extrication machine which requires two separate vehicles for mobility, and
- (d) GSM Police radio communication and additional long-range communication equipment.

The NDMU require the following tooling and equipment:

Communication

- (a) HF sets
- (b) VHF mobile sets
- (c) VHF base station sets
- (d) VHF Radio repeater
- (e) Pocket phone radios

Transport/Search and Rescue Equipment

- (a) Aircraft (Rotocraft)
- (b) Lorries 4x4
- (c) Land cruisers
- (d) Nissan Urvan
- (e) Mini-bus 25-seater
- (f) Incident command vehicle c/w accessories
- (g) Firefighting motor cycles
- (h) Ambulance
- (i) Heavy duty stand-by-generator trailer
- (j) Fire engines
- (k) Water bowser
- (l) Recovery vehicle heavy duty
- (m) Truck forklifts
- (n) Low loader vehicles
- (o) Excavator
- (p) Earth mover
- (q) Grader 120G c/w accessories
- (r) Bull dozer D6 heavy duty

Equipment

- (a) Fire extinguishers dry powder
- (b) Fire extinguishers CO2
- (c) Fire extinguishers waterloo
- (d) Crime scene sealing tapes
- (e) Strobe lights
- (f) Explosive detectors
- (g) Digital cameras
- (h) Life detectors
- (i) Drones
- (j) Bullet proof vests
- (k) Bullet proof jackets
- (l) Fireproof aprons (Nomex)
- (m) Reflective vests
- (n) Reflective jackets
- (o) Eye protective goggles

- (p) Industrial helmets
- (q) Life saver jackets
- (r) Gloves heavy duty
- (s) Fire proof blankets
- (t) Water proof torches
- (u) Gas masks c/w accessories
- (v) Safety boots
- (w) Surgical gloves
- (x) Body bags
- (y) Spine board and head immobilizer
- (z) Stretchers (f/aid)
- (aa) First Aid boxes c/w refills
- (bb) Night vision goggles
- (cc) Anti-trauma scoop stretchers
- (dd) Chain saw c/w accessories 2.5 Hp
- (ee) Ear muffs
- (ff) Ear plugs
- (gg) Firefighting boots
- (hh) Firefighting gloves
- (ii) Portable foam generators
- (jj) Expandable ladders
- (kk) Chemical protection unit
- (ll) Siren manual
- (mm) Loud hailer
- (nn) Metal detectors
- (oo) Gas detectors
- (pp) Basic radiation measuring device portable
- (qq) Diving suits
- (rr) Diving fins
- (ss) Diving boots
- (tt) Metal cutters
- (uu) Pry bar
- (vv) Hacksaw blades

PART III:KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

CHAPTER ELEVEN: LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

11.1 Introduction

1008. The Kenya Prisons Service (KPS) has received the least attention in terms of reforms in all the institutions in the criminal justice sector. Prior to the Taskforce, the Service was the subject of other official reviews including: The Presidential Committee on Terms and Conditions of Service for the Police Force, the Administration Police Force and Prisons Service (Ominde Committee) of 1987; The Report of the Presidential Committee on Review of Terms and Conditions of Service for the Kenya Police Force, the Administration Police Force, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service, August 4, 1997; and the Report of the High Level Committee on the Prisons Crisis of July, 2008 (the Madoka Report).
1009. Unlike NPS, KPS reforms have largely remained out of public discussions, except when serious incidents have occurred in the institution. This is partly why little is known about the progress of reforms and challenges confronting the Service.
1010. The Taskforce reviewed the reports of previous committees, received oral and written memoranda from members and the leadership of KPS, various stakeholders and the public in relation to the Service. In particular, the Taskforce held consultations with members and officers of all KPS cadres across the country. The Taskforce also visited prisons in all the 47 counties and saw first-hand the working and living conditions of the officers as well as the situation of inmates, who form part of the working environment for the KPS officers.
1011. The Taskforce notes that some positive changes have taken place in KPS over the years. The adoption of an “Open Door Policy” in 2001, in the hitherto closed KPS, paved the way for reforms, transparency, and critical partnerships. The promulgation of the Constitution in 2010 laid the foundation for the enactment of the Persons Deprived of Liberty Act, 2014, which protects the rights of prisoners.
1012. However, the reform journey in KPS remains incomplete due to patchwork implementation of recommendations of previous reports. It is indeed scandalous that KPS still relies on outdated laws such as the Prisons Act, 1977; the Borstal Institutions Act, 1963; and the Kenya Prisons Service Standing Orders of 1979 to run its operations. These laws and regulations are not only obsolete, but are also not aligned to the Constitution in letter and spirit.
1013. The Taskforce noted the dire situation in KPS where, unlike NPS, no modernisation plan has been put in place. Most of the issues identified for action through implementation of recommendations in previous reports remain unaddressed and KPS reforms have generally stagnated. The Service has also had an annual average funding deficit of about 40 per cent since 2008, which has affected its institutional development.
1014. The Taskforce encountered dedicated but disillusioned KPS officers performing their duties under very difficult working and living conditions. Low pay, poor working and living conditions, outdated tools and equipment and lack of support for welfare concerns, among other factors were cited as the main causes for inefficiency and low morale.
1015. Members of the Taskforce were shocked by the horrendous housing situation of KPS officers. Some officers live in tents erected in prison compounds while others with families are accommodated in halls where they share the available limited space, with just bed sheet curtains separating one family from another. In some cases, officers have

erected makeshift iron-sheet houses, while others live in condemned structures. The conditions can only be described as inhumane and degrading, and an outrage to any claim to professional treatment.

1016. Excessive crowding in prison facilities and the high number of remand inmates, coupled with inadequate allocation of funds have negatively impacted working and living conditions in prisons. In the prisons visited, members of the Taskforce observed that inmates and remand detainees lacked the most basic personal supplies. There are obvious challenges in the supply of prison uniform, because prisoners were observed wearing tattered uniforms of questionable quality while others totally lack them. This, it was observed, compels some inmates to remain indoors. In some cases, convicted inmates wore personal civilian clothes, which in itself constitutes a risky practice that can aid escape. This situation facilitates inmates' idle stay in the accommodation blocks since they cannot participate fully in the rehabilitation programmes outside the compound.
1017. The Taskforce notes that the Service has large tracts of land that should have been well utilised to ensure that the Service is self-sufficient in food supply. Prisons farms have been run down due to lack of resources as well as poor management and corruption.
1018. The Taskforce found it outrageous that the situation remains similar to what the Madoka Committee established some 15 years ago. This is because the problems bedevilling KPS are systemic and structural in nature, and require urgent attention and decisive action if any meaningful changes are to occur in KPS.

11.2 Governance and Leadership Concerns

A crisis of leadership

1019. The Taskforce agrees with the assessment and conclusion of the Madoka Committee that poor leadership is the genesis of the problems bedevilling KPS. In its Report, the Committee noted that **“the problem with Kenya Prisons Service is not lack of funding. The considered opinion of the Committee is that the crisis in prisons is caused by failure of leadership and command. This may explain why corruption is a pandemic that has virtually eaten away the soul of the prisons service.”**
1020. The Madoka Committee recommended a change in the KPS leadership to promote reforms in the Service. The committee recommended that the top leadership of the Service be picked from outside KPS to give the institution a clean break with the past.
1021. Table 10.1 shows the Commissioner Generals of Prisons since 2008. From 2008-2019, the Commissioner General was Isaya SM Osugo CBS, from the Kenya Police Service; Wycliffe O Ogallo, CBS, former Secretary in National Government Administration (Interior) led the Service from 2019 to 2021 and Brig (Rtd.) John K Warioba, EBS, has been at the helm of the Service from 2021 to date. All the Commissioner Generals of Prisons since 2008 to date have been appointed from outside KPS.

Table 11. 1: Commissioner General of Prisons since 2008

S/No.	Name	Remarks
1	Isaya S.M. Osugo, C.B.S.	(2008 – 2019) Kenya Police Service
2	Wycliffe O. Ogallo, C.B.S.	(2019 – 2021) Secretary, National Government Administration, Interior
3	Brig (Rtd.) John K. Warioba, E.B.S.	(2021 -) Brigadier Retired, Kenya Defence Forces

1022. While the Madoka Committee prescribed external leadership as a panacea to the challenges in KPS, new leadership has always encountered internal entrenched interests, which benefit from outdated laws and systems and are keen to preserve the *status quo*. The challenges to the leadership manifest in the form of capture of any new leadership or internal resistance to any reform in the Service.
1023. The Taskforce was informed that the KPS senior leadership is largely disconnected from the daily realities of junior officers. For instance, the Taskforce established many cases of senior leadership members allocating themselves houses, even in stations where they do not operate from, while junior officers in the same stations live in deplorable conditions and in substandard rental houses a distance away from their work stations.
1024. The Taskforce was, for example, informed that in Nairobi area, staff at the KPS headquarters are allocated houses within the various quarters in prisons, which end up disadvantaging prison-based officers expected to occupy those houses. It was also reported that others who have moved out of stations on transfer still hold on to allocated houses, thus occasioning majority of the station staff to live outside the quarters.
1025. Reluctance or failure by ministry and the KPS leadership to review the Prisons Act is the starkest illustration of why reforms in the institution have consistently failed. There are several provisions of the current Act, albeit outdated, that would have promoted reforms if the leadership was interested in their implementation. However, these have also been ignored by successive leaderships of the Service.
1026. The responsibility for leadership failure in KPS is shared by successive top leaders and the State Department for Correctional Services in the Ministry of Interior and National Administration, which has retained control of KPS over the years. The Taskforce notes that the Commissioner-General of Prisons (CGP) is not the Accounting Officer for KPS. That function has remained with the Principal Secretary in charge of Correctional Services at the Ministry of Interior. The Taskforce is of the view that this arrangement is what fuels the blame games between KPS leadership and the Ministry of Interior over who is responsible for the Service's perennial failures, and camouflages the lack of interest in undertaking comprehensive changes in the Service.
1027. The Taskforce has noted that the appointment of the current Commissioner-General has kindled optimism that he could be a reform champion, and it therefore presents the opportunity for addressing many of the leadership challenges the Service faces.

Endemic corruption

1028. The Taskforce was informed during public hearings and deliberations with stakeholders that corruption deeply permeates every aspect of KPS: From recruitment, promotions and transfers to procurement. In their submissions, KPS officers pointed out that recruitment is mired in corruption, and that prison officers' jobs are simply "bought" by those who can afford. The officers asserted, and the Taskforce concurs, that corruption is sanctioned, accepted and facilitated as a way of running the entire Service.
1029. The Taskforce notes that overall, laws, policies, procedures, guidelines and procedures are in place to address corruption. However, there is little to show in terms of results for these processes and procedures in the KPS. It is clear that the only way to address the entrenched scourge of corruption is for the leadership to take responsibility and lead on implementation.

Lack of effective oversight

1030. Part of the reason that previous recommendations have not been implemented is the lack of proper external oversight mechanisms for KPS. KPS remains largely invisible in comparison to other criminal justice agencies such as NPS. It is instructive, for instance, that the Prisons Act, section 20(1)(c), provides for the establishment a Prisons Council that would consider all questions affecting the welfare and efficiency of the Service and provide a measure of oversight and supervision. However, this Council has never been constituted in spite of the recommendation by the Madoka Committee. As a result, there is no effective oversight of the leadership of the Service.
1031. The poor demarcation of functions, roles and powers between the CGP and the Principal Secretary responsible for Correctional Services has contributed to the leadership challenges in the Service. The development of various policies and management instruments has stagnated or stalled as a result. The Taskforce was informed that there are many instances where corruption incidents could not be effectively investigated on account of this lack of clarity of roles.
1032. To ensure clarity of roles and functions in the top leadership of the Service, and also to promote accountability and oversight, the Taskforce is of the view that the Prisons Council, which is provided for in the Prisons Act, be restructured and operationalized to manage the human resources functions of the Service, which are currently under the Public Service Commission but with the changes provided hereunder.

Recommendations

1033. To address the governance and leadership concerns in the Service, the Taskforce recommends that:
- (a) The Prisons Council of KPS should be restructured to comprise of:
 - (i) A chairperson who shall have the same qualifications as those of a Supreme Court Judge;
 - (ii) The Principal Secretary for Finance or a representative;
 - (iii) A representative of Public Service Commission;
 - (iv) The PS Correctional Services; and
 - (v) The Commissioner General of Prisons, who shall be the Secretary to the Council.
 - (b) Given the importance of the Service in the justice system, and to attract a competent council, the chairperson and members should be paid a competitive retainer and sitting allowances, determined by the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with SRC;
 - (c) The Taskforce notes that for most of its history, and since the 2008 crisis, the Commissioner-General of Prisons has been recruited from outside the Service. During its deliberations with internal stakeholders, the Taskforce noted that this practice created low morale among serving officers of the Service. To address their legitimate concerns, the Taskforce recommends that the restructured Prisons Council (as proposed) should be vested with the power to carry out a transparent, and competitive recruitment process of the CGP that is open to external candidates as well as qualified members of the Service;

- (d) To support the CGP and to strengthen senior leadership of the Service, the Taskforce recommends that the Directors of Farms and Industries should be experienced persons who possess technical expertise in their respective fields;
 - (e) To accord the Service and the CGP the necessary stature and independence, the Taskforce recommends that the CGP should be designated as a state officer through legislative amendment; and
 - (f) To ensure effective and accountable leadership of the Service, the CGP should be designated as the Accounting Officer of the Service.
1034. The Taskforce notes that while the Madoka Committee prescribed external leadership as a panacea to the challenges in KPS, new leadership has always encountered entrenched internal interests that benefit from outdated laws and systems and are keen to preserve the *status quo*. Challenges to the leadership manifest in the form of capture of any new leadership or resistance to progressive reform.
1035. The Taskforce was informed, and established, that in many cases, operations in the Service have, on many occasions, been run and handled unprofessionally, given the high levels of nepotism and corruption in recruitment into the Service. To address this and to disrupt these networks, the Taskforce recommends that Parliament immediately enacts a law that will provide for an independent body, appointed by the President to carry out a fresh vetting of all serving officers of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Prisons (SSP) and above; (save for the current CGP) within 6 months of publication of this Report.
1036. There is need for KPS as a disciplined Service to operate professionally pursuant to the constitutional principles on independence and neutrality of such Services and the public service in general. The continued blurring of roles undermines these constitutional imperatives. The Taskforce recommends, therefore, that the role of the Ministry of Interior be clearly spelt out as follows:
- (a) The Cabinet Secretary and the State Department for Correctional Services shall be responsible for: Providing policy guidelines to the Service; monitoring and evaluating the performance of the functions of the Service; inspecting the facilities of the Service; and facilitating the involvement of the public in the activities of the Service; and
 - (b) In pursuit of the foregoing, the Cabinet Secretary shall set up an inspectorate for purposes of monitoring compliance with policies, and establish a Prisons Reform Unit for ensuring continuous and sustainable KPS reforms. The Cabinet Secretary shall also develop guidelines on the promotion of human rights by the Service and, in particular, making prisons accessible to oversight actors and equipped to enable them to support child protection, persons with disabilities, and persons with special needs.
 - (c) To address the issue of corruption, the Taskforce recommends that the KPS should review its anti-corruption and prevention of bribery procedures and policies to ensure they are effective in preventing corruption. The KPS should seek assistance from the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to put mechanisms in place to implement anti-corruption measures and policies in the Service.
 - (d) To address complaints of mismanagement of Magereza SACCO, The Taskforce recommends that the CGP should engage Saccos Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) to investigate the current challenges of Magereza SACCO and take appropriate action.

CHAPTER TWELVE: STRUCTURAL AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

12.1 Introduction


1037. The State Department for Correctional Services falls under the Ministry of Interior and National Administration as per Executive Order No. 1 of January, 2023. The State Department comprises of two technical departments namely: Kenya Prisons Service and the Probation and Aftercare Services, supported by General Administration and Planning Services. Previously, the two technical departments were domiciled under the then Office of the Vice President and Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage. Correctional Services, as provided in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, is a National Government function.
1038. The Kenya Prisons Service is headed by the Commissioner-General of Prisons (CGP) who, through the Principal Secretary, is responsible to the Cabinet Secretary for the smooth running of the Service. It is a key department within the Ministry of Interior and National Administration.
1039. The mandate of the State Department for Correctional Services is derived from Executive Order No. 1 of 2023, and includes:
- (a) Correctional Services;
 - (b) Policy for Reform of Penal Justice System;
 - (c) Prisons Enterprise;
 - (d) Development of Administrative Policies for Borstal Institutions and Facilities for Incarcerated Minors;
 - (e) Probation Services;
 - (f) Treatment of Young Offenders in Borstal Institutions and the Youth Corrective Training Centre; and
 - (g) Provision of facilities for children aged four (4) years and below accompanying their mothers to Prison.
1040. As a uniformed and disciplined entity, KPS is established under the Prisons Act, Cap. 90 and the Borstal Institutions Act, Cap. 92 of the Laws of Kenya. The Prisons Act regulates Kenyan prisons and provides for Youth Corrective Training Centres and for the organisation, discipline, powers, and duties of prison officers and matters incidental thereto. The Act also provides for the composition and administration of the Service, offences by prison officers and disciplinary procedures, the establishment and control of prisons, admission, control and discharge of prisoners, and offences by prisoners and disciplinary procedures.
1041. To assist in effective governance of the prisons, the Service is comprised of the following 13 directorates: Administration and Personnel; Operations; Standards, Compliance and Public Relations; Prison Enterprises; Farms; Commandant Prisons Staff Training College; Gender, NGOs and Sports; Planning and Development; Legal, Human Rights, Research and Statistics; Logistics; Human Resource; Rehabilitation and Welfare; and Directorate of Health. The Services' terms and conditions of service are guided by the following laws, regulations and policies:

- (a) The Constitution of Kenya, 2010;
- (b) The Public Service Commission Act, 2017;
- (c) The Prisons Act, 1977;
- (d) The Borstal Institutions Act, 1964;
- (e) The Employment Act, 2007;
- (f) The Pensions Act, Cap 189;
- (g) Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual for the Public Service, 2016;
- (h) The Kenya Prisons Service Standing Orders, 1979;
- (i) The Scheme of Service for Uniformed Prisons Personnel, 2014;
- (j) Guidelines on Establishment and Abolition of Offices in the Public Service, 2015;
- (k) Human Resource Development Policy for the Public Service, 2015;
- (l) Guidelines on Secondment in the Public Service, 2016;
- (m) Guidelines for Staff Performance Appraisal System (SPAS) in the Public Service, 2016;
- (n) Induction Handbook for the Public Service, 2017;
- (o) Guidelines on Managing Training in the Public Service, 2017;
- (p) Human Resource Planning and Succession Management Strategy for the Public Service, 2017;
- (q) Salaries and Remuneration Commission Job Description Manual for Kenya Prisons Service, Volume One, 2017;
- (r) Framework for Short Term Employment in Public Service, 2019;
- (s) Discipline Manual for the Public Service, 2022;
- (t) Salaries and Remuneration Commission (Remuneration and Benefits of State and other Public Officers) Regulations, 2022;
- (u) Kenya Prisons Service Strategic Plan, 2018-2022;
- (v) Policy on Care of Children of Incarcerated Mothers, 2022-2030;
- (w) Correctional Services Policy, 2022;
- (x) KPS, HIV and AIDS Workplace Policy, 2014; and
- (y) KPS, Alcohol and Drug and Substance Abuse Policy, 2011.

12.2 Administrative framework in Kenya Prisons Service

1042. The Service has 13 directorates, including the Commandant, Prisons Staff Training College. In addition, there are offices of the Head of Prisons Health Services and Administrative Secretary, who head health services and civilian support staff, respectively.

Figure 12. 1: The Prisons system organogram



Source: KPS Submissions

NOTES:

	INTEL	Intelligence		D/WEL	Director Welfare
	DCGP, ADMIN	Deputy Commissioner General Administration		H/SERVICES	Health Services
	DCGP, TECH	Deputy Commissioner General of Prisons Technical		S/WEL	Social Welfare
	S/AS	Senior Administration Secretary		G/COUNS	Guidance and Counselling
	D/A	Director Administration			
	D/OP	Director Operations		SPIRITUAL	Spiritual Welfare
	D REH	Director Rehabilitation		SPORTS	Sports Coordinator
	D/WEL	Director Welfare		F/EDU	Formal Education
	D/ REFORMS	Director Reforms		ACU	Aids Control Unit
	D/HR&D	Director Human Resource and Development		D/ REFORMS	Director Reforms

	M/POWER	Manpower		LEGAL	Legal Section
	TRAINING/D	Training and Development		STATS	Statistics Section
	REG	Central Registries		RESEARCH	Research Section
	GEND	Gender		COMPLAINS	Complaint Section
	PUBLIC REL	Public Relations		HRIGHT	Human Rights Section
	DISCIPLINE	Discipline		D/HR&D	Director Human Resource and Development
	CMDT	Commandant –PSTC		FINA	Finance
	INITIAL T	Initial Training		ACC.	Accounts
	DEV COURS	Development Courses		CE	Chief Economics
	BAND	Prisons Band /Dance Band		PROCUREM	Procurement
	REFRE/COURS	Refresher Courses		AUDITOR	Internal Auditor
	D P & D	Director Planning and Development			
	PLANNING	Staff Officer Strategic Planning			
	BUDGET	Staff Officer Budget			
	INFRU	Head Infrastructure			
	LANDS	Staffing Office Land Survey GIS			
	LOGISTICS	Logistics			
	INSPECT	Inspections			
	TEL/ICT	Telecommunications and ICT			
	CONTIGENCY	Contingency			
	SECURITY	Staff Officer Security			
	REG.COM	Regional Commander			
	COUNT.COM	County Commissioner			
	OIC	Officer In Charge			
	D REH	Director Rehabilitation			
	FARMS	Farms			
	INDUST	Industries			
	BUILD	Building Section			
	VOCAT	Vocational Training			
	PPP/ NGOS	Public Private Partnerships/Non-Governmental Organizations			

Source: Kenya Prisons Service

Reporting, command, governance and accountability

1043. As adverted, the Kenya Prisons Service is headed by the Commissioner-General of Prisons (CGP), assisted by two Deputy-Commissioners General of Prisons. They are in turn assisted by officers of the rank of Senior Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons (SACGP), Assistant Commissioner-General (ACGP), Deputy Commissioner

of Prisons (DCP), Assistant Commissioner of Prisons (ACP), Senior Superintendent of Prisons (SSP), Superintendent of Prisons (SP), Chief Inspectors of Prisons (CIP), and Inspectors of Prisons (IP), who are senior officers with support from junior officers in the rank of Senior Sergeant (S/Sgt), Sergeant (Sgt), Corporal (Cpl) and Prisons Constable (PC).

1044. The Service is also supported by a civilian cadre of officers who are professionals in their areas of operation. These are the senior administrative secretary, the human resource management officers, clerical staff, chaplains, maalims and maalimats, counsellors/social welfare officers, medical health personnel, lawyers, as well as finance and procurement personnel.
1045. The grades or staff levels are in two parts, senior and junior staff. The ranks of the Kenya Prison Service staff are listed hereunder from lowest rank to the highest.
 - (a) Prisons Constable;
 - (b) Corporal;
 - (c) Sergeant;
 - (d) Senior Sergeant;
 - (e) Inspector of Prisons;
 - (f) Chief Inspector of Prisons;
 - (g) Superintendent of Prisons;
 - (h) Senior Superintendent of Prisons;
 - (i) Assistant Commissioner of Prisons;
 - (j) Deputy Commissioner of Prisons;
 - (k) Assistant Commissioner-General of Prisons;
 - (l) Senior Assistant Commissioner-General of Prisons
 - (m) Deputy Commissioner-General of Prisons; and
 - (n) Commissioner-General of Prisons.
1046. Prisons are established under the Prisons Act, pursuant to which the Cabinet Secretary may, by notice in the *Gazette*, declare any building, enclosure or place, or any part thereof, to be a prison for the purposes of the Act, and may, in like manner, declare that any prison shall cease to be a prison for the purposes of the Act. The Act stipulates that every prison shall include the grounds and buildings within the prison enclosure and any other grounds or buildings belonging or attached thereto and used by prisoners or the staff of the prison.
1047. While the Prisons system has a number of laws that provide for various aspects of governance and administration of the Service, the comprehensive legislative framework for KPS remains poorly implemented. And as stated, the laws governing this critical sector have not adapted to the changing times, occasioning minimal implementation of reforms in KPS. The Prisons Act was last revised in 1977, and the Borstal Institutions Act in 1991.
1048. The Taskforce acknowledges, however, that a few notable positive changes have taken place within the Service. For instance, in 2001, the then Commissioner of Prisons (CP) Abraham Kamakil introduced for the first time the “Open Door Policy”, which opened

up prisons to human rights bodies, media and the public. This initiative introduced new programmes and activities, some of which are not anchored in the laws governing prisons. Commissioner Kamakil started the construction of modern humane houses for KPS staff.

1049. He also championed better pay as well as the introduction of a comprehensive medical cover for staff. It was during his tenure that he approved deployment of KPS officers to UN Peacekeeping Missions as Government Provided Personnel (GPP) to mentor, advise, train and support prisons systems in post-conflict situations in Africa and beyond. The Taskforce notes that these reforms were largely not anchored in policy or law but were driven by the Commissioner of Prisons personal vision and initiative on availability of vacancies as declared by the UN Peace-keeping Office in New York for secondment and deployment.
1050. The Taskforce was required to identify and recommend legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational reforms in KPS for effective service delivery. The Taskforce visited all counties and correctional facilities within the Republic, heard views and received memoranda on the efficacy of the legal, policy, and administrative challenges experienced by the Service. The Taskforce also reviewed reports of previous Taskforces and Committees and the recommendations they made on KPS reforms.

Areas of policy and legislative reform

1051. The Taskforce established that the Constitution does not make reference to KPS as an institution but provides that correctional services is a National Government function. Section 24 (1) (2) (3) and section 25 (a) (b) of the Prisons Act formally provides regulations for the establishment and control of prisons facilities, including temporary prisons.
1052. The Taskforce was informed that the Office of the Commissioner-General of Prisons is not entrenched in the Constitution neither does it enjoy security of tenure. Consequently, the Service submitted that CGP is appointed and dismissed at the discretion of the presidency.
1053. The Taskforce further observed that there is a clear guideline and specific provision on the qualifications for the appointment of the CGP and the DCGP in the Revised Scheme of Service for Prisons Uniformed Personnel, revised in October 2014 and approved by the Public Service Commission. However, KPS officers pointed out that there has been a lacuna in law permitting the consistent appointment of CGP of whatever qualifications and from outside the Service, thereby demoralising officers who desire growth and job satisfaction for self-actualization.
1054. It was also submitted that while KPS officers are required to join multi-agency operations, there is no legal or administrative framework governing their deployment, operations, and compensation. As a result, officers have often missed out on allowances for such activities either through embezzlement or non-remittal.
1055. The Taskforce notes that the Commissioner-General of Prisons is required to administer the prisons industries and the farms' revolving funds. The Service submitted that the location of this function in the Office of the CGP is strenuous to the office holder due to challenges in budgetary allocation and lack of tools and equipment.
1056. It was further submitted by the Service that although the Prisons Council is provided for in law, in the Prisons Rules section 20 (1) (a) to (c), the modalities and mechanisms of operationalizing it have not been clearly defined. However, it was established by the

Taskforce that the subsidiary legislation on the Prisons (Prisons Council) Rules provides for the Prisons Council's establishment, membership, functions and provisions for arbitration. The Taskforce was unable to determine any initiatives made by past administrations to operationalize the Council. Senior prisons officers who made submissions under Kenya Prisons Retired Officers Association (KEPROA), informed the Taskforce that they never at any time saw it in operation during their tour of duty.

1057. The Madoka Committee, which was appointed to investigate the prisons crisis in 2008, recommended the immediate operationalization of the Prisons Council. According to the Committee, the Council would provide a forum for addressing issues affecting prisons staff, which recommendation has never been implemented.
1058. The Taskforce established that Clause 124 (1)(x) of the Prisons Service Standing Orders allowing commanders to discipline junior officers for '*any other conduct*' creates an opportunity for abuse of junior officers. It is, therefore, unsurprising that junior officers submitted to the Taskforce that the provision has been abused by commanders to settle personal scores with them, generating widespread discontent among junior officers after the use of arbitrary and illegal disciplinary procedures.
1059. The Taskforce notes that since the CGP is not the accounting officer of the Kenya Prisons Service, he/she does not have overall control of the affairs and budgeting cycle of the Service. This consequently impairs and handicaps the CGP's operational command of the Service.
1060. The Taskforce further observes that as a result of failure to fully implement the Community Service Orders (CSO) Act, prisons in Kenya are extremely congested, which directly affects the working environment of KPS officers.
1061. The Taskforce also notes that the absence of a parole mechanism in Kenya further contributes to congestion in prisons, undermines the rehabilitation mission of KPS, and places immense pressure on the Service in taking care of prisoners who, by all metrics of review, should be released if a parole procedure was operational.
1062. It is also established that there is no policy on the welfare and management of intersex inmates and officers within the Service.

Recommendations

1063. The Taskforce has analysed the pertinent issues regarding the legal framework of KPS and considered the stakeholders' submissions. To improve service delivery and streamline the operations of the Service, the Taskforce recommends that:
 - (a) The appointment of the Commissioner-General of Prisons should be competitive and anchored in law;
 - (b) The CGP should be made the accounting officer of KPS to give him or her overall control of the Service;
 - (c) A complete overhaul of the obsolete Prisons Act including the Parole system, the Borstal Institutions Act, the Community Service Order Act, and the Service Standing Orders to create a new correctional services legal order that is in line with the Constitution should be undertaken;
 - (d) Development of new and review of existing KPS policies to align them with the current constitutional dispensation should be undertaken; and
 - (e) The provisions of Persons Deprived of Liberty Act, 2014, which has not been effected by KPS should be implemented.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

13.1 Introduction

1064. The Taskforce was required to review human capital management and development policies with respect to standards and practices in recruitment, deployment, transfers, training, career progression, performance-based and competitive promotions, reward, exit, and post-exit management, and recommend implementation of changes that enhance professionalism, motivation, morale, meritocracy, professionalism and retention in the Kenya Prisons Service. This calls for examination of the legal framework and practice governing the operations of the Service.
1065. Article 233 of the Constitution establishes the Public Service Commission (PSC). Pursuant to Article 234, the Commission establishes and abolishes offices in the public service; appoints persons to hold or act in those offices; confirms appointments; investigates, monitors and evaluates the organization, administration and personnel practices in the Public Service; develops human resources in the Public Service; ensures that the public service is efficient and effective by upholding high standards of professional ethics; reviews and makes recommendations to the national government in respect of qualifications of officers in the public service. The Public Service Commission manages the KPS human resource function.
1066. Article 234(5) of the Constitution allows the Public Service Commission to delegate in writing, with or without conditions, any of its functions and powers under the Constitution to any one or more of its members or to any officer, body or authority in the public service.
1067. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 234(5) of the Constitution, the Commission has delegated, in writing and via a delegation instrument, the human resource powers and functions to the Commissioner-General of Prisons. The delegation instrument explains the scope of the delegated authority and application of attendant norms. The delegated authority covers recruitment up to the rank of Chief Inspector of Prisons, promotion, re-designation, transfers and disciplinary control at designated levels. In addition, the delegated authority extends to training and standards for human resource management and development-related functions. In exercising these delegated powers and functions, the CGP acts in accordance with applicable legislation, regulations, policies and guidelines.
1068. The delegated authority is exercised with clear reporting and accountability mechanisms to PSC. Such delegation does not divest PSC of any responsibility over its constitutional and statutory mandate. The laws, policies and regulations listed hereunder are critical to human capital management and development in the Kenya Prisons Service:
- (a) The Constitution of Kenya;
 - (b) The Public Service Commission Act, 2017;
 - (c) The Prisons Act, 1977;
 - (d) The Employment Act, 2007;
 - (e) The Pensions Act, Cap 189;
 - (f) The Borstal Institutions Act, 1963 (Revised 2012);
 - (g) The Children Act, 2022;
 - (h) Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual for the Public Service, 2016;

- (i) The Kenya Prisons Service Standing Orders;
- (j) The Scheme of Service for Uniformed Prisons Personnel, 2014;
- (k) Guidelines on Establishment and Abolition of Offices in the Public Service, 2015;
- (l) Human Resource Development Policy for the Public Service, 2015;
- (m) Guidelines on Secondment in the Public Service, 2016;
- (n) Guidelines to the Staff Performance Appraisal System (SPAS) in the Public Service, 2016;
- (o) Induction Handbook for the Public Service, 2017;
- (p) Guidelines on Managing Training in the Public Service, 2017;
- (q) Human Resource Planning and Succession Management Strategy for the Public Service, 2017;
- (r) Salaries and Remuneration Commission Job Description Manual for Kenya Prisons Service, Volume One, 2017;
- (s) Framework for Short Term Employment in Public Service, 2019;
- (t) Discipline Manual for the Public Service, 2022;
- (u) Salaries and Remuneration Commission (Remuneration and Benefits of State and other Public Officers) Regulations, 2022; and
- (v) Kenya Prisons Service Strategic Plan, 2018-2022.

Summary of views received and issues raised

1069. The Taskforce received proposals for review of human capital management and development policies from key stakeholders including: the Kenya Prisons Service, Public Service Commission, Ministry of Interior and National Administration, State Department for Correctional Services, the National Treasury, Salaries and Remuneration Commission, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, Council of Governors, Parliamentary Committee on Security, the Kenya Prisons Retired Officers Association, Prisons Reforms Working Group, Kenya Private Sector Alliance, uniformed and non-uniformed officers of KPS, members of the public and civil society organizations. The views suggested that there are major problems with human capital management and development policies in the areas of recruitment, deployment, transfers, training, scheme of service, performance-based and competitive promotions, reward, exit and post-exit management. A brief consideration of each of them follows.

13.2 Recruitment

1070. The Taskforce was mandated to review the human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in recruitment and to recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy, and professionalism in Kenya Prisons Service (KPS).

1071. In undertaking the requirements of this term of reference, the Taskforce reviewed the Constitution of Kenya, the Public Service Commission Act, the Public Service Commission Regulations and other enabling provisions of the law.

1072. It cannot be overemphasised that proper recruitment within KPS plays a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness, efficiency, and overall integrity of the institution. Recruiting the right individuals for this vital sector will allow for the selection of highly qualified

and competent officers, who possess the necessary skills and knowledge to handle the diverse challenges and responsibilities within the prisons system. Such individuals will bring valuable expertise and professionalism, contributing to the maintenance of security, order and discipline within correctional facilities.

1073. On recruitment, the Madoka Committee recommended an immediate change in the top leadership at KPS. The committee was clear that the fresh leadership should preferably be sourced from outside KPS and predicated on a new management structure. The committee further recommended that the appointment and terms of service for the Commissioner-General of Prisons be translated from permanent to a three-year renewable contract to ensure security of tenure and that professional staff would be recruited to spearhead rehabilitation. Lastly, it recommended, among others, the increase in the number of procurement officers at Kenya Prisons headquarters.
1074. Currently the recruitment process as reflected in the instrument of delegation is guided by the following PSC procedure, suitably tailored to meet KPS requirements:
- (a) *Declaration of Vacant Posts:* In this regard, PSC considers requests to fill vacant positions declared. Such requests are submitted by the Authorized Officer (in this case the Commissioner-General of Prisons) upon recommendation by the Human Resource Management Advisory Committee (HRMAC). In exercising these powers and functions, the Authorized Officer shall act in accordance with applicable legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines which may be issued by the Commission.
 - (b) *Advertisement of vacant posts:* KPS is required to advertise all vacant posts in a manner that reaches the widest pool of potential applicants and allows for at least 21 days to elapse from the date of publication of the advertisement to the close of receiving applications. It is required that the advertisement specifies the following details: name of institution, title of the post, terms of service, mode and deadline of transmitting applications, number of vacancies, job description, person specification, any considerations that may occasion disqualification, any consideration of affirmative action, proposed remuneration and indication that only shortlisted and successful candidates will be contacted. The advertisement is ordinarily delivered in soft copy to PSC to be posted on its website. The advertisement should also be placed in at least one daily newspaper and one radio of national coverage and circulated in the offices of County Commissioners.
 - (c) *Managing Applications:* Where applicable, it is required that every advertising entity uploads PSC 2 forms on their websites so that information provided by applicants is harmonized. Each State Department must maintain a record of all applications received for every post advertised in a database that can be accessed for audit purposes. Such records may be disposed of upon expiry of a period of three (3) years from the date of completion of the exercise.
 - (d) *Short-listing:* Where applicable, it is required that for every advertised position, the advertising entity shall form a short-listing panel made up of a sub-committee of HRMAC appointed by the Authorized Officer. A profile for each applicant shall be prepared and must include: name, national identity number, KRA PIN, birth certificate number, age, gender, ethnic group, disability status, vacancy number, job group, date of substantive appointment (for serving officers), qualifications and experience of each applicant. This profile shall be scrutinized by the panel and a shortlist prepared in line with criteria established beforehand

(derived from the job advertisement). The shortlist must comply with Articles 10, 27, 54, 55, 56, 232 and Chapter Six (6) of the Constitution. In addition, the final shortlist shall take into consideration merit, Kenya's diverse communities, gender, youth, ethnicity, marginalized and minority communities and persons with disabilities in accordance with the Public Service Commission Diversity policy. For promotional positions, all qualified serving officers as per the advertisement shall be shortlisted and given an opportunity to compete for available vacancies. The decision of the sub-committee shall be forwarded to HRMAC for consideration and recommendation to the Authorized Officer for submission to the Commission for approval; The short-listing report shall be submitted to the Commission within seven days (7) for scrutiny and approval; and the Commission shall within 21 days approve the shortlist before proceeding with selection.

- (e) *Selection:* In this phase, a selection panel being a sub-committee of HRMAC and composed of different members from the short-listing panel, shall be appointed by the Authorized Officer to conduct selection interviews; provided that the committee shall have power to co-opt any person whose expertise shall be required during the interview. The panel shall develop a scoring criterion and an agreed way of ranking candidates. The decision of the sub-committee shall be forwarded to HRMAC for consideration and recommendation to the Authorised Officer for onward submission to the Commission for approval.

- 1075. HRMACs are required to preserve a full and accurate record of all its proceedings, including applications, short-listing criteria, score sheets and minutes for a period of three (3) years.
- 1076. The advertising entity is expected to upload the list of successful applicants on its website and post the same on all notice boards of the relevant State Departments across the country within 14 days of conclusion of the exercise. The Authorized Officer shall forward to the Commission quarterly reports for recruitment, which shall include the following: name, date of birth, gender, ethnic group, disability (if any), whether the officer is from a minority or marginalized community and whether the officer is a person with disability.
- 1077. The Taskforce noted that in following the stated procedure, the recruitment of prisons constables is a one-day affair conducted by the Service. It is during this one-day exercise that KPS conducts recruitment countrywide in all *gazetted* Sub-counties. An advertisement is run in two newspapers of national circulation 21 days prior to the recruitment informing the public of the date and venues. Recruitment teams are uniformed officers drawn from all penal institutions, regional commands, Prisons headquarters and the Prisons Staff Training College.
- 1078. The teams are headed by gazetted officers but in exceptional circumstances, such areas as in the North Eastern part of the country, the teams may be headed by a seasoned Chief Inspector. Officers can only recruit from the counties where they are deployed for the exercise. The recruitment is conducted in public open areas such as county headquarters grounds, primary schools' fields and stadia provided for in the advert. The recruitment teams are required to ensure that they recruit candidates from each division (sub-county) within a county. The Service outlines the minimum requirements potential candidates must possess, and issues a disclaimer in the advertisement that the recruitment is a free exercise and that recruitments are only conducted at the venues indicated in the advertisement.

1079. Each prospective candidate wishing to enlist into the Service must meet the following requirements: (a) be a Kenyan citizen; (b) possess a valid national identification card; (c) have no criminal record; (d) possess a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) grade of D+ and above or equivalent qualification from a recognised institution; (e) be aged between 18 and 28 years; (f) be at least 5 feet 4 inches tall for men and 5 feet 2 inches tall for women; (g) be physically and medically fit; (h) have good hearing and clear vision; (i) female candidates must not be pregnant at the time of recruitment and during the entire training period and (j) candidates must also present their birth and KRA PIN certificates on the recruitment day.
1080. Once selected, the recruit trainees undergo an intensive government-sponsored paramilitary initial training course lasting not less than nine (9) months.
1081. For cadets and technicians, the Service recruits diploma and certificate holders as well as university graduates in fields related to corrections. The entry requirements are as follows: (a) must be a Kenyan citizen; (b) must have a valid national identification card; (c) have no criminal record; (d) be between the ages of 18 and 28 for diploma or certificate holders; (e) be between the ages of 18 and 30 for degree holders; (f) be at least 5 feet 4 inches tall for men and 5 feet 2 inches tall for women; (g) be physically and medically fit; (h) must have good hearing and clear vision; (i) must have a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) grade of C+ and above or equivalent qualification and an undergraduate degree from a recognized institution of higher learning.
1082. Technicians must have a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) grade of C and above or equivalent qualification, and a diploma or certificate from a recognized institution registered with relevant statutory body where applicable. Lastly, female candidates must not be pregnant at the time of recruitment and during the entire training period.
1083. Upon recruitment, candidates undergo an intensive government-sponsored paramilitary initial training course lasting not less than nine (9) months for the recruits and technicians, and 13 months for cadet recruits.
1084. The Taskforce observed that there is currently no recruitment policy in place and the Service relies on select provisions of the Constitution, the Employment Act, the Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual, Service Standing Orders, Scheme of Service for Uniformed Prisons Personnel and the Public Service Commission Regulations, 2020.

Summary of officers', public and stakeholder views

1085. The Taskforce was privileged to hear directly from primary institutions, key stakeholders and members of the public. KPS submitted that its funding for recruitment is episodic and therefore cannot conduct regular recruitment to replace officers who exit through natural attrition. The Service further submitted that infrastructural capacity at the Prisons Staff Training College can only accommodate a maximum of 3,000 course participants or trainees at any one time. The Taskforce was informed by the Prisons officers of the need for the CGP to be publicly vetted, competitively recruited, and enjoy security of tenure as well as being placed at par with the National Police Service Deputy Inspector-General.
1086. The Taskforce established that there is lack of trained professional counsellors and chaplaincy personnel to meet the psychosocial, welfare and wellbeing as well as the spiritual needs of the Service's fraternity.
1087. The Taskforce noted that recruits are entitled to a monthly stipend of KSh. s10,000 during training and start earning a salary after the pass-out parade. KPS officers proposed that

- recruitment for the Service should be digitized to promote transparency and accountability in the exercise and prompt payment of the monthly stipend.
1088. A sizeable number of stakeholders posited that members of KPS should be recruited on the same terms and conditions of service as members of NPS since their work is similar in nature. Officers of KPS proposed that their ranks should be collapsed and restructured to mirror those of the NPS. The change, they explained, would cure the differences in perks between members of the Services.
 1089. Unlike the Madoka Committee recommendation on the term of the CGP as earlier stated, junior members of KPS suggested that the CGP should serve for a non-renewable term of four years. The Service proposed that ranks and duties should be well defined and followed to the letter; job descriptions be drawn up before the commencement of recruitment; and that deployment be based on professional and educational qualifications.
 1090. The Taskforce also received memoranda that gazetted officers be deployed by the CGP based on qualifications, ability and experience to ensure proper utilization of human resources and guarantee higher productivity.
 1091. The Taskforce was told that more offices including regional, sub-regional, county and sub-county commands should be created. It was also submitted that there should be periodic reviews of the terms and conditions of service after every four (4) years;
 1092. It was further submitted that recruitment should be devoid of inducements and kickbacks, nepotism or discrimination to accord every citizen an opportunity to be employed according to the dictates of the Constitution.
 1093. In order to entrench accountability and transparency, it was suggested that the recruitment of cadets and professionals should be done electronically.
 1094. It was further submitted to the Taskforce that there was need to recruit and build capacity of healthcare workers to address emerging healthcare issues and improve the quality of healthcare delivery to KPS staff and inmates.
 1095. It was also suggested that there is need to establish career progression guidelines for all officers to incorporate the technical officers and artisans in order to address recruitment, entry levels, promotions, career development, job description and filling of vacancies through placement.
 1096. In Nakuru County, the prisons welfare and chaplaincy civilian staff submitted that the terms of service for the enlisted chaplains be on a permanent and pensionable basis rather than on contract, and that there is need for regular recruitment of professional chaplaincy personnel to replace those who leave the Service due to natural attrition.
 1097. KPS submissions also placed emphasis on the need to develop a gender sensitive policy on recruitment in line with the Constitution. It was argued that this would promote gender equity in line with the National Gender Policy. It was further clarified to the Taskforce that the number of female offenders is apparently growing, and this will require more female KPS officers.
 1098. Members of the public submitted that the current recruitment of KPS officers lacks transparency and is largely perceived to be shrouded in corruption, with positions ‘sold’ to the highest bidders. They proposed that to address this challenge, KPS should embrace online selection process for professionals, with oversight agencies monitoring the process. It was further suggested through all submissions from various prison officers across the country and those who gave their views in plenary that an internal audit of skills available

- in KPS be carried out before recruiting graduates or professionals from the open market to deal with the disgruntlement of officers already in the Service who have the relevant qualifications and skills advertised, but also have an upper hand given their experience from the years served.
1099. The Taskforce also heard from officers on the ground that introduction of an efficient monitoring and reporting mechanism for officers on probationary terms of service before confirmation was taking too long in some cases. It was submitted that a monitoring and evaluation framework be put in place to gauge the level of discipline and competence to qualify for permanent and pensionable employment when officers are due for appointment.
 1100. Other issues noted by stakeholders included undesirability of continuous annual recruitment, which they asserted was a sign of unplanned and unbridled growth; that over-strength in limited functions could lead to idleness or over-employment; that the Service would be more efficient if it had fewer but well-paid personnel; that the constant utility of training facilities to turn out new recruits undermines the capacity to improve skills for existing staff; and that the current spate of recruitment suggests wanton availability of staff to splash on any job.
 1101. Contrary to the foregoing observations, other stakeholders submitted that for the Service to ameliorate human resource capacity gaps, there is need to enhance financing and enable regular recruitment to address issues of succession management and bridge the gap created by natural attrition.
 1102. Stakeholders also submitted that there is need to introduce an independent Prisons Service Commission to steer recruitment, transfers, promotions, training, discipline and general matters of welfare. The argument here was that the Public Service Commission, under which KPS currently falls, appears overwhelmed in looking after the entire public service. KPS' perceived lagging on progressive issues and benefits available to its members was cited as the reason there is need for a shift to a Prisons Commission.
 1103. The Taskforce observed that corrupt recruitment practices had led to the enlistment of undeserving and uninterested persons into the Service.
 1104. Other stakeholders, including the Kenya Private Sector Alliance proposed a 30 per cent increase in the recruitment of women in KPS and fair promotion opportunities for women in the Service to attract and retain a diverse talent pool, comply with constitutional requirements on inclusion and approach Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while offering better service to the public.
 1105. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) observed that there is no policy for the recruitment of KPS officers hence the need for the Service to develop one.
 1106. The Taskforce notes that the provisions of the Constitution anticipate ethnic diversity in the civil service. Employment in government is a critical component in the distribution of national resources. Article 232(1) (h) requires representation of Kenya's diverse communities as one of the values and principles of the public service. Article 232(1) (i);(ii) requires affording adequate and equal opportunities for appointment, training, advancement at all levels of the public service of all members of all ethnic groups.
 1107. It was proposed that the allocation of slots at the recruitment centres should be as closely as possible proportional to the population other than the amorphous decision that each county or sub-county gets defined slots, when in essence these districts or sub-counties are not the same in terms of population. It was proposed that there should be affirmative action in recruitment, especially in regions or communities underrepresented in KPS to address such skewed staffing.

Findings


1108. The Taskforce established that there is lack of regular recruitment in the Service to replace officers who exit through natural attrition. The Taskforce established that the Service does not have an adequate number of chaplains and professional counsellors.
1109. The Taskforce established that currently, the CGP is not competitively recruited.
1110. The Service does not have in place a structured recruitment plan on a need basis to replace those who exit, and does not have its own recruitment policy. Additionally, the Service lacks an intersex recruitment policy.
1111. The Service recruitment process is marred with corrupt practices, nepotism and kickbacks.
1112. The Service has not adhered to the constitutional dictates on the two-thirds representation of gender.
1113. To understand the recruitment needs of the Service, it is imperative to highlight the statistics of the in-post officers vis-a-vis the approved establishment. The number of uniformed officers in post has grown by 6,450 or 30 per cent, from 21,250 in 2016 to 27,700 in 2022. This growth was occasioned by over recruitment. Table 12.1 and Figure 12.1 show the figures of in-post officers between 2016 and 2022.

Table 13. 1: In-post officers between 2016 and 2022

YEAR	PC	CPL	SGT	SSGT	IP	CIP	SP	SSP	ACP	SACP	DCP	SDCP	ACGP	TOTAL
2016	14,348	2888	1804	995	512	405	173	78	29	8	-	7	3	21,250
2017	16271	3097	1853	899	578	213	327	115	68	23	7	6	2	23,459
2018	19229	3003	1826	857	633	197	352	110	64	22	6	5	-	26,304
2019	18872	3016	1840	836	621	196	346	101	64	20	5	3	-	25,920
2020	21293	3121	1810	812	615	200	345	95	54	1	-	-	16	28,360
2021	21201	3034	1761	780	589	190	334	92	48	-	-	-	13	28,042
2022	18406	3964	1955	1306	950	663	320	85	41	-	-	-	10	27,700
% Growth in in-post officers														30%

Source: Kenya Prisons Service

Figure 13. 1: Growth in uniformed officers in-post between 2012 and 2022



Source: Kenya Prisons Service

1114. The authorised establishment (Table 13.2) indicates that there are various vacant positions in KPS. Some grades are occupied over the authorised establishment. There is, therefore, room for promotion of officers into the vacant positions.

Table 13. 2: Variance between authorised establishment and in-post officers in KPS

PG	Designation	PG/JG	AE	IN-POST	VARIANCE	VARIANCE (%)
14	Commissioner General of Prisons	14 (U)	1	1	0	0%
13	Deputy Commissioner-General of Prisons	13 (T)	2	2	0	0%
12	Senior Assistant Commissioner-General of Prisons	12 (S)	7	8	1	
11	Assistant Commissioner-General of Prisons	11 (R)	17	10	-7	0.02%
10	Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	10 (P)	35	25	-10	0.03%
9	Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	9 (M)	151	82	-69	0.18%
8	Senior Superintendent of Prisons	8 (L)	218	304	86	
7	Superintendent of Prisons	7 (K)	674	167	-507	1.34%
6	Chief Inspectors	6 (K)	1,153	539	-614	1.62
5	Inspectors	5 (J)	1,385	1,134	-251	1.62%
4	S/Sergeants	4 (J)	2,038	1,593	-445	1.18
3	Sergeants	3 (H)	2,897	2,911	14	
2	Corporals	2 (G)	5,131	5,003	-128	0.3%
1	Constables	1 (F)	24,159	19,456	-4,703	12%
	TOTAL		37,868	31,235	-6,633	

Source: Kenya Prisons Service

1115. Table 13.3 indicates the rank distribution of the in-post officers in 11 years between 2012 and 2022. It indicates vacant positions in the senior ranks, which makes it difficult for succession planning within the Service.

Table 13. 3: KPS distribution of in-post officers by rank, 2011 to 2022

Year	PC	CPL	SGT	SSGT	IP	CIP	SP	SSP	ACP	SACP	DCP	SDCP	ACGP	SACGP	Total
2012	2,284	1,185	546	461	331	116	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,923
2013	44	6	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	54
2014	14	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
2015	3	4	1	10	3	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	78
2016	369	2	45	4	6	-	-	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	491
2017	-	12	4	189	96	264	104	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	676
2018	1	-	4	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
2019	155	56	24	16	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	260
2020	234	59	35	28	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	375
2021	1,598	1,020	608	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,226
2022	1,128	530	603	619	480	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,360
Total	5830	2874	1874	1329	948	437	104	65	7	0	0	0	0	0	13,468
Prop	43%	21%	14%	10%	7%	3%	1%	0.5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	

Source: Kenya Prisons Service

Recommendations

1116. The Taskforce established that several officers are employed alongside their family members in the Service, with some of them serving in the same station. Since some of the officers who have relatives in the same station hold positions of authority, there are challenges with performance, transfers, deployment and training opportunities. The

Taskforce, therefore, recommends that an HR audit be undertaken within six months upon publication of this Report to establish the extent of the situation and develop appropriate policies and guidelines to address the problem.

1117. Provisions of Article 232 of the Constitution on values and principles of public service should be strictly applied during recruitment and promotion processes to enhance transparency. The proposed Prison Council should conduct rigorous oversight on the Service.
1118. For purposes of succession planning, continuity and availability of leadership skills and competencies, the Taskforce recommends the regular and structured recruitment of cadet officers.
1119. KPS should carry out a human resource audit of its service with a view of reviewing the entire staff establishment of the Service.
1120. Upon review of the establishment, there is need to harmonize the recruitment, promotion, overall career progression and exit with the approved establishment.
1121. The entry grade into the Service should be capped at a minimum grade C Minus (C-), with exceptions granted to candidates from marginalized areas. The minimum recruitment age should be raised from 18 to 21 years.
1122. There should be a hybrid model of recruitment into the Kenya Prisons Service that will entail:
 - (a) Online application to filter applicants according to requirements in the advertisement; with shortlisted candidates attending physical interviews at county and sub-county level.
 - (b) For recruitment of graduates into the Kenya Prisons Service, internal recruitment should form a quarter of the total number of vacancies advertised and shall entail: online application for the relevant advertised vacancies; and shortlisted candidates to attend physical interviews at county level and filling the rest of the vacancies externally from the market.
 - (c) Recruitment should be based on a competitive and transparent selection; and
 - (d) Intersex persons should be given equal opportunity like the rest in recruitment.
 - (e) Although the Taskforce gave audience to non-uniformed staff of the KPS, the Taskforce notes that they are employees of the Public Service Commission and therefore makes no recommendation on their issues.

13.3 Deployment and transfers

Current context and practice

1123. The Taskforce was required to review the standards and practices in operational issues of deployment and transfers, and to recommend the implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in KPS.
1124. Deployment is defined as the temporary movement of an officer from one station to another to undertake a specific assignment, for a period not exceeding three months, during which the pay point remains at the original station. KPS officers can be deployed from one station to another or from one assignment to another for a period not exceeding three months. Ideally this should be operational deployment.

1125. Contrary to this understanding, the Taskforce established that, like in NPS, transfers in KPS are sometimes disguised as deployment and largely whimsical.
1126. After visiting prison facilities in all the counties and receiving views and submissions, the Taskforce established that the CGP, through the instrument of delegation by the Public Service Commission, has the sole mandate to deploy and transfer officers across the penal institutions, Prisons headquarters, Prisons Staff Training Colleges, and the regional offices. Further, the CGP has authority to determine the staff establishment of every penal institution.

Prisons, public and stakeholder views

1127. The Taskforce notes that deployment of officers in KPS from one station to another should be based on staff establishment as supported by KPS workload analysis recommendations. While this should be the norm, the Taskforce was informed that in practice, consideration is never made of age, capability, specialization, disability or gender. The result is misplacement of officers, which in turn affects service delivery.
1128. KPS officers pointed out that they are deployed straight from the training school to the field without consideration of the strength in various counties, thus causing staff imbalance. Freshly graduated constables with hardly any experience are often deployed straight to hardship areas.
1129. KPS officers stated that deployments are characterized by corruption, favouritism, tribalism, nepotism and demands for sexual favours from female officers. The Taskforce was informed that officers deployed to perform police duties, such as elections security and examination supervision, are not usually trained on crowd control or even human rights issues specific to such assignments yet they are often in contact with citizens in volatile environments during such deployments. The officers also lamented that there are instances when they were not paid allowances as their counterparts in NPS in the multi-agency operations.
1130. The Task Force was informed that there are many cases of officers who are deployed in non-core functions including some serving as drivers and in VIP protection. Although VIP protection is not a function of the KPS, the practice is that powerful individuals request for specific officers who are then deployed to their protection. This ends up taking away officers from core prison duties negatively affecting the performance of the service.

Findings and emerging issues

1131. The Taskforce established that KPS deployments are governed by KPS Standing Orders. However, deployments within the Service are abused by the KPS leadership, who often use them as disciplinary measures against junior staff. The Taskforce notes that the Standing Orders are inadequate to address the many challenges raised by KPS officers since some of the provisions have been overtaken by time having been last revised in 1979, given that they are not in line with the new constitutional dispensation. Beyond the Standing Orders, the Service has not developed any policy on deployments.
1132. The Taskforce established that the CGP has the sole mandate of deploying officers within the Service as delegated by the Public Service Commission. However, without a clear policy governing deployment, this delegated mandate is often abused and riddled with administrative loopholes, corruption and favouritism. The lack of mechanisms for effective oversight over the exercise of delegated powers and functions is responsible for this state of affairs.

1133. The Taskforce established that deployments are often used as a disciplinary measure against junior officers and to extract sexual favours from female officers. Female officers who do not accede to these sexual demands are sent on punitive deployments.
1134. The Taskforce further established that there is no policy on the deployment of officers who may become physically disabled while on duty and neither is there a mechanism for re-designating their services to other departments in government or even within the Service to accommodate such officers' conditions.
1135. The Taskforce observed that the Directorate of Human Capital Management is only based at KPS headquarters, even though some human capital management decisions are made and implemented at the regional and correctional facility level. Regional commanders, who have no or minimal training on human capital management are expected to make and implement human capital management policies.
1136. The Taskforce established that officers are often deployed to undertake activities or assignments they do not qualify for. This has increased with the regular participation of the Service in multi-agency operations, including in areas affected by terrorism. Some of the activities such as crowd control and policing duties in terrorism-affected areas expose KPS officers to risks which, in some cases, lead to loss of lives.
1137. The Taskforce noted that favouritism and corruption are prevalent in deployments within the Service resulting from policy and legal lacunas on human capital management. These gaps have occasioned opportunities for use of deployment as a tool for extortion.
1138. "Transfer" means the movement of an officer from one duty station to another. However, unlike deployment, the pay point of the officer changes to the new station. Further, transfers usually include moving the officer to the new station for a period of more than 3 months.
1139. Put differently, transfer is the posting of officers from one station to another in their substantive capacity within the Service, which is undertaken by the authorized officer on the recommendation of the Human Resource Management Advisory Committee (HRMAC).
1140. The Commissioner-General of Prisons retains all the powers to transfer senior and junior officers. There are four primary types of transfers within the Service: administrative transfer, which assists in staff balancing and succession management; versatility transfer, which is intended to enhance staff knowledge and skills in KPS work; transfer on application or request (own request); and transfer on recommendation by the Officer in Charge to the CGP in most cases due to security reasons on the part of the officer or the facility. A recommendation can also be made after an aggravated offence against prison discipline. The power to transfer however remains the authority of the CGP on further advice from the HRMAC.
1141. For context, all transfers across regions are processed through the Prisons Human Resource Management Advisory Committee. However, regional Human Resource Management Advisory Committee is involved in transfers within regions on delegated authority to the Regional Commanders. Additionally, transfers on serious security grounds are determined by the Commissioner-General of Prisons in consultation with the Director, Administration and Director of Operations. Likewise, transfers on serious medical grounds are determined by the Commissioner-General of Prisons in consultation with the Director, Administration and Personnel.

1142. Transfer of officers to the northern and other far-flung remote areas of the Country is subject to the following conditions: mandatory medical examination of those selected; to be certified physically fit for service; and must serve for a minimum period of 18 months.
1143. Lastly, when an officer is transferred from one station to another, the officer will be eligible for transfer allowance amounting to one (1) month's basic salary, provided the new station is not less than 40 kilometres from the former station. Transfer allowance should be paid at least three (3) days prior to departure pursuant to the provisions of Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual for the Public Service. As earlier stated, officers who are transferred at their own request are not eligible for this allowance.

Prisons officers' views

1144. The Taskforce was informed that officers are often unwilling to work in some stations because of the variations in house allowances, which depend on the location of the stations. The locations are classified as cities, county headquarters and others. The Taskforce also noted that some officers are reluctant to work in certain areas and in maximum-security prisons due to perceived risks associated with such environments. In some stations, the staff distribution in terms of gender consideration for optimum functionality was alarming since some had no officers of the opposite gender to support roles such as security checks for visitors.
1145. Officers pointed out that some transfers to hardship regions are a disciplinary tool used against the affected officers. Like deployments, transfers are used to extract sexual favours from female officers and those who reject such advances are moved to hardship areas.
1146. The Taskforce was informed of cases of officers who have worked in one station for more than 10 or even 25 years despite this being in contravention of KPS Standing Orders. In addition, the Taskforce was informed of cases where some officers had been transferred from one hardship area to another in violation of the provisions of the KPS Standing Orders.
1147. Besides, transfers are effected without notice or payment of transfer allowance. Officers stated that when the transfer allowance is eventually paid, it is often long after the transfer, which defeats the purpose it is meant to serve i.e. facilitate the officer's movement from their current station to the new one. This greatly prejudices the social, economic, and professional life of the affected officers and undermines their morale.
1148. Officers similarly pointed out that transfers within the Service are haphazard, and without consideration of time of the year, family structures, school calendar, or even health status of the affected officers.
1149. The general feeling among KPS officers on transfers was that there is nepotism, sexual harassment, favouritism, and corruption that in some instances overrides merit. Officers lamented that the appeal mechanisms against such transfers are not available, adequate, or known to them.

Findings and emerging issues

1150. The Taskforce established that similar to deployments, the lack of a transfer policy in the Service has created room for all manner of vices. It is clear that despite the existence of guidelines on transfer in the KPS Standing Orders, transfers are still riddled with corruption, sexual harassment, favouritism and nepotism.
1151. The use of transfers for disciplinary reasons is in clear violation of Standing Orders.

1152. The Taskforce further established that Regional Commanders can transfer officers within the regions only up to the rank of senior sergeant. These officers make up the bulk of the workforce in KPS. This power is exercised with no oversight, which loophole has left junior officers exposed to untold suffering, prejudice, unpredictability in transfers and abuse of power by the commanders.
1153. Since directorates are not decentralized to the counties or regions, Regional Commanders who do not have expertise on human capital management effect transfers without any consultations with the professional human resource management and development experts, who are not usually deployed to regions or stations.
1154. Under KPS Standing Orders, there are mechanisms for an officer to contest a transfer. However, majority of officers do not even know about that mechanism. The Taskforce is of the view that this mechanism does not work. Appeals are not practical since some of the transfers are initiated by the officers' immediate commanders, who are logically inclined to undermine and sabotage the appeal process.
1155. The Taskforce notes that the primary challenge with transfers is the senior leadership's lack of the right attitude, empathy, professionalism and competence in the management of the Service. The outcome of this is a Service of grossly demoralized officers. Indeed, in most stations visited, junior officers lamented about their poor relationship with their commanders.
1156. The Taskforce further noted that there are some officers who have overstayed in stations for multiple reasons, including personal or commercial interests, proximity to their home counties or places of residence, among other reasons unrelated to the Service. The Taskforce was informed that this practice has compromised professionalism and service delivery.
1157. However, the Taskforce notes and appreciates that there are also many commanders who are professional and selfless, are of high integrity and maintain cordial working relationships with senior and junior officers.

Recommendations

1158. After reviewing the submissions by all the relevant stakeholders and the public, the Taskforce observes that deployment and transfers are sometimes conducted by officers who are not human resource professionals. This breeds practices such as the use of deployment and transfers for purposes that are not based on proper interpretation and implementation of policies. To address these issues, the Taskforce recommends that:
- (a) All HR matters, including transfers, should be carried through the PSC integrated automated system for proper audit and accountability;
 - (b) KPS should revise the Prisons Service Standing Orders to align all the transfers of officers with school going children to be at the end of the school year;
 - (c) The Service should set timelines within which the transfer appeal is heard and determined (90 days recommended);
 - (d) The proposed Prisons Council should, within a year of its operationalisation, formulate human resource policies;
 - (e) KPS officers should be transferred after every three years;
 - (f) The transfer allowance should be remitted to the officer's account through the payroll;

- (g) Transfer of officers who are over 50 years of age should be to a county near their homes or a place of their choice to enable them reintegrate into the local community;
- (h) PSC and the proposed Prisons Council should exercise meaningful oversight on all delegated powers to the CGP, and where such powers are abused, the delegation should be withdrawn;
- (i) Within one year of publication of this Report, the CGP should revise Prisons Service Standing Orders to address human resource issues around transfers, deployment, and mechanisms to capture the recommendations of the Taskforce;
- (j) In the meantime, those officers performing HR functions should be trained on people skills and change management;
- (k) The CGP should undertake staff rationalisation for all officers for competence and suitability-based deployment;
- (l) Within six months of the publication of this Report, the CGP should carry out an audit of officers who have been in the same station for more than three years for the purposes of planning and budgeting for transfers;
- (m) There should be adherence to the re-designation policy for officers who intend to move out of the professional areas they were recruited into; and
- (n) The CGP should, within six months of publication of this Report, establish a confidential mechanism for reporting sexual harassment related to transfers and deployment, and institute stern sanctions against officers soliciting sexual favours for transfers and deployments.
- (o) The Task Force recommends that KPS officers deployed to non-core duties be returned to the Service for redeployment.

13.4 Training

Current context and practice

- 1159. The Prisons Staff Training College (PSTC) is mandated by Chapter 5 of the Prisons Service Standing Orders and the revised Scheme of Service for KPS uniformed personnel to conduct training for prisons officers from constables up to the rank of Chief Inspector of Prisons (CIP).
- 1160. The Madoka Committee recommended that the ministry provides financial management training to officers-in-charge of prisons as they have unfailingly exhibited major weaknesses in the area. This was evidenced by the number of audit queries that had consistently been raised by the Controller of Budget and Auditor-General. The Madoka Committee recommended that gazetted officers should undergo development or management courses at the Kenya School of Government.
- 1161. The Prisons Staff Training College accommodation capacity is 3,000 per intake. The college offers the following categories of courses:
 - (a) Nine (9) months Initial Training Course for newly recruited Constables;
 - (b) Thirteen (13) months Initial Training Course for newly recruited Cadet Officers;
 - (c) Development courses for newly promoted Non-Commissioned Officers and Inspectors;

- (d) Drills and duties basic and advanced courses for instructors and potential instructors;
- (e) Administration of penal institutions seminar for officers-in-charge;
- (f) In-house seminars for trainers;
- (g) Tailor-made courses for officers performing special duties; and
- (h) Refresher courses.

Prisons, public and stakeholder views

1162. The Taskforce was informed that funds for critical areas such as training have in the past either been returned or re-allocated to cater for non- prioritised items, more often than not without the knowledge of the Commissioner-General of Prisons. This means that majority of the prisons officers do not get opportunities for further training after the completion of the initial training at the Prisons Staff Training College (PSTC).
1163. There is also a challenge with accommodation facilities as the infrastructural capacity at the college can only accommodate a maximum of 3,000 course participants or trainees at any one time.
1164. The Madoka Committee recommended that the college be fully utilised with regular training programmes to build capacity for all ranks within the Service. The Taskforce was, however, informed that the Service has neither senior officers' training courses nor a training programme specific to officers of the rank of Superintendent of Prisons (SPs) and above. However, the Service has made efforts to construct a senior training wing at the Prisons Staff Training College, Ruiru, with a maximum class capacity of 200 senior officers and boarding facilities for 50 course participants.
1165. The shift from punishment to rehabilitation of offenders demands specialised and complex training approaches. To ensure that prison officers remain aligned with international best practices in corrections, it is crucial to prioritise continuous capacity building for instructors through local and international training programmes and educational benchmarking with well-established correctional systems.
1166. As a result, there is a pressing need to create additional training centres that offer ongoing instruction to cultivate diverse skills in correctional management. Examples of such training centres include satellite colleges that provide training in unique skills, such as handling children in conflict with the law, vulnerable groups, violent extremism and prison telecommunication and signals.
1167. It was also submitted that the shift from punishment to rehabilitation of offenders demands specialised and complex training approaches.
1168. The Taskforce also noted that KPS lacks a driving school to impart specialised driving skills in tandem with the nature of work of the Service.
1169. The KPS chaplaincy department submitted that their personnel have been overlooked in government-sponsored training in courses on management, rehabilitation skills, emerging security issues, cultism and radicalisation trends. They also decried lack of religious literature, Bibles or Korans, teaching manuals and Sacramental or ritual elements, lack of sufficient numbers of trained chaplaincy personnel to meet the spiritual needs of KPS fraternity, and lack of stationery supplies to facilitate training and religious instruction to the inmates.

1170. The Madoka Committee recommended that officers who had served for more than five years should be given an opportunity to attend refresher courses. However, the Taskforce was informed that majority of KPS officers do not get opportunities for refresher training after the completion of the initial training at the Prisons Staff Training College (PSTC) due to inadequate resources.
1171. Officers stated that training opportunities are often more readily available to senior officers than to their junior counterparts. This is despite the fact that training and capacity development is integral and increases proficiency in an organisation. KPS officers stated that training support is often offered by non-state actors, which makes it unsustainable.
1172. Stakeholders noted that there is urgent need to streamline the initial and in-service training curriculum to incorporate international human rights standards. They further observed that the training curriculum for prison officers requires a paradigm shift from a focus on containment to rehabilitation. It is apparent that the major focus of training at the PSTC is to produce a prisons security officer and not a correctional or rehabilitation officer.
1173. The Office of Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) submitted that the ever-evolving nature and increasing sophistication of crime calls for continuous and extensive training for the various law enforcement agencies. Further, criminal justice actors need to be in consonance in the fight against crime, including undertaking joint trainings. This will require that the training curriculum should be continuously reviewed to reflect those emerging issues.
1174. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) observed that there is need for continuous review of the training programmes and curricula to ensure recruits are imbued with modern skills in tandem with the evolving rehabilitative and human rights trends. The Commission called for an integrated approach to human rights in all trainings offered by the Service. The Commission further proposed that at pass-out, officers should be awarded a diploma or certificate indicating the course content and subsequent academic award. This is meant to boost officers' morale as well as chart out their career progression with recognised accredited certificates.
1175. The Taskforce was informed of an unresolved concern regarding an arrangement between the KPS and Kenyatta University in 2016 that would have allowed officers to undertake a degree course at the university. Officers complained that they were coerced to undertake studies, with some taking personal loans, and yet the programme was later abandoned and they have never graduated.
1176. The officers noted that the Madoka Committee recommended a radical reshuffle of substantive training personnel to ensure that office holders are competent and qualified professional staff in order to streamline the training component in the Service. The Taskforce was informed that this has not been done as superintendents in charge of borstal institutions are uniformed officers and not trained professional teachers capable of handling unique children matters.
1177. The Taskforce was informed that some trained teachers in the Service are sometimes assigned general duties instead of teaching responsibilities. This negatively affects teaching and learning, leading to poor performance by learners. In addition, the general duties assigned to teachers overwhelm them, leading to delays in submission of education reports to Service headquarters. Similarly, it was reported that trained teachers in correctional institutions remain in one job group longer than their counterparts employed by the Teachers Service Commission (TSC).

1178. It was submitted that majority of the schools in correctional institutions do not have the required textbooks, set books, reference books, examination revision books, Competency-based Curriculum (CBC) designs and other necessary items like calculators, mathematical sets and tables, chalks and pens. They also do not have adequate ideal buildings required to facilitate learning for offenders. Prisons industry is a major rehabilitation programme provider for offenders in the Kenya Prisons Service, undertaking vocational training of inmates as a means to prepare them for reintegration into society upon their release. However, there is no scheme of service for technical officers and artisans who are in charge of this vocational training.
1179. The leadership and officers of KPS were keen on the accreditation of their training college and recognition of various certificates issued by the institution.

Findings and emerging issues

1180. The Taskforce established that the basic training curriculum for KPS officers is heavily focused on paramilitary training, with limited focus on the rehabilitative and correctional mission of the Service.
1181. The Taskforce further established that the Service curriculum is yet to go through the requisite stages of approval and adoption. It was observed that the current curriculum is outdated and replete with old methods of training. The Taskforce was informed that efforts to enlist the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development (KICD) to finalise curriculum development process was frustrated by a lack of commitment and resources. As a result, the Service continues to use a draft curriculum since 2005, which in itself is an illegality.
1182. Further, the PSTC is not accredited and the certificates issued to officers are, therefore, not recognised outside the Service. This is an issue that has occasioned discontent among officers. Without an accreditation system, there is no quality control over training offered in the college.
1183. The Taskforce established that there is no structured system for continuous training of officers, and training opportunities are not available on merit. Lack of funding support for continuous training further means only a few opportunities are available for officers. The Service over-relies on actors such as development partners and civil society to organise, conduct and fund trainings, which is not sustainable.
1184. Instructors in the PSTC are not well trained, do not have access to modern and relevant training materials, and are poorly motivated.

Recommendations

1185. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations to improve training and capacity development in KPS:
- (a) The Service should develop a training policy to provide for structured training for all cadres of officers;
 - (b) KPS should undertake a comprehensive overhaul and review of the curriculum content and ensure the curriculum is approved and validated. The review of the training curriculum should include modules on corruption, governance, integrity issues and climate change, among other relevant areas;
 - (c) Initial training for cadet officers should take not less than 15 months and the initial basic training for constables should not be less than 12 months. This would give

recruits ample time to undertake relevant theoretical and practical training, including field attachments;

- (d) KPS should expand the current infrastructure at the PSTC to adequately cater for recruits and cadets;
- (e) KPS should establish a college for middle and senior level officers, separate from PSTC;
- (f) The Service should ensure full implementation of the annual training projections;
- (g) The Service should embrace full automation in the management of training;
- (h) KPS should ensure accreditation of PSTC to ensure that its certificates are recognised;
- (i) The State Department responsible for the Service should ensure provision of adequate funding for training programmes in the Service;
- (j) The Service should ensure continuous professional development courses for all officers in their respective professions;
- (k) KPS should introduce quality assurance mechanisms for all courses;
- (l) KPS should establish regional training centres or collaborate with existing NPS centres;
- (m) CGP should develop and implement a training policy for non-uniformed officers; and
- (n) CGP should establish strategies for collaboration with institutions of higher learning and the National Defence University.

13.5 Career progression, schemes of service, reward and promotion

Context and practice

- 1186. One of the mandates of the Taskforce was to review human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in career progression, performance-based and competitive promotions, and rewards, and to recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in KPS.
- 1187. Career progression in the context of KPS is anchored on a structured system that recognises and rewards performance, experience and qualifications. Career progression aims to advance the growth of an individual's career over time. This requires the sequential development and movement of an individual through different stages in the profession.
- 1188. For one to be eligible to advance from one rank to another, one is required to meet certain criteria, such as minimum experience, possession of relevant qualifications and some mandatory training, which in many instances involves sitting examinations.
- 1189. Currently the Scheme of Service for uniformed prisons personnel provides for clear and concise job descriptions and specifications at all levels of KPS within the grading structures. The scheme was first developed in 2004 and reviewed on October 7, 2014. The aims and objectives of the scheme are:

- (a) to provide for a well-defined career structure, which will attract, motivate and facilitate retention of suitably qualified and competent prisons uniformed personnel;
 - (b) to provide for clearly defined job descriptions and specifications, delineating duties and responsibilities at all levels within the career structure to enable officers understand the requirements and demands of their job;
 - (c) to establish standards for recruitment, training and advancement within the career structure on the basis of qualifications, knowledge of the job, merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results;
 - (d) to ensure appropriate career planning and succession management; and
 - (e) advancement from one grade to another under the scheme will depend on the existence of a vacancy in the authorised establishment, merit and approval of the Public Service Commission.
1190. Scheme is administered by the Principal Secretary responsible for the Kenya Prisons Service function, in conjunction with the CGP. In administering the scheme, the two office holders are expected to ensure strict compliance with the provisions of the Constitution for fair and equitable treatment of staff. (see Appendix 1 and 2, Part III of the report for details on appointments and promotions in KPS).

Prisons, public and stakeholders' views

1191. From the Taskforce's field visits and the submissions received, it emerged that promotion of officers in all ranks is often not based on merit. Officers submitted that there is need to develop a well-structured and consistent upward career progression system in the Service.
1192. The Taskforce was informed that many officers have stagnated in their job groups for too long. The career progression of graduate constables and those who have earned degrees while in the Service is not clear, leading to discontent and low morale among officers.
1193. Officers pointed out that there is need for SRC to separate salary scales for inspectors and senior sergeants as well as chief inspector and superintendent of Prisons, including payment of allowances, since they share job groups.
1194. Stakeholders submitted that there is need to review the Kenya Prisons Service Standing Orders and the Scheme of Service to align them with career progression guidelines for proper service delivery by KPS officers.
1195. The stakeholders submitted that there is need to create new a rank of Assistant Superintendent of Prisons (ASP) after collapsing Assistant Commissioner of Prisons (ACP) and Deputy Commissioner of Prisons (DCP) to form a new rank known as Commissioner of Prisons (CP)
1196. Officers further pointed out that lack of continuous professional development within the Service negatively impacts their career progression. Implementation of career progression guidelines is a challenge. Officers were of the view that promotion boards in KPS were excessively bureaucratic in nature and therefore frustrating to officers seeking promotion. They also perceive the boards to be unethical and lacking in professionalism.

1197. The officers also asserted that the Government Human Resource Information System (GHRIS), which encompasses recruitment, promotion, transfer and deployment processes, as well as performance management, has not been fully operationalised in KPS.
1198. Stakeholders proposed that the recruitment of constables and corporals be classified in the following manner:
- (a) Constable grade III (Upgraded F);
 - (b) Constable grade II (Upgraded G) 9 years of service;
 - (c) Constable grade I (Upgraded H) 18 years' service;
 - (d) Corporal grade II (Upgraded G) plus Corporal allowance; and
 - (e) Corporal grade I (Upgraded H) 4 years as Corporal plus Corporal allowance.
1199. Stakeholders explained that these changes will ensure that even if an officer retires in the lower ranks, at least the officer will have achieved three pay grades in service before exit. It was further submitted that there is need to consider up scaling the academic entry requirements for KPS officers to accommodate and attract special skills from persons in possession of recognised certification. Further, they proposed the rationalisation of the required strength of a correctional facility so that officers can be released for leave or training as may be necessary.
1200. Further, the officers submitted that KPS has challenges retaining professionals because of the poor terms and conditions and lack of career progression.

Findings

1201. The Taskforce established that the existing Scheme of Service is not being implemented as required. The result is that many officers have stagnated, some even retiring after serving for very long in one rank without any hope of promotion or advancement.
1202. The Taskforce notes that the Service does not have schemes of service for the various professionals hired, which leads to cases of misplaced deployment. This means that their skills are not utilised appropriately and their potential is wasted. There are many officers who were recruited as artisans and have not been promoted beyond the rank of constable.
1203. The Taskforce was informed that career progression from one rank to the next is mired in bribery, corruption, tribalism, nepotism and favouritism. The failure to automate human resource processes in the management of the Service significantly contributes to the lack of transparency and corruption in the system.
1204. Promotions have not adhered to the principles and values of gender equity enshrined in the Constitution as male officers dominate most of the prominent offices in KPS, particularly the top management in the directorates and regional commands.
1205. The Taskforce further established that KPS does not have career progression guidelines but a scheme of service, which is old, archaic, outdated and not alive to modern corrections management and emerging trends.
1206. The Taskforce was informed that there is a long-standing problem with the alignment of job groups in KPS with those of NPS. The Taskforce notes that the Public Service Commission and SRC have directed that the alignment of job groups and salary scales be undertaken. This has not happened, thus causing discontent within the Service.

Recommendations

1207. As we have stated, career progression is critical for attracting, retaining and motivating employees in any organisation. Without it, it is impossible to retain the best skill set in the market, which leads to high employee turnover, poor organisational commitment and general lack of morale among officers. Indeed, the Taskforce found a greatly demoralised KPS workforce that has lost hope of ever advancing beyond their current ranks due to the outdated career progression guidelines. To address these issues, the Taskforce recommends that:

- (a) the CGP, in consultation with PSC, should formulate Career Progression Guidelines that will address issues of stagnation of KPS officers;
- (b) The CGP should review the Career Progression Guidelines to ensure professional and technical officers are taken care of;
- (c) PSC and the CGP should ensure that KPS fully embraces and applies the Government Human Resource Information System and that it is implemented to manage all KPS human resource functions;
- (d) The State Department responsible for the Service should review and implement the recommendations of PSC and SRC regarding the alignment of job groups in the Service, pay groups, and salary scales to align with those of NPS. The NPSC created the rank of ASP, which is not in the KPS ranks. To align the ranks in the two Services, there is need to create a corresponding rank in KPS. The Taskforce, therefore, recommends the introduction of the rank of ASP to address the disharmony in the ranks and job groups in the two Services.

1208. In order to address the challenges related to the command and reporting structure in NPS, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) The Cabinet Secretary should introduce a three-tier KPS ranking structure, and all prisons officers should have seniority according to their position in the three-tier ranking structure as follows:

Kenya Prisons Service Gazetted officers Ranks

- (i) Commissioner-General of Prisons (proposed to be State Officer)
- (ii) Deputy Commissioners-General of Prisons
- (iii) Senior Assistant Commissioners-General of Prisons;
- (iv) Assistant Commissioners-General of Prisons;
- (v) Commissioners of Prisons;
- (vi) Senior Superintendents of Prisons;
- (vii) Superintendents of Prisons; and
- (viii) Assistant Superintendents of Prisons.

Kenya Prisons Service Inspectorate Ranks

- (i) Chief Inspectors of Prisons; and
- (ii) Inspector (II and I).

Kenya Prisons Service Subordinate Officers Ranks

- (i) Senior Sergeant;

- (ii) Sergeant
- (iii) Corporal (III, II and I); and
- (iv) Constable (III, II, and I);
- (b) PSC and the Service should develop clear career progression pathways to stem high staff turnover among the professionals in the Service;
- (c) PSC and the Service should halt cases of unnecessary appointment of retired or retiring officers on contract once they reach the mandatory retirement age;
- (d) KPS should fill currently vacant top-level positions in their authorised establishments. This will enable efficient service delivery and enhance succession management;
- (e) KPS should undertake a process to promote officers into the vacant positions in their authorised establishments. This will raise the morale of the officers and enhance service delivery;
- (f) KPS needs to review its authorised establishments to align with the proposals made by the Taskforce;
- (g) KPS should align its recruitment with the authorised establishment; and
- (h) The review of KPS organogram should make it conform to the approved establishment.

13.6 Reward and sanctions

1209. Rewards and sanctions play a central role in KPS as they are a means of recognizing and motivating staff, encouraging professional development, enhancing the Service's public image and improving employee engagement and retention. Currently, an officer who attains excellent performance or highest mark of honour can be considered for any of the following awards: an extra one month's salary (13th month basic salary); a promotion; Letter of Commendation by the authorized officer; and Roll of Honour. Excelling employees may also be considered for nomination for National Honours and Awards by His Excellency the President.

Prisons, public and stakeholder views

- 1210. The officers submitted that in recognition of exemplary performance, deserving performers should be given priority when it comes to awards.
- 1211. Further, it was submitted that modalities for streamlining KPS national nomination for awards should be introduced, with core consideration pegged on seniority and merit.
- 1212. Henceforth, proper award policies and regulations need to be put in place and implemented. Cases of lack of transparency and accountability in the issue of awards were cited in submissions made to the Taskforce.
- 1213. It was proposed that a performance management system be introduced and key staff involved in the implementation of the strategy trained. Some stakeholders suggested there is need to develop proper criterion for consideration of national honours and awards.
- 1214. Officers in forward areas submitted that they do not get rewards, and are neglected in the operation areas; they called on the CS and Principal Secretary to visit and appreciate their work.

Findings

- 1215. The Taskforce established that the current system of rewards and sanctions is inefficient, ineffective, opaque, and unaccountable.
- 1216. It was also established that there is no career reward policy in the Service.
- 1217. Further, where award processes are conducted, only officers in the urban areas are involved as those in marginal areas are often left out due to signal challenges and the inability to properly engage with the mainstream Service.

Recommendations

- 1218. During field visits, the Taskforce witnessed some KPS officers who deserve reward for exhibiting exemplary commitment to innovation and cleanliness in some stations. The Taskforce is aware of the Public Service Excellence Awards (PSEA). However, Covid-19 appears to have disrupted the process of awarding deserving public officers. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding rewards:
 - (a) KPS should introduce a reward and sanctions scheme and strategy for rewarding excellence and exemplary performance, including in regional and international fora;
 - (b) There should be complete automation of the process of application for recognition of merit. This information should be retained in the website for a prescribed period;
 - (c) The CGP should develop a reward and recognition scheme and strategy to ensure deserving officers get the necessary recognition;
 - (d) The CGP should ensure that identification and nomination of deserving officers involves public participation; and
 - (e) The Service should provide for structured and regular identification of suitable officers, including scheduled and impromptu visits to KPS facilities.

Exit and post-exit management

- 1219. The Taskforce was required to look into various aspects of the exit and post-exit management of Kenya Prisons Service with the aim of addressing gaps and challenges to improve effectiveness and service delivery. Specifically, the Taskforce looked into various issues, including pre-exit training, financial training, posting to home regions at least three years to retirement, retirement, pension and benefits for dependents, send-off (on death, retirement on medical grounds), exit on the basis of dismissal and desertion, substance abuse and terminal illness, pension fraud and post-exit management.
- 1220. Previous taskforces and committees had identified gaps and challenges linked to exit and post-exit management for KPS officers, which are reiterated in the findings of this Report.

Current context and practice

- 1221. The Public Service Commission's Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual provides for the retirement procedure for public servants, including KPS officers. As provided in the manual, officers are to be notified at least nine (9) months before retirement date and processing of pension expedited. There are clear guidelines for exit on medical grounds, and for exit through resignation, among others.

1222. The Government has established the Public Service Superannuation Scheme for civil servants, teaching service and the disciplined Services. It is a retirement benefits scheme under the Retirement Benefits Act, 1997.
1223. Further, an officer can exit the Service through retirement after having worked for 12 or 20 years.
1224. Statistically, a total of 2,141 officers retired between 2012 and 2022. The year 2022 had the highest number of officers retiring: 310 officers left the Service. The rank of Corporal had the highest number retiring (587 officers), followed by that of Prisons Constable (510 officers). The rank of Deputy Commissioner of Prisons had the lowest number of retirees (2 officers), followed by that of Senior Deputy Commissioner of Prisons (5 officers). Corporals had the highest proportion (27%) of retirees, followed by Prisons Constables (24%). The rank of Deputy Commissioner of Prisons had the least proportion (0.1%) of retirees, followed by Senior Deputy Commissioner of Prisons (0.2%).

Table 13. 4: Retirement data between 2012 and 2022.

Year	PC	CPL	SGT	SSGT	IP	CIP	SP	SSP	ACP	SACP	DCP	SDCP	ACGP	SACGP	Total
2012	10	6	1	3	2	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	24
2013	21	9	1	8	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44
2014	65	50	40	30	11	9	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	209
2015	52	57	38	24	17	18	3	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	213
2016	68	67	37	25	16	13	14	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	244
2017	41	48	31	28	11	10	1	-	3	1	-	1	-	-	175
2018	69	76	43	34	17	13	8	6	2	1	-	3	-	-	272
2019	69	67	32	24	21	5	2	7	3	2	1	1	-	1	235
2020	41	60	49	39	17	6	8	2	6	2	-	-	-	2	232
2021	34	60	31	11	17	12	8	3	5	-	-	-	1	1	183
2022	40	87	52	63	29	8	13	4	7	1	-	-	4	2	310
Total	510	587	355	289	161	96	60	27	29	8	2	5	6	6	2141
Prop	24%	27%	17%	13%	8%	4%	3%	1%	1%	0.4%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	

Source: Kenya Prisons Service

Again, the number of retirees is highest in the lower ranks because of lack of promotions. Similarly, the higher ranks have the lowest retirement rates as there are fewer occupants in those positions.

Submissions from prisons, public and stakeholders

1225. The Taskforce was informed that the Service has no retirement policy, which would provide training programmes to prepare officers for retirement in terms of time, financial and health management. KPS officers are not taught how to live post-service, and many of them die soon after retirement when confronted with drastic changes they are not prepared for.
1226. Further, it was submitted that there is no policy guiding pre- and post-exit management of KPS officers in several aspects, including: pension scheme, medical cover, access to mess and leave centres, utilisation as part-time or contract lecturers, state appointments and burial arrangements. Officers proposed that there be a policy for reintegration of officers back to their communities through postings close to their homes as they approach retirement age.
1227. The privileges enjoyed by senior officers of the rank of Assistant Commissioner-General of Prisons and higher are immediately withdrawn upon retirement. Attaining the rank of Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons and above is a competitive process that requires one to have commendably performed duties over a period of time. In line with

this provision, retention of these privileges serves as a reward mechanism to motivate other serving officers to diligently perform their duties and aim for higher ranks.

1228. There is no system in the Service to tap into and make use of the skills and expertise of some officers who retire at the peak of their careers.
1229. The Taskforce was informed that the processing of terminal benefits is quite bureaucratic and tedious. The duration it takes to calculate and remit retirement benefits does not favour retirees, who sometimes pass on before receiving their benefits.
1230. It was also submitted that upon retirement, officers' pensions are calculated based on "three years as not having been promoted rule", which disadvantages them. The current retirement benefits taxation is very high and the process of pension processing takes inordinately long.
1231. Dependents of officers who die in the line of duty submitted that they did not receive support from the Service in understanding how to access gratuity and benefits of the departed officers.
1232. It was further submitted that there is no benevolent fund to support officers' widows, widowers and orphaned children.
1233. Officers with disciplinary cases and those dismissed from the Service complained that their cases were not handled well by the Discipline Board.
1234. It was also submitted that desertion rules do not take into account the existing logistical challenges that arise when officers travel to their homes, which might be far flung.
1235. It was further submitted that there is an increasing number of officers who are struggling with drug and substance abuse, and remain in the Service. KPS does not have a policy on handling these cases, especially where officers do not respond to rehabilitation. This forces commanders to devote extra personnel to keep watch over them.
1236. Similarly, except for the HIV and Aids Policy and the Drug and Substance abuse Policy, the officers intimated that KPS does not have a policy on officers with terminal diseases that would allow them to continue serving close to their families for purposes of care and emotional support.

Pre-exit sensitisation and financial training

1237. The Taskforce forms the view that the Service has no retirement policy that would provide training programmes to prepare officers for retirement in terms of time, financial and health management. KPS officers are not trained on how to live post-service and many of them die soon after leaving the Service when confronted by drastic changes they are not prepared for.
1238. Further, the Taskforce established that there is no policy guiding pre- and post-exit management of KPS officers in several aspects, including: pension scheme, medical cover, access to mess and leave centres, utilisation as part-time or contract lecturers, state appointments and burial arrangements.
1239. Similarly, the Taskforce finds that there is no policy guiding reintegration of officers back to their communities through postings close to their homes as they approach retirement age.
1240. There is no system in the Service to tap into and make use of the skills and expertise of some officers who retire at the peak of their careers.

1241. The Taskforce established that the processing of terminal benefits is quite bureaucratic and tedious. The duration it takes to calculate and remit retirement benefits does not favour retirees, who sometimes pass on before their benefits are processed. The Taskforce further established that upon retirement, officers' pensions are calculated based on "three-years as not having been promoted rule", which disadvantages them. The current retirement benefits taxation is very high and the process of pension processing takes inordinately long.
1242. Dependents of officers who die in the line of duty submitted that they did not receive support from the Service in understanding how to access gratuity and benefits of the departed officers. It is also the Taskforce's finding that there is no benevolent fund to support officers' widows, widowers and orphaned children.
1243. The Taskforce observed that officers who complained of being treated unfairly leading to their dismissal on disciplinary grounds paint a disturbing image of the Service. Those who desert the Service for whatever reason show underlying problems.
1244. The Taskforce has noticed the increasing number of officers who are struggling with drug and substance abuse but are still in the Service. KPS does not have a policy on handling these cases, especially where officers do not respond to rehabilitation. This forces commanders to devote extra personnel and resources to keep watch over them, which resources could have been utilised elsewhere more productively.
1245. Similarly, the Taskforce found that except for the HIV and Aids Policy, and the Drug and Substance Abuse Policy, KPS does not have a policy on officers with terminal diseases that would allow them to continue serving close to their families for purposes of receiving care and emotional support.

Recommendations

1246. From the foregoing narrative, it is clear that the challenges the retired officers face are mainly around accessing their pensions and medical cover. The Taskforce recommends that to address these challenges:
 - (a) KPS should establish a liaison desk at the pension's office or a pensions officer should be stationed at the KPS headquarters to specifically address KPS officers' pension issues;
 - (b) The number of documents needed to process pension should be reduced by fully automating the process;
 - (c) KPS should sensitise officers and conduct pre-retirement training at least two years before retirement to ensure all documents required are in order to avoid delays and corruption;
 - (d) KPS should review and update the HIV and Aids Policy as well as the Drug and Substance Abuse Policy to cover emerging areas such as inability to work as a result of drug dependency;
 - (e) Like in KDF, Kenya Prisons Service and other disciplined Services must put in place a proper succession planning policy;
 - (f) Further, the renewal of contracts for the retired officers serving in KPS should cease;
 - (g) KPS should establish a contributory insurance fund, modelled along the Defence Forces Medical Insurance Scheme (DEFMIS) that will assist officers to access medical treatment in retirement; and
 - (h) The officer in-charge of prisons in a county should, in the event of the death of a retired prisons officer, facilitate a dignified send-off for the departed officer.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: REMUNERATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

14.1 Introduction

1247. The Taskforce was required to recommend a review of remuneration for members of KPS and consideration of new and applicable allowances for officers to enhance professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness.
1248. KPS as a whole consists of **31,227** uniformed officers spread across the Service. There are also non-uniformed officers working at the headquarters, Training College, and regional level as well as station level offering technical and various support services to the uniformed officers. The non-uniformed officers are part of the Civil Service, deployed to various government departments and Semi-Autonomous Government Agencies, including KPS hence, their remuneration conforms to that of the Civil Service and is not part of this Taskforce's review.
1249. The remuneration payable to members of KPS has been a key issue of public debate and focus in past reforms. There is a perception that low salaries and deplorable living and working conditions for members of KPS are directly linked to the poor performance of officers at work.
1250. Concerns over remuneration have been highlighted by previous Taskforces on KPS. The Madoka Committee noted that the remuneration of KPS officers did not consider their unique skills and the nature of their work. The Committee concluded that while the salary payable to lower cadre officers of KPS was comparable to other public service salaries at the same level, it was not adequate as it ignored the unique aspects of work carried out by prisons officers.
1251. The Taskforce undertook consultations with the KPS leadership, the Public Service Commission, Salaries and Remuneration Commission, National Treasury, Ministry of Housing, KPS officers, other key stakeholders and the citizens during public participation fora on the issues of remuneration for the Service.
1252. Written and verbal submissions to the Taskforce decried the poor salaries, working and living conditions for members of KPS, which were singled out as the main source of low morale among officers and a major contributor to depression and other mental health challenges within KPS.
1253. Currently, salaries in KPS are paid based on the salary structure approved by the Public Service Commission and SRC. The salary structure is divided into various salary points and specifies annual increments. The annual increment is awarded subject to the maximum basic salary for the rank, except where it is withheld on disciplinary grounds or any other reason provided in the Human Resource Procedures Manual. Gross salary is the total of basic salary and all payable allowances.
1254. Proposals for remuneration increases ranging from **100** per cent to **250** per cent were, therefore, made to the Taskforce.
1255. The Taskforce has, however, considered these proposals, against other factors, which include:
 - (a) The Country continues to face challenging external and domestic environment. In addition to the Covid-19 pandemic, Kenya has over the past two years, suffered a series of devastating negative and persistent shocks that include the worst drought

in decades as well as the adverse spill-overs from the conflict in Eastern Europe and tighter global financial market conditions;

- (b) Extreme climate change events have emerged as key drivers of food insecurity and increased cost of living. Indeed, many Kenyans are currently confronted with increasingly higher prices of basic commodities, especially food, energy and transport; and
 - (c) The ongoing Government interventions that are aimed at providing short-term solutions to the high cost of living, which include duty waiver for importation of key food products such as white maize, rice, yellow maize, soya beans, soya bean meal, assorted protein concentrate, and feed additives, in order to bridge the food stocks deficit as well as lower and stabilise food prices.
1256. The Taskforce determined that its terms of reference to recommend review of the remuneration for uniformed members of KPS required it to address three issues:
- (a) The system of remuneration and the need to establish an improved system of remuneration for uniformed members of KPS;
 - (b) The review of the basic salary structure to address poor salaries, working and living conditions for uniformed members of KPS.; and
 - (c) The consideration of new and applicable allowances for KPS.

14.2 System of Remuneration

1257. The Taskforce observes that concerns over remuneration have been highlighted by previous taskforces on KPS. The Madoka Committee noted that the remuneration of KPS officers did not consider their unique skills and the nature of their work. The Committee concluded that while the salary payable to lower cadre officers of KPS was comparable to other public service salaries at the same level, it was not adequate as it ignored the unique aspects of work carried out by prisons officers.
1258. The Taskforce notes that the Civil Service has, for a long time, used job groups in its grading until 2019, when it changed to the Civil Service Grade (CSG). The Disciplined Services use pay grades (PG), while the teaching service recently converted job groups to the T-Scale. While the disciplined Services are delinked from the Civil Service grades, the pay grades or scales rates are linked to the Civil Service Job Groups or (JG) (U, T, S, R, P, N, L, K, J, H, G, and F). The job groups are assigned to the KPS uniformed officers by PSC in accordance with section 98 of the Public Service Commission Act, 2017. This means that uniformed members of KPS receive relatively the same basic salary as members of the Civil Service, no matter the difference in their job descriptions, job specifications or roles and responsibilities because they belong to the same job groups. The only exceptions to this are KPS weighting and specific KPS allowances.
1259. The Taskforce concluded that the role of members of KPS cannot be compared with precision to any single job group in the Civil Service cadres for purposes of determining remuneration. In determining remuneration, **mixing the grading nomenclatures** as equivalent is incorrect. The Civil Service Job Groups should be for Civil Service only, the Teaching service T-Scale should be for teachers only and the Disciplined Service Pay Grades should be for KDF, NIS, NPS, KPS and NYS. The unique nature of the KPS and the work its members perform makes comparison or equating through job groups untenable. Table 13.1 illustrates how remuneration for members of KPS is determined through Civil Service Job Group classification and not Disciplined Services Pay Grade.

Table 14. 1: Civil Service system of remuneration based on Civil Service job group classification

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	Job Group	Basic Min	Basic Max
National Police Service Uniformed Personnel					
Inspector-General– Police (State Officer)	PG14	CC	U	459,113	
Deputy Inspector-General– Kenya Police (State Officer)	PG13	CC	T	372,750	
Senior Assistant Inspector–Police	PG12	CC	S	189,640	289,090
Assistant Inspector–Police	PG11	CC	R	151,550	197,830
Commissioner–Police	PG10	CC	P	103,360	144,090
Senior Superintendent–Police	PG 9	CC	N	68,720	98,380
Superintendent–Police	PG 8	CC	M	57,060	83,890
Assistant Superintendent–Police	PG 7	CC	L	53,570	81,120
Chief Inspector–Police	PG 6	AX	K	47,290	68,720
Inspector–Police	PG 5	CC	J	42,940	62,750
Senior Sergeant–Police	PG 4	AX	J	40,270	58,820
Sergeant–Police	PG 3	CC	H	36,450	53,570
Corporal–Police	PG 2	CC	G	26,500	50,330
Constable– Police	PG 1	CC	F	20,390	38,975
Kenya Prisons Service					
Commissioner General of Prisons	PG14	AU	U	292,765	576,120
Deputy Commissioner-General of Prisons	PG 13	AU	T	212,270	323,640
Senior Assistant Commissioner - General of Prisons	PG 12	AU	S	167,250	212,270
Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 11	AU	R	126,370	198,730
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	PG 10	AU	P	78,510	138,910
Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	PG 9	AU	M	68,720	98,380
Senior Superintendent of Prisons	PG 8	AU	L	57,060	83,890
Superintendent of Prison	PG 7	AU	K	48,780	73,310
Chief Inspector - Prisons	PG 6	AX	K	47,290	68,720
Inspector– Prisons	PG 5	AU	J	42,940	62,750
Senior Sergeant–Prisons	PG 4	AX	J	40,270	58,820
Sergeant–Prisons	PG 3	AU	H	36,450	53,570
Corporal–Prisons	PG 2	AU	G	26,500	50,330
Constable– Prisons	PG 1	AU	F	20,740	38,980
Civil Service (Non-Uniformed Officers NPS, KPS, NYS)					
Secretary	CSG4	AA	T	169,140	324,430
Director	CSG5	AA	S	133,870	197,800
Deputy Director	CSG6	AA	R	99,900	169,140
Assistant Director	CSG7	AA	P	87,360	121,430
Principal Officer	CSG8	AA	N	49,000	87,360
Senior Officer	CSG9	AA	L	42,970	59,120
Officer I	CSG10	AA	K	38,270	51,170
Officer II	CSG11	AA	J	31,270	41,260
Officer Assistant III	CSG12	AA	H	25,470	33,950
Technicians I	CSG13	AA	G	22,270	30,020
Technicians II	CSG14	AA	F	16,890	20,800
Senior Support Staff	CSG15	AA	E	15,670	17,570
Support Staff I	CSG16	AA	D	14,610	16,250
Support Staff II	CSG17	AA	C	13,280	15,120

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	Job Group	Basic Min	Basic Max
National Youth Service (NYS)					
Director-General– NYS		AZ	U		
Director-General–NYS	PG15	AV	T	169,140	324,430
Deputy Director-General– NYS	PG14	AV	S	133,870	197,800
Senior Deputy-Director [1] –NYS	PG13	AV	R	121,430	169,140
Senior Deputy-Director [2] –NYS	PG12	AV	Q	99,900	133,870
Deputy-Director–NYS	PG11	AV	P	87,360	121,430
Senior Assistant Director– NYS	PG10	AV	N	66,500	90,550
Assistant Director–NYS	PG09	AV	M	58,600	83,180
Senior Superintendent–NYS	PG08	AV	L	49,780	71,050
Superintendent–NYS	PG07	AZ	K	43,250	62,190
Chief Inspector–NYS	PG06	AV	K	41,990	58,600
Inspector–NYS	PG05	AV	J	38,340	54,190
Senior Sergeant–NYS	PG04	AZ	J	36,240	51,250
Sergeant–NYS	PG03	AV	H	33,300	47,040
Corporal–NYS	PG02	AV	G	24,860	44,500
Private–NYS	PG01	AV	F	18,730	30,420
Teaching Service (TSC)					
Chief Principal	T-Scale 15	AB		131,380	157,656
Senior Principal	T-Scale 14	AB		118,242	141,891
Principal	T-Scale 13	AB		104,644	125,573
Deputy Principal III	T-Scale 12	AB		91,041	109,249
Senior Headmaster	T-Scale 11	AB		77,840	93,408
Head teacher	T-Scale 10	AB		62,272	77,840
Senior Lecturer IV	T-Scale 09	AB		52,308	65,385
Secondary Teacher I	T-Scale 08	AB		43,154	53,943
Secondary Teacher II	T-Scale 07	AB		34,955	43,694
Secondary Teacher III	T-Scale 06	AB		27,195	33,994
Primary Teacher II	T-Scale 05	AB		21,756	27,195

Sources: Computation from NPS, KPS, NYS, CS and TSC basic salary structures

Civil Service job groups classification and salary scales

Comparison of basic salary for Job Group ‘F’ and equivalent grades in the various services

1260. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for the Police Constable, Prisons Constable, Clerical Officer II and NYS Private is determined by Job Group ‘F’. Therefore, the minimum basic salary for a Constable of Police is KSh. 20,390 and a maximum of KSh. 38,975; minimum basic salary for a Constable of Prisons is KSh. 20,740 and a maximum of KSh. 38,980, while the minimum basic salary for a Private in NYS is KSh. 18,730 and a maximum of KSh. 30,420. In comparison, a Civil Servant at Job Group ‘F’ equivalent has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 16,890 with a maximum of KSh. 20,800. The Civil Service Pay Group assumes that the Police Constable, Prisons Constable and NYS Private share job descriptions or job specifications with Clerical Officer II.

Table 14. 2: Basic salary comparison for Job Group ‘F’ equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Constable –Police	20,390	38,975
Constable –Prisons	20,740	38,980
Clerical Officer II–CS	16,890	20,800
Private–NYS	18,730	30,420

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Comparison of basic salary for Job Group ‘G’ and equivalent grades in the various services

1261. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for corporals in NPS, KPS, and NYS as well as Clerical Officer I and Primary Teacher II is determined by Job Group ‘G’. The minimum basic salary for a Corporal of Police and Prisons is KSh. 26,500 and a maximum of KSh. 50,330; while the minimum basic salary for a Corporal in NYS is KSh. 24,860 and a maximum of KSh. 44,500. In comparison, a Civil Servant at Job Group ‘G’ equivalent earns a minimum basic salary of KSh. 22,270 and a maximum of KSh. 30,020 while in the Teaching service, teachers at TScale 5 have a minimum basic salary of KSh. 21,756 with a maximum of KSh. 27,195. The Civil Service Pay Group assumes that the corporal of Police, Prisons, and NYS share job descriptions or job specifications with Clerical Officer I and Primary Teacher II.

Table 14. 3: Basic salary comparison JG ‘G’ equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Corporal –Police	26,500	50,330
Corporal –Prisons	26,500	50,330
Clerical Officer I - CS	22,270	30,020
Corporal –NYS	24,860	44,500
Primary Teacher II	21,756	27,195

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Comparison of basic salary for Job Group ‘P’ and equivalent grades in the various Services

1262. Due to differences in grading structures, the nomenclature adopted for various managerial positions in the uniformed Services differs at higher ranks, e.g., at Job Group ‘P’ equivalent in NPS has Commissioner of Police while KPS has Deputy Commissioner of Prisons. There will be a need for harmonisation of nomenclatures in the various uniformed Services to enable peer comparisons and interaction.
1263. However, under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for the Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, Assistant Director in the Civil Service, Deputy Director – NYS, Senior Headmaster – TSC, is determined by Job Group ‘P’.
1264. The minimum basic salary for a Commissioner of Police is KSh. 103,360 and a maximum of KSh. 144,090. The minimum basic salary for a Deputy Commissioner of Prisons is KSh. 78,510 and a maximum of KSh. 138,910. The minimum basic salary for a Deputy Director in NYS and a Civil Servant at Job Group ‘P’ equivalent has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 87,360 and a maximum of KSh. 121,430. In the teaching service, a teacher at TScale 11 has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 77,840 with a maximum of KSh. 97,408. This indicates that the Commissioner of Police at NPS earns a higher minimum and maximum basic salary than the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, who in turn earns higher than the Deputy Director at NYS and a Civil Servant at Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades. It is worth noting that the remuneration at this grade has been harmonised for NYS and the Civil Service. The teaching service has the least basic salary at JG ‘P’ equivalent grades.

Table 14. 4: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in the various services

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Commissioner – Police	103,360	144,090
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	78,510	138,910
Assistant Director – CS	87,360	121,430
Deputy Director – NYS	87,360	121,430
Senior Headmaster – TSC	77,840	93,408

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades

1265. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, pay for a Police constable, a Prisons constable, an NYS Private, and a KDF Private is determined by Job Group 'F'. Yet a Private with the KDF has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 33,193 and a maximum of KSh. 34,772 compared to the minimum basic salary for a Constable of Police at KSh. 20,390 and a maximum of KSh. 38,975; the minimum basic salary for a Constable of Prisons is KSh. 20,740 and the maximum is KSh. 38,980, while the minimum basic salary for a Private in NYS is KSh. 18,730 and a maximum of KSh. 30,420. This indicates that a Private with KDF earns a higher minimum basic salary than the Constable at KPS, who in turn earns a slightly higher minimum basic salary than the Constable at NPS and the Private at NYS. The maximum basic salaries for constables at NPS and KPS are higher than those for the Private at the KDF.

Table 14. 5: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Constable – Police	20,390	38,975
Constable – Prisons	20,740	38,980
Private – NYS	18,730	30,420
Private – KDF	33,193	34,772

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades

1266. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for a Commissioner of Police, a Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, a Deputy Director – NYS, and a Warrant Officer 1 is placed at Job Group 'P'. Yet the minimum basic salary for a Commissioner of Police is KSh. 103,360 and a maximum of KSh. 144,090. The minimum basic salary for a Deputy Commissioner of Prisons is KSh. 78,510 and a maximum of KSh. 138,910. The minimum basic salary for a Deputy Director in NYS is KSh. 87,360 and a maximum of KSh. 121,430. In KDF, Warrant Officer 1 has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 81,216 with a maximum of KSh. 84,415. This indicates that the Commissioner of Police at NPS earns a higher minimum and maximum basic salary than the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, who in turn earns a higher salary than the Deputy Director at NYS even though all of them are Job Group 'P' equivalents. The Warrant Officer 1 at KDF has the least basic salary maximum at Job Group 'P' equivalent grades.

Table 14. 6: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Commissioner -- Police	103,360	144,090
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	78,510	138,910
Deputy Director -- NYS	87,360	121,430
Warrant Officer 1 -- KDF	81,216	84,415

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Analysis of incremental notches

1267. The Taskforce examined incremental notches from the minimum basic salary to the maximum salary for uniformed officers in KPS. The Taskforce notes that SRC advised public entities to align their current salary structure in salary grades as evaluated **with salary structures of between eight (8) and 12 salary points**. This, advice, can therefore be taken as the current policy on salary structuring. It is therefore important to align all salary structures to the SRC advice of between eight (8) and 12 salary points.
1268. KPS has a 14-tier grading structure from PG1 to PG14. The salary structure developed for each pay grade is summarised in Table 14.7. P13 and P14 are state officers whose salaries are determined by SRC.
- All KPS job grades have a salary structure that is in line with SRC advice on the minimum of eight (8) salary scale points;
 - All incremental notches are in line with SRC policy advice;
 - KPS salary structure is enhanced to what pertains in the wider Civil Service at equivalent job groups for grades up to Job Group ‘N’ equivalent. For higher grades, the salary structures are more or less similar;
 - For PG 1 and PG 2, the longer incremental notches accord the officers enhanced salary over time and therefore should be maintained; and
 - The KPS job grades PG5, PG7, PG10, PG11 and PG14 need restructuring since they are not in line with the minimum eight (8) salary points.

Table 14. 7: Incremental notches from minimum to maximum salary for uniformed officers in KPS

Prisons Job Grade	Minimum Basic Salary	Number of Incremental Notches	Maximum Basic Salary
PG 14	292,765	11	576,120
PG13	212,270	8	339,361
PG12	167,250	8	257,257
PG11	126,370	10	198,730
PG10	90,813	17	138,910
PG9	68,720	11	98,380
PG8	57,060	12	83,890
PG7	48,780	13	73,310
PG6	47,290	12	68,720
PG5	42,940	13	64,581
PG4	40,270	12	60,688
PG3	36,450	12	55,354
PG2	26,500	19	52,048
PG1	20,926	19	40,330

Source: SRC/KPS

Remuneration gaps across disciplined services

1269. The Taskforce noted that pay review and increases for members of NPS, KPS and NYS have been closely linked to annual basic salary movement and incremental notches designed for the wider public service sector or Civil Service Job Groups and not for KDF or Disciplined Services Pay Grades. As a result, NPS, KPS and NYS remuneration, or average earnings, do not take into account all aspects of changes in remuneration for disciplined Services. Since 2012, remuneration and review for members of NPS, KPS, and NYS have not broadly kept pace with that of members of KDF.

1270. The Taskforce compared the basic salary structure between KDF, NPS and KPS. It found that average earnings for members of KDF were higher on the minimum basic salary scale while members of NPS, KPS and NYS average earnings were higher on the maximum basic salary scale. The Taskforce observed that minimum basic salary scale rates for members of KDF are generally 20 to 40 per cent higher than those of members of NPS, KPS and NYS for similar lower ranks or equivalent job group, and generally 8 to 10 per cent more for higher ranks or equivalent job group. Some of the grades in KDF under comparison with NPS, KPS, and NYS have relatively short salary structures, meaning that officers must progress within a very short period otherwise they would stagnate should they not get promoted.

Table 14. 8: Remuneration gaps across disciplined services

Rank & Grade	Kenya Defence Forces			National Police Service			Kenya Prisons Service			
	Ranks	Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum
PC	Private	33193-34772	PG 1	20390-38975	12803 - (-4203)	39% - (-12%)	PG 1	20740-38980	12453 - (-4208)	38% - (-12%)
CPL	S/ Private	36541-39379	PG 2	26500-50330	10041 - (-10951)	27% - (-28%)	PG 2	26500-50330	10041 - (-10951)	27% - (-28%)
SGT	Land CPL	47502-48302	PG 3	36450-53570	11052 - (-5268)	23% - (-11%)	PG 3	36450-53570	11052 - (-5268)	23% - (-11%)
S/ SGT	CPL	49757-53672	PG 4	40270-58820	9487 - (-5148)	19% - (-10%)	PG 4	40270-58820	9487 - (-5148)	19% - (-10%)
IP	SGT	53989-60376	PG 5	42940-62750	11049 - (-2374)	20% - (-4%)	PG 5	42940-62750	11049 - (-2374)	20% - (-4%)
CIP	S/SGT	63420-68220	PG 6	47290-68720	16130 - (-500)	25% - (-0.7%)	PG 6	47290-68720	16130 - (-500)	25% - (-0.7%)
ASP	WO2	70400-73600	PG 7	53570-81120	16830 - (-7520)	24% - (-10%)				
SP	WO1	81216-84415	PG 8	57060-83890	24156 - 525	30% - 0.6%	PG 7	48780-73310	32436 - 11105	40% - 13%
SSP	2nd LT	87448 - 89197	PG 9	68720-98380	18728 - (-9183)	21% - (-10%)	PG 8	57060-83890	24156 - 525	30% - 0.6%
ACP	LT	97184-103132					PG9	68720-98380	28464 - 4752	21% - (-10%)

Source: Taskforce Computation

1271. The Taskforce concludes that there is no harmony across the grades in terms of minimum basic salary at comparable grades. Harmony is important, especially for grades that have similar entry qualifications and more or less similar training regimes in the disciplined Services.

1272. Across the country, officers informed the Taskforce that the current basic salary was meagre, and did not reflect the prevailing economic conditions. Officers therefore suggested review of the current salaries and allowances. They further submitted that, annual increments be based on merit, performance and cadre. The officers suggested that the salary structures be clearly defined across all cadres, with the starting and highest point per rank clearly shown.

1273. The Taskforce was informed that the current salary structure allows some junior officers to earn more than their seniors, hence causing disaffection like in the case of senior sergeant and inspector of prisons as well as chief inspector and superintendent of prisons. Officers submitted that ranks and current allowances pay group be delinked. The implication here will be that even without promotions, the salaries of officers will continue to increase, thus motivating officers in lower ranks.
1274. The Commissioner-General of Prisons and senior officers of KPS who appeared before the Taskforce proposed that the basic salary of officers be enhanced by **250** per cent.

Submissions by PSC

1275. In its submission to the Taskforce, the Public Service Commission noted that the Salaries and Remuneration Commission had, in 2016/17, conducted a job evaluation exercise in the public service and recommended a salary review for the Kenya Prisons Service. The review was to be implemented in a phased manner to take into consideration the overall affordability within a sustainable fiscal framework. It pointed out that the government implemented Phase I, II, and III of the salary reviews for the uniformed officers in Prisons Grades '1' to '14' with effect from July 1, 2017 to July 1, 2019. The Commission further provided data on new salaries applicable to uniformed officers in the Kenya Prisons Service in PG '1' to '14' who were in the Service on or after July 1, 2020.

Submissions by SRC

1276. The Salaries and Remuneration Commission informed the Taskforce that it was planning to review, set and advise on the remuneration and benefits for KPS officers and other public officers under the Third Remuneration and Benefits Review Cycle that covers the Financial Years (FYs) 2021/2022 to 2024/2025 as follows:
- (a) for the period 2021/2022, as applicable in the second remuneration review cycle;
 - (b) for the period 2022/2023, SRC as advised vide SRC letter of June 17, 2021 on freeze of remuneration and benefits in the public service; and
 - (c) for the period 2023/2024 to 2024/2025 shall review, set and advise the remuneration and benefits on or before the commencement of FY 2023/2024.

Submissions by National Treasury and Economic Planning Ministry

1277. In its submissions to the Taskforce, the National Treasury underscored the need for the review of remuneration and applicable allowances for KPS officers to take into account fiscal sustainability of the public sector wage bill as provided for in Article 230 (5) of the Constitution. The National Treasury averred that review of salaries and remunerations should be cognisant of the constrained fiscal environment including subdued revenue collection and government policy on fiscal consolidation by containing public borrowing to minimise accumulation of public debt.

Recommendations

1278. Having examined the Civil Service remuneration system, the Taskforce recommends:
- (a) SRC should establish a system of remuneration for disciplined Services completely delinked from the Civil Service Job Groups Classification System and Pay Determination;
 - (b) PSC should review job descriptions for members of KPS for all pay grades and restructure the salary structure for PG12, PG11 and PG10 to have a minimum of eight (8) salary scale points (notches); and PG1 and PG2 should be maintained at 19 notches.

- (c) Government should establish a Remuneration Advisory Board for Disciplined and Security Services through an Act of Parliament.

14.3 Salary

Analysis of salaries and allowances in KPS

1279. The findings and recommendations of the Taskforce are predicated on its understanding of the role and place of KPS in public governance.
1280. KPS is a central actor in the criminal justice system, with the responsibilities of safe containment of those who have been sentenced to prison terms and the rehabilitation of offenders.
1281. KPS is currently confronted by new security challenges (such as terrorism and violent extremism) and complexities arising from new technologies. The contemporary prison officer is, therefore, expected to understand new risks associated with new security challenges and vulnerabilities presented by new technologies.
1282. The Taskforce witnessed first-hand demands placed on KPS officers as they execute their duties. These officers work long hours and are on call seven days a week (day and night), including during weekends and holidays). Due to exigencies of duty, they are at times recalled from leave to attend to duty and are, therefore, expected to be available 24/7 for 365 days a year without any incentive or compensation for leave not utilised.

Job risk and unique skills of KPS officers

1283. The Taskforce established that KPS officers require and apply unique skills in the containment and rehabilitation of inmates. They also handle and maintain sophisticated weapons, tools, and equipment. The nature of work of KPS officers, the intensity of some duties, and the kind of risks that they are exposed to such as attacks by inmates, deplorable working conditions, exposure to transmittable diseases including tuberculosis, multi-drug resistant TB, and Covid-19, among others call for special considerations in determining their remuneration. During the Covid-19 pandemic experience of lockdowns, for example, officers were all recalled back to duty stations due to the nature of their clients' vulnerability and were exposed to infection, with some officers losing their lives. This led to trauma and anxiety among the entire officers' population and their families even as other public servants worked from home.
1284. Specific factors that the Taskforce considered in making recommendations on remuneration of members of KPS included:
- (a) *Job risks:* KPS officers are often exposed to the threat of violence as well as the risk of contracting serious diseases given their daily interaction with inmates in limited spaces. These are risks that most of the other officers in public service were not exposed to;
 - (b) *Specialised training and development:* Training of KPS officers involves long hours of rigorous physical and mental exertions daily. The training is paramilitary and involves weapons training, which takes a minimum of nine months. In addition, recruits have to undertake class work on other areas such as prison administration, computation of sentences and security in prison, liberal studies, and human rights and laws relating to prisons, basic combat skills training, treatment of youthful offenders in borstal institutions among other courses;

- (c) *Upheaval of family life:* The nature of KPS officers' duties has impact on personal and family life. It affects the spousal or partner employment and even makes it hard for a spouse or partner to find or maintain a job due to frequent and unpredictable movements in the course of duty. In some cases, officers are deployed to stations or areas where they have no choice but to leave their families behind;
- (d) *Hours of work:* KPS personnel have to abide by a requirement underpinned by Service laws to be available for duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, including holidays and weekends, without payment of overtime;
- (e) *Stress, personal relationships and impact of the job:* KPS personnel ordinarily experience greater levels of stress than the rest of the public service and it gets worse when they are deployed for special operations and in unfavourable deplorable working environment where they supervise inmates;
- (f) *Leave:* Leave may be forfeited for Service reasons. Furthermore, it may be difficult for Service personnel to take leave whenever they wish, or plan ahead as a result of the unpredictability of Service commitments; and
- (g) *Limitation of labour rights:* By the nature of their work, certain rights and freedoms of KPS officers are limited. This means that the officers do not have access to mechanisms for negotiating their remuneration and benefits that are available to other categories in the public service.

SRC's criteria for the job evaluation of officers of the KPS

1285. The Salaries and Remuneration Commission is mandated to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of State Officers and to advise on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. Among the factors SRC is expected to consider in its work include: fiscal sustainability of the wage bill, the need to attract and retain the skills required in the public service, the need to recognise productivity and performance, and transparency and fairness. In executing its mandate, therefore, the Commission ordinarily undertakes job evaluation.

1286. The Taskforce notes that among the factors that SRC takes into consideration when determining the nature and level of remuneration is job evaluation (JE), which assists in determining the worth of one job in relation to another. The idea is that comparing "like job" to "like job" assists in determining the relative worth of various jobs in relatable categories.

1287. SRC undertook a job evaluation exercise in 2016 for the public service, including KPS. The outcome of that exercise placed a KPS constable at par with a clerical officer in the public service at a job salary structure of B3, B4 and B5 (Job Group F). The recommendations from the salary review were to be implemented in three phases for purposes of overall affordability within a sustainable fiscal framework.

Recommendations

1288. Having examined the job evaluation and job grading reports for KPS, Taskforce recommends:

- (a) PSC should develop a new Job Description Manual for all the jobs, posts, roles or designations; and
- (b) SRC should conduct new job evaluations for KPS using a new Job Description Manual.

Economic context and cost of living

1289. Despite low rates of inflation realised between 2012 and 2022, the prices of all basic commodities more than doubled between 2012 and 2022, without corresponding increases in real wages.


1290. Table 14.9 shows trends in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)¹⁶ and inflation rates in Kenya since 2012. The Consumer Price Index rose from 124.7 in 2012 to 228 in 2022. This, in effect, means that the cost of living rose by 104 over the same period. Thus, in percentage terms, the cost of living rose by 84 per cent without a productivity factor award. This, in effect, means that the cost of living for the members of KPS rose by 84 per cent over the period.

Table 14. 9: Trends in inflation, consumer price indices and rise in the cost-of-living, 2012 – 2022

Year	Inflation Rate	Consumer Price Index	Rise in Cost of Living
2012	9.38%	124.7	0.0%
2013	5.72%	131.8	7.1%
2014	6.88%	140.9	16.2%
2015	6.58%	150.2	25.5%
2016	6.30%	159.6	34.9%
2017	8.01%	172.4	47.7%
2018	4.69%	180.5	55.8%
2019	5.24%	190.0	65.3%
2020	5.40%	200.2	75.5%
2021	6.11%	212.5	87.8%
2022	7.66%	228.7	104.0%

Source: Computation from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Data

Figure 14. 1: Trends in inflation rate and rise in cost-of-living, 2012 - 2022



Source: Computation from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Data

Prisons constable's basic salary from 2013 to 2023

1291. Although the cost of living for the members of KPS has risen by 84 per cent since 2013, the growth in the minimum basic salary for a prison constable joining the KPS has only been by 21 per cent (from KSh. 11,010 to KSh. 20,740) during the same period.

1292. Table 14.10 outlines the Basic Salary of KSh. 11,010, Housing Supplementation of KSh. 1,650, Medical Allowance of KSh. 495 and Police Prison Allowance KSh. 5,000 paid to a Constable of Kenya Prisons on entry into the service in January 2010. The Gross Pay was KSh. 18,155.

¹⁶ CPI reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.

Table 14. 10: Gross salary of a constable on joining the Kenya Prisons Service in May 2010

S/No.	Pay category	Amount
1	Basic salary	11,010.00
2	Housing supplementation	1,650.00
3	Medical allowance	495.00
4	Police Prisons allowance	5,000.00
	Gross Salary	18,155.00

Source: Taskforce computation

1293. Table 14.11 outlines the basic salary of KSh. 20,740, rental house allowance of KSh. 9,500, housing supplementation of KSh. 3,000, commuter allowance of KSh. 3,000 and police prison allowance of KSh. 7,000 paid to a constable of the Kenya Prisons on entry into the service in January 2022. The gross pay was KSh. 43,240.

Table 14. 11: Gross salary of a constable on joining the Kenya Prisons Service in January 2022

S/No.	Pay category	Amount
1	Basic salary	20,740.00
2	Rental house allowance	9,500.00
3	Commuter allowance	3,000.00
4	Housing supplementation	3,000.00
5	Police/Prison Allowance	7,000.00
	Gross Salary	43,240.00

Source: Taskforce computation


1294. Table 14.12 and Figure 14.2 outline the salary progression for a constable of Kenya Prisons over a period of 14 years. The progression takes into account salary and allowance reviews over that period and the officers' annual increments.

Table 14. 12: Trends in increments in gross salary of a Prisons constable who joined the KPS from May 2010

Year	Basic Salary	Remarks	Monthly Allowances	Gross Salary
2010	11,010	Min. Basic Salary (on appointment)		
2010	14,060	Salary Review	7,145	21,675
2011	14,530	Min. Basic Salary	7,145	21,675
2012	16,886	Min. Basic Salary	6,650	23,536
2013	18,900	Min. Basic Salary	7,775	26,675
2014	19,470	Annual Increment	10,000	29,470
2015	20,040	Annual Increment	10,000	30,040
2016	20,610	Annual Increment	10,000	30,610
2017	21,510	Annual Increment	10,000	31,510
2017	23,460	Salary review 2017	10,000	33,460
2018	24,440	Annual Increment	10,000	34,440
2018	25,120	Salary Review 2018	10,000	35,120
2019	26,130	Increment	22,500	48,630
2019	26,840	Salary Review 2019	22,500	48,630
2020	27,880	Annual Increment	22,500	50,380
2020	28,640	Salary review 2020	22,500	51,140
2021	29,710	Annual Increment	22,500	52,210
2022	30,000	Annual Increment	22,500	52,500
2023	31,850	Annual Increment	22,500	54,350

Source: Taskforce computation

Figure 14. 2: Trends in increments in gross salary of a constable who joined the KPS from May 2010



Recommendations

1295. Having considered the uniqueness of the services offered by the members of KPS, their working conditions, duties and responsibilities, disrupted family life, and the potential risk they face in the course of their duties, the Taskforce recommends:

- (a) A basic salary increase of **40** per cent for the lowest rank or Pay Grade (PG 1) for uniformed officers reducing progressively to **3** per cent for the highest rank or Pay Grade (PG14). The Taskforce recommends that the new remuneration structure should be implemented in three (3) phases from 1st July, 2024.

Table 14. 13: Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the Kenya Prisons Service as per FY 2022/2023

Prisons Officer		Basic Salary					Monthly Allowance		
Job Group	Pay Grade	Min.	Max.	House: Nairobi	House: Cluster 2	House: Other Areas	Commuter	Prison	House Supplementation
U	PG14	292,765	576,120	-	-	-	official	-	-
T	PG13	212,270	323,640	80,000	-	-	official	16,000	-
S	PG12	167,250	212,270	60,000	56,000	-	20,000	13,000	-
R	PG11	126,370	198,730	55,000	40,000	28,000	16,000	13,000	-
P	PG10	78,510	138,910	45,000	34,200	24,600	12,000	13,000	-
N	PG9	68,720	98,380	34,200	24,600	17,700	8,000	11,000	-
N	PG8	57,060	83,890	33,500	23,700	17,000	6,000	9,000	-
L	PG7	48,780	73,310	30,000	21,000	15,000	5,000	9,000	-
L	PG6	47,290	68,720	27,000	18,000	13,000	5,000	9,000	-
K	PG5	42,940	62,750	24,950	15,000	11,000	4,000	9,000	-
J	PG4	40,270	58,820	15,700	11,300	8,150	4,000	7,000	4,400
H	PG3	36,450	53,570	9,800	7,300	5,700	4,000	7,000	3,900
G	PG2	26,500	50,330	9,650	7,150	5,600	4,000	7,000	3,400
F	PG1	20,740	38,980	9,500	7,000	5,500	3,000	7,000	3,000

Source: SRC

Table 14. 14: Recommendation for New Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the Kenya Prisons Service by the Taskforce

Prisons Officer		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowance		
Job Grade	Police Grade	Min.	Max.	House	Commuter	Prison
U	PG14	301,548	584,903	-	official	-
T	PG13	218,638	330,008	70,000	24,500	16,000
S	PG12	204,637	345,850	60,000	20,500	16,000
R	PG11	163,535	262,020	55,000	16,500	13,000
P	PG10	112,617	181,531	45,000	12,500	13,000
N	PG9	111,906	148,538	34,200	8,500	11,000
N	PG8	101,711	138,115	33,500	8,500	11,000
L	PG7	65,103	100,503	30,000	6,250	9,000
L	PG6	59,742	82,880	27,000	6,250	9,000
K	PG5	53,246	74,887	22,100	5,250	9,000
J	PG4	51,546	71,964	20,100	4,250	9,000
H	PG3	48,114	67,018	15,700	4,250	7,000
G	PG2	36,040	61,588	15,050	4,250	7,000
F	PG1	29,296	57,700	14,500	3,250	7,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

NOTE: Introduction of common National House Allowance rate for all KPS Uniformed Officers at new rate applicable to officers from PG1 to PG4.

Discontinue House Supplementation Allowance

14.4 New and applicable allowances

1296. The issue of allowances payable to KPS officers has been a subject of previous Taskforces reports and reviews. Allowances in KPS are paid as provided in the various policies and circulars released to the Service from time to time. The Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual for the public service spells out the general allowances payable to Civil Servants.

1297. The Madoka Committee had made a number of recommendations on allowances, including the payment of risk allowance to all prisons officers to ensure uniformity. The Taskforce notes that there is a wide range of allowances that are currently paid to KPS officers. These allowances are summarised in Table 14.15:

Table 14. 15: List of allowances currently payable to uniformed members of the Service and rates applicable per rank or job group

S/No	Type of Allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
1.	Rental House Allowance	All Officers	- Based on work station and rank PG 1 PC KSh. 9,500 for Nairobi and KSh. 5,500.00 in other regions. - PG 14 KSh. 60,000 for Nairobi
2.	Hardships Allowance	Officers in designated hardship areas	Based on rank for officers working in designated hardship areas ranging from KSh. 4,300.00 to KSh. 45,000.
3.	Commuter Allowance	All Officers	Based on rank. PG 1 KSh. 3,000

S/No	Type of Allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
			- PG 2 KSh. 4,000 - PG 3 KSh. 4,000 - PG 4 KSh. 4,000 - PG 5 KSh. 4,000 - PG 6 KSh. 5,000 - PG 7 KSh. 5,000 - PG 8 KSh. 6,000 - PG 9 KSh. 8,000 - PG 10 KSh. 12,000 - PG 11 KSh. 16,000 - PG 12 KSh. 20,000 - PG 13 & 14 Chauffeured
4.	Extraneous Duty Allowance	All Officers	- Extraneous allowance shall be paid to officers who are called upon to undertake extra responsibilities in addition to their normal duties and therefore work over and above the official working hours on a continuous basis. - PC to CPL paid at the rate of KSh. 4,500 - Sgt to IP KSh. 7,000 - CIP and above KSh. 10,000 - All officers in Job Group 'T' in all State Departments rate is KSh. 60,000
5.	Animal Handler's Allowance	Officers at the dog and horse units	Payable at a rate of KSh. 1,500
6.	Instructors Allowance	All Officers at PSTC	Paid at the rate of @ 25% of the basic salary
7.	Transfer Allowance	All Officers	Officers transferred from one station to another and a distance that is more than 40 km, not provided with transport. (Officers' basic salary).
8.	Housing Supplementation	Prisons Constable -Corporal -Sergeant -Senior Sergeant	Officers in from PG 1 to PG 4 - PG 1 KSh. 3,000 - PG 2 KSh. 3,400 - PG 3 KSh. 3,900 - PG 4 KSh. 4,400
9.	Leave	All Officers	Officers serving designated hardship areas are paid leave travel allowance twice in a one F/Y and is based on the rank ranging from KSh. 4,000.00 JG "F"- "J", KSh. 6,000.00 JG "K"- JG "N" and KSh. 10,000.00 JG "P"-JG "S"
10.	Police/Prison Allowance	All Officers	Based on the rank PG 1-PG 4 KSh. 7,000

S/No	Type of Allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
			- PG 5-PG 8 KSh. 9,000 - PG 9 KSh. 11, 000 - PG 10-PG12 KSh. 13,000 - PG 13-PG 14 KSh. 16,000
11.	Non-Practicing Allowance	Officers admitted to the bar to practice and attached to the Legal Unit. Job Group “K” and above. Qualified medical practitioners.	- Paid at a rate of KSh. 15,000 for sate counsel - Paid at the rate of KSh. 19,000 for medical practitioners
12.	Special Legal Allowance	Chief Inspector and above	Payable at a rate of KSh. 30,000 per month.
13.	Health Risk Allowance	For qualified medical practitioners exposed to occupational risks.	Payable at a rate of KSh. 30,000 per month.
14.	Disability Guide	Officers with disability (PWD).	Payable at a rate of KSh. 20,000.00 per month.
15.	Entertainment Allowance	All Officers on Job Group ‘T’ in the State Departments	Payable at the rate of KSh. 65,000
16.	Domestic Allowance	All Officers on Job Group ‘T’ in the State Departments	Payable at a rate of KSh. 15,600

Source: Kenya Prisons Service

1298. The Taskforce was informed that the current allowances are inadequate given the changing economic realities. There are also other allowances that are not currently payable to KPS officers since they are clustered with the rest of the public servants.

Comparison of house allowance (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowance for NPS, KPS, NYS, and the wider public sector FY 2022/2023

1299. The Taskforce noted that the house, commuter, and leave allowances rates paid to members of NPS, KPS and NYS are closely linked to the public sector allowances system and the rates are broadly determined equally for equivalent grades or job groups across the entire public sector. Table 13.14 outlines a summary of allowances paid to employees at various grades and job groups across the services.

Table 14. 16: Comparison of allowances paid to NPS, KPS, NYS and the wider public sector FY 2022/2023

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
National Police Service Uniformed Personnel							
Inspector-General – Police (State Officer)	PG14	CC	U	-	-	-	50,000
Deputy Inspector-General– Kenya Police (State Officer)	PG13	CC	T	-	-	-	50,000
Senior Assistant Inspector– Police	PG12	CC	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Assistant Inspector– Police	PG11	CC	R	55,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Commissioner of Police	PG10	CC	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Superintendent– Police	PG 9	CC	N	36,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Superintendent– Police	PG 8	CC	M	34,200	8,000	14,650	6,000

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Assistant Superintendent – Police	PG 7	CC	L	33,500	6,000	12,300	6,000
Chief Inspector – Police	PG 6	AX	K	27,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector– Police	PG 5	CC	J	24,950	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant – Police	PG 4	AX	J	15,700	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant– Police	PG 3	CC	H	9,800	4,000	6,600	4,000
Corporal– Police	PG 2	CC	G	9,650	4,000	5,700	4,000
Constable – Police	PG 1	CC	F	9,500	4,000	4,300	4,000
Kenya Prisons Service							
Commissioner General of Prisons	PG14	AU	U	100,000	-	-	50,000
Deputy Commissioner– General of Prisons	PG 13	AU	T	80,000	24,000	60,000	10,000
Senior Assistant Commissioner-General of Prisons	PG 12	AU	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Assistant Commissioner– General of Prisons	PG 11	AU	R	55,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	PG 10	AU	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	PG 9	AU	M	34,200	8,000	14,650	6,000
Senior Superintendent of Prisons	PG 8	AU	L	33,500	6,000	12,300	6,000
Superintendent of Prison	PG 7	AU	K	30,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Chief Inspector– Prisons	PG 6	AX	K	27,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector– Prisons	PG 5	AU	J	24,950	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant– Prisons	PG 4	AX	J	15,700	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant– Prisons	PG 3	AU	H	9,800	4,000	6,600	4,000
Corporal – Prisons	PG 2	AU	G	9,800	4,000	5,700	4,000
Constable – Prisons	PG 1	AU	F	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Civil Service (Non-Uniformed Officers)							
Secretary	CSG4	AA	T	80,000	40,000	60,000	10,000
Director	CSG5	AA	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Deputy Director	CSG6	AA	R	50,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Assistant Director	CSG7	AA	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Principal Officer	CSG8	AA	N	35,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Senior Officer	CSG9	AA	L	28,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Officer I	CSG10	AA	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Officer II	CSG11	AA	J	10,000	4,000	8,200	4,000
Officer Assistant III	CSG12	AA	H	6,750	4,000	6,600	4,000
Technicians I	CSG13	AA	G	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000
Technicians II	CSG14	AA	F	4,500	4,000	4,300	4,000
Senior Support Staff	CSG15	AA	E	4,500	4,000	3,700	4,000
Support Staff I	CSG16	AA	D	4,125	3,000	3,300	4,000
Support Staff II	CSG17	AA	C	3,750	3,000	3,000	4,000
National Youth Service (NYS)							
Director General – NYS		AZ	U	100,000	-	-	50,000
Director General – NYS	PG15	AV	T	80,000	24,000	-	10,000

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Deputy Director General -- NYS	PG14	AV	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Senior Deputy Director [1] – NYS	PG13	AV	R	50,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Senior Deputy Director [2] – NYS	PG12	AV	Q	45,000	14,000	31,500	10,000
Deputy Director – NYS	PG11	AV	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Assistant Director – NYS	PG10	AV	N	35,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Assistant Director– NYS	PG09	AV	M	28,000	8,000	14,650	6,000
Senior Superintendent -- NYS	PG08	AV	L	28,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Superintendent– NYS	PG07	AZ	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Chief Inspector – NYS	PG06	AV	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector– NYS	PG05	AV	J	10,000	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant Major– NYS	PG04						
Senior Sergeant – NYS	PG04	AZ	J	8,668	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant– NYS	PG03	AV	H	-	4,000	-	4,000
Corporal – NYS	PG02	AV	G	-	3,000	-	4,000
Private – NYS	PG01	AV	F	-	3,000	-	4,000
Teaching service (TSC)							
Chief Principal	T-Scale 15	AB		50,000	16,000	38,100	16,000
Senior Principal	T-Scale 14	AB		45,000	14,000	31,500	14,000
Principal	T-Scale 13	AB		45,000	12,000	27,300	12,000
Deputy Principal III	T-Scale 12	AB		35,000	8,000	17,100	8,000
Senior Headmaster	T-Scale 11	AB		28,000	8,000	14,650	8,000
Head teacher	T-Scale 10	AB		16,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Senior Lecturer IV	T-Scale 09	AB		10,500	5,000	10,700	5,000
Secondary Teacher I	T-Scale 08	AB		6,750	4,000	8,200	4,000
Secondary Teacher II	T-Scale 07	AB		6,750	4,000	6,600	4,000
Secondary Teacher III	T-Scale 06	AB		4,500	3,000	5,700	4,000
Primary Teacher II	T-Scale 05	AB		4,500	3,000	4,300	4,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

1300. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various Services indicate that constables of Police and Prisons earn KSh. 9,500, which is higher than that of Civil Servants in equivalent grades who earn KSh. 4,500. Privates in NYS do not earn a house allowance at this level. It will be important to harmonise house allowances for the non-uniformed officers with that of the Police and Prisons, while implementing the allowance for the NYS personnel hence allowing them to reside in private accommodation. The rates used to analyse the house allowances are Nairobi City rates which are the highest among the regions.
1301. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance of KSh. 3,000, which is uniform across all the services. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 4,300, but privates in NYS do not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the services as indicated in the Table 14.17.

Table 14. 17: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various Services in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Constable– Police	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Constable– Prisons	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Clerical Officer II – CS	4,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Private– NYS	0	3,000	0	4,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

1302. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various services indicates that Police and Prisons corporals earn KSh. 9,650, which is higher than that of civil servants and teachers in equivalent grades who earn KSh. 6,750. Privates in the NYS do not earn a house allowance at this level. It will be important to harmonise house allowances for the civil service and teachers with that of the NPS and KPS, while implementing the allowance for NYS personnel, hence allowing them to reside in private accommodation.

1303. All officers at this level earn monthly Commuter Allowance at KSh. 4,300 for Police and Prisons while employees in the Civil Service, NYS and teachers earn KSh. 4,000. Hardship allowance is paid at a standard rate of KSh. 5,700, however the Privates at NYS does not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the Services as indicated in the Table 14.18.

Table 14. 18: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Corporal - Police	9,650	4,300	5,700	4,000
Corporal - Prisons	9,650	4,300	5,700	4,000
Clerical Officer I - CS	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000
Corporal - NYS	0	4,000	0	4,000
Primary Teacher II	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000

Source: SRC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowance for Job Group 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

1304. An analysis of the house allowances indicates that at this level employees in all the Services earn a standard amount of KSh. 45,000. All employees across the various Services at this level earn monthly commuter allowance at KSh. 12,000; hardship allowance is paid at a standard rate of KSh. 27,300 and leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 10,000 as indicated in the Table 14.19.

Table 14. 19: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for JG 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Commissioner - Police	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Assistant Director Officer II - CS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Director - NYS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Headmaster - TSC	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000

Source: SRC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23 (KDF included)

1305. An analysis of the house allowances paid to officers in various disciplined Services as compared to that of KDF indicate that constables of Police and Prisons earn KSh. 9,500, which is lower than that of KDF at equivalent grades who earn KSh. 10,000. Privates in NYS do not earn a house allowance.
1306. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance at KSh. 3,000 which is uniform across all the Services, however KDF officers do not draw this allowance. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 4,300, however, the privates at NYS and KDF do not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the Services, except for KDF whose earning range from KSh. 25,000 to KSh. 45,000 as indicated in the Table below.

Table 14. 20: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23 (KDF included)

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Constable–Police	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Constable–Prisons	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Private–NYS	0	3,000	0	4,000
Private –KDF	10,000	0	0	25,000

Source: SRC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23

1307. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various disciplined Services as compared to the KDF indicate that officers in the Police, Prisons and NYS earn at a higher rate of KSh. 45,000 compared to the KDF, who draw KSh. 36,000 at equivalent grades.
1308. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance of KSh. 12,000, which is uniform across all the services, except KDF members who do not draw this allowance. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 27,300, however, the privates in NYS and the KDF do not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 10,000 to officers in this grade across all the services, except for the KDF, whose earning ranges from KSh. 25,000 to KSh. 45,000 as indicated in the Table 14.21 below.

Table 14. 21: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022/23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Commissioner–Police	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Director–NYS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Warrant Officer I–KDF	36,000	0	0	25,000 – 45,000

Source: SRC

1309. The Taskforce received submissions and views on the issue of allowances from key institutions (including KPS and PSC), various stakeholders and members of the public. The Taskforce also conducted field visits and heard from officers of various ranks as well as opinion leaders and the public.
1310. From the submissions by KPS officers, the Taskforce established that there are challenges with the payment of applicable allowances. Often, they are not paid in time. This is

especially the case with transfer allowance. There are cases where allowances are channelled through senior officers but do not reach the junior officers, especially on duties that require payment of subsistence and meal allowances. Partly, the senior officers noted that this practice is exacerbated by inadequate funding on the vote items.

1311. There are also cases where officers are assigned higher responsibilities, yet they are not usually compensated for the same. This practice obtains despite clear provisions of the relevant regulations on allowances. For example, the prisons commanders are at work all the time as no prison cell will be opened without their knowledge, which means that they are woken up at night in case of emergencies, hence the need to pay extraneous allowance to such cadres of officers.
1312. The Taskforce was also told of the difficult and often embarrassing situations that KPS officers are placed in when they are mobilised for multiagency support operations or even escort of prisoners with no allowances provided for basic upkeep.
1313. The Taskforce also established that non-uniformed officers do not enjoy some of the allowances, yet they work under the same conditions and in the same environment with uniformed officers. The Taskforce's attention was drawn to the plight of some health workers in the Service, who are not paid non-practising allowance unlike their counterparts in the public service.
1314. In addition, the Taskforce was also informed that KPS corporals and non-commissioned officers receive a lower house allowance than their job group equivalents in the public service.
1315. The Taskforce was informed that KPS officers accompanying inmates or remand detainees for court attendance, which often last a whole day, were not entitled to a meal allowance or provided with meals. The Taskforce finds it unacceptable that there is rampant non-adherence to regulations and procedures on payment of allowances in KPS. There are also administrative weaknesses that facilitate corruption in the payment of allowances. The Taskforce established that there are many instances where KPS officers are instructed to undertake official duties, like escorting prisoners to other prisons, or inmates for court appearance without the necessary facilitation in terms of allowances and per diems, leaving them embarrassed, frustrated and demoralised.

Recommendations

Having considered the submissions and having reviewed relevant documents, the Taskforce concludes that **restructuring and review of KPS allowances is urgent**. Such restructuring and review must address the wide disparities and varied eligibility criteria for payments to achieve harmonisation and standardisation. The Taskforce recommends that:

- (a) SRC should harmonise, standardise and review payable rates for monthly allowances for uniformed and non-uniformed officers in KPS. The harmonised, standardised and payable rates should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.
- (b) SRC and PSC should introduce new allowances for uniformed officers and non-uniformed officers deployed to KPS. The new allowances should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.
- (c) There should be strict implementation of overtime pay as provided for in the Public Service HR Manual and KPS Standing Orders.
- (d) To curb the reported issues of allowances and other remittances not reaching junior officers, the Taskforce recommends strict adherence to automation of payment for all allowances to KPS officers as is the practice in the civil service.

- (e) There should be strict prohibition of cash payment of allowances to KPS officers.
- (f) There should be prompt payment of allowances during multi-agency operations that involve members of KPS.
- (g) The Taskforce further recommends enhanced accountability for the automated system to prevent cases of embezzlement of funds and corruption.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: WELFARE REFORMS IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

15.1 Introduction

1316. The Taskforce was required to assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current housing policy for members of KPS and make appropriate recommendations, including proposals for a housing mortgage for officers. with regard to health, the Taskforce was required to assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current medical scheme for the Kenya Prisons Service and recommend comprehensive reform or revision of the same for improvement.
1317. On compensation, the Taskforce was required to assess and recommend the establishment of funds or schemes to cater for loss of life or injuries in the line of duty, terminal illness including mental health illness and possible legal and administrative framework to cater for KPS officers' dependants.
1318. The sections below analyse the observations and findings of the Taskforce on the above welfare matters and recommendations to address the challenges that members of KPS face.

15.2 Housing

1319. There is no doubt that KPS housing has been one of the areas of key concern and a source of discontent among officers.
1320. The Madoka Committee established that most officers were living in "deplorable conditions", which violated their privacy and self-esteem. The Committee concluded that most of KPS officers were actually living in shacks and shanties, and that slums had proliferated in prisons. The Committee recommended that all shanties be demolished and uni-huts should be provided in the short term. The Committee also recommended a long-term policy of constructing houses, particularly for junior officers within KPS compounds.
1321. The Taskforce has reviewed the recommendations of the Madoka Committee with respect to housing and received submissions from KPS officers. The members of the Taskforce also witnessed firsthand the state of housing in various prisons across the country.

Current practice and situation

1322. The Taskforce notes that all officers in KPS are eligible for house allowance applicable to their grades as stipulated in government circulars issued from time to time. Officers occupying institutional houses pay rent equivalent to the value as determined by the State Department responsible for Housing, or surrender their house allowance, whichever is lower.
1323. In line with prevailing regulations, members of the Service who are required to reside in close proximity to their duty station are supposed to be provided with decent housing.
1324. The Taskforce was informed by the KPS leadership that currently the Service has only 5,000 permanent units against a staff strength of 31,384. KPS housing is under the State Department of Housing, which approves Bills of Quantities (BQs) and supervises construction and maintenance of houses.
1325. The State Department for Housing and Urban Development is the implementer of the Kenya Prisons Service Housing Programme, responsible for providing housing to members of the Service who are required to pay rents at prevailing market rates as determined from time to time. The programme commenced in 2016 and to date, 1,782 units have been completed and handed over, while 1,650 are at various stages of completion.

1326. The State Department for Public Works acts as project manager for houses that are constructed on land provided by KPS. However, the programme has faced the challenge of inadequate funding, with reports that many contractors have not been paid for work already done. Other challenges experienced include slow progress of works, accumulation of pending bills, and increased construction costs as a result of interest on delayed payment.

Findings

1327. Across all the KPS facilities in the country, the Taskforce noted that the state of KPS housing is decaying, appalling and generally unfit for human habitation. Houses ranged from mud houses, metallic uni-huts to self-built iron sheet shacks. Other officers reside in condemned houses with crumbling walls and broken sanitation, crowded halls and low quality and tattered tents. Maintenance of the few good houses is poor, thus exposing officers and their families to unfathomable health risks.

1328. The Taskforce established that officers often choose to live in these unfortunate conditions within KPS grounds for a number of reasons. The first is that the house allowance they are given is too little to pay for decent housing near the stations. Second, prisons may be located in remote areas where there is no housing available for rent. Third, where decent housing is available within KPS grounds, the houses are monopolised by senior officers to the disadvantage of junior cadres. This is the scenario the Taskforce was confronted with in Langata Women's Prison where senior KPS officers, particularly from Prisons headquarters, including some who do not work at that station, have occupied the available houses to the exclusion of junior officers who cannot afford the rental rates in the affluent vicinity.

1329. The situation in Langata Women's Prison was particularly shocking given the facility's public prominence. The Taskforce found families sharing dormitory-style housing with only bed sheet curtains separating different families. In addition, officers were sharing tents erected in the compound. These scenes are replicated in nearly all prisons premises across the country where slum-like structures have sprung up.

1330. It is instructive that the Taskforce found KPS officers living in the same conditions that the Madoka Committee decried in its report 15 years ago. This shows deliberate aversion to implementing recommendations by those responsible, and deliberate ignorance of the dire need for better housing over the years to uplift the living standards of KPS officers as well as lack of political goodwill to provide funding for better living spaces.

1331. The poor state of KPS housing is even more perplexing given that KPS has plenty of land and professionals in its ranks. It also has reasonably accessible labour from inmates that can assist in the construction of affordable housing.

1332. The Taskforce notes that the housing situation in KPS, 60 years after independence, is simply horrendous, unacceptable and an indictment of the KPS leadership and the responsible policy makers. It is the considered view of the Taskforce that the crisis in KPS housing is not a consequence of mere lack of resources but mainly the result of failure of leadership by those responsible.

Recommendations

1333. The Taskforce notes that the practice of housing KPS officers both in and outside the prisons stations has precipitated command vulnerability. In cases where quick mobilisation is needed, it becomes impossible for the commanders to assemble officers

for duty. However, the Taskforce appreciates that given the scarcity of housing, some KPS officers must be accommodated outside their work stations.

1334. Further, the Taskforce noted that the houses in which the officers live are dilapidated and lacked basic amenities. Officers who operate from outside KPS lines are compelled to live in informal settlements due to the low house allowance paid. As such, their security is compromised and their uniforms, too, may be stolen and used to commit crimes. Taking the above findings into consideration, the Taskforce recommends that:

- (a) The CGP should urgently develop a housing policy to guide the construction, allocation, and management of KPS housing units;
- (b) The development of a masterplan for KPS facilities, including officer's housing should be prioritised;
- (c) The Service should collect and retain funds collected from rent to be used for development, construction and maintenance of KPS housing infrastructure;
- (d) The management of KPS housing should be under the directorate responsible for housing in the office of the CGP, pursuant to the provisions of a housing policy to be developed by the Service;
- (e) The house allowance payable to KPS officers should be enhanced as already recommended in this Report;
- (f) Building more KPS houses should be pursued through public private partnerships;
- (g) An audit of stalled projects, resolution of any pending contractual disputes where applicable, and completion in all other cases should be concluded as a matter of priority;
- (h) The house allowance payable to all KPS officers should be retained since majority of the officers will not be able to secure housing within their work stations;
- (i) The services of the directorate of housing should be devolved to county level to enable closer supervision of the maintenance of houses;
- (j) The National Treasury, in liaison with the CGP, should set aside a percentage of the capital in the Public Service Mortgage Scheme for KPS;
- (k) The government should set aside a reasonable percentage of the units constructed under the affordable housing scheme for KPS officers;
- (l) KPS should urgently and satisfactorily address the issue of its senior leadership occupying houses meant for junior officers;
- (m) KPS should prohibit the occupation of any condemned housing structures and should take further steps to demolish such hazardous structures
- (n) Before building officers' housing on prison land, the CGP should ensure the registration of such land;
- (o) KPS should, within the confines of the law, use available prisoners' labour with fair compensation advanced to the inmates, to cut the costs of constructing houses for the Service;
- (p) Accreditation and approval of Bills of Materials for KPS houses should be done by professionals in the Service to reduce the bureaucracies associated with construction;

- (q) KPS housing should incorporate, as much as possible, green technology to minimise the use of firewood in its facilities; and
- (r) The government should consider using NYS to build housing units for the Service.

15.3 Medical scheme

1335. The Taskforce analysed the current medical scheme, held consultations with and received submissions from the KPS leadership and officers, key stakeholders, the public and the providers of the medical insurance cover. The Taskforce considered the issues around transition from the previous scheme, quality of services offered and access to the accredited facilities.
1336. The risks associated with the duties of KPS officers call for proper measures to ensure that staff are well covered in the event of accidents, injury, sickness or other health risks that may confront them in the course of their duties. The need for a comprehensive medical insurance scheme is primary when it comes to access to quality health care. The availability of such a medical scheme would demonstrate that KPS values the health and welfare of its staff. This would significantly boost morale, job satisfaction, motivation and commitment of officers and contribute to their productivity.
1337. A well-functioning medical scheme ensures that officers receive medical treatment promptly, minimising the risk of complications and allowing for quick return to duty. By providing timely healthcare, the medical scheme would help to reduce absenteeism and ensure continuity of KPS operations. Over the years, KPS has had different insurance covers from different institutions. These include:
- (a) NHIF for Civil Servants, Kenya Prisons Service, National Police Service, County Governments, and public and private institutions between January 1, 2012 and September 30, 2016;
 - (b) Comprehensive medical cover from AON between October 1, 2016 and September 30, 2017;
 - (c) NHIF comprehensive cover between October 1, 2017 and June 30, 2022; and
 - (d) Consortium of underwriters (CIC, Old Mutual, and Britam) between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023.

Submissions by officers

1338. Based on the views of KPS officers, especially in the junior ranks, the Taskforce noted that the current medical insurance scheme is a source of pain and discontent among many KPS officers.
1339. The Taskforce recorded complaints about the non-availability of records such as marriage certificates and information about officers and their families whenever they sought services in accredited health facilities. There were also complaints about bureaucratic delays in the approval of treatment and performance of required medical procedures, all of which are allegedly blameable on the transition from the previous to the current medical insurance scheme.
1340. While the current medical insurance is said to be unlimited for officers from job group A to L, several limitations become apparent especially when officers from the lower cadres seek treatment under the scheme. Junior officers stated that there are daily treatment ceilings that are capped at between Ksh800 and Ksh1,500 per family week per week, irrespective of whether one has exhausted one's annual outpatient limit. The persons

seeking treatment are thus compelled to pay cash or space out treatment to their detriment following the daily minimum rate prescribed by the current cover.

1341. Junior officers also stated that despite there being a list of accredited facilities provided for in the cover, there are instances when they have been turned away because their low ranks exclude them from accessing treatment in such facilities. This includes emergency cases that cannot be admitted to these facilities because of rank.
1342. The Taskforce also established that some counties had very few accredited hospitals or health facilities and, in some instances, some of those 'hospitals' are tiny facilities with inadequate staffing and medication.
1343. Reportedly, junior officers or their dependents with special medical conditions can no longer access services in facilities they previously attended. Most such cases have lost essential medical records to previous medical facilities and are compelled to start afresh or revert to previous arrangements at their own expense.
1344. According to the provisions of the contract, the number of dependents per principal officer is limited to five and one spouse, thus presenting challenges to officers with larger families or in polygamous marriages. The Taskforce noted that the scheme excludes cover for alcohol and substance abuse, which is a major concern as cases of addiction within the Service are on the rise.
1345. Officers decried the lack of information regarding the rollout of the medical cover. They felt that they were not educated on the changes and no clear information was provided on what was expected of them once the new service provider came on board. With this, the officers and their families were left grappling with challenges whenever one fell sick. Some hospitals turned away officers, ostensibly because they only offer services to certain job groups. Such information only became available to officers or their families when seeking medical attention.
1346. Junior officers submitted that they are limited to a certain calibre of hospitals while their seniors were accommodated in most hospitals that were considered better. The junior cadres noted that differentiating the type of hospitals that they could visit *vis-a-vis* their seniors was discriminatory and in bad faith. Further, they noted that as the ones in close contact with inmates, their risk exposure was way higher, hence the need to have a wide array of accredited facilities.
1347. There was a reported delay in payment of the Last Respect Expense Benefits to bereaved families, especially where the officers had passed on. Other concerns raised were that overseas treatment is limited to specific hospitals, with the authorisation being more tedious now as compared to the previous service provider.

Submission by committee on medical scheme

1348. The Taskforce held consultations with the committee that negotiated the new medical scheme. The committee pointed out that the old NHIF scheme had become too expensive and there were many complaints by officers over the quality of service. After assessment, the new scheme was adjudged as providing better value for money.
1349. The committee informed the Taskforce that the cap on daily spending per officer was not part of the terms of the contract negotiated.
1350. On transition challenges, the committee informed the Taskforce that arrangements to create awareness among the officers were in place and that information would be sent out.

1351. On the limited number of accessible facilities, the committee informed the Taskforce that commanders on the ground had been tasked to send to the provider the list of facilities that were available in their areas. This process was still ongoing and the number of facilities was increasing.

1352. The Taskforce was informed that a hotline had been established to assist officers who encountered challenges in accessing medical services.

Submission by the medical service provider

1353. The Taskforce received submissions from the CIC managing director on the outlook of the service to KPS officers. On the issue of daily limits, the he informed the Taskforce that it was an arrangement with the various hospitals to tackle corruption and ensure the viability of the scheme. He also informed the Taskforce that they are accrediting more facilities in many areas to deal with the issue of low numbers.

Findings

1354. The Taskforce identified key issues around the current medical scheme as follows: First, the number and availability of accredited hospitals that are accessible to the officers is a major concern. Second, there is need to establish a proper referral system. Third, there is need to sensitise officers on the services available to them under the current medical insurance scheme. Lastly, there are procedural challenges due to the transition from one medical insurance cover to another.

1355. The Taskforce established that the current medical insurance for KPS, which began in January 2023, contains benefits that are graded according to job groups. According to the policy contract, holders of job groups A to L and their dependents can access ‘unlimited’ medical cover for inpatient and outpatient services as well as specialised treatment in accredited healthcare facilities. As opposed to this, officers in job group M to T have limitations that specify what they are entitled to as outpatient or inpatient care, and what is excluded from the insurance scheme.

1356. The non-uniformed staff who are seconded to KPS from other ministries are covered under NHIF, unlike the other prisons staff.

The current medical scheme benefits, as provided in the insurance cover, are as captured in Table 15.1.

Table 15. 1: Medical scheme benefits provided for under the current cover

Job Group	PG NPS	PG KPS	Inpatient	Outpatient	Maternity	Optical	Dental
A-H	PG 1-3	PG 1-3	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
J	PG 4-5	PG 4-5	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
K	PG 6	PG 6-7	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
L	PG 7	PG 8	Unlimited	Unlimited	200,000	100,000	60,000
M&N	PG 8-9	PG 9-10	3,000,000	400,000	200,000	100,000	60,000
P	PG 10	PG 11	3,200,000	450,000	200,000	100,000	60,000
Q, R, S, T	PG 11-13	PG 12-13	3,500,000	500,000	200,000	100,000	60,000

Source: KPS Submissions to the Taskforce

1357. A review of the accredited facilities by the Taskforce shows a relatively limited geographical coverage and reach of health facilities under the current medical insurance scheme compared to the previous one. According to records seen by the Taskforce, there are five (5) counties (Nyandarua, West Pokot, Samburu, Uasin Gishu, and Elgeyo Marakwet) where there are no accredited facilities under the current medical insurance scheme. There are many other counties with one or only a handful of providers that are not sufficient given the geographical expanse of these counties.

Table 15. 2: Number of accredited CIC facilities in comparison with NHIF facilities

County	No. of NHIF Facilities	No. of CIC Facilities
Nyandarua	6	0
West Pokot	9	0
Samburu	9	0
Elgeyo Marakwet	6	0
Mombasa	26	36
Baringo	20	2
Bomet	5	2
Bungoma	26	4
Busia	22	3
Embu	22	7
Garissa	16	1
Homa Bay	28	3
Isiolo	13	2
Kajiado	53	15
Kakamega	44	6
Kericho	10	7
Kiambu	51	14
Kilifi	35	7
Kwale	4	2
Tana River	3	2
Lamu	3	2
Taita Taveta	11	6
Wajir	25	2
Mandera	55	1
Marsabit	14	4

County	No. of NHIF Facilities	No. of CIC Facilities
Meru	56	2
Tharaka Nithi	14	2
Kitui	28	7
Machakos	16	8
Makueni	22	3
Nyeri	11	2
Kirinyaga	37	5
Murang'a	9	3
Turkana	23	4
Trans Nzoia	24	7
Nandi	26	3
Laikipia	18	6
Nakuru	86	19
Narok	24	3
Kericho	10	6
Vihiga	17	2
Siaya	44	1
Kisumu	51	17
Migori	48	2
Kisii	40	6
Nyamira	24	2
Nairobi	77	205
Uasin Gishu	27	9

Source: Computation from data provided by NHIF and CIC

1358. While transition challenges are understandable and indeed normal, there is need to give regard to emergencies and extreme situations the officers may face. The Taskforce received reports of loss of lives among officers because of inability to access treatment. There were also complaints that authorisation for treatment procedures can take up to seven working days, which is inordinately long for a person seeking medical attention.
1359. The Taskforce further notes that lack of consultation in making policy changes, as happened in the procurement of KPS medical cover, has adversely affected the officers' welfare. This in itself is unconstitutional as it goes against the principle of subsidiarity and public participation. Indeed, the disruption occasioned by abrupt move to the new scheme exposed officers to a window during which they were unable to access medical care.

1360. The KPS hospital constructed in Ruiru Campus is fully equipped but has not been commissioned and handed over to the Service as the contractor has not been paid for the Service. This has delayed service delivery to members of the KPS. The facilities available in prisons that are functional are serving the community well. Further, the Kenya Prisons Service has established a health directorate at the headquarters for coordination of services. A few health centres have been established in some prisons. Many prisons have makeshift facilities, lacking in virtually all medical equipment. The directorate relies on medical staff posted from the Ministry of Health, who are insufficient in number. There is need to establish well equipped health facilities in all prisons. This also requires the recruitment and training of prisons medical staff.

Recommendations

1361. The Taskforce analysed the views and submissions of KPS officers, key stakeholders and the medical insurance provider and reviewed various documents including the contracts and the negotiation minutes. The Taskforce notes the severe absence of responsibility by the negotiating team in advancing the interests of KPS officers in the negotiations. Ultimately, the interests of junior officers were minimally represented, which has precipitated the current unfortunate reported findings. Consequently, the Taskforce is constrained to recommend the termination of the said contract in the public and the officers' interest. The Taskforce further recommends that:
- (a) Non-renewal of the 2023 medical insurance contract of the Consortium;
 - (b) Future medical insurance negotiations should have a six-month period from advertisement to on-boarding of staff to enable the negotiations to cover all the necessary areas and minimise teething challenges at the on-boarding stage;
 - (c) There should be full participation of officers in determining the medical cover that would be contracted and the terms of engagement;
 - (d) In future contracts, the contract and minutes should match and be consistent. K disclosures such as capitation should be included in the body of the main contract;
 - (e) In future medical insurance contracts, information on subcontractors should be shared as a core part of the negotiations including distribution of service providers and facilities;
 - (f) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the contractual performance should be clear and periodically reviewed by the insured and the insurer;
 - (g) The Insurance Implementation Committee should be involved in the negotiations from the outset;
 - (h) The Terms of Reference should include proof of service providers across the country through service level agreements, among other methods as may be determined from time to time;
 - (i) The service provider should provide officers and the Service with expenditure returns every quarter;
 - (j) There should be a framework for independent oversight over negotiations and execution of contracts;
 - (k) KPS should negotiate and provide comprehensive group life cover for all cadres;

- (l) All insurance contracts negotiated on behalf of officers should cover longer periods to prevent disruptions and the constant transition challenges experienced by changing from one insurer to another;
- (m) Given that the World Health Organisation classifies drug abuse and alcoholism as diseases, future medical insurance should cover such cases as part of contractual obligations;
- (n) The Service should operationalize the KPS hospital constructed in Ruiru Campus and further recruit and train adequate medical staff for all Prison health facilities;
- (o) KPS recruits should be included in the Service's medical cover; and
- (p) Arrangement should be made for the sharing of medical facilities across the security sector services.

15.4 Compensation scheme

1362. The Taskforce noted that compensation for accidents and occupational diseases for KPS officers is covered under the Work Injury Benefits Act, 2007 (WIBA). WIBA covers the hours the officer is at their place of work.
1363. Besides the provisions of WIBA, the government has introduced the Group Personal Accident (GPA) Scheme, which is funded by the National Treasury and currently covered by Britam Insurance Company Ltd. The GPA covers permanent bodily injury or death arising from bodily injury or death in the line of duty, and provides 24-hour cover to employees whether within or outside the country.

Table 15. 3Benefits payable under the GPA and WIBA

Cover	Benefit
Death under GPA	5 years Basic Salary
Death under WIBA	8 years Gross Salary (basic salary + regular allowances)
Permanent Total Disability under GPA	5 years basic salary x percentage awarded
Permanent Total Disability under WIBA	8 years (basic salary + house allowance) x percentage awarded

Source: CIC

Findings

1364. The Taskforce was informed that the legal and administrative framework to cater for the KPS officers' dependents after loss of life, terminal illness and injuries has some significant challenges. When officers are injured, processing compensation takes a fairly long time and, in some cases, officers complained that the awards are not commensurate to the injuries sustained.
1365. Table 15.4 shows the number of unpaid compensation and claims for various categories including group life, disability, injuries, terminal illness, mental illness and last expense from 2012 to 2022. There is a total of 242 cases of unpaid compensation and claims, with 2020 having the highest number (94 cases), followed by 2021 (75 cases). There is, however, no data provided for the years 2012 to 2016.

Table 15. 4: Unpaid compensation and claims (Group Life, Disability, Injuries, Disability, Terminal Illness, Mental Health Illness and Last Expense)

Year	Number of Officers
2017	2
2018	1
2019	29
2020	94
2021	75
2022	41

Source:KPS

The major reasons for delays in settling claims include:

- (a) Delays in payment of insurance premiums by respective government ministries;
 - (b) Incomplete documentation to support the claim, for instance, police abstract forms, medical forms;
 - (c) Disputes occasioned by unclear interpretation of existing contract by contracting parties;
 - (d) Unexplained delays from insurance companies for such reasons as misplaced claim forms and complexity of involving co-insurers;
 - (e) Rejected claims;
 - (f) Under NHIF there was no GPA in place so compensation for injuries sustained while out of the work station were not covered. The introduction of WIBA in 2022 covered compensation for injuries, leading to a backlog of claims; and
 - (g) Insurer disputing percentages awarded, necessitating a second opinion, which is unprocedural.
1366. The Taskforce established that the system for pursuing compensation claims in case of accidents and injury is all manual and centralised in Nairobi. Officers informed the Taskforce that in the circumstances, they are often compelled to travel to Nairobi from their duty stations to follow up on compensation claims yet they usually operate on limited days off duty and low finances. Consequently, many of them are compelled to abandon legitimate claims for compensation. Further, many officers lack knowledge and information on how to initiate a compensation claim resulting in time-barred applications.
1367. Further, the Taskforce obtained statistics on the number of deaths or injuries in the line of duty for the past few years as presented in Table 15.5. The data show that since 2012, KPS has lost 18 officers in the line of duty while 43 have been injured in the line of duty. While there are no reported officers injured in 2012 and in 2016, the majority of the injuries were reported in 2013 (7 officers), 2019 (7 officers) and 2020 (8 officers). The highest number of officers killed in the line of duty were reported in 2017 and 2022 (4 officers each) with 2016 having no reported case of officers killed.

Table 15. 5: KPS officers killed or injured in the line of duty since 2012

Year	Injured	Killed
2012	Nil	1
2013	7	2
2014	1	1

Year	Injured	Killed
2015	5	1
2016	Nil	Nil
2017	4	4
2018	4	1
2019	7	2
2020	8	1
2021	1	1
2022	6	4
Total	43	18

Source: KPS

1368. In light of the data provided, the Taskforce notes that it is imprudent use of financial resources to provide a blanket medical cover for all officers. Instead, the Treasury could set up a fund to compensate for the previously insured risks. Alternatively, KPS could negotiate for insurance of a given number of officers that is informed by the statistics. This move would significantly save public resources, which would be used elsewhere in alleviating the living and working conditions of prisons officers.

Recommendations

1369. The Taskforce is alive to the number of KPS officers exposed to unique risks associated with their nature of work. Having considered the submissions and public views, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) KPS leadership should reduce the turnaround time for payment of claims by automating the process of filing and settling such claims;
- (b) The Service should conduct impactful and sustained sensitisation on these procedures and processes;
- (c) In the event of an injury or death, the Officer in Charge should alert the responsible HR office, which should immediately inform either the officer or the family and advise on the procedure for lodging claims for compensation;
- (d) KPS and its sister Services should establish a unit with dedicated staff for central processing claims;
- (e) KPS should ensure there is a timely payment of premiums;
- (f) KPS should make it mandatory for members to nominate their legal beneficiaries to avoid long standing family disputes;
- (g) KPS should put in place a dispute resolution committee composed of members from the following directorates: Human Resources, Legal, Administration and Personnel, and Health Services to ensure fast resolution of compensation disputes;
- (h) Contracted insurance companies should be compelled to adhere to contract terms, failure to which the contract be suspended or terminated unless there is good cause;
- (i) A determination needs to be made on settling historical claims because of inability to obtain missing documents or doing away with them to bring to an end that chapter;
- (j) Contracts negotiating committees must involve a legal officer and a medic (medical officer, nurse or clinical officer), among others who would be instrumental in clarifying some fundamental contract terms; and
- (k) KPS should find a way of ensuring that all data in regard to insurance is retained to ensure easier on-boarding of subsequent insurers.

15.5 Mental health

1370. On mental health, the Taskforce was required to assess issues of psychological support, guidance and counselling at station level and make any other recommendation to improve the mental wellbeing of KPS officers.
1371. The Taskforce notes that KPS work involves close interactions with incarcerated persons. Prison is, by definition, an unhappy place. No one wants to remain in prison and this by itself creates serious psychological stress. KPS officers are, therefore, expected to ensure safe custody and containment of inmates who may be violent and other inmates who may be facing psychiatric and psychological problems on account of their incarceration. Inevitably, therefore, this kind of environment takes a mental and psychological toll on officers.
1372. KPS records indicate that mental health challenges have been increasing within the Service and that between January and December 2022 alone, a total of 179 officers were admitted into rehabilitation centres.

Findings

1373. The Taskforce established that the Kenya Prisons Act does not address mental health issues. In addition, KPS does not have an institution-specific mental health policy but is instead guided by the Kenya Mental Health Policy 2015- 2030.
1374. Mental health challenges in KPS are linked to the nature of work and exacerbated by the officers' poor working and living conditions. Officers are regularly exposed to aggressive behaviour, abuse and even threats of violence from inmates. Separation from family as well as long hours of work often predispose KPS officers to alcoholism and drug abuse.
1375. The poor psychological and mental health support system in the Service means that officers do not have the help they need at the earliest opportunity. Further, the Service does not have counselling professionals in sufficient numbers to provide psychological support to officers. However, the Taskforce notes that KPS has a policy on Psychological Counselling Services. The policy framework is, however, largely dysfunctional as there is a debilitating shortage of counsellors, and its general implementation has been poor. As a result, officers-in-charge have taken it upon themselves to provide chaplaincy, guiding and counselling services. These are, however, based on the initiative of individual officers and the quality and nature of the support given is not standardised or subject to any kind of review.
1376. Table 15.6 shows that since 2020, a total of 672 KPS officers have been admitted to rehabilitation centres for various reasons, including mental health challenges. The highest number of officers admitted to rehabilitation centres was in 2023 (308 officers) and 2022 (179 Officers).

Table 15. 6: KPS officers admitted to rehabilitation centres since 2020

Year	Officers
2020	94
2021	91
2022	179
2023	308

Source: KPS

Just like in the compensation scheme, rather than take a wholesale cover for mental health, it is financially prudent to identify a specific number (from the statistics), for

coverage. Also, instead of establishing a mental institution for the institutions, it would be easier for officers to receive treatment from the already established mental health institutions, which would greatly save on public resources.

Recommendations

1377. KPS officers are expected to ensure safe custody and containment of inmates, who may be violent or experiencing psychiatric and psychological problems on account of their incarceration. Inevitably, this kind of environment takes mental and psychological toll on officers. The Taskforce, therefore, recommends that:

- (a) There is need to review and implement the KPS Psychological Counselling Services Policy;
- (b) The CGP should ensure that there is ample physical space or offices to provide counselling services to officers in a safe and private atmosphere;
- (c) Mental health should be comprehensively covered by the medical insurance scheme, but with a smaller number of officers covered as informed by statistics from KPS; and
- (d) The Ministry of Interior and National Administration should develop a policy on shared services for its various institutions as a cost-saving measure. For instance, KPS and NPS can use the services of the same professional counsellors, hospitals and training facilities, among others.

15.6 General welfare

1378. The Taskforce was required to review and recommend improvement of matters relating to the welfare of officers in all KPS cadres and all other matters incidental to optimal service delivery of service.

1379. KPS does not have a welfare policy. Welfare includes anything that is done for the comfort and improvement of employees and is provided over and above wages. Welfare helps in keeping the morale and motivation of employees high so as to retain them for longer durations and for them to perform better.

1380. Welfare measures need not be in monetary terms only but in any kind or form. Employee welfare may, therefore, include but is not limited to monitoring of working conditions, creation of harmony at work through infrastructure for health and insurance against disease and accidents involving the employee and their families.

1381. KPS has a Directorate of Rehabilitation and Welfare at its headquarters. The Service also has a Welfare Committee that regulates and advises on the activities of all other welfare committees at regional offices and KPS institutions. The welfare support is, however, not a funded vote and relies on the cess collected from prisons canteens.


Findings

1382. As stated, the Taskforce established that KPS does not have a staff welfare policy. The Welfare Committee in place does not have any guaranteed source of funding.

1383. The Taskforce observed that there is no KPS canteen system and officers sometimes have to improvise to establish one in their facility. In addition, most KPS institutions do not have any recreation facilities or programmes for officers. There are no social halls for playing games or watching TV. As a result, many officers spend their leisure time in bars outside KPS institutions, a situation that contributes to the problem of alcoholism and drug dependency in the Service.

1384. KPS officers do not have any staff buses or suitable transport for use whenever they travel, for instance to support a bereaved colleague, attend sporting activities, attend official meetings away from stations, etc. In many cases, officers use the same means of transport that is used to transport inmates.
1385. The Taskforce also found that all Prisons staff are charged Ksh 200 monthly for sporting activities, which amount is not accounted for. Further, there is no policy basis upon which the deductions are anchored; neither is there a guideline on how the funds are used.
1386. The Taskforce found that prisons environments have been proven to be highly stressful worldwide. The Kenya Prisons Service has a welfare unit, which looks into the welfare of staff and inmates. Currently, the unit has over 1,000 members of staff deployed in various institutions. However, many KPS facilities also lack proper offices in terms of structures and furniture for staff, let alone welfare offices.
1387. There is also need to establish new prisons to provide more space to ease congestion in the existing institutions. Specifically, there is need to adopt international standards of prisoner accommodation in cells for their enhanced safety.
1388. Besides housing and accommodation, the service needs to develop other physical facilities including educational facilities such as academies, nursery schools, maternity facilities, canteens, recreational facilities, multipurpose halls with kitchens, Offices, furniture, administration blocks, armouries, workshops, dispensaries and gymnasiums in all prisons.
1389. The Taskforce also found that the welfare of KPS officers is intertwined with that of inmates. As a result, most officers' needs are not keenly addressed due to competition for the limited resources. Briefly, below is the welfare structure for KPS.

Figure 15.1 : Organisation structure for the Directorate of Rehabilitation



Recommendations

1390. The Taskforce recognises that the general welfare of officers plays a key role in their motivation and enhances a positive environment, both for the officers and their families. The lack of a Welfare Policy, among other measures, poses a challenge to the realisation of an effective KPS. The Taskforce, therefore, makes the following recommendations:
- (a) The leadership of KPS should create a centrally managed structure to oversee the establishment and running of KPS canteens across the country. Such a framework should be led by a senior officer and be facilitated with adequate resources to ensure that there are properly run canteens countrywide. This should be benchmarked on the DEFCO Welfare Canteens;
 - (b) The nature of services and facilities provided in canteens should depend on the practicalities and needs of various stations. Hardship or forward areas should have priority for establishment and running of canteens;
 - (c) The Council and the CGP should arrange for the establishment of recreational and sports facilities for officers and their families. The designs of correctional facilities should take these needs into account;
 - (d) The Council and leadership of KPS should partner with county governments to develop early childhood development and education (ECDE) facilities within or in the vicinity of KPS premises so as to cater for the needs of officers' children;
 - (e) The government should provide officers in remote or operational areas with transport facilitation for purposes such as shopping and other welfare engagements;
 - (f) The government should ensure sufficient budgetary allocation for sports activities to improve the welfare of KPS officers, which the CGP can use to commission and facilitate tournaments for the Service;
 - (g) KPS should develop a comprehensive sports policy, a welfare policy, and a social welfare personnel recruitment policy;
 - (h) Also, the Service should improve the terms of service for the welfare staff;
 - (i) KPS should ensure availability of counselling rooms in all stations; and
 - (j) There is need to refurbish or in many cases kpsconstruct and furnish offices, at all Prison facilities.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

16.1 Introduction

1391. Effective prison reform is critical to the achievement of criminal justice reforms, owing to the core role that that KPS plays in the sector. In turn, a major of part of prison reform is building the technical and operational capability of the Service to enable it to discharge its mandate and functions in accordance with applicable national, regional, and international standards.
1392. This chapter evaluates the technical and operational capability of the Service to effectively discharge its mandate, the challenges that it faces in this regard, and further identifies recommendations to enhance the technical and operational capability of its different components.

16.2 ICT and modernisation

Current context and practice

1393. The Terms of Reference required the Taskforce to reassess the necessity of adopting and operationalising ICT usage in all operations of the Kenya Prisons Service in an effort to harness technology. These assessments relate to: adoption of digital records in prison management for record keeping and data management for officers as well as prisoners, body cameras, vehicles cameras, smart and intelligent surveillance equipment, digital scanners and mobile jammers, among others, consistent with the Constitution.
1394. The Taskforce established that the Kenya Prisons Service still performs a number of its core functions manually. These functions range from storage and retrieval of inmates' and staff records, prisons surveillance and security, court attendance and correspondence with criminal justice institutions and agencies to administrative and institutional systems that enable the KPS to operate.
1395. Very few KPS facilities have structured cabling, and only a handful are connected to the National Optic Fibre Backbone (NOFB). This means that KPS has not leveraged on the backbone ICT infrastructure in the country, primarily due to the high costs involved. The radio communication network within the KPS, which is essential to operations, is dilapidated.
1396. The HF Base and VHF repeater radio communication system infrastructure that KPS relies on is outdated and largely unserviceable. A brief history of the system is important for context. The system has been in place since 1954 when it started with a radio-telephone system to facilitate direct communication between penal institutions and the headquarters. It was expanded and became a signal section in 1957, with the primary purpose of facilitating voice and data communication. Notably, the system was part of the Police Communication Network, where a few channels were allocated to the Service for the purposes already alluded to. The Taskforce was informed that the system underwent major expansion and repairs between 1998 and 2002, but further expansion was halted soon after, pending investigations into security-related projects. The Taskforce noted that although the infrastructure is still in place, it is no longer viable for modification and expansion.
1397. While very few KPS facilities have installed CCTV surveillance systems, the quality of equipment, compatibility and interoperability have routine challenges. Apparently, lack of funds for repair and maintenance hinders continuous running of the systems.

1398. There is no doubt that manual systems of data management are time consuming, prone to human error and highly unreliable in management decision-making. This is exacerbated by technical, legal, cultural and organisational barriers to data and information sharing. This hampers smooth operations and affects the rights of inmates and officers.
1399. The Taskforce notes that to enhance the efficiency of the Service, these systems need to be modernised. Some aspects of the modernisation may involve electronic management of data, information and communication as well as adoption of virtual courts in all KPS facilities, among others.

Prisons, public and stakeholder views

1400. In their submissions, the KPS leadership and officers underscored the importance and benefits of leveraging ICT for service delivery. They further submitted that KPS has, with the help of development partners, commenced automation of services (such as those relating to records and data management) as well as acquisition of modern communications equipment, which have improved efficiency.
1401. In addition, KPS noted that incidence monitoring (surveillance), which is critical in detecting, deterring and resolving emerging security breaches, would greatly benefit from ICT-based interventions.
1402. KPS officers, especially those who have to escort remand detainees to courts for routine mentions of court matters and rulings on interlocutory applications, proposed the establishment of virtual courts. It was noted that this will assist in cutting transport and logistical burdens relating to the movement of inmates.
1403. On its part, the State Department for ICT submitted that effective rollout of ICT infrastructure will have to include training and capacity building for KPS officers in order to enhance their ICT literacy skills. The Department also noted that the automation of systems will assist in managing the number of staff required to manually undertake some Service functions.
1404. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions observed that KPS is part of the national criminal justice system and that automation and integration of its systems with the other criminal justice agencies will enhance efficiency. Specifically, the ODPP called for the development of a Digital Case Management System that is linked to physical and virtual courts, the ODPP, Probation and Aftercare Services (PAS), and other criminal justice actors.
1405. Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) called for the adoption of technology to deal with emerging trends in the use of technology to commit crimes (such as cybercrimes and fraud) in KPS correctional facilities. KEPSA also urged the use of ICT platforms to sensitise the public about reforms and rehabilitation programmes in the institution.

Findings

1406. The Taskforce observed that KPS facilities generally lagged behind other State institutions in adopting modern technology. The communication equipment within the Service is moribund. This situation has compelled officers use personal phones and emails for official communication.
1407. While a handful of correctional facilities have electronic video surveillance, majority of them rely on manual security operations that are increasingly unreliable. Sophisticated crimes committed in these facilities by inmates require ICT-based security interventions.

1408. The lack of an automated information and records storage and retrieval system presents a challenge to effective correctional facility management. If automated, critical processes such as the retrieval of health records during inmate transfer, obtaining security backgrounds of inmates, and other vital records, will greatly enhance efficiency in important areas such as when determining an inmate's welfare, court processes, and the general prison security management.
1409. The adoption of virtual courts and ICT in the Service will greatly reduce the cost of operations and enhance the general efficiency of the institution by reducing transport costs in transfer to attend to court matters.

Recommendations

1410. The Taskforce notes the centrality of technology and ICT in modern correctional spaces. The need to adopt ICT is critical if the dynamics of rehabilitation and correction of inmates are to be met and addressed. Fully aware of the competencies of the current KPS workforce and the training needs, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) The KPS leadership should develop a law, strategy and policy for the incorporation of technology in all its operations, including record keeping;
 - (b) The Principal Secretary and the CGP should establish a fully-fledged ICT function with professionals in KPS to provide leadership in automation of KPS functions;
 - (c) Given the availability of the National Fibre Optic Backbone in all counties, the CGP should undertake a reconstruction of KPS VOIP telephony;
 - (d) There is need for the establishment of a surveillance system in all prisons;
 - (e) KPS should leverage on the Integrated Criminal Management System for the management of inmates within the prisons and link it with all the criminal justice actors;
 - (f) The CGP should make deliberate investment in ICT infrastructure in the Service, and the Cabinet Secretary should provide the necessary support;
 - (g) The CGP should conduct exclusive and specific recruitment of ICT experts, offer competitive terms of service to ensure retention and undertake capacity building of all officers on matters of ICT;
 - (h) KPS should endeavour to adopt technology in internal communication; KPS currently uses signals and internal memos, which are all printed and dispatched. This translates to the use of tonnes of printing paper. KPS should upgrade this and embrace paperless communication through the use of intranet facilities for internal communication. This will translate to a lot of savings in procuring printing papers, cartridges and toners;
 - (i) The development of a customised Enterprise Resource Systems to run all the operations of KPS should be undertaken;
 - (j) The Service should make facilities and uniforms friendly to persons living with disabilities;
 - (k) Modernisation of the kitchens system in all 134 prisons to shift from firewood-based energy to Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) or other green energy solutions that are less carbon emitting;

- (l) Modernisation of energy supply to KPS to move from 100 per cent reliance on Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) main grid to green energy as well as solar and wind;
- (m) Modernisation of search procedures within prisons to incorporate technology; and
- (n) Provision of modern equipment that march current and emerging security threats;
- (o) Modernisation of transport facilities through providing adequate vehicles for all the prisons and specialised vehicles for high-risk prisoners;

16.3 Logistical capacity, tooling and equipment

Infrastructure and facilities

- 1411. Physical infrastructure and facilities are critical for the effective operation of correctional facilities. Such infrastructure and facilities include prison buildings, integrity of the structures, entry and exit points, inner and outer fences and perimeter walls, alarm systems, locks, cameras and surveillance equipment, scanners and radios, among other equipment.
- 1412. The status of facilities and equipment in most correctional facilities around the country is dire and worrying. Most of the facilities were established in the colonial period, and still have physical structures that were constructed during that time. In some facilities, the walls were built with weak materials, which double up as the inner correctional facility wall. Since these facilities sometimes host high-risk prisoners, their state poses a security risk.
- 1413. Across the country, there are rural farm-based correctional facilities with large tracts of land that are not properly fenced. Some have live fences and hedges, which can be easily scaled or breached. While these facilities have gates at the front and inner perimeter walls, the outer boundaries are porous and susceptible to breach by intruders.
- 1414. There is a perennial problem of crowding in correctional facilities, with the current facilities having a capacity of 29,000 inmates against the current population of an estimated 60,000. The taskforce noted that in some prisons like Vihiga, the inmates literally sleep inside the toilets. Further, in Hindi Prison, one ward is available for occupation but the inmates were bundled into another ward that was extremely congested. Further, there are insufficient ablution and sanitation facilities. As a consequence, some prisons use buckets for their ablution needs. Nothing can be more dehumanising and offensive to the right to dignity and privacy or so grossly abuse the right to a clean environment.
- 1415. The crowding in prisons is detrimental to the health and wellness of not only the inmates but also that of the prison officers for whom the prison is a workplace.
- 1416. Proposed infrastructure development, under the State Department of Public Works, include the construction of male and female correctional facilities, health units, water and sanitation works, borehole sinking and telecommunications infrastructure, among others. The proposed developments also include modernisation plans for training facilities, farming and prison industries. Modernisation will also include a switch to Bio gas programme as an energy source, construction of a special needs prison, and a Super Maximum prison facility in Manyani. The entire proposed modernisation and infrastructure development is estimated to cost almost KSh. 64 billion.
- 1417. In many facilities, especially the medium-security category correctional facilities, there are hardly any hand-held metal detectors in use during visits. Officers registered

complaints about outdated firearms and weapons that are not reliable with multiple mechanical stoppages.

1418. The Kenya Prisons Service has received assistance from development partners in the construction of additional infrastructure and the improvement and maintenance of current structures in order to assist in the containment of violent extremist offenders. KPS has also received equipment such as CCTV cameras, walk-through scanners, portable metal detectors and other equipment. However, such assistance has been limited to a handful of correctional facilities (mainly Maximum-Security facilities) where high-risk offenders are contained. The rest of the institutions run on old and outdated equipment and systems that require an overhaul.

Prison intelligence and security

1419. The evolving nature of security concerns within correctional facilities requires an effective system of intelligence and security response. Such emerging concerns include the hosting of high-risk prisoners, for example, persons convicted of or undergoing trial for terrorism-related offences, cybercrimes and fraud, and crimes in other emerging areas.
1420. However, KPS is yet to install a comprehensive system of intelligence and security response. The Taskforce was told that KPS largely relies on external agencies to gather information or collect intelligence necessary for its actions. Many of its security-related measures and actions are prompted by external monitoring by other security agencies.

Prison logistics and operations

1421. Being an integral part of the criminal justice system, KPS is charged with important responsibilities that require effective logistical support and operations for the smooth-running of the sector. KPS, for instance, is required to ensure the timely production in court of remand detainees who are on trial. This calls for logistical operations and support that will enable the correctional facilities to carry out this core function. Furthermore, KPS is under constitutional and legal obligation to ensure that the rights of inmates in its custody are respected and protected. These onerous responsibilities call for the facilitation of KPS in terms of logistics and operations.
1422. While KPS has been facilitated with vehicles, these are not adequate. In many correctional facilities, the Taskforce recorded only one vehicle used both for official and personnel transport as well movement of prisoners. The women's prisons decried of lack of vehicles for transport of any nature. In many cases, the Taskforce was informed that medical emergencies are not well attended due to a lack of transport.
1423. While there are a number of serviceable vehicles assigned to KPS, they are hardly adequate to support operations. Furthermore, there are a number of vehicles that are in a state of disrepair mainly due to lack of funds and resources for maintenance and repair. (See Appendix for details). Officers also mentioned that they lack specialised vehicles to transport high-risk inmates thus posing a major security risk.
1424. The smooth running of KPS operations requires an effective financial management and procurement system. The Service has continued to experience delays in procurement processes as well as disbursement of funds due to existing bureaucracies. This has resulted in poor absorption of allocated funds, leading to accumulation of pending bills and stalled projects, among other challenges.

1425. Funding for modernisation, tooling and equipment has been minimal, with the little allocated remaining unutilised due to existing bureaucracies. The KPS leadership submitted that implementation of the Service's activities depends on the goodwill of the Principal Secretary, State Department for Correctional Services as the Accounting Officer.
1426. Most prisons in remote locations require boreholes to supplement water supply due to the prevalent shortages in dry areas. Furthermore, due to the vastness of the regions of operation, logistical support in terms of vehicles, fuel, and facilitation of prisoner movement and other aspects of operations should be factored in the allocation of resources. The increasing insecurity resulting from terrorism-related activities have also complicated prison operations in the region.
1427. KPS officers called attention to prison facilities located in remote areas without access roads and other basic facilities and amenities for officers and inmates. For instance, Maranjau Prison in Murang'a does not have electricity or a proper road network.
1428. Officers further submitted that the current facilities are congested yet there is adequate land for expansion to ensure adherence to applicable minimum standards. For instance, it was suggested that two additional correctional facilities could be established at Kakuma and Lokichar in order to decongest the main prison at Lodwar Township.

Rehabilitation and reform of prisoners

1429. KPS industries and farms are an important part of inmates' rehabilitation and reform while in custody. The farms and industries provide a channel for equipping inmates with life skills to facilitate their reintegration into society upon release. Thus, KPS farms and industries should be equipped with modern tools, machinery and equipment to compete with the outside market in the production and manufacturing of products and goods for sale while earning revenue for the government.
1430. KPS submitted that its farms had been largely non-profitable until a turn-around strategy was applied two years ago when their revolving funds posted an exponential growth from KSh. 4.2 million in 1993 to KSh. 645 million in 2020. This strategy has led to cost cutting on food supplies to prisons and improved the productivity of the farms.

Summary of public and stakeholder views

1431. KPS officers called for automation of various aspects of the Service's operations and processes. Areas proposed for automation or digitisation include prison enterprises (procurement of supplies and raw materials, marketing, purchase of items and stock control within the industries among other processes); human resource management including staffing, prisoners' deployment, and other management systems. They explained that this could only be achieved through the establishment of a Prisons Information System.
1432. KPS officers stated that they lack basic equipment for use in training inmates and to equip the prison industries. They lamented the use of archaic tools to run the industries and still meet strict targets set by their superiors. They added that there are no modern workshops to house products made by inmates.
1433. KPS officers submitted that the establishment of the vehicle licence plates workshop in Kamiti Maximum Security Prison was intended to supplement rehabilitation programmes for offenders. The withdrawal of this facility has negatively impacted rehabilitation of offenders rendering redundant a total of 15 trained staff and 85 inmates

deployed to the licence plates production machinery. An analysis of the Five-Year Prison Industry Revolving Fund shows that sales from production between 2017/18 and 2021/22 were almost KSh. . 1.5 billion. Further, it was submitted that despite racking in billions of shillings from enterprise, the Service lacks equipment, machines, and trained machine operators who can leverage technology to produce goods of a higher quality in greater quantities.

1434. The KPS leadership recommended the purchase of 145 assorted vehicles for the top leadership and at least 1,020 units of various models of leased vehicles for operational purposes.

Table 16. 1: Status of current vehicles

Department-owned Motor Vehicles	Number
Serviceable	190
Grounded - Economical to repair	48
Unserviceable	70
Total	308
Government-leased Motor Vehicles	
Serviceable	141
Grounded at various stations (ambulances)	10
Surrendered/returned to Urysia Peugeot Centre	9
Total	150

Source: KPS memorandum to Taskforce

Table 16. 2: Recommendation for additional vehicles

S/No.	Vehicle Description	2022/2023	2023/2024	2024/2025	Total
	Medium Duty SUV off-road 4*4 (7-seater)	35	30	30	95
	Medium Duty Double Cabin Pick-up 4*4	30	50	40	120
	Heavy Duty Utility Vehicle (Toyota Land Cruiser caravan)	20	30	30	80
	Heavy Duty Utility Vehicle (Toyota Land Cruiser Pick up)	70	60	65	195
	14-seater Micro Bus	45	35	20	100
	33-35-seater Mini-Bus	20	25	30	75
	62-Seater Bus	20	25	25	70
	4-Ton Medium Duty Truck (Mini-Lorry)	30	40	20	90
	10-Ton Lorry	20	20	20	60
	Ambulance	70	50	15	135
	Total	360	365	295	1,020

Source: KPS Memorandum to Taskforce

1435. With regard to equipment, KPS staff identified tools necessary for enhancing security to include:

- (a) baggage scanners;
- (b) effective network jamming equipment for use within prison;
- (c) phone and motherboard detectors;
- (d) body and luggage x-ray scanners to detect non-metal contraband in correctional facilities;
- (e) upgrade and expansion of CCTV equipment and area coverage (including storage capacity);

- (f) vehicle scanners;
- (g) motion sensors at the outer fences to the facilities;
- (h) electric perimeter fence on the outer boundaries of correctional facilities;
- (i) basic protection equipment for the staff, such as: pepper spray, electric batons, net throwers, electromagnetic guns and electric gloves;
- (j) listening devices and CCTV for surveillance;
- (k) equipment and material for the fortification of guard points for maximum-security facilities and other levels of facilities that host violent extremist offenders (e.g., sandbags and back-up for all strategic guard points); and
- (l) modernisation of weapons by introduction of AK-47 rifles and Scorpion, alongside the G3 in use, as they are lighter and efficient in close combat engagements.

1436. KPS leadership also called for the provision of funding for the construction of super-max prisons; expansion and refurbishment or/ modernisation of prisons to humane environments with, for instance, beds for inmates. The leadership called for continuation and acceleration of ongoing prisons renovations and construction of new and modern prisons under the auspices of Kenya Prisons Service Reforms. They said this will modernise prisons services to meet international minimum standards. Correctional facilities are under the Ministry of Public Works, which is also responsible for the approval of the bills quantities (BQs), supervision of construction and maintenance. KPS has a number of registered professionals and artisans in construction. However, these professionals have no authority to approve BQs, supervise construction and certify completed projects.

Recommendations

1437. Logistical capacity, tooling and equipment are core to KPS, without which the institution will be rendered ineffective in the delivery of its mandate. While inadequacy of resources and uncertainty of funds (despite commitments to modernise the Service) are major contributors to the current state of affairs in KPS, it is also true that some of the major challenges identified are related to issues of leadership, integrity and a general lack of management strategies in the Service. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding logistical capacity, tooling, and equipment:

- (a) KPS should strengthen the Fleet Management Unit to assess adequacy or otherwise of current fleet and fuel allocations with a view to rationalising the same. This unit should also undertake an audit of all Prisons vehicles;
- (b) The CGP should develop a Transport Policy to guide the management of all vehicles and transports systems within KPS;
- (c) KPS should establish a Fleet Management System to include audit, tracking, fuel consumption, geo-fencing and other components of fleet management;
- (d) KPS should undertake formulation and implementation of a fleet management strategy and policy to assist in ensuring optimal management of government vehicles, including disposal of unserviceable ones; and
- (e) The Government should replenish the KPS Revolving Fund out of which funds were used to buy the licence plate-making machine. This will enable KPS to revitalise the Prisons Enterprise.

1438. With regard to safety and protective equipment, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) The KPS Quality Assurance Unit should be involved in all steps of procuring safety and protective equipment in order to ensure that proper equipment is acquired to support the institution's operations. The unit should be empowered to assist in the control of acquisition processes for KPS equipment; and
 - (b) The CGP should take personal responsibility for the quality of gear or equipment acquired for use in the Service, including taking responsibility for any loss of life or injury as a result of poor quality of gear and equipment.
1439. The Taskforce observed that the equipment, tools and machinery in workshops, farms and offices are in a poor state of repair and that many are obsolete. In order to ensure optimal levels of service, the government should provide resources necessary for acquiring tools and equipment for KPS operations. Specifically, the government should fund the modernisation budget for KPS.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: OTHER REFORMS IN THE KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

17.1 Introduction

1440. The Taskforce was required to assess a number of other issues and reforms in the KPS. These include: recommend general reforms including titling of all KPS land, consider the integration or otherwise of constitutional human rights and fundamental freedoms in the training and curriculum for KPS officers, and to assess, consider, review and recommend the nature, quality and standard of uniform for KPS officers and inmates. The Taskforce was also required to assess issues of gender mainstreaming and Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) within the KPS.
1441. In addressing the above issues, the Taskforce collected views, received memoranda, and reviewed documentation related to the current status and made findings in accordance with the Terms of Reference and further makes proposals and recommendations for reform.

17.2 Titling of Land and Premises

Current context and practice

1442. It was noted that KPS owns large tracts of land across the country, much of which is used for farming and other rehabilitation programmes. Lack of security of title coupled with weak systems of accountability and corruption have led to wanton loss of land belonging to the Service.
1443. KPS submitted that the total land under its ownership is 9,088.97 hectares (or 22,458.84 acres). However, 1,713 hectares (or 4,234.06 acres) have been grabbed by corrupt and well-connected individuals, leaving it with only 7,375.92 hectares (or 18,225.90 acres). Out of 134 correctional facilities in the country, it is disconcerting to note that only 14 have title deeds. The vulnerability of the untitled pieces of land to further grabbing and loss to well-connected corrupt individuals should worry the KPS leadership and compel them to take appropriate action.
1444. In some parts of the country, land is generally categorised as community land. This means that even land belonging to KPS is not adjudicated. This has created avenues for grabbing KPS land. In Lodwar, for instance, the land acreage allocated to KPS is not documented, neither is the interest registered.
1445. The Taskforce witnessed many instances of private constructions right inside KPS land. Needless to mention, there are cases where KPS facilities are located in what reflects in the land registries as private land.

Summary of prisons, public and stakeholder views

1446. Members of the public who submitted views to the Taskforce expressed concern about the loss of prison land to political figures and politically connected individuals. There were testimonies about tracts of land that were originally prisons-owned but are now in the hands of individuals.
1447. The public further noted that there is a lot of land in the control of KPS that is lying idle, a factor that attracts land grabbers. It was also submitted that there are many cases pending in court regarding claims of ownership over land belonging to KPS.

1448. The issue of land grabbing was surfaced in Kitale Main Prison, Industrial Area Nairobi Remand and Allocation Prison, Langata Women, Uasin Gishu, Shimo La Tewa, Kapsabet and Kamiti, among others.
1449. In some instances, KPS land has been allocated to NYS without the necessary processes and documentation. A case in point is Kilifi and Kwale, where 20 acres each have been taken over by NYS.

Findings

1450. The Taskforce established that the Ministry of Interior and National Administration, in collaboration with the Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning, is in the process of titling all land that belongs to KPS. However, the exercise is yet to yield the expected outcome due to the complexity of the process and the issues involved -- not to mention the lethargy of the KPS leadership. The risk of loss of KPS land to powerful and corrupt individuals connected to the government remains high.
1451. Table 16.1 illustrates the KPS land and its title status. There are a total of 112 parcels of land belonging to KPS across all the 47 counties. Among these, 75 parcels are intact with Nairobi County having the highest number (5); nine parcels have been grabbed and developed by private developers, and 10 parcels have been excised and allocated to individuals who have further developed the land. Three parcels are currently under different ownership (Nairobi-1; Taita Taveta-2) and disputed parcels are five. One parcel of land in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu County has transferred ownership of some section (80.94 Ha) to Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital through a Cabinet approval, seven parcels have been reallocated and one parcel in Bungoma County is facing threats of forcible possession from the local community.

Table 17. 1: Categories of KPS land ownership and status

KPS Land with title deeds

Station	Land Reference Number (LR. NO.)	Current Use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Kamiti Prison	32586	Correctional Facility	400.2	Title Deed	Land is intact
Woodley Senior Officers' Quarters	209/11338/3,9-24	Senior Staff Quarters	17 Units	Title Deed	Intact
Nakuru Main Prison	452/1/4 LN NO. 371/1961 PDP NO. R7/97/198	Correctional Facility And Farm	188.9	Title Deed	Disputed with several court cases already filed in nakuru court.
Naivasha	LR NO. 1144/453 (BLOCK 3/1)	Correctional Facility And Farm	340	Title Deed	Intact
Kitale Main	LR NO. 2197/2/2 & 9075	Correctional Facility And Farm	1099.5	Title Deed	Large portion of the farm land excised and allocated to individuals some of whom have settled on the land. There are cases

Station	Land Reference Number (LR. NO.)	Current Use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
					pending in courts of law
Kitale Medium	LN NO. 72 OF 1961 GN NO. 145 OF 1943	Correctional Facility And Farm	64.3	Title Deed Allotment Letter	
Eldoret Main	LN NO.371 OF 1961	Correctional Facility	21.85	Title Deed	The entire land has been subdivided and allocated to private individuals but the prison is in possession.
Lumumba Farm		Prison Farm	167.85	Title Deed	80.94 transferred to mtrh through approval by the cabinet
Ngeria Farm	GN NO. 127 OF 1971	Correctional Facility And Farm	713	Title Deed	Intact
Kericho Main	LN 313 OF 1965 721 OF 1961 ALLOTMENT LETTER REF NO. 209163/VII PDP NO. 40/KR/22/63/3	Correctional Facility And Farm	2.19	Title Deed/ Allotment Letter	Under threats from county government
Kericho Medium	LN NO. 313 OF 1965 PDP NO. R22/07/02	Correctional Facility And Farm	40.9	Title Deed	Intact
Kajiado Main	PDP NO. KAJ/166/07/01	Correctional Facility	13.12	Title Deed	Intact
Kajiado Prison Farm	PDP NO. KAJ/166/02/3	Prison Farm	40.00	Title Deed	Intact
Kitengela Prison	LR NO. 9740 GN NO. 431 OF 1958	Correctional Facility And Farm	110.28	Title Deed	Intact
Loitokitok	PDP NO. KAJ/317/2013/1	Correctional Facility And Farm	1.62	Title Deed	Intact
Maralal	SAMBURU/NGA'AA RI/4	Correctional Facility And Farm	19.00	Title Deed	Intact
Rumuruti Prison & Farm	PDP NO. R/17/172/82/3	Correctional Facility And Farm	11.3	Title Deed	Intact
Lodwar Prison	PDP NO. LWA/341/012/10	Correctional Facility	5.05	Title Deed	Intact
Lodwar Farm	GN NO. 258 OF 1968 PDP NO. 341/23/025/011	Prison Farm	65.51	Title Deed	Intact
Kapenguria	GN NO. 340 OF 1989 PDP NO. KAPE/318/04/1	Correctional Facility	26.71	Title Deed	Intact

Station	Land Reference Number (LR. NO.)	Current Use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Sigor Prison Farm	GN NO. 760 OF 1963	Prison Closed Down Due To Insecurity	80.94	Title Deed	Intact
Narok Prison	LN NO. 1184 OF 1954 PDP NO. 163/97/72	Correctional Facility	26.22	Title Deed	The land has been grabbed and allocated to private individuals by the defunct town council of narok
Kilgoris Prison	TRANSMARA/OLOL UA /3	Correctional Facility	30.00	Title Deed	Intact
Kabarnet	PDP NO. RB328/01/10	Correctional Facility	3.5	Title Deed	The land has boundary issue with the local authorities.
Eldama Ravine	PDP NO. KBK/30/2003/4 GN NO. 388 OF 1928	Correctional Facility	0.88	Title Deed	Most of the land was grabbed and developed by private developers
Tambach Prison	LR NO. TAMBACH PLOT NO. 3 GN NO. 1404 OF 1961 PDP NO. ITN/542/98/10	Correctional Facility	0.81	Title Deed	Intact
Bomet Prison	LN NO.719 OF 1961 DP NO. R336/2000/01	Correctional Facility	9.76	Title Deed	The land was grabbed and allocated to the private developers by the local authorities.
Bomet Farm	LN NO.719 OF 1961 DP NO. R336/2000/01	Prison Farm	9.76	Title Deed	The county government has reallocated the land for other purposes without the prison authority.
Sotik	LN NO.721 OF 1957	Correctional Facility	18.21	Title Deed	The whole land was grabbed and allocated to private individuals. The prison managed to recover 18.21ha even though there are people with title therein.

Station	Land Reference Number (LR. NO.)	Current Use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Kapsabet	PDP NO. KAP/126/98/2 GN NO. 721 OF 1961	Correctional Facility	20.23	Title Deed	The land was apportioned and allocated to individuals by the then municipal council. The grabbed portion is fully developed.
Kakamega Main	GN NO. 56 OF /1931 PDP NO. W16/94/8	Correctional Facility	36	Title Deed	The land allocated to individuals.
Shikusa	GN 1263 OF 1951 LN 452 OF 1959, LN 617& 618 OF 1963 PDP NO. W16/2011/05(NOT APPROVED)	Borstal Institution	424.93	Title Deed	The land is claimed by the forestry department.
Busia	BUKHAYO/ BUGENG/ 2918	Correctional Facility	57.14	Title Deed	Land is intact
Kisumu Kodiaga Prison	KISUMU/ KORANDO/ 3853 (LR NO. 8419) GN NO. 406 OF 1961 LN 721 OF 1961	Correctional Facility And Farm	123.03	Title Deed	Land is intact
	KISUMU MUNICIPALITY BLOCK10/102	Prison Farm	25.17	Title Deed	Land is claimed by the nyalenda slum dwellers.
Regional Prison Offices	KISUMU MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 10/98 (LR NO.1148/1170)	Regional Headquarters	6.55	Title Deed	The whole parcel has been grabbed. A big portion of the land is currently occupied by the grace ogot estate. The remaining 2.24ha which is occupied by prison staff houses is also grabbed and title issued to private individuals.
	KISUMU MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 8/28		2.47	Title Deed	The land was subdivided into three portion where ack church occupies a larger part of the land and the

Station	Land Reference Number (LR. NO.)	Current Use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
					municipal court occupying have of the reminder and the other half is occupied the main water for kiwasco and two blocks of prison officers' houses.
Kibos Prison	LR NO. 54 BL & LR NO. 5654/31 GN NO. 290 OF 1968 LN 297 OF 1968	Correctional Facility And Farm	93.48	Title Deed	Land is intact
Migori Prison	LN NO. 136 OF 08/04/1993 PDP NO. 133/69/01	Correctional Facility And Farm	20.75	Title Deed	The land was subdivided and allocated to other government agencies and public schools leaving prison with only 1.59ha
Homa Bay Prison	LR NO. 145/413 (PARCEL NO. 392) GN 118 OF 1961	Correctional Facility And Farm	12.5	Title Deed	The local authority has proposed to construct a by-pass to decongest homa bay town through the prison land. Larger portion of this land was reallocated to private developers who have developed it.
Siaya Prison	LN NO. 334 OF 15/10/1993 PDP NO. 321/01/7	Correctional Facility And Farm	20.75	Title Deed	Land is intact
Meru Prison	LR NO. 167/63/2 GN NO. 721 OF 1961	Correctional Facility And Farm	6.07	Title Deed	Intact
Makueni Prison	LR NO. 32365	Correctional Facility	27.63	Title Deed	Intact
Muranga Prsion	MURANG'A MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 2/526	Correctional Facility And Farm	4.86	Title Deed	Intact
Mwea	MWEA TOWNSHIP LR NO. GATH /210/668	Ln 284/1969	203.14	Title Deed	203.14

Station	Land Reference Number (LR. NO.)	Current Use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Kiambu	KIAMBU TOWNSHIP 80/2 & 77 GN NO. 640 OF 1967 LN 721 OF 1961	Prison And Farm	15.44	Title Deed	Bigger portion is being claimed by private individuals.
Nyahururu (Thompsons Falls)	NYAHURURU MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 6/3		1.255	Title Deed	Intact
Shimo La Tewa	MN/I/1479 & 1480 GN NO. 834 OF 1953 LN 320 OF 1965 & 109 OF 1962	Prison Facility And Farm	271.89	Title Deed	Much land was allocated to individuals by the then city council of mombasa. They have not taken possession of the land but they have title deeds for the respective parcels.
Malindi	LR NO. 109/71 PDP NO. 55/KLF/2/97	Correctional Facility And Farm	106.03	Title Deed	Land is intact except some locals are squatting on a portion of it.
Hola	HOLA TOWNSHIP PDP NO. TRD/312/2011/02 LN 512 OF 1957	Correctional Facility	5.50	Title Deed	Land is intact
Prison Farm At Bura (Mwatate)	BURA/MWATATE/1 385	Undeveloped	394.04	Title Deed	The title should be transferred from the county government to prison.
Voi Prison Farm	PDP NO. TTA/64/90/1	Prison Farm	40.46	Title Deed	Intact
Hindi	LR NO. 24354 GN 1690 OF 1954	Correctional Facility and Farm	289.3	Title Deed	Intact

Source: KPS

Land with allotment letters

Station	Land reference number	Current use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Nairobi Remand & Allocation	N/a	Correctional facility for remand and short sentenced prisoners	12.5	Letter of Allotment Ref No. 209163/Viii/B PDP No. 42/17/01/1 GN No. 8 Of 1911	LARGE SECTION OF THE LAND IS GRABBED AND DEVELOPED BY PRIVATE DEVELOPERS
Nanyuki Prison	Letter of allotment ref no. 198961/7 Pdp no. R/54/97/28	Correctional facility	10.04	Letter of Allotment	INTACT

Station	Land reference number	Current use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Kisii Prison	Letter of allotment ref no. 209163/vii/109 Pdp no. Ksi/37/91/4	Correctional facility and farm	6.01	Letter of Allotment	LAND IS INTACT
Karachuonyo Prison	West karachuonyo/wagwe/ii/138	Correctional facility	10.52	Allotment Letter Ref No. 261392/5	LAND IS INTACT
Marsabit Prison	Letter of allotment ref no. 209163/xii/47 Pdp no. 276/91/2	Correctional facility	5.09	Letter Of Allotment	LAND IS INTACT
Marianjau	Lr no. 17/igajo/885 Gn no. 441 of 1973	Correctional facility and farm	60.70	Allotment	INTACT
Kaloleni	Letter of allotment ref no. 209163/viii/b Pdp no. 134/klf/2/2006 Gn no. 212 of 1985	Correctional facility and farm	2.02	Letter Of Allotment	LAND IS INTACT
Garissa Medium	Allotment letter ref no. 34826/14/110	Correctional facility and farm	51.6	Allotment Letter	INTACT

Source: KPS

Land owned on the basis of a deed plan

Station	Land reference number	Current use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership document	Remarks
Kerugoya	Kerugoya Municipality Parcel 491	Deed Plan	14.76	Deed Plan	14.76

Source: KPS

Land owned on the basis of a survey plan

Station	Land reference number	Current use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership document	Remarks
Nairobi West Prison	209/11302	Correctional Facility	25.47	Survey Plan	The entire land is grabbed with a larger portion developed

Source: KPS

Land owned on the basis of agreement between the Community and KPS through (facilitated by Provincial Administration)

Station	Land Reference Number	Current Use	Approximate Area (Ha)/Number of House Units	Ownership document	Remarks
	PARCEL 452 ROKOCHO-KEIYO SOUTH.		24.28	Agreement made between the community and the prison through the area chief's office.	

Station	Land Reference Number	Current Use	Approximate Area (Ha)/Number of House Units	Ownership document	Remarks
Chegilet Prison Farm		PRISON LAND AT CHEGILET FARM-KEIYO NORTH	45.01	Agreement made between the community and the prison through the area chief's office.	Land intact
Prison Farm At Kapkobil		PRISON LAND AT TOT (KAPKOBIL)-MARAKWET EAST	20.23	Agreement made between the community and the prison through the area chief's office.	Land intact
	PARCEL 452 ROKOCHO-KEIYO SOUTH.		24.28	Agreement made between the community and the prison through the area chief's office.	

Source: KPS

KPS Land with undeclared basis of ownership

Station	Land Reference Number	Current Use	Approximate Area (Ha)/Number of House Units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Officers' Mess Nairobi West		MESS BUILDING	1.01		Land intact
Prisons Headquarters (Magereza House)	PDP NO. 42/16/92/2	MAGEREZA HOUSE BUILDING	0.64		Land intact
Bungoma	PDP NO. W/128/2000/11 GN NO. 161 OF 1963	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	4.23		The land is highly threatened by local authorities
Vihiga Prison	GN NO. 2658 OF 2008	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	2.15		Land intact
	KISUMU KORANDO/3827 MAP SHEET 14	WATER PUMP AND STAFF HOUSES	1.0		Land intact
Kendege Prison (Kehancha)			8.09		Land intact
Prison Farm At Lichota		PRISON FARM	20.23		Land intact
Prison Land At Nyatike	LR NO.17955		4.9		Land intact
Isiolo Prison	PDP NO. 117/75/1	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	32.38		The farm has been subdivided and reallocated to private

Station	Land Reference Number	Current Use	Approximate Area (Ha)/Number of House Units	Ownership Document	Remarks
					individuals whom have acquired title deed for the same.
Moyale	PDP NO. 194/91/14 LR NO. 197.74 GN NO. 103 OF 1946	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	18.01		Portion of the land is grabbed
Kitui Prison	GN NO. 262 OF 1927	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	18.5		Part of the land has been allocated to private individuals by the then municipal council. Some of the plots are already developed.
Mutomo	PDP NO. 2/2/18/3/7	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	7.9		Land intact
Mwingi	PDP NO. MWG/398/08/2	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	9.0		Land intact
Makueni Remand Home	PDP NO. MKN/78/02	REMAND HIOME	0.65		0.65
Machakos Main Prison	MACHAKOS MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 1/30 & 31 GN NO. 397 OF 1958	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	21.74		Private individuals allocated plots in between the prison staff houses and some have developed the same.
Yatta Prison	LR NO. 22292	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	9.674		Land intact
Mara	LETTER FROM DISTRICT COMMISSIONER	STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION	3.2		The area governor cancelled the allocation of land to prison and reallocated it for other purposes with no land left for prison despite the already developed prison facilities.
	PLOT NO. 1369		4.86		Land intact
	PLOT NO. 1208		0.8		Land intact
	PLOT NO. 178		1.62		Land intact

Station	Land Reference Number	Current Use	Approximate Area (Ha)/Number of House Units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Chuka (Marimanti)	THARAKA/MARIMANTI/2802	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	28.33		I Land intact
Nyeri Prison	PDP NO.C6/76/12	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	35.57		
Thika	THIKA MUNICIPALITY GN NO. 1134 OF 1954 GN NO. 435 OF 1927	PRISON AND FARM	„		Most of the land is allocated to private developers. Some of the plots are developed.
	RUIRU TOWNSHIP LR NO. 11538/1 GN NO. 475 OF 1984 TITLE DEED	PRISON AND FARM	238.01	238.01	Land intact
Nyahururu (Thompsons Falls)	NYAHURURU MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 6/3		1.255	TITLE DEED	Land intact
	NYAHURURU MUNICIPALITY BLOCK 6/4 GN NO. 850 OF 1954 & 1060 OF 1952		1.303		Land intact
Oljororok Salient Scheme	LR NO. 1663 LN NO. 153 OF 2010		43.5		Land intact
Kwale Main	PDP NO. 140/I/CT/2/76	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	53.65		Land intact
Kwale Women Prison	„	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	2.74		Land intact
Kilifi Prison	PDP NO. 134/KLF/2/2006 GN NO. 212 OF 1985	PRISON AND FARM	23.5	23.5	About 15 acres of the land was allocated to a private individual by the then local town council. The grabbed portion was subdivided and titles issued. Some portions are already developed.
Hola Farm	GN NO. 1406 OF 1959 PDP NO. TRD/312/93/7	PRISON FARM		40.47	Land intact

Station	Land Reference Number	Current Use	Approximate Area (Ha)/Number of House Units	Ownership Document	Remarks
Manyani	MANYANI SHEET 189/2 LN NO. 363 OF 1958 GN 1133 OF 1954	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND FARM	1214.08		Land belongs to kenya wildlife service
Wundanyi	LR NO. 10/98 PDP NO. TTA/112/2009/1	WUNDANYI TOWNSHIP	2.0		Land intact
Taveta Prison And Staff Line	PDP NO. TTA/89/2009/1	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	3.86		Land intact
Voi Prison	PDP NO. TTA/64/2009/4 LN 139 OF 1999 & LN 8 OF 1956 GN 697 OF 1955	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	4.31		Land intact
Wajir Main	PDP NO. 332/96/13	WAJIR TOWNSHIP	28		Land intact
Eldas	PDP	UNDER CONSTRUCTION	UNDER CONSTRUCTION		Land intact
Mandera Prison	MANDERA TOWNSHIP	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY			Land intact
Garissa Main	PDP NO. 326/06/07/22 GN NO. 1085 OF 1945 LETTER OF ALLOTMENT REF NO. 209163/VIII/B	CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	3.51		Land intact

Source: KPS

KPS Land owned on the basis of Government Land Grant

Station	Land reference number	Current use	Approximate area (ha)/number of house units	Ownership document	Remarks
LANG'ATA WOMEN		CORRECTIONAL FACILITY	42.09	GN NO. 1132 OF 1954	Large portion is excised and allocated to individuals who have developed and settled on the land
PRISON'S TIMBER YARD	N/A	TIMBER KILN	0.9	PDP NO. 42/17/2003/02	Land intact

Source: KPS

1452. The Taskforce notes that there are ongoing discussions on the possibility of relocating some prisons from congested urban areas. The Taskforce is, however, cognisant of the fact that the proposal is not universally popular and that there is a real risk that the relocation could lead to further loss of KPS land if proper safeguards such as titling are not undertaken before commencing such measures.
1453. The Taskforce also notes the government efforts through the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to recover prisons land particularly in Machakos Prison.
1454. There is a perennial problem of crowding in correctional facilities where the current capacity of 29,000 inmates is unable to meet the population estimated at 60,000. The Taskforce noted that in some prisons like Vihiga, the inmates literally sleep inside the toilets. Further, in Hindi Prison, an extra ward is available for occupation but the inmates were bundled into another ward that was extremely congested. Further, there are insufficient ablution and sanitation facilities. As a consequence, some prisons use buckets for their ablution needs. Nothing can be more dehumanising and offensive to the right to dignity, privacy and abuse to the right to a clean environment.
1455. The crowding in prison is detrimental to the health and wellness of not only the inmates but also that of the prison officers for whom the prison is a workplace.

Recommendations

1456. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding the improvement of KPS premises and titling of the institution's land:
- (a) The CGP should, within six months, appoint and facilitate a committee to carry out an inventory of all KPS land and ensure titling. The relevant state agencies and institutions should provide requisite cooperation and facilitation to the committee;
 - (b) The KPS leadership should plan for the progressive securing of all the institution's land through fencing;
 - (c) All court cases involving KPS land should be fast-tracked and any other disputes settled through the ADR process;
 - (d) The CGP should take measures to regularise KPS facilities constructed on contested or private land;
 - (e) There should be a waiver of stamp duty and other charges for speedier registration of titles for KPS land;
 - (f) An approved framework of modern correctional facilities should be gazetted, published, and publicised;
 - (g) Parliament should allocate sufficient funds to facilitate continuous improvement of KPS premises;
 - (h) The CGP should pay particular attention to the state of correctional facilities, especially in 'forward areas', to ensure that they are habitable;
 - (i) The Taskforce recommends that the government should invest in the construction of modern prison facilities in tandem with the best international standards to alleviate the acute congestion in prisons; and
 - (j) The Taskforce therefore recommends that the CGP should be provided with the funding to purchase beds, mattresses, and blankets for inmates. In line with that,

the Taskforce further recommends that inmates should be provided with basic toiletries by KPS. The Taskforce witnessed depressing cases of inmates sleeping on cold concrete floors with no beddings, which is untenable.

17.3 Human rights training

Current context and practice

1457. The Kenya Prison Service has an obligation to ensure that its officers are up-to-date in terms of human rights training. This is specifically important due to the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010, which drastically changed the legal atmosphere within which the Service operates.

Submissions from the public and stakeholders

1458. The Taskforce was informed that the basic Prison Constable Recruit Training has integrated human rights in the curriculum. However, the Taskforce was informed that continuous training on emerging human rights issues is poor and largely haphazard since most officers never access such training opportunities. It was also submitted that although KPS has conducted trainings for some of its officers on matters of constitutionalism and human rights, there is an overreliance on actors such as development partners and civil society to organise, conduct and fund trainings, which is not sustainable.
1459. The public, and other key stakeholders, submitted that failure to train the KPS officers on existing national and international human rights contributes to non-observance of human rights, hence the various cases of violations of human rights by the prisons officers.
1460. It was submitted that some of the periodically reported cases of human rights violations by KPS officers could be attributed to lack of training on human rights. On that issue, the Taskforce was informed that there is need to integrate a Human Rights-based Approach to correctional facilities within the training curriculum both at the entry level as well as for serving cadres. This can be achieved by collaborating with likeminded institutions like KNCHR, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority and the National Gender and Equality Commission.
1461. Further, it was also submitted that some prisons officers assault inmates in the name of 'punishment', despite the express prohibition of such practices by the law. This is a manifest expression of lack of basic understanding of human rights law on the part of the officers.

Findings

1462. It is the finding of the Taskforce that there is minimal focus on sustained and regular training in human rights and constitutionalism for prison officers.
1463. The initial prison training course only has a small component on human rights for recruits. Continuous training for officers is haphazard and largely dependent on the goodwill and support of development partners.
1464. Further, the Taskforce concurs with various observations that the lack of regular and continuous training on human rights for prison officers significantly contributes to their troubled relationship with inmates.

For context, Table 17.2 shows that KPS provides four training courses for its officers (Prisons Administration, Human Rights, Treatment of Offenders and Treatment of Youthful Offenders). All the four courses target recruit trainees and officers on promotional courses.

Table 17. 2: KPS human rights courses

No.	Courses/Training	Target	Human Rights Content
1	Prisons Administration	Recruit trainees, Officers on promotional courses	Complaints handling mechanism
2	Human Rights	Recruit trainees, Officers on promotional courses	● Introduction to Human Rights ● History of Human Rights ● Principles and Characteristics of Human Rights; ● Categories of Human Rights ● Classification of Human Rights ● Human Rights Instruments Related to Persons Deprived of their Liberty ● Standard Minimum Rules
3	Treatment of Offenders	Recruit trainees, Officers on promotional courses	Humane Treatment of All Offenders
5	Treatment of Youthful Offenders	Recruit trainees, Officers on promotional courses	Humane Treatment of Children in Conflict with the Law

Source: KPS

1465. The Taskforce established that human rights and accountability are largely seen by officers as irritations and hindrances to their effectiveness rather than the routine way of correction and rehabilitation.

Recommendations

1466. Given the widespread reports of cases of human rights violations, the general attitude of officers to human rights as well as the constitutional requirements that human rights and values be promoted in correctional facilities, the Taskforce recommends that:
- The KPS leadership should regularly review the basic KPS Constable Training Course to ensure that it responds to the changing dimensions of human rights in rehabilitation and correction services;
 - The KPS leadership should integrate human rights in the change management strategy of the Service as recommended elsewhere in this Report;
 - The KPS leadership should ensure that officers have access to training opportunities and are regularly trained on human rights; and
 - KPS must ensure compliance with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (The Nelson Mandela Rules) and (the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (The Bangkok Rules) as well as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules) in order to alleviate the myriad challenges correctional facilities face.

17.4 Uniforms

1467. It is worth noting that proper official attire not only enhances the confidence of officers but also contributes to respect and professionalism and influences the attitudes and behaviour of the officers, inmates and the members of the public that they serve.
1468. Furthermore, in the prison environment, uniforms assist in identification of prisoners for security purposes. Prisoners' uniforms must be of good quality and must ensure the good health and wellbeing of those who wear them. There must also be a distinction in attire between convicted and un-convicted inmates, as well as the different categories of prisoners.

Summary of public and stakeholder views

1469. Most of the officers who submitted views regarding uniforms raised concerns about inadequate supplies of uniform kits and accompanying items. The uniforms supplied to prisons are inadequate and do not reach the junior officers at the tail-end of distribution lines. As KPS officers are not allowed to be in civilian attire when on duty, they are compelled to buy their own uniforms and items, which sometimes are not of the prescribed quality, colour and standards.
1470. KPS officers called for a participatory and consultative process before major decisions about official uniforms and dress codes are made. The officers called for regularisation of uniforms through the National Uniforms Committee, and prescriptions in terms of colour, shade, quality, and texture and the dissemination of authorised uniforms by the Quartermaster.
1471. Officers suggested that uniforms should be issued as a package on an annual or quarterly basis. The uniforms -- which include: socks, boots, shirt, trousers, lanyard, caps, swagger canes, rain coats, sweaters, great coats and umbrellas -- should be in full combat, good quality, and issued to all staff in all ranks. In the alternative, all staff cadres should receive a uniform allowance that is adequate. Officers proposed at least four pairs of uniforms be issued annually for all KPS officers.
1472. Officers stated that there should be strict adherence to day and night uniform within KPS, and special uniforms should be provided to officers deployed to special duty. It was also submitted that a decision should be made to minimise use of jungle or combat uniform, which is considered intimidating to the public.
1473. It was submitted that uniforms for inmates should be favourable to the weather and climatic conditions of the area or region where the facility is situated. This is because there are poor facilities in cold areas and many of the inmates lacked warm clothing to shield them from the harsh weather conditions. This poses serious health risks to prisoners, especially the elderly and sick inmates who are vulnerable to weather conditions. Special body wear for female inmates and children should also be considered when providing clothing to prisoners.
1474. Officers pointed out that KPS industries could be contracted and provided with materials and supplies to mass produce uniforms for the different categories of inmates. This would be more economical and would boost rehabilitation programmes.

Findings

1475. The Taskforce established that KPS is experiencing challenges in ensuring adequate supply of uniform to officers, especially junior cadres. This is compounded by a poor system of distribution for uniforms that puts junior officers at a disadvantage.

1476. The Taskforce observed that there is no discernible adherence to laid down procedures regarding the quality, colour, type, adequacy and use of uniform by KPS. The prevailing situation is that KPS officers in the same cadre wear different shades of uniform, yet, they are in the same Service.
1477. Table 17.3 outlines the various KPS officers working uniform items with their corresponding specifications, unit of measure and the number issued to each officer. For shirts (the olive green), Camouflage jungle jacket and the Jungle green trousers; the officers receive the material measured in meters. For shoulder badges, socks and shoes; they are issued in pairs and for each item 2 pairs are issued.

Table 17. 3: KPS officers working uniform

S/No.	Items	Unit of Issue	Issue per Person
1.	Beret	No	1
2.	Cap badge	No	1
3.	Lanyard R/G	No	1
4.	Whistle chrome	No	1
5.	Shoulder badge (clothe)	pair	2
6.	Olive green shirt material	Mtrs	3.4
7.	Shirt stitching	No	2
8.	Jungle green trouser material	Mtrs	4
9.	Trouser stitching	No	2
10.	Socks	Pair	2
11.	Shoes	Pair	2
12.	Belt R/G	No	2
13.	Jersey R/G	No	2
14.	Camouflage jungle jacket	Mtrs	2.5
15.	Jungle jacket stitching	No	1
16.	Raincoat	No	1
17.	Great Coat	No	1
18.	T-shirt	No	2

Source: KPS

1478. Furthermore, there seems to be a trend of preference for “military style” colours in the Service, a trend that de-emphasises the central role of KPS as a reformation and rehabilitation service as opposed to a security institution.
1479. The Taskforce found many inmates in the correctional facilities visited who have only one pair of uniform. Some had tattered uniforms and were almost half-naked. As a result, some inmates could not be assigned any duties outside the facilities since they had no formal wear.

Ceremonial uniform

1480. Table 17.4 shows the uniform items issued to KPS officers for ceremonial purposes. For Baratheia, the officers are issued with the material measured in metres, the shoulder badge chrome is issued in pairs, and the rest of the items are issued in pieces. These uniforms are worn during ceremonial occasions.

Table 17. 4: KPS Ceremonial uniform

S/No.	Items	Unit of Issue	Issue Per Person
1.	Cap peak R/G	No	1
2.	Cap badge chrome	No	1
3.	Tie	No	1
4.	Lanyard	No	1
5.	Whistle chrome	No	1
6.	Shoulder badge chrome	pairs	1
7.	White shirt	No	2
8.	Barathea	Mtrs	3.5
9.	stitching	No	1
10.	Belt ceremonial	No	1
11.	Shoes	Pair	1
12.	Socks	Pair	1

Source: KPS

Inmates

1481. Once convicted, inmates are required to surrender their home clothes to the prison facility and to wear prison uniforms. The uniforms supplied to each inmate are as indicated in the Table 16.5. However, it was submitted that the choice of the inmates' uniform does not inspire change of attitude and rehabilitation. The Taskforce finds that there is need not only to ensure that inmates are properly kitted, but the choice of uniform conforms to the overall objective of rehabilitation and change.
1482. Table 17.5 illustrates the uniform specifications and beddings issued to inmates. A six-metre blue-striped uniform material is issued, two pairs of shoes and two pairs of uniform stitching, two orange jerseys, and one piece of mattress. Blankets, bed sheets and bedcovers are each issued in two pieces alongside one set of feeding pan.

Table 17. 5: Inmate uniform and beddings

S/No.	Items	Unit of Issue	Issue Per Person
1.	Blue stripped uniform material	Mtrs	6
2.	Jersey orange	No	2
3.	Shoes	Pair	2
4.	Uniform stitching	Pairs	2
5.	Mattress	No	1
6.	Blankets	No	2
7.	Bed sheets	No	2
8.	Bed Covers	No	2
9.	Feeding pans	Set	1

Source: KPS

1483. Further, there is a different shed of uniform for capital remand inmates. Table 17.6 illustrates the uniform specifications and bedding materials issued to capital remand inmates (men). A six-metre grey drill uniform material is issued, two pairs of shoes and uniform stitching, two orange jerseys, one piece of mattress; blankets, bed sheets and bedcovers, each given in two pieces, and one set of feeding pan.

Table 17. 6: Uniform and beddings for capital remand inmates (men)

S/No.	Items	Unit of Issue	Issue Per Person
1.	Grey drill uniform material	Mtrs	6
2.	Jersey Grey	No	2
3.	Shoes	Pair	2

S/No.	Items	Unit of Issue	Issue Per Person
4.	Uniform stitching	Pairs	2
5.	Mattress	No	1
6.	Blankets	No	2
7.	Bed sheets	No	2
8.	Bed Covers	No	2
9.	Feeding pans	Set	1

Source: KPS

1484. Table 17.7 provides the uniform specifications and bedding materials issued to capital remand inmates (women). A six-metre pink drill uniform material is issued, two pairs of shoes and uniform stitching, two pink jerseys, one piece of mattress, blankets, bed sheets and bedcovers, each given in two pieces, and one set of feeding pan.

Table 17. 7: Uniform and beddings for capital remands (women)

S/No.	Items	Unit of Issue	Issue Per Person
1.	Grey Drill	Mtrs	6
2.	Jersey Orange	No	2
3.	Shoes	Pair	2
4.	Uniform stitching	Pairs	2
5.	Mattress	No	1
6.	Blankets	No	2
7.	Bed sheets	No	2
8.	Bed Covers	No	2
9.	Feeding pans	Set	1

Source: KPS

1485. Different types of uniforms are worn on different occasions, i.e., the ceremonial uniform is worn during national celebration parades, passing- out parades, Quarter Guards, Guards of Honour, promotional interviews and burials or parties. The working dress is an everyday wear and worn by officers on routine prison duties while the Mess Dress is worn by Senior Officers when attending formal evening functions.
1486. A set of KPS uniform consists of a pair of trousers, shirts, footwear (permanent shine, safari boot & ankle high boots), head dress (cap peak, beret & helmet), lanyard, socks, belt (ceremonial with service colours, working belt), neck tie, aiguillettes, gloves, sash, sword, scimitar, medals, jackets, name tag, full combat camouflage jungle, cane stick / swagger cane/baton, jersey, rain coat, great coat, T- Shirt and badges of rank.
1487. In addition, technical officers deployed to work in prison industries and building sections should be issued with a pair of overall khakis, jungle boots (buildings), a pair of dust coats (industries), a pair of gloves and a pair of goggles. Uniform being a critical identifier item for the Service needs to be given great priority to ensure that officers and inmates are well kitted.
1488. However, due to limited resources, the Service has perennially procured few and inadequate sets of uniform that has led to the majority of officers lacking decent uniform, considering the fact that they are required to work in their official uniforms on daily basis (seven days a week).

Recommendations

1489. Appropriate and smart official attire not only enhances the confidence of prison officers, it also earns members of the Service the public respect they require to enable them discharge their functions. Indeed, the kind of uniform worn by KPS can influence the

attitudes and behaviour of both the officers and the inmates. The Taskforce, therefore, makes the following recommendations regarding KPS uniform:

- (a) The Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration should propose legislation for enactment to provide for the establishment of a National Uniforms Committee composed of the different disciplined Services whose mandate will be to approve standards, colour and quality of uniforms for use by the disciplined services;
- (b) There should be established a Uniforms Quality and Assurance Committee of KPS, which should be empowered to make final and binding recommendations regarding the quality of uniforms to be procured for the Service, and procurement processes should include mandatory inspection and acceptance of uniforms delivered. In the event the uniform is not accepted, the officers who approved such procurement should be held accountable, including bearing a surcharge equivalent to the cost involved;
- (c) The CGP should take personal responsibility for the quality of uniforms procured and adherence to prescribed standards and conditions for KPS uniforms;
- (d) The KPS leadership should ensure that all officers have an adequate and regular supply of all uniforms and kitting they require to carry out their work. Specifically, the CGP should address concerns raised about the Quarter Master and lack of transparency and integrity in the distribution of KPS uniforms and accessories;
- (e) The process of determining appropriate uniform should be subjected to public participation and approved uniform should be gazetted after approval by the proposed Uniforms Committee;
- (f) The KPS leadership should establish a mechanism for raising complaints related to the procurement and supply of uniforms by members of KPS;
- (g) Any new uniforms for KPS should go through the process prescribed in these recommendations, including public and officer participation;
- (h) Maternity dresses and trousers should be included in the issuance of uniforms for female officers;
- (i) Automation of the entire process of supply, issuance, and distribution of uniform in the Service should be undertaken;
- (j) The Government should enforce the law that prohibits the use of gazetted prison or security sector uniforms by any other person;
- (k) There should be deliberate effort by KPS to supply inmates with sufficient and quality uniforms;
- (l) KPS should differentiate women remand inmates' uniforms from those of other women convicts;
- (m) KPS should develop new school uniforms for boys and girls in Borstal institutions that are separate from inmate uniforms; and
- (n) The Taskforce recommends that KPS industries should knit officers' and inmates' uniforms to save costs and ensure the constant supply of quality uniforms.

17.5 Gender mainstreaming

1490. According to the National Policy on Gender and Development, gender mainstreaming “is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.”¹⁷

Current context and practice

1491. The administration of correctional systems operates within a broader governance culture and societal system. In largely patriarchal societies, such as Kenya, the prison system and administration (to a large extent) reflect the social structures and cultural biases prevalent in society. Indeed, for a long time, the top leadership and senior management positions in KPS have been dominated by men, and while there have been some changes in the composition, top management and leadership remain largely male dominated.
1492. KPS has an established directorate in charge of Gender, Sports, and NGO Coordination as well as gender desks in regional offices with designated officers in charge. However, lack of an institutional gender policy or strategy has hampered broad gender mainstreaming within the Service. The gender directorate, it was submitted, faces challenges of inadequate human resource skills, low levels of awareness on gender issues, lack of space and equipment, among other challenges. It was noted, however, that KPS, through the directorate, is in the process of developing a gender policy that will cover all areas, including sexual and gender-based violence, and guidelines for the protection of vulnerable prisoners.

Prisons, public and stakeholder views

1493. KPS officers, including those handling gender matters, submitted that they have not been trained on gender issues. Members of the public who submitted views stated that the officers they interacted with in KPS lacked empathy and were insensitive on many occasions.
1494. The officers called for the establishment of nursing stations within their offices and places of work to enable officers nursing young children to attend to them as they go about their duties.
1495. The officers further said that there is need to implement applicable international standards and uphold rights at the workplace that can ensure gender mainstreaming and constitutional compliance within KPS.

Findings

1496. The Taskforce established that KPS does not have a gender mainstreaming policy. Lack of an institution-specific and comprehensive policy means that there is no basis and reference for the assessment and identification of gender mainstreaming gaps and measures to remedy the current challenges. Furthermore, a gender policy would provide a basis for measurable goals, targets, and plans for gender mainstreaming that will assure progress and certainty for the institution and mobilisation of resources and development of other institutional capacities required to ensure progress in this regard.

¹⁷Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2019, at p. 52.

1497. The Taskforce established that KPS has established a gender mainstreaming committee to spearhead gender inclusion in the Service in coordination with regional offices. However, there are no dedicated gender mainstreaming structures at the station level.
1498. To further highlight the need for a focused career progression module, it is imperative to indicate the gender distribution in the prison atmosphere. Table 17.8 shows that there are 134 prisons/correctional facilities in the country. Some 44 or 33 per cent of these facilities are female. Inmate population is currently at 62,178, with only 3,155 or 5 per cent being female. KPS currently has 31,271 uniformed officers, 7,340 or 23 per cent of whom are female.

Table 17. 8: KPS gender distribution for prisons/correctional facilities (inmate population and uniformed officers)

	Number of Prisons/Correctional Facilities		Inmate Population		Uniformed Officers In post	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Male	90	67.16	59,023	94.9	23,931	76.52
Female	44	32.86	3,155	5.07	7,340	23.47
Total	134	100	62,178	100	31,271	100

Source: KPS

1499. The current distribution of male uniformed officers per male prison/correctional facility is 265 regardless of facility type – this means that there is one male uniformed officer for every two male inmates/prisoners.
1500. The current distribution of female uniformed officers per female prison/correctional facility is 167, regardless of facility type – this means that there is one female uniformed officer for every two female inmates/prisoners.
1501. Further, KPS has a total of 31,271 uniformed officers across various ranks. There are 7,340 female officers, constituting approximately 23.47 per cent of the total. Male officers make up the majority, totalling 23,931, or approximately 76.52 per cent, of the total officer strength.
1502. Male officers constitute the higher number in any rank compared to female officers. However, the proportion of male officers per rank compared to the proportion of female officers is fairly distributed across many ranks except for the rank of SACGP, DCP, and CPL, where the proportion of female officers is lower than that of male officers. This means that male officers in the respective ranks are more likely to be promoted to the next ranks than female officers in the same ranks.

Table 17. 9: KPS uniformed officers' gender distribution

S/No	Rank	Male	Female	(%) Male	(%) Female	% Proportion of Male Per Rank	% Proportion of Female Per Rank
1	CGP	1	-	100	-	0.00	0.00
2	DCGP	1	1	50	50	0.00	0.01
3	SACGP	9	-	100	-	0.04	0.00
4	ACGP	8	2	80	20	0.03	0.03
5	DCP	23	3	88	12	0.10	0.04
6	ACP	66	15	81	19	0.28	0.20
7	SSP	227	77	74	26	0.95	1.05
8	SP	129	38	77	23	0.54	0.52
9	CIP	403	138	74	26	1.68	1.88
10	IP	856	283	75	25	3.58	3.86

S/No	Rank	Male	Female	(%) Male	(%) Female	% Proportion of Male Per Rank	% Proportion of Female Per Rank
11	S/SGT	1174	425	73	27	4.91	5.79
12	SGT	2226	688	76	24	9.30	9.37
13	CPL	4040	927	81	19	16.88	12.63
14	PC	14768	4743	75	25	61.71	64.62
	TOTAL	23,931	7340	76.52	23.47	100.00	100.00

1503. Table 17.10 shows that there are 175 appointment positions in the current KPS uniformed officer establishment, 124 or 70 per cent of these are male while 52 or 30 per cent are female.

1504. The proportion of male appointments to total male uniformed officers is currently 0.5 per cent, while the proportion of female appointments to the total female uniformed officers' strength is currently 0.7 per cent.

1505. The proportion of male officers likely to be appointed to positions of Directors, Deputy Directors, Regional Commanders and Deputy Regional Commanders is higher (92%) than the proportion of female officers likely (13%) to be appointed to such positions.

Table 17. 10: Ranking prison officers by gender

S/No.	Appointment	Male/AE	Female/AE	% Male	% Female
1.	CGP	1/1	-	100	-
2.	DCGP	1/2	1/2	50	50
3.	Directors	10/11	1/11	90.91	9.09
4.	Deputy Directors	9/11	2/11	81.81	18.18
5.	Commandant	1	-	100	-
6.	Deputy Commandant	-	1/1	100	-
7.	Regional Commanders	8/8	0/8	100	-
8.	Deputy Regional Commanders	6/7	1/7	85.71	14.29
9.	Officers-In-Charge	88/134	46/134	65.67	34.32
	TOTAL	124/175	52/175	69.87%	29.55 %

Source: KPS

Recommendations

1506. KPS has historically been a male dominated institution, a situation that still persists especially at the leadership and management levels of the Service. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations in order to address gender balance:

- (a) PSC and KPS should consider the gender factor in all recruitments and promotions and any such processes should comply with the constitutional criteria provided by Article 232 (1) (i);
- (b) The KPS leadership should develop and implement a Gender Policy within 6 months of the publication of this Report;
- (c) KPS should take steps to provide facilities for lactating mothers and crèches in the workplaces;
- (d) KPS and the National Uniforms Committee should prepare and approve maternity uniforms for female officers;
- (e) KPS should implement affirmative action for female officers in promotions to the ranks of SACGP, DCP, and CPL to increase the proportion of women in these ranks.

- (f) The KPS leadership should consider a framework that allows lactating and expectant female officers to carry out lighter duties suitable for their situation for at least a year; and
- (g) The KPS leadership should decentralise the Gender Directorate to the station level across the country.

17.6 Sexual harassment and gender-based violence

Current context and practice

- 1507. There is currently no institutional policy in KPS on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), despite the fact that cases of SGBV are reported. Lack of an SGBV policy has hampered the development of institutional mechanisms and avenues for effectively addressing SGBV.
- 1508. The Taskforce notes that there is no data on SGBV in the Service since there is no dedicated reporting mechanism. However, the Taskforce observed that an assessment of workplace SGBV was being undertaken during the Taskforce's public consultation phase to provide a basis for the development of an SGBV Workplace Policy.
- 1509. The Taskforce also noted that a training manual for newly recruited KPS officers on working with sexual offenders has been developed. Also developed was a training manual for welfare officers working with offenders. The idea, it was explained, was to assist in sensitising officers on SGBV and generally raising awareness in the Service.

Prisons, public and stakeholder views

- 1510. KPS officers submitted that there is need for a mechanism such as an anonymous reporting system that would encourage reporting of all cases of sexual harassment. To guard against false reporting, the officers suggested that there should be exhaustive investigation before any action is taken. In the same breadth, they proposed that victims of sexual harassment should receive professional counselling even as investigations proceed.
- 1511. Further, KPS officers were of the view that to encourage reporting of sexual harassment cases, the observance of the strictures of chain of command should be limited.
- 1512. Further, it was submitted that there should be established SGBV offices, which should have both male and female representatives to encourage victims to report without fear or intimidation.
- 1513. Other suggestions made by KPS officers on curbing sexual harassment included separating senior and junior officers' quarters, installation of CCTV cameras and lighting system, establishing a complaints management system and developing a workplace policy on sexual harassment.

Findings

- 1514. The Taskforce established that sexual harassment is widespread in the Service. This is evidenced by numerous reports from female officers. The main reason for this trend is that there is low awareness on sexual harassment and there is no proper mechanism or dedicated avenue for addressing the issue.
- 1515. The Taskforce noted that while the Service has a directorate dedicated to gender affairs, it has insufficient resources to assist and facilitate the rollout of programmes and activities to address sexual and gender based-violence (SGBV).

1516. The Taskforce further notes that the prevailing state of affairs created a hostile work environment especially for female officers. Depressing reports were recorded of cases where expectant female staff are not allocated light duties or are required to provide personal medical information in order to get time off, or are victimised for rejecting sexual advances from senior officers.

Recommendations

1517. On sexual harassment, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) All KPS officers should have core training modules on sexual harassment that covers institutional aspects as well as the role of KPS in handling reported cases of sexual harassment;
 - (b) KPS should develop a stand-alone Sexual Harassment Policy as a matter of best practice and in fulfilment of the legal requirement. The definition of sexual harassment in the proposed Sexual Harassment Policy should be aligned to related offences set out in the Sexual Offences Act and in the Employment Act;
 - (c) Sexual harassment in KPS should be considered as an aspect of human resource management as it affects the productivity of officers concerned;
 - (d) KPS leadership should take responsibility for mainstreaming measures to address sexual harassment in KPS and ensure the full rollout of the necessary structures;
 - (e) KPS should ensure that there is investment in psychosocial support for victims of sexual harassment. The rising cases of prison officers' suicide and family violence are evidence of the need to address the issue of SGBV and domestic violence in the Service;
 - (f) The KPS leadership should provide for grievance handling mechanisms that that can give confidence to officers to report cases of sexual harassment without fear of reprisal; and
 - (g) Officers in charge of correctional facilities should ensure that the facilities are properly tooled, friendly and suitable for handling SGBV victims, such as guaranteeing privacy and confidentiality.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: BENCHMARKING AND MODERNISATION

18.1 Introduction

1518. The Taskforce was obligated to assess and consider opportunities and platforms for benchmarking on regional and international standards and exchange programmes with a view to modernising correctional services. It is in light of this mandate that the Taskforce considered the necessity to continuously expose members of KPS to benchmarking and exchange programmes to enable the Service keep up with emerging changes and trends in other jurisdictions, exchange ideas and improve their knowledge and skills.

18.2 Benchmarking

1519. The Taskforce notes that Kenya has established strong relationships with many countries including governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and private entities that are capable of providing additional assistance or exchange knowledge with the KPS. There are also existing cooperation agreements between Kenya and some of these entities.
1520. “Benchmarking” is an efficiency tool that is based on the principle of measuring the performance of one organisation against a standard, whether absolute or relative to other organisations. It can be used to assess performance objectively; identify areas where improvement is needed; and identify other organisations that have processes resulting in better performance, with a view to their adoption. Benchmarking can also test whether improvement programmes have been successful.
1521. Benchmarking has three main aspects:
- (a) Standards benchmarking: Setting a standard of performance that an effective organisation could be expected to achieve. The publication of a challenging standard can motivate staff and demonstrate a commitment to improve the service provided. Information on an organisation’s performance against the standard can be used as a monitoring tool by its commanders. This can only be achieved if field officers are enabled to do what is expected of them. The idea of performance contracting can also come in handy if the set objectives are “SMART” – strategic, measurable, achievable, replicable and time-bound. This can be done in the context of the previous performance against the resources required to achieve desired objectives.
 - (b) Results benchmarking: Comparing the performance of a number of organisations providing a similar service. In the Kenya Prisons Service, this technique can serve to allow the public to judge whether their penal institutions or prison facilities make effective use of its resources, compared to other similar providers. This is a real test for the services and particularly the command. KPS can look at what is being done by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), for example. Why is it that KWS is doing very well in terms of its objective? Is it a leadership issue or is it about motivation? and
 - (c) Process benchmarking: Undertaking a detailed examination within a group of organisations of the processes that produce a particular output, with a view to understanding the reasons for variations in performance and incorporating best practices. There are a number of service providers within the republic that KPS can look at and reflect on to unleash the potential of its officers.

1522. Countries that have good correctional standards and practices include: Sweden, Canada, Denmark, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Namibia, Botswana, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, United States and New Zealand. Some of the standards and practices that KPS could consider include:

- (a) *Staff recruitment*: This is based on competence, suitability, professional capability and integrity.
- (b) *Staff training*: Evidence-based best practice in penal science training that is tailored to prisons general and specific duties. Training should include relevant national legislation, regulations and policies, as well as applicable international and regional instruments that guide the work and interactions of prison staff with inmates; rights and duties of prison staff in the exercise of their functions, respecting the human dignity of all prisoners and the prohibition of certain conduct, in particular torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; security and safety, including the concept of dynamic security, the use of force and instruments of restraint, and the management of violent offenders, with due consideration of preventive and defusing techniques, such as negotiation and mediation; First Aid, the psychosocial needs of prisoners and the corresponding dynamics in prison settings, as well as social care and assistance, including early detection of mental health issues. Only those candidates who successfully pass the theoretical and practical tests at the end of all trainings should be allowed to enter the prison service. There should be continuous provision of in-service training courses with a view to maintaining and improving the knowledge and professional capacity of personnel;
- (c) *Sexual and gender-based violence*: The United States, for instance, enacted the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) in 2003 which aims to eliminate sexual assault and staff sexual abuse in prisons, jails, police lockups, private prisons, juvenile facilities and community confinement facilities. Further, the National PREA Standards for Adult Prisons of 2012 require agencies to comply with these standards by demonstrating zero tolerance -- not merely by words and written policy, but through their actions, including what they do to prevent sexual assault, sexual abuse and sexual harassment and the response when this occurs. It makes the prevention and elimination of sexual assault, sexual abuse, and sexual harassment a top priority. Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) has designated a PREA administrator to oversee, coordinate and monitor implementation of these changes as well as be responsible to continually evaluate and seek out new methods to prevent and reduce sexual assault, sexual abuse, and sexual harassment within the department's facilities, private prisons, community corrections, Youthful Offender System programmes and parole that requires forensic medical examinations used whenever possible for sexual assaults. CDOC requires all staff, contract employees and volunteers to attend PREA basic training and annual refresher training. Specialised training is offered for first responders, which covers crime scene preservation, avoiding contamination, following forensic evidence collection protocol as it applies to sexual assault victims and/or sexual predators, addressing the dynamics of sexual victimisation, signs/symptoms associated with sexual violence and appropriate responses and interventions for victims of sexual abuse and/or sexual predators. There is an established confidential telephone system using a pre-programmed number for any offender under the supervision of Colorado Department of Corrections to call and report incidents of sexual assault, sexual abuse, or sexual harassment. The State has also ensured that there is a facility PREA coordinator at each prison;

- (d) *Inmate admission procedures:* In Australia, for instance, all prisoners are photographed on admission and provided with the opportunity to shower and offered clean prison clothing and shoes. The prisoner may be placed in a holding cell while staff are processing the prisoner. Prisoners are given an orientation session within the first day of arriving, where they learn about the prison routine, including meal times, shower times, exercise and their prisoner rights. They are advised on prison rules, behaviour expectations, the discipline process, health, welfare and infection issues and how to make telephone calls, contact family, money and property'
- (e) *Assessment and placement of inmates upon conviction:* Upon conviction, there should be an intake and classification process that includes a review of the individual's criminal history, educational history, and identification of programme needs, which are utilised in the classification process, fingerprinting and photographing, and a full medical, mental health, and dental evaluation by clinical staff. All these should take a minimum of three weeks and should be at a designated reception facility before the inmate commences serving the sentence in a prison. This assessment tailors an inmate's rehabilitation needs based upon their classification, any documented custody issues, and programme needs. It is at the reception facility that bed space availability is sought from the prison authorities where the inmate is to serve sentence;
- (f) *Classification:* The Colorado Department of Corrections conducts the initial inmate classification, which is completed at intake to determine the incarcerated individual's initial custody level and facility assignment. The first re-classification is completed six months after intake. The classification process is very key in identifying potential sexual vulnerability and sexually aggressive behaviour in offenders'
- (g) *Disciplinary procedures:* The disciplinary procedures that are transparent and conducted openly with proper redress mechanisms leads to more humane treatment of prisoners;
- (h) *Searches:* Most jurisdictions offer Personal Protective Equipment to aid in searches. At the bare minimum, gloves are provided during inmate and cell searches as the search involves coming into contact with body cavities
- (i) *Inmate accommodation:* Accommodation usually includes full fixtures such as toilets, taps and lights that are clean and in reasonable working condition. Where any damage occurs, it should be reported on the same day for early intervention. A deep-cleaning schedule has been developed for cells, wards and toilets;
- (j) *Crowding:* In order to tackle crowding, jurisdictions have decriminalised many offences, imprisoned minors as a last resort, and provided alternatives to imprisonment as well as compassionate release;
- (k) *Parole:* This is the most commonly used form of early release from prison that aids in decongestion. Parole or early conditional release refers to the early release of sentenced prisoners under individualised post-release conditions. It can be mandatory when it takes place automatically after a minimum period or a fixed proportion of the sentence has been served, or it can be discretionary when a decision has to be made whether or not to release a prisoner conditionally, after a certain period of the sentence has been served. A conditional release or parole is always accompanied by a general condition that the prisoner should refrain from engaging in criminal activities. However, this is not always the only condition imposed. Other

conditions may be imposed on the prisoner, to the extent that these are appropriate for his/her successful social reintegration’

- (l) *Health care*: Inmates should have access to necessary healthcare services free of charge and without any discrimination on the grounds of their legal status. Namibia has enshrined in law the provision of essential health care services for every prisoner, reasonable access to non-essential mental health care with an emphasis on the inmate’s rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the community; and access to preventative health measures;
- (m) *Contact with the outside world and family ties*: Planned visitation can occur when family members book visits through appointments’
- (n) Children accompanying their mothers to prison;
- (o) Prisoners welfare;
- (p) Dissemination of information to prisoners;
- (q) *Complaints handling mechanisms*: where proper redress mechanisms are put in place, grievances are at a minimum’
- (r) Formal education and vocational training;
- (s) *Prison funding*: this should be adequate to avoid prison authorities over relying on donations from NGOs, private entities and individuals;
- (t) *External oversight*: External inspections are conducted by bodies/organisations independent of the prisons. The objective should be to ensure that prisons are managed in accordance with existing laws, regulations, policies and procedures, with a view to bringing about the objectives of penal and corrections services, and that the rights of prisoners are protected;
- (u) *Effective rehabilitation programmes*: International research has demonstrated that offering targeted and effective rehabilitation services to offenders is an effective way to decrease an offender’s likelihood of reoffending. Rehabilitation programmes should be designed to address the needs of offenders and contribute to their successful reintegration into society. Australia has offence-focused rehabilitation programmes for the offenders and prisoners who are most likely to reoffend. These programmes address specific risk factors, such as criminal attitudes, which have been demonstrated to contribute to the likelihood they will reoffend. Norway relies on community-based correctional facilities that focus on rehabilitation and reintegration into society. KPS should tailor a return-to-work strategy for each inmate for better reintegration back into society; and
- (v) *Prisoners earning scheme*: KPS can collaborate with other penal organisations to improve its own standards and practices through the framework of bilateral agreements for exchange programmes facilitated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agreements would enable KPS to engage directly with other countries, whether they are in their immediate neighbourhood or beyond. As a result of these engagements, KPS would be able to fulfil its vision of becoming a correctional Service in Africa and beyond.

Recommendations

1523. The Taskforce therefore recommends that:

- (a) The Cabinet Secretary and the CGP, through existing international relations frameworks, should engage other correctional services within the region, in Africa

and globally with a view to securing appropriate strategies to network and engage in exchange programmes;

- (b) The CG should ensure that there is a structured framework for the leadership and members of KPS to join relevant regional and international correctional forums with a view of broadening the scope of engagement and advancement of the Service;
- (c) The CG should formulate a detailed policy to regulate benchmarking and exchange programmes within 12 months;
- (d) CGP should set up a policy to ensure equity and fairness in offering opportunities to all members of the KPS including junior officers in the forward areas;
- (e) The CGP should ensure that those who attend benchmarking or exchange programmes to mandatorily be required to prepare and submit reports and where possible, sensitise other members of the KPS on wisdom gained;
- (f) There is need to prohibit misuse of benchmarking opportunities where same people are over-exposed at the expense of others;
- (g) CGP should establish, maintain and keep an updated database of those who have previously been exposed to benchmarking and exchange programmes; and
- (h) CGP should establish a monitoring and evaluation strategy to assess the efficacy of the benchmarking and exchange programme, and ensure its continued improvement.

18.3 Modernisation

1524. The Taskforce notes that modernisation of KPS will not be achieved in a limited time frame and should be an evolving process with long term vision. Modernisation should focus on strengthening infrastructure at the cutting-edge level by way of constructing buildings and premises, equipping the Service with the required level of mobility, modern weaponry and machines, communication systems, computerisation and digitisation, other equipment, forensic tools, training and sufficient housing and officers.

Recommendations

1525. Establish Modernisation Programme for KPS (2024 – 2035) with the following scope:

- (a) Organisational development including restructuring and streamlining of units and efficiency to avoid the overlapping of functions, simplify procedures. Rationalisation of systems, standards and procedures in the administration of KPS
- (b) Professionalisation of human resources management and transformation of personnel.
- (c) Infrastructure development – upgrades basic systems and support systems.
- (d) Upgrading of equipment and facilities.
- (e) Construction, improvement and upgrading of buildings, facilities and/or offices; and
- (f) Undertaking reforms – in all areas.

1526. Establish a KPS Modernisation Fund (2024 – 2035) with a long-term Funding Scheme to implement the modernisation programme targeting:

- (a) Construction;

- (b) Upgrading of infrastructure;
- (c) Mobility;
- (d) Weapons;
- (e) Training;
- (f) Computerisation and Digitisation;
- (g) Equipment;
- (h) Forensic science; and
- (i) Reforms.

See Appendix to this part of the Report for details

CHAPTER NINETEEN: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX (KENYA PRISONS SERVICE)

19.1 Summary of Recommendations

Leadership and management

1527. The Prisons Council of KPS should be restructured to comprise of: a chairperson who shall have the same qualifications as those of a Supreme Court Judge; the Principal Secretary for Finance or a representative; a representative of Public Service Commission; the PS Correctional Services; and the Commissioner General of Prisons, who shall be the Secretary to the Council.
1528. Given the importance of the Service in the justice system, and to attract a competent council, the chairperson and members should be paid a competitive retainer and sitting allowances, determined by the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with SRC;
1529. The restructured Prisons Council (as proposed) should be vested with the power to carry out a transparent, and competitive recruitment process of the CGP that is open to external candidates as well as qualified members of the Service;
1530. The Directors of Farms and Industries should be experienced persons who possess technical expertise in their respective fields;
1531. The CGP should be designated as a state officer through legislative amendment; and
1532. The Cabinet Secretary and the State Department for Correctional Services shall be responsible for: providing policy guidelines to the Service; monitoring and evaluating the performance of the functions of the Service; inspecting the facilities of the Service; and facilitating the involvement of the public in the activities of the Service.
1533. The Cabinet Secretary shall set up an inspectorate for purposes of monitoring compliance with policies, and establish a Prisons Reform Unit for ensuring continuous and sustainable KPS reforms.
1534. The Cabinet Secretary shall also develop guidelines on the promotion of human rights by the Service and, in particular, making prisons accessible to oversight actors and equipped to enable them to support child protection, persons with disabilities, and persons with special needs.
1535. The KPS should review its anti-corruption and prevention of bribery procedures and policies to ensure they are effective in preventing corruption. The KPS should seek assistance from the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to put mechanisms in place to implement anti-corruption measures and policies in the Service.
1536. The CGP should engage Saccos Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) to investigate the current challenges of Magereza SACCO and take appropriate action.

Structural and legislative reform

1537. The appointment of the Commissioner General of Prisons should be competitive and anchored in law;
1538. The CGP should made the accounting officer of KPS to give him or her overall control of the Service;
1539. There should be a complete overhaul of the obsolete Prisons Act including the Parole system, the Borstal Institutions Act, the Community Service Order Act, and the Service

Standing Orders to create a new correctional services legal order that is in line with the Constitution should be undertaken

1540. KPS should initiate a complete review of all KPS policies to align them with the current constitutional dispensation should be undertaken; and
1541. The provisions of Persons Deprived of Liberty Act, 2014, which has not been effected by KPS should be implemented.

Recruitment

1542. An HR audit should be undertaken within six months upon publication of this Report to establish the extent of challenges related to nepotism in the Service and develop appropriate policies and guidelines to address the problem.
1543. Provisions of Article 232 of the Constitution on values and principles of public service should be strictly applied during recruitment and promotion processes to enhance transparency. The proposed Prison Council should conduct rigorous oversight on the Service
1544. For purposes of succession planning, continuity and availability of leadership skills and competencies, the Taskforce recommends the regular and structured recruitment of cadet officers.
1545. KPS should carry out a human resource audit of its service with a view of reviewing the entire staff establishment of the Service.
1546. Upon review of the establishment, there is need to harmonize the recruitment, promotion, overall career progression and exit with the approved establishment.
1547. The entry grade into the Service should be capped at a minimum grade C Minus (C-), with exceptions granted to candidates marginalized areas. The minimum recruitment age should be raised from 18 to 21 years.
1548. There should be a hybrid model of recruitment into the Kenya Prisons Service that will entail:
 - (a) Online application to filter applicants according to requirements in the advertisement; with shortlisted candidates attending physical interviews at county and sub-county level.
 - (b) For recruitment of graduates into the Kenya Prisons Service, internal recruitment should form a quarter of the total number of vacancies advertised and shall entail: online application for the relevant advertised vacancies; and shortlisted candidates to attend physical interviews at county level and filling the rest of the vacancies externally from the market.
 - (c) Recruitment should be based on a competitive and transparent selection and
 - (d) Intersex persons should be given equal opportunity like the rest in recruitment.
 - (e) Although the Taskforce gave audience to non-uniformed staff of the KPS, the Taskforce notes that they are employees of the Public Service Commission and therefore makes no recommendation on their issues.

Deployment and transfers

1549. All HR matters, including transfers, should be carried through the PSC integrated automated system for proper audit and accountability.

1550. KPS should revise the Prisons Service Standing Orders to align all the transfers of officers with school going children to be at the end of the school year;
1551. The Service should set timelines within which the transfer appeal is heard and determined (90 days recommended);
1552. The proposed Prisons Council should, within a year of the its operationalisation, formulate human resource policies;
1553. KPS officers should be transferred after every three years;
1554. The transfer allowance should be remitted to the officer's account through the payroll;
1555. Transfer of officers who are over 50 years of age should be to a county near their homes or a place of their choice to enable them reintegrate into the local community;
1556. PSC and the proposed Prisons Council should exercise meaningful oversight on all delegated powers to the CGP, and where such powers are abused, the delegation should be withdrawn;
1557. Within one year of publication of this Report, the CGP should revise Prisons Service Standing Orders to address human resource issues around transfers, deployment, and s mechanisms to capture the recommendations of the Taskforce;
1558. In the meantime, those officers performing HR functions should be trained on people skills and change management;
1559. The CGP should undertake staff rationalisation for all officers for competence and suitability-based deployment;
1560. Within six months of the publication of this Report, the CGP should carry out an audit of officers who have been in the same station for more than three years for the purposes of planning and budgeting for transfers;
1561. There should be adherence to the re-designation policy for officers who intend to move out of the professional areas they were recruited into; and
1562. The CGP should, within six months of publication of this Report, establish a confidential mechanism for reporting sexual harassment related to transfers and deployment, and institute stern sanctions against officers soliciting sexual favours for transfers and deployments.
1563. The Task Force recommends that KPS officers deployed to non-core duties be returned to the Service for redeployment

Training

1564. KPS should develop a training policy to provide for structured training for all cadres of officers;
1565. KPS should undertake a comprehensive overhaul and review of the curriculum content and ensure the curriculum is approved and validated
1566. The review of the training curriculum should include modules on corruption, governance, integrity issues and climate change, among other relevant areas;
1567. Initial training for cadet officers should take not less than 15 months and the initial basic training for constables should not be less than 12 months. This would give recruits ample time to undertake relevant theoretical and practical training, including field attachments;

1568. KPS should expand the current infrastructure at the PSTC to adequately cater for recruits and cadets;
1569. KPS should establish a college for middle and senior level officers, separate from PSTC;
1570. The Service should ensure full implementation of the annual training projections;
1571. The Service should embrace full automation in the management of training;
1572. KPS should ensure accreditation of PSTC to ensure that its certificates are recognised;
1573. The State Department responsible for the Service should ensure provision of adequate funding for training programmes in the Service;
1574. The Service should ensure continuous professional development courses for all officers in their respective professions;
1575. KPS should introduce quality assurance mechanisms for all courses;
1576. KPS should establish regional training centres or collaborate with existing NPS centres;
1577. CGP should develop and implement a training policy for non-uniformed officers; and
1578. CGP should establish strategies for collaboration with institutions of higher learning and the National Defence University.

Career progression and Schemes of Service

1579. The CGP, in consultation with PSC, should formulate Career Progression Guidelines that will address issues of stagnation of KPS officers;
1580. The CGP should review the Career Progression Guidelines to ensure professional and technical officers are taken care of;
1581. PSC and the CGP should ensure that KPS fully embraces and applies the Government Human Resource Information System and that it is implemented to manage all KPS human resource functions;
1582. The State Department responsible for the Service should review and implement the recommendations of PSC and SRC regarding the alignment of job groups in the Service, pay groups, and salary scales to align with those of NPS. The NPSC created the rank of ASP, which is not in the KPS ranks. To align the ranks in the two Services, there is need to create a corresponding rank in KPS. The Taskforce, therefore, recommends the introduction of the rank of ASP to address the disharmony in the ranks and job groups in the two Services.
1583. In order to address the challenges related to the command and reporting structure in NPS, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
1584. The Cabinet Secretary should introduce a three-tier NPS ranking structure, and all police officers should have seniority according to their position in the three- tier ranking structure as follows:

Kenya Prisons Service Gazetted officers

- (i) Commissioner General of Prisons (proposed to be State Officer)
- (ii) Deputy Commissioners General of Prisons
- (iii) Senior Assistant Commissioners-General of Prisons;
- (iv) Assistant Commissioners-General of Prisons;

- (v) Commissioners of Prisons;
- (vi) Senior Superintendents of Prisons;
- (vii) Superintendents of Prisons; and
- (viii) Assistant Superintendents of Prisons.

Kenya Prisons Service Inspectorate

- (i) Chief Inspectors of Prisons; and
- (ii) Inspector (II and I).

Kenya Prisons Service Subordinate Officers

- (i) Senior Sergeant;
- (ii) Sergeant
- (iii) Corporal (III, II and I); and
- (iv) Constable (III, II, and I).

- 1585. PSC and the Service should develop clear career progression pathways to stem high staff turnover among the professionals in the Service;
- 1586. PSC and the Service should halt cases of unnecessary appointment of retired or retiring officers on contract once they reach the mandatory retirement age;
- 1587. KPS should fill currently vacant top-level positions in their authorised establishments. This will enable efficient service delivery and enhance succession management;
- 1588. KPS should undertake a process to promote officers into the vacant positions in their authorised establishments. This will raise the morale of the officers and enhance service delivery;
- 1589. KPS needs to review its authorised establishments to align with the proposals made by the Taskforce;
- 1590. KPS should align its recruitment with the authorised establishment; and
- 1591. The review of KPS organogram should make it conform to the approved establishment.

Rewards and sanctions

- 1592. KPS should introduce a reward and sanctions scheme and strategy for rewarding excellence and exemplary performance, including in regional and international fora;
- 1593. There should be complete automation of the process of application for recognition of merit. This information should be retained in the website for a prescribed period;
- 1594. The CGP should develop a reward and recognition scheme and strategy to ensure deserving officers get the necessary recognition;
- 1595. The CGP should ensure that identification and nomination of deserving officers involves public participation; and
- 1596. The Service should provide for structured and regular identification of suitable officers, including scheduled and impromptu visits to KPS facilities.
- 1597. KPS should establish a liaison desk at the pension's office or a pensions officer should be stationed at the KPS headquarters to specifically address KPS officers' pension issues;

1598. The number of documents needed to process pension should be reduced by fully automating the process;
1599. KPS should sensitise officers and conduct pre-retirement training at least two years before retirement to ensure all documents required are in order to avoid delays and corruption;
1600. KPS should review and update the HIV and Aids Policy as well as the Drug and Substance Abuse Policy to cover emerging areas such as inability to work as a result of drug dependency;
1601. Like in KDF, Kenya Prisons Service and other disciplined Services must put in place a proper succession planning policy;
1602. The renewal of contracts for the retired officers serving in KPS should cease;
1603. KPS should establish a contributory insurance fund, modelled along the Defence Forces Medical Insurance Scheme (DEFMIS) that will assist officers to access medical treatment in retirement; and
1604. The officer in-charge of prisons in a county should, in the event of the death of a retired prisons officer, facilitate a dignified send-off for the departed officer.

Establishing a system of remuneration for KPS

1605. SRC should harmonise, standardise and review payable rates for monthly allowances for uniformed and non-uniformed officers in KPS. The harmonised, standardised and payable rates should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.
1606. SRC and PSC should introduce new allowances for uniformed officers and non-uniformed officers deployed to KPS. The new allowances should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.
1607. There should be strict implementation of overtime pay as provided for in the Public Service HR Manual and KPS Standing Orders.
1608. To curb the reported issues of allowances and other remittances not reaching junior officers, the Taskforce recommends strict adherence to automation of payment for all allowances to KPS officers as is the practice in the civil service.
1609. There should be strict prohibition of cash payment of allowances to KPS officers.
1610. There should be prompt payment of allowances during multi-agency operations that involve members of KPS.
1611. The Taskforce further recommends enhanced accountability for the automated system to prevent cases of embezzlement of funds and corruption.
1612. SRC should establish a system of remuneration for disciplined Services completely delinked from the Civil Service Job Groups Classification System and Pay Determination;
1613. PSC should review job descriptions for members of KPS for all pay grades and restructure the salary structure for PG12, PG11 and PG10 to have a minimum of eight (8) salary scale points (notches); and PG1 and PG2 should be maintained at 19 notches.
1614. Government should establish a Remuneration Advisory Board for Disciplined and Security Services through an Act of Parliament.
1615. PSC should develop a new Job Description Manual for all the jobs, posts, roles or designations; SRC should conduct new job evaluations for KPS using a new Job Description Manual.

Salaries and remuneration

1616. A basic salary increase of **40** per cent for the lowest rank or Pay Grade (PG 1) for uniformed officers reducing progressively to **3** per cent for the highest rank or Pay Grade (PG14). The Taskforce recommends that the new remuneration structure should be implemented in three (3) phases from 1st July 2024.

Housing

1617. The CGP should urgently develop a housing policy to guide the construction, allocation, and management of KPS housing units;
1618. The development of a masterplan for KPS facilities, including officer's housing should be prioritised;
1619. The Service should collect and retain funds collected from rent to be used for development, construction and maintenance of KPS housing infrastructure;
1620. The management of KPS housing should be under the directorate responsible for housing in the office of the CGP, pursuant to the provisions of a housing policy to be developed by the Service;
1621. The house allowance payable to KPS officers should be enhanced as already recommended in this Report
1622. Building more KPS houses should be pursued through public private partnerships
1623. An audit of stalled projects, resolution of any pending contractual disputes where applicable, and completion in all other cases should be concluded as a matter of priority;
1624. The house allowance payable to all KPS officers should be retained since majority of the officers will not be able to secure housing within their work stations
1625. The services of the directorate of housing should be devolved to county level to enable closer supervision of the maintenance of houses;
1626. KPS should prohibit the occupation of any condemned housing structures and should take further steps to demolish such hazardous structures
1627. The National Treasury, in liaison with the CGP, should set aside a percentage of the capital in the Public Service Mortgage Scheme for KPS;
1628. The government should set aside a reasonable percentage of the units constructed under the affordable housing scheme for KPS officers
1629. KPS should urgently and satisfactorily address the issue of its senior leadership occupying houses meant for junior officers;
1630. Before building officers' housing on prison land, the CGP should ensure the registration of such land;
1631. KPS should, within the confines of the law, use available prisoners' labour with fair compensation advanced to the inmates, to cut the costs of constructing houses for the Service;
1632. Accreditation and approval of Bills of Quantities for KPS houses should be done by professionals in the Service to reduce the bureaucracies associated with construction;
1633. KPS housing should incorporate, as much as possible, green technology to minimise the use of firewood in its facilities; and
1634. The government should consider using NYS to build housing units for the Service.

Medical scheme

- 1635. Future medical insurance negotiations should have a six-month period from advertisement to on-boarding of staff to enable the negotiations to cover all the necessary areas and minimise teething challenges at the on-boarding stage;
- 1636. There should be full participation of officers in determining the medical cover that would be contracted and the terms of engagement;
- 1637. In future contracts, the contract and minutes should match and be consistent. K disclosures such as capitation should be included in the body of the main contract;
- 1638. In future medical insurance contracts, information on subcontractors should be shared as a core part of the negotiations including distribution of service providers and facilities;
- 1639. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the contractual performance should be clear and periodically reviewed by the insured and the insurer;
- 1640. The Insurance Implementation Committee should be involved in the negotiations from the outset;
- 1641. The Terms of Reference should include proof of service providers across the country through service level agreements, among other methods as may be determined from time to time;
- 1642. The service provider should provide officers and the Service with expenditure returns every quarter;
- 1643. There should be a framework for independent oversight over negotiations and execution of contracts;
- 1644. KPS should negotiate and provide comprehensive group life cover for all cadres;
- 1645. All insurance contracts negotiated on behalf of officers should cover longer periods to prevent disruptions and the constant transition challenges experienced by changing from one insurer to another;
- 1646. Given that the World Health Organisation classifies drug abuse and alcoholism as diseases, future medical insurance should cover such cases as part of contractual obligations;
- 1647. The Service should recruit and train prison medical staff; and
- 1648. KPS recruits should be included in the Service's medical cover.

Mental health

- 1649. There is need to review and implement the KPS Psychological Counselling Services Policy;
- 1650. The CGP should ensure that there is ample physical space or offices to provide counselling services to officers in a safe and private atmosphere;
- 1651. Mental health should be comprehensively covered by the medical insurance scheme, but with a smaller number of officers covered as informed by statistics from KPS; and
- 1652. The Ministry of Interior and National Administration should develop a policy on shared services for its various institutions as a cost-saving measure. For instance, KPS and NPS can use the services of the same professional counsellors, hospitals and training facilities, among others.

General welfare

1653. The leadership of KPS should create a centrally managed structure to oversee the establishment and running of KPS canteens across the country. Such a framework should be led by a senior officer and be facilitated with adequate resources to ensure that there are properly run canteens countrywide. This should be benchmarked on the DEFCO Welfare Canteens;
1654. The nature of services and facilities provided in canteens should depend on the practicalities and needs of various stations. Hardship or forward areas should have priority for establishment and running of canteens;
1655. The Council and the CGP should arrange for the establishment of recreational and sports facilities for officers and their families. The designs of correctional facilities should take these needs into account;
1656. The Council and leadership of KPS should partner with county governments to develop early childhood development and education (ECDE) facilities within or in the vicinity of KPS premises so as to cater for the needs of officers' children;
1657. The government should provide officers in remote or operational areas with transport facilitation for purposes such as shopping and other welfare engagements;
1658. The government should ensure sufficient budgetary allocation for sports activities to improve the welfare of KPS officers, which the CGP can use to commission and facilitate tournaments for the Service;
1659. KPS should develop a comprehensive sports policy, a welfare policy, and a social welfare personnel recruitment policy;
1660. Also, the Service should improve the terms of service for the welfare staff;
1661. KPS should ensure availability of counselling rooms in all stations; and
1662. There is need to refurbish and, in most institutions construct and furnish offices, at the county commands.

ICT and modernisation

1663. The KPS leadership should develop a law, strategy and policy for the incorporation of technology in all its operations, including record keeping;
1664. The Principal Secretary and the CGP should establish a fully-fledged ICT function with professionals in KPS to provide leadership in automation of KPS functions;
1665. Given the availability of the National Fibre Optic Backbone in all counties, the CGP should undertake a reconstruction of KPS VOIP telephony;
1666. There is need for the establishment of a surveillance system in all prisons;
1667. KPS should leverage on the Integrated Criminal Management System for the management of inmates within the prisons and link it with all the criminal justice actors;
1668. The CGP should make deliberate investment in ICT infrastructure in the Service, and the Cabinet Secretary should provide the necessary support;
1669. The CGP should conduct exclusive and specific recruitment of ICT experts, offer competitive terms of service to ensure retention and undertake capacity building of all officers on matters of ICT;

1670. KPS should endeavour to adopt technology in internal communication; KPS currently uses signals and internal memos, which are all printed and dispatched. This translates to the use of tonnes of printing paper. KPS should upgrade this and embrace paperless communication through the use of intranet facilities for internal communication. This will translate to a lot of savings in procuring printing papers, cartridges and toners;
1671. The development of a customised Enterprise Resource Systems to run all the operations of KPS should be undertaken;
1672. The Service should make facilities and uniforms friendly to persons living with disabilities;
1673. Modernisation of the kitchens system in all 134 prisons to shift from firewood-based energy to Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) or other green energy solutions that are less carbon emitting;
1674. Modernisation of energy supply to KPS to move from 100 per cent reliance on Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) main grid to green energy as well as solar and wind;
1675. Modernisation of search procedures within prisons to incorporate technology;
1676. Provision of modern equipment that march current and emerging security threats;
1677. Modernisation of transport facilities through providing adequate vehicles for all the prisons and specialised vehicles for high-risk prisoners.

Logistical capacity, tooling, and equipment

1678. KPS should strengthen the Fleet Management Unit to assess adequacy or otherwise of current fleet and fuel allocations with a view to rationalising the same. This unit should also undertake an audit of all Prisons vehicles;
1679. The CGP should develop a Transport Policy to guide the management of all vehicles and transports systems within KPS;
1680. KPS should establish a Fleet Management System to include audit, tracking, fuel consumption, geo-fencing and other components of fleet management;
1681. KPS should undertake formulation and implementation of a fleet management strategy and policy to assist in ensuring optimal management of government vehicles, including disposal of unserviceable ones; and
1682. The Government should replenish the KPS Revolving Fund out of which funds were used to buy the licence plate-making machine. This will enable KPS to revitalise the Prisons Enterprise.
1683. The KPS Quality Assurance Unit should be involved in all steps of procuring safety and protective equipment in order to ensure that proper equipment is acquired to support the institution's operations. The unit should be empowered to assist in the control of acquisition processes for KPS equipment;
1684. The CGP should take personal responsibility for the quality of gear or equipment acquired for use in the Service, including taking responsibility for any loss of life or injury as a result of poor quality of gear and equipment.
1685. The government should fund the modernisation budget for KPS.

Titling of land and prison premises

- 1686. The CGP should, within six months, appoint and facilitate a committee to carry out an inventory of all KPS land and ensure titling. The relevant state agencies and institutions should provide requisite cooperation and facilitation to the committee;
- 1687. The KPS leadership should plan for the progressive securing of all the institution's land through fencing;
- 1688. All court cases involving KPS land should be fast-tracked and any other disputes settled through the ADR process
- 1689. The CGP should take measures to regularise KPS facilities constructed on contested or private land;
- 1690. There should be a waiver of stamp duty and other charges for speedier registration of titles for KPS land;
- 1691. An approved framework of modern correctional facilities should be gazetted, published, and publicised;
- 1692. Parliament should allocate sufficient funds to facilitate continuous improvement of KPS premises;
- 1693. The CGP should pay particular attention to the state of correctional facilities, especially in 'forward areas', to ensure that they are habitable;
- 1694. The government should invest in the construction of modern prison facilities in tandem with the best international standards to alleviate the acute congestion in prisons;
- 1695. The Government to provide CGP with funding to purchase beds, mattresses, and blankets for inmates and basic toiletries by KPS.

Human rights training

- 1696. The KPS leadership should regularly review the basic KPS Constable Training Course to ensure that it responds to the changing dimensions of human rights in rehabilitation and correction services;
- 1697. The KPS leadership should integrate human rights in the change management strategy of the Service as recommended elsewhere in this Report;
- 1698. The KPS leadership should ensure that officers have access to training opportunities and are regularly trained on human rights;
- 1699. KPS must ensure compliance with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (The Nelson Mandela Rules) and (the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (The Bangkok Rules) as well as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules) in order to alleviate the myriad challenges correctional facilities face.

Uniforms

- 1700. Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration should propose legislation for enactment to provide for the establishment of a National Uniforms Committee

composed of the different disciplined Services whose mandate will be to approve standards, colour and quality of uniforms for use by the disciplined services;

1701. There should be established a Uniforms Quality and Assurance Committee of KPS, which should be empowered to make final and binding recommendations regarding the quality of uniforms to be procured for the Service, and procurement processes should include mandatory inspection and acceptance of uniforms delivered. In the event the uniform is not accepted, the officers who approved such procurement should be held accountable, including bearing a surcharge equivalent to the cost involved;
1702. The CGP should take personal responsibility for the quality of uniforms procured and adherence to prescribed standards and conditions for KPS uniforms;
1703. The KPS leadership should ensure that all officers have an adequate and regular supply of all uniforms and kitting they require to carry out their work. Specifically, the CGP should address concerns raised about the Quarter Master and lack of transparency and integrity in the distribution of KPS uniforms and accessories;
1704. The process of determining appropriate uniform should be subjected to public participation and approved uniform should be gazetted after approval by the proposed Uniforms Committee;
1705. The KPS leadership should establish a mechanism for raising complaints related to the procurement and supply of uniforms by members of KPS;
1706. Any new uniforms for KPS should go through the process prescribed in these recommendations, including public and officer participation;
1707. Maternity dresses and trousers should be included in the issuance of uniforms for female officers;
1708. There should be automation of the entire process of supply, issuance, and distribution of uniform in the Service should be undertaken;
1709. The Government should enforce the law that prohibits the use of gazetted prison or security sector uniforms by any other person;
1710. There should be deliberate effort by KPS to supply inmates with sufficient and quality uniforms;
1711. KPS should differentiate women remand inmates' uniforms from those of other women convicts;
1712. KPS should develop new school uniforms for boys and girls in Borstal institutions that are separate from inmate uniforms;
1713. Taskforce recommends that KPS industries should knit officers' and inmates' uniforms to save costs and ensure the constant supply of quality uniforms.

Gender mainstreaming

1714. PSC and KPS should consider the gender factor in all recruitments and promotions and any such processes should comply with the constitutional criteria provided by Article 232 (1) (i);
1715. The KPS leadership should develop and implement a Gender Policy within 6 months of the publication of this Report;

- 1716. KPS should take steps to provide facilities for lactating mothers and crèches in the workplaces;
- 1717. KPS and the National Uniforms Committee should prepare and approve maternity uniforms for female officers;
- 1718. KPS should implement affirmative action for female officers in promotions to the ranks of SACGP, DCP, and CPL to increase the proportion of women in these ranks
- 1719. The KPS leadership should consider a framework that allows lactating and expectant female officers to carry out lighter duties suitable for their situation for at least a year; and
- 1720. The KPS leadership should decentralise the Gender Directorate to the station level across the country.

Sexual harassment and gender-based violence

- 1721. KPS officers should have core training modules on sexual harassment that covers institutional aspects as well as the role of KPS in handling reported cases of sexual harassment;
- 1722. KPS should develop a stand-alone Sexual Harassment Policy as a matter of best practice and in fulfilment of the legal requirement. The definition of sexual harassment in the proposed Sexual Harassment Policy should be aligned to related offences set out in the Sexual Offences Act and in the Employment Act;
- 1723. Sexual harassment in KPS should be considered as an aspect of human resource management as it affects the productivity of officers concerned;
- 1724. KPS leadership should take responsibility for mainstreaming measures to address sexual harassment in KPS and ensure the full rollout of the necessary structures;
- 1725. KPS should ensure that there is investment in psychosocial support for victims of sexual harassment. The rising cases of prison officers' suicide and family violence are evidence of the need to address the issue of SGBV and domestic violence in the Service;
- 1726. The KPS leadership should provide for grievance handling mechanisms that that can give confidence to officers to report cases of sexual harassment without fear of reprisal; and
- 1727. Officers in charge of correctional facilities should ensure that the facilities are properly tooled, friendly and suitable for handling SGBV victims, such as guaranteeing privacy and confidentiality.

Benchmarking

- 1728. The Cabinet Secretary and the CGP, through existing international relations frameworks, should engage other correctional services within the region, in Africa and globally with a view to securing appropriate strategies to network and engage in exchange programmes;
- 1729. The CG should ensure that there is a structured framework for the leadership and members of KPS to join relevant regional and international correctional forums with a view of broadening the scope of engagement and advancement of the Service;
- 1730. The CG should formulate a detailed policy to regulate benchmarking and exchange programmes within 12 months;

1731. The CGP should set up a policy to ensure equity and fairness in offering opportunities to all members of the KPS including junior officers in the forward areas;
1732. The CGP should ensure that those who attend benchmarking or exchange programmes to mandatorily be required to prepare and submit reports and where possible, sensitise other members of the KPS on wisdom gained;
1733. There is need to prohibit misuse of benchmarking opportunities where same people are over-exposed at the expense of others;
1734. CGP should establish, maintain and keep an updated database of those who have previously been exposed to benchmarking and exchange programmes; and
1735. CGP should establish a monitoring and evaluation strategy to assess the efficacy of the benchmarking and exchange programme, and ensure its continued improvement.

Modernisation

1736. Establish Modernisation Programme for KPS (2024 – 2035) with the following scope:
 - (a) Organisational development including restructuring and streamlining of units and efficiency to avoid the overlapping of functions, simplify procedures. Rationalisation of systems, standards and procedures in the administration of KPS
 - (b) Professionalisation of human resources management and transformation of personnel.
 - (c) Infrastructure development – upgrades basic systems and support systems.
 - (d) Upgrading of equipment and facilities.
 - (e) Construction, improvement and upgrading of buildings, facilities and/or offices; and
 - (f) Undertaking reforms – in all areas;
 - (g) Establish a KPS Modernisation Fund (2024 – 2035) with a long-term Funding Scheme to implement the modernisation programme targeting:
 - (h) Construction;
 - (i) Upgrading of infrastructure;
 - (j) Mobility;
 - (k) Weapons;
 - (l) Training;
 - (m) Computerisation and Digitisation;
 - (n) Equipment;
 - (o) Forensic science; and
 - (p) Reforms.

19.2 Implementation Matrix

S/No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
Leadership and Management			
1	<i>1.1 Operationalize the restructured Prisons Council as per recommendation</i>	Immediately after review of the Act	Parliament CS Interior
	<i>1.2 Appoint the CGP as a state officer and the accounting officer of the Service.</i>	Immediate	CS National Treasury (Law to clearly provide)
	<i>1.3 Vet senior officers ranked Senior Superintendent of Prisons and above except the CGP.</i>	6 Months	CGP CS Ministry of Interior Public Service Commission.
	<i>1.4 Review the Prison Anti-corruption and prevention of bribery procedures and policies to ensure they are effective</i>	6 months	CGP EACC
	<i>1.5 Establish prison reform unit</i>	Immediately	CGP
	<i>1.6 Engage Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) to investigate Magereza SACCO Challenges</i>	Immediately	SASRA Magereza Sacco
Structural and Legislative Reforms			
2	<i>2.1 Undertake a complete overhaul and comprehensive reforms of all the prisons statutes to create a new Correctional Services legal order in accordance with the Constitution.</i>	Six months	CS Interior Parliament
	<i>2.2 Develop, review and implement KPS Policies that accord with the proposed legal framework and the Constitution as appropriate</i>	Within one year	CS Interior CGP
	<i>2.3 Review service standing orders as per recommendations in the report</i>	Within one year	CS Interior CGP
Recruitment			
3	<i>3.1 Develop guidelines for effective oversight, regular, structured and audit of recruitment by the Prison Council.</i>	Three Months	Proposed Prison Council.
	<i>3.2 Undertake a human resource audit of the Service</i>	Three Months	PSC Proposed Prison Council CGP
	<i>3.3 Review the Guidelines for the recruitment of Prison Constables and Cadet Officers to address recommendations in the Report (the only recommendation is to have regular and structured cadet recruitment)</i>	Within Three Months	CGP
Deployment and Transfers			
4	<i>4.1 Ensure utilization of Government Human resource information (GHRIS) for HR management in the Service matters</i>	Within three months	CS Interior PSC CGP
	<i>4.2 Implement recommendations on deployment and transfers as detailed in the report</i>	Immediate	PSC CGP
	<i>4.4 Develop relevant HR policies to address recommendations</i>	Within One Year	Proposed Prison Council PSC CGP

S/No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	4.5 No person should serve in one County/station for a period of more than three months	Immediate (not later than three months)	Proposed Prison Council PSC CGP
Training			
5	5.1 Develop a comprehensive training policy for all cadres.	One year	CS Interior CGP Prisons Council
	5.2 Undertake a comprehensive curriculum overhaul and review to ensure it is approved and validated and ensure accreditation of PSTC for recognition. establish strategies for collaboration with other institutions of higher learning	One year	CS Interior CGP Prisons Council
	5.3 Expand and decentralize the current training infrastructure at the KPS to cater for all cadres of the Service and develop and implement a training policy for non- uniformed officers	One year	CS Interior CGP Prisons Council CS National Treasury
Career Progression			
6	6.1 Formulate, review, and implement career progression guidelines in the KPS, including professional and technical officers.	One year	CPG, PSC
	6.2 Harmonise job groups, pay groups, and salary scales with the Security Sector	Immediate	State Department Responsible for the Service, PSC, SRC
Reward			
7	7.1 Establishment and implement a reward and sanction scheme, with complete automation of process in consideration of merit and public participation	One year	CGP
Exit and Post-Exit Management			
8	8.1 Develop and implement measures to address recommendations regarding exit and post-exit management in the KPS Seek approval for establishment of a pension liaison office to specifically address KPS officers' pension issues.	Three Months	KPS National Treasury
	8.2 Establish a contributory insurance fund that will assist retired officers to access medical and social services, develop a proper succession policy and cease the renewal of retired officers contracts	One year	CS Interior CGP
Salary and Remuneration			
9	9.1 Create Security and Disciplined Services Sector as a separate budgeting sector for NPS planning and budgeting	Immediately, within two months	CS Interior CS National Treasury
	9.2 Implement recommendations on KPS basic salaries structures for uniformed as provided in this report	Within One (1) Year	CS Interior CS National Treasury
	9.3 Undertake a technical review of the ranks to ensure command harmony in the Service.	Within One (1) Year	PSC CGP

S/No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	9.4 Establish remuneration and advisory board for Security and Disciplined Services.	Within One (1) Year	CS Interior CS National Treasury
	9.5 Conduct Job Evaluations based on new job description manuals.	Immediately, within two months	CS Interior CS National Treasury
Allowances			
10	10.1 Develop guidelines for strict implementation of overtime pay for non-uniformed members of staff	Three Months	SRC CS National Treasury PSC CGP
	10.2 Undertake automation of payment of all allowances, including during multi-agency operations	Three Months	SRC CS National Treasury PSC CGP
	10.3 Review, standardize and harmonize allowances for NPS members as recommended in this Report.	Within One (1) Year	SRC CS National Treasury PSC CGP
	10.4 Implement new allowances for KPS members as recommended in this report.	Within One (1) year	SRC CS National Treasury PSC CGP
Housing			
11	11.1 Develop and implement a housing policy, including decentralization of management	Within one year	CGP CS Housing
	11.2 Develop a masterplan for KPS facilities.	Within six Months	CGP CS Housing
	11.3 Ensure transfer of KPS housing to the directorate responsible for housing.	One year	CS Interior CS Housing CGP
	11.4 Undertake an audit of incomplete and stalled projects, while pursuing public private partnerships for completion	Three Months	CS Interior CGP
	11.5 Undertake an audit of incomplete and stalled projects, while pursuing public private partnerships for completion	Three Months	CS Interior CGP
Medical Scheme			
12	12.1 Non –renewal of the current service providers. and audit the process and implementation of the 2023 medical scheme.	Immediately	CS Interior CGP
	12.2 Adhere to legal provisions and comprehensive procurement guidelines for negotiation, procurement and rollout of medical scheme to ensure that it takes into account the unique needs of KPS officers as recommended and new recruits as recommended by the report.	Immediately within (3) Months	CS Interior CGP
	12.3 procurement and rollout of medical scheme to ensure that it takes into account the unique needs of KPS officers as recommended by the report.	Immediately within (3) Months	CS Interior CGP
	12.4 Include KPS recruits in the KPS Medical Cover	Immediately	CS Interior CGP

S/No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
Compensation Scheme			
13	13.1 Establish and negotiate group life cover based on actuarial risk officers and set clear parameters for the cover	Immediately within (3) Months	KPS
	13.2 Conduct impactful and sustained sensitization on the procedures and processes	Immediately within (3) Months	KPS
	13.3 Automate the claims process to reduce the turnaround time.	Immediately within (3) Months	KPS
	13.4 Settle all unpaid claims including past insurers	Immediately within (3) Months	KPS
Mental Health.			
14	14.1 Review and implement psychological counseling services Policy, including adequate support infrastructure, medical cover, and shared services	Six months	CS Interior CGP
	Customization of the wellness program. and implementation of psycho-social support policy.	Six months	CS Interior CGP
Welfare.			
15	15.1 Establish a centrally managed structure led by a senior officer to oversee establishment and running of Prisons Canteens and be facilitated with adequate resources and facilities.	Six months	CGP.
	15.2 Partner with county governments to develop ECDE facilities within the vicinity.	One year	The Council, KPS Leadership, County Government.
	15.3 Develop a comprehensive sports policy, to include establishment of establishment sports and recreational facilities of staff and families	One year	KPS
ICT and Digitisation			
16	16.1 Develop a law, strategy and policy for the incorporation of technology in all operations of the Service With gradual integration with justice actors/ security services sector.	One year	CS Interior Parliament State Law Office CGP
	16.2 Establish a fully-fledged ICT function with professionals in KPS to provide leadership in automation of KPS functions.	Six months	CS Interior CGP
	16.3 Establish a surveillance system in Prisons.	One year	CGP CS Interior
	16.6 Invest in ICT infrastructure.	One year	CGP CS Interior
	16.8 Develop customized enterprise resource systems.	One year	CGP CS Interior

S/No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
Logistical Capacity, Tooling and Equipment			
17	17.1 Review and implement a transport policy that includes fleet management system	One year	CGP
	17.2 Replenish KPS revolving fund	Six Months	CGP
Prison Premises and Titling of Prisons Land			
18	18.1 Appoint and facilitate a multi-agency Committee to facilitate the implementation of measures and recommendations regarding prisons land and premises including inventory and titling	Six (6) Months	CS Lands CS Interior CGP Multi-agency Committee
	Gazette, publish, and publicize Approved framework of modern correctional facilities with parliament allocating sufficient funds to facilitate continuous improvement	Six (6) Months	CS Lands CS Interior CGP Multi-agency Committee
Human Rights Training			
19	19.1 Undertake regular review of KPS training course to ensure it responds to the changing dimensions of human rights UN standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners.		CGP
	19.2 Integrate human rights in change management.		CGP
	19.3 Provide access to Human Rights training opportunities for Officers.		CGP
Uniforms.			
20	20.1 Enact a law providing for the establishment of a National Uniforms Committee.		CS Defence CS for Internal Security and National Administration. Parliament
	20.2 Establish uniforms quality and assurance committee for KPS and empower it to develop and implement measures to address recommendations regarding uniforms in the Service	Six months	CGP
Gender Mainstreaming.			
	21.2 Develop and Implement a comprehensive Gender Policy for the Service.	6 Months	CGP
Sexual Harassment and Gender Based Violence			
22	22.2 Develop and implement a comprehensive and stand-alone sexual harassment policy.	One year	CGP
	22.6 Establish a confidential grievance mechanism for officers to report cases of sexual harassment.	Six months	CGP
Benchmarking			
23	23.1 Develop, Formulate and implement detailed policy guidelines to regulate benchmarking and exchange programme in the Service as recommended	One year	CS Interior CGP

S/No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
Modernization			
24	<i>24.1 1 Develop and implement KPS modernization plan and provide corresponding funding</i>	One Year	CS Interior CS National Treasury CGP

19.3 APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Summary of Kenya Prisons Service Scheme of Service/Career Progression Guidelines

Entry Point	Rank	Requirements
Recruit Constable	Prisons Constable	(a) Be a Kenyan citizen (b) Possess a valid National Identification Card (c) Have no criminal record (d) Have a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) grade of D+ and above or equivalent qualification from a recognised institution (e) Be aged between 18-28 years (f) Be at least 5 feet 4 inches tall for men and 5 feet 2 inches tall for women (g) Be physically and medically fit (h) Have good hearing and clear vision (i) Female candidates must not be pregnant at the time of recruitment and during the entire training period; and (j) Potential candidates must also present their birth certificate and KRA PIN certificate on the recruitment day.
Technical Officers	CPL, SGT, S/SGT	(a) Must be a Kenyan citizen (b) Must have a valid National Identification Card (c) Have no criminal record (d) Be between the ages of 18-28 for diploma or certificate holders (e) Be at least 5 feet 4 inches tall for men and 5 feet 2 inches tall for women (f) Be physically and medically fit (g) Must have good hearing and clear vision

Entry Point	Rank	Requirements
		(h) Technicians must have a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) grade of C and above or equivalent qualification, and a diploma or certificate from a recognised institution and registered with relevant statutory bodies where applicable.; and (i) Female candidates must not be pregnant at the time of recruitment and during the entire training period.
Prisons Cadet	IP-ACP	(a) Must be a Kenyan citizen (b) Must have a valid National Identification Card (c) Have no criminal record (d) be between the ages of 18-30 (e) Be at least 5 feet 4 inches tall for men and 5 feet 2 inches tall for women (f) Be physically and medically fit (g) Must have good hearing and clear vision (h) Cadets must have a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) grade of C+ and above or equivalent qualification and an undergraduate degree from a recognised institution of higher learning; and (i) Female candidates must not be pregnant at the time of recruitment and during the entire training period.

Appendix 2: Requirements for direct appointments

Rank	Requirements
Corporal	Requirements at the entry level is a Certificate in any of the following disciplines: (a) Primary Teacher 1 (P1), (b) Early Childhood Development Education, (c) Social Work, (d) Conflict Resolution and Management, (e) Criminology, (f) Psychology, (g) Agriculture, (h) Animal Health, (i) Music, (j) Electronics, (k) Community Development, (l) Counselling, (m) Information Communication Technology, (n) Printing Technology, (o) Building Construction, (p) Mechanical Engineering, (q) Electrical Engineering, (r) Woodwork, (s) Hair and Beauty Therapy, (t) Nursing, (u) Laboratory Technology, (v) Pharmacy; or (w) or any other equivalent qualification from a recognised institution.
Sergeant	(a) Requirements at the entry level of a is a Diploma in any of the following disciplines: (b) Security and Correctional Science, (c) Security Management, (d) Counselling, (e) Social Work,

Rank	Requirements
	(f) Law, (g) Community Work, (h) Criminology, (i) Psychology, (j) Anthropology, (k) Forensic Sciences, (l) Nursing, (m) Clinical Medicine, (n) Oral Health, (o) Pharmacy, (p) Laboratory Technology, (q) Education, (r) Early Childhood Development Education, (s) Agriculture, (t) Animal Health, (u) Printing Technology, (v) Engineering, (w) Building Construction, (x) Leather-work, (y) Woodwork/Wood Technology, (z) Fine Arts, (aa) Textile Technology, (bb) Design, (cc) Hair and Beauty Therapy, (dd) Information Communication Technology, (ee) Music, (ff) Statistics; or (gg) any other equivalent qualification from a recognised institution.
Cadet	Requirements at the entry level of a is a Bachelor's degree in any of the following disciplines: (a) Security and Correctional Science,

Rank	Requirements
	(b) Sociology, (c) Psychology, (d) Social Work, (e) Counselling, (f) Criminology, (g) Anthropology, (h) Economics, Statistics, (i) Law, (j) Business Administration, (k) Commerce, (l) Marketing, (m) Education, (n) Information Sciences, (o) Design, (p) Fine Arts, (q) Music, (r) Medicine, (s) Nursing, (t) Nutrition, (u) Pharmacy, (v) Agriculture, (w) Veterinary Medicine, (x) Land Economics, (y) Land Survey, (z) Electronics Engineering, (aa) Electrical Engineering, (bb) Computer Engineering, (cc) Computer Science, (dd) Building Construction and Civil Engineering; or (ee) equivalent qualification from a recognised institution.
Corporal of Prisons,	<u>Direct appointment</u> For appointment to this grade, a candidate must:

Rank	Requirements
	(i) have Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (K.C.S.E) minimum mean Grade D+ (plus) from a recognised institution; (ii) have Certificate in Government Trade Test Grade II from a recognised institution; OR (iii) have Certificate in Craft or its equivalent qualifications from a recognized institution; OR have Certificate in relevant disciplines such as Primary Teacher 1 (P1), Social Work, Conflict Resolution and Management, Criminology, Psychology, Agriculture, Animal Health, Music, Electrical Engineering, Electronics, Community Development, Counselling, Information Communication Technology, Printing Technology, Building Construction, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Woodwork, Hair and Beauty Therapy, Nursing, Laboratory Technician or Pharmacy from a recognised institution. <u>Promotion</u> For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served as a Constable of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate of Initial Training for Prisons Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than nine (9) months; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Sergeant of Prisons	<u>Direct Appointment</u> For appointment to this grade, a candidate must: (i) have Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (K.C.S.E) minimum mean grade D+ (plus) from a recognised institution; (ii) have Government Trade Test Certificate Grade I from a recognised institution; OR have Diploma in any of the following disciplines: Security and Correctional Science, Security Management, Counselling, Social Work, Law, Community Work, Criminology, Psychology, Anthropology, Forensic Sciences, Nursing, Clinical Medicine, Oral Health, Pharmacy, Laboratory Technology, Education, Early Childhood Development

Rank	Requirements
	Education, Agriculture, Animal Health, Printing Technology, Engineering, Building Construction, Leather-work, Woodwork/Wood Technology, Fine Arts, Textile Technology, Design, Hair and Beauty Therapy, Information Communication Technology, Music or Statistics from a recognised institution; <u>Promotion</u> For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Corporal of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate in Development Course for Corporals lasting not less than two (2) months from Prisons Staff Training College; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Senior Sergeant of Prisons,	For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: - (i) served in the grade of Sergeant of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate in Development Course for Sergeants lasting not less than two (2) months from Prisons Staff Training College; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Inspector of Prisons,	<u>Direct Appointment</u> For appointment to this grade, a candidate must: (i) have Bachelor's degree in any of the following disciplines: Security and Correctional Science, Sociology, Psychology, Social Work, Counselling, Criminology, Anthropology, Business Administration, Commerce, Marketing, Information Communication Technology, Information Science or Music from a recognised institution; (ii) have Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution. <u>Promotion</u> For promotion to this grade, an officer must have:

Rank	Requirements
	(i) served in the grade of Senior Sergeant of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate in Development Course for Sergeants lasting not less than two (2) months from Prisons Staff Training College; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Chief Inspector of Prisons,	For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Inspector of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate of Initial Training for Prisons Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than nine (9) months; OR Certificate of Initial Training for Cadet Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than thirteen (13) months; OR Post graduate Diploma in Security and Correctional Science from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in Development Course for Inspectors lasting not less than two (2) months from Prisons Staff Training College; (iv) Prisons Senior Officers Management course lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (v) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (vi) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (vii) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Superintendent of Prisons	<u>Direct Appointment</u> For appointment to this grade, a candidate must: - (i) have Bachelor's degree in any of the following disciplines: Economics, Statistics, Education, Nursing, Nutrition, Agriculture, Land Economics, Land Survey, Computer Engineering or Computer Science from a recognised institution; (ii) have Certificate in computer application skills from a recognized institution.

Rank	Requirements
	<u>Promotion</u> For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Chief Inspector of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate of Initial Training for Prisons Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than nine (9) months; OR Certificate of Initial Training for Cadet Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than thirteen (13) months; OR Post graduate Diploma in Security and Correctional Science from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in Development Course for Inspectors lasting not less than two (2) months from Prisons Staff Training College; (iv) Prisons Senior Officers Management course lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (v) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (vi) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (vii) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Senior Superintendent of Prisons	<u>Direct Appointment</u> For appointment to this grade, a candidate must: - (i) have Bachelor's degree in Veterinary Medicine, Pharmacy, Law, Electronics Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Building Construction or Civil Engineering from a recognised institution; (ii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution. <u>Promotion</u> For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: - (i) served in the grade of Superintendent of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate of Initial Training for Prisons Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than nine (9) months; OR Certificate of Initial Training for Cadet Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than thirteen (13) months;

Rank	Requirements
	OR Post graduate Diploma in Security and Correctional Science from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in Prisons Senior Officers Management course lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (iv) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (v) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (vi) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	<u>Direct Appointment</u> For appointment to this grade, a candidate must: (i) have a Bachelor's degree in Medicine from a recognised institution; (ii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution. <u>Promotion</u> For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Senior Superintendent of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate of Initial Training for Prisons Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than nine (9) months; OR Certificate of Initial Training for Cadet Officers from the Prisons Staff Training College lasting not less than thirteen (13) months; OR Post graduate Diploma in Security and Correctional Science from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in Prisons Senior Officers Management course lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (iv) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (v) shown merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results; and (vi) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	For appointment to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Assistant Commissioner of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years;

Rank	Requirements
	(ii) Certificate in Strategic Leadership Development Programme lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) demonstrated professional competence and administrative capability in work performance and results; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	<u>Promotion</u> For promotion to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Deputy Commissioner of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate in Strategic Leadership Development Programme lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) demonstrated professional competence and administrative capability in work performance and results; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Senior Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	For appointment to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate in Strategic Leadership Development Programme lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) demonstrated professional competence and administrative capability in work performance and results; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.
Deputy Commissioner General of Prisons	For appointment to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Senior Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate in Strategic Leadership Development Programme lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (iii) Certificate in computer application skills from a recognised institution; (iv) demonstrated thorough understanding of national goals, policies and programs and the ability to relate them to the Prisons functions; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.

Rank	Requirements
Commissioner General of Prisons	For appointment to this grade, an officer must have: (i) served in the grade of Deputy Commissioner General of Prisons for a minimum period of three (3) years; (ii) Certificate in Strategic Leadership Development Programme lasting not less than six (6) weeks from a recognised institution; (iii) thorough understanding of national goals, policies and programs and the ability to relate them to the Prisons functions; and (iv) demonstrated a high degree of professional competence, administrative capability and initiative in general organization and management of prisons and must be familiar with government regulations relating to prisons; and (v) maintained outstanding discipline record.

Appendix 3: Kenya Prisons Service Curriculum: Corporals Course Summary and time allocation

Code	Topic	Sub-Topic	Time (Hrs.)
5.0	Supervision Practices in Prison	-Supervision -Leadership -Motivation -Inspection -Escort duties -Security -Routine duties	40
6.0	Aspects of Laws Relating to Prisons Management	-Concept of law -Fundamentals of the constitution of Kenya -Crime and Punishment -Jurisdiction of different courts in Kenya -Provisions of prisons and Borstal Acts	15
7.0	Field Instructions	-Foot drills -Arms drills -Riot control drills -Complements -Arms and ammunition management -Basic combat skills	45

Code	Topic	Sub-Topic	Time (Hrs.)
8.0	Physical Training and Sports	-Gymnastics -Sports -First aid	10
9.0	Human Rights	-Historical background of human rights -Classifications of human rights	21
10.0	Guidance and Counselling	-Guidance -Counselling -Attitude formation and change	21
11.0	Human Relations	-Concept of human relations -Social interaction -Group mobilization -Conflict and conflict resolution	15
12.0	Prison Health Management	-Common diseases -Hygiene -Nutrition -Drug and substance abuse -HIV/AIDS	20
13.0	Prisons Investigations	-Background investigations -Undercover investigations -Surveillance at the place of work -Observation and description	15
14.0	Disaster Preparedness and Management	-Disaster preparedness -Disaster planning -Disaster mitigation	15
15.0	Communication and Report Writing	-Concept of communication -Forms of communication -Channels of communication -Barriers to effective communication -Report writing	21
16.0	Office Practice and Procedures	-Office practice -Office staff -Office procedures -Report writing	15

Code	Topic	Sub-Topic	Time (Hrs.)
17.0	Sentence Management and Reintegration	-Sentence management -Rehabilitation programmes -reintegration programmes	16
18.0	Treatment of Youthful Offenders	-Youthful offenders -Classification of youthful offenders -Standard minimum rules for treatment of youthful offenders -procedures in Borstal Institutions -procedures In Youth Corrective Training Centres	23
19.0	Government Regulations and Ethics	-Concept of integrity -Government regulations	17
20.0	Computer Application Packages	-Introduction to spreadsheet theory -concept of spreadsheets -cell referencing -Build and save a worksheet -Retrieve and editing -Formulae and mathematical functions -Formatting a worksheet -Printing a worksheet -Graphs -Macros -Simple database management	30
21.0	Spiritual Welfare	-Comparative religion -Behaviour change and attitude formation -Creation and fall of man	21
3.2 Sergeants Course Summary and Time Allocation			
Code	Subject	Topic	Time (Hrs)
5.0	Introduction to Management	-Concept of management - Management functions -Qualities of a good manager -Motivation -Leadership -Time Management	35

Code	Topic	Sub-Topic	Time (Hrs.)
6.0	Government Law and ethics	-Government structure -Separation of powers -Law -Government and ethics -Corruption prevention	25
7.0	Field instruction	-Foot drills -Arms drills -Arms and ammunition management -Basic combat skills -Executive protection	40
8.0	Physical training and sports	-Talent identification -Sport management	15
9.0	Human rights	-Concept of human rights -International human rights instruments -National human rights monitoring agencies	25
10.0	Guidance and Counselling	-Counselling techniques -Personality traits -Self awareness -Counselling ethics -Attitude change	30
11.0	Public relations	-The concept of public relations -Scope of public relations -Customer care	25
12.0	Prisons health Management	-Hygiene -Nutrition -Common diseases -HIV and AIDS -Environmental programmes	30
13.0	Investigation Skills	-Truth finding methods -Finger printing techniques -Court appearance and legal principle	15
14.0	Disaster Preparedness and management	-Disaster preparedness -Disaster response -Challenges in disaster response -Disaster mitigation	15
15.0	Communication and report Writing	-Concept and principle of Communication -Principle of communication -Language of communication -Importance of effective communication within ranks -Report writing	20

Code	Topic	Sub-Topic	Time (Hrs.)
16.0	Office Administration	-Office personnel -Office duties -Office equipment	20
17.0	Sentence Management and Reintegration	-Sentence management -Rehabilitation -Programmes -Reintegration programmes	20
18.0	Computer Application Packages	-Database management systems -Data entry and saving -Retrieving and editing facilities -Sorting and indexing -Functions -Querying -Reports and labels Linking -Screen and view	20
19.0	Spiritual welfare	-Spiritual welfare programmes -Moral values -Family	25

Appendix 4: Inspectors course outline and programme

Unit	Topics	Contact lecture hours
General Management	Concept of management Planning (work- plan) Organizing Staffing Controlling Directing Leadership Decision Making Delegating, Motivating Communication and information management Emerging trends in management	30Hrs
Financial Management	Sources of Government Revenue Financial records Budgeting process Financial regulations and orders Audits	30Hrs
Procurement	Introduction to procurement Government procurement procedures Storage Inventory Management	

Unit	Topics	Contact lecture hours
	Repair and maintenance of institutional infrastructure and assets Stock control 01 Stores disposal	20Hrs
Records Management	Types and us of accountable documents in prison Types of reference books and administrative registers Record organization and storage Records appraisal and disposal.	20Hrs
Safety/ Security and Management of Prisons	Concept of safety and security Building and other structure Progressive stage system computation and sentences Classification of prisons and prisoners Safety and security checks in prisons	30Hrs
	Searches Key system Discipline and security Escorts Technology in security and safety Security system design	
Project Management	Introduction to project management Project conceptualization and identification /Appraisal Project planning in prison service Project proposal and budgeting Resources mobilization Project implementation ‘‘monitoring and evaluation report’’	20Hrs
Public Relations	Introduction to public relations Customer care Publics of prison service institution Public Relations programmes Tools of public relations Media relations Corporate social responsibility	30Hrs
Spiritual Welfare	Spiritual rehabilitation program Role of religion in rehabilitation of inmates Worship and religious books Leadership in spiritual welfare	20Hrs
Rehabilitation And Reintegration	Concept of rehabilitation and re- integration Rehabilitation programmes	

Unit	Topics	Contact lecture hours
	Emerging issues Approaches to reintegration programmes Monitoring and evaluation activities	30Hrs
Disaster Preparedness and Management	Concept of disaster Disaster preparedness Disaster response Disaster mitigation Conflict resolution Disaster in prison Firefighting/drills First aid techniques in disaster management Challenges to disaster management in prison	30Hrs
Laws Relating to Prisons	Concept of law Sources of law in Kenya Laws relating to prisons Court structure Criminal procedures (trial process) Criminal justice system	30Hrs
Human Rights	Concepts of human rights Classification of human rights Human rights culture in workplace(prison) Standard minimum rules for treatment of offenders Vulnerable groups	30Hrs
Governance And Ethics	Concept of self-governance Principles of governance Role of good governance in prisons management Code of conduct and ethics	20Hrs
Physical Training and Sports	Importance of training and sports Types of physical training activities and sports Facilities and equipment Developments of talents Safety precautions and faith in physical training Technology and sports Martial arts (Prison Staff)	35Hrs
Field Instruction	Foot drill at the halt Matching Complements while matching Compliments while matching with a rifle	

Unit	Topics	Contact lecture hours
	Anti-riot drills Weapon training Basic combat skills Execution protection (VIP) Cane drills Sword drills Word of command	40Hrs
Statistics and Research Methodology	Introduction to statistics and research methodology Research design and problem solving Research proposals Report writing and presentation Role of statistics in prison service	20Hrs
Communication	Communication devices and methods Communication systems and procedures Managing inquiries Conducting meetings Speech and speech writing Reports and briefs Memos and official letters	20 Hrs

Appendix 5: Education & Vocational Training Coordination Unit Prisons Headquarters

S/No.	Item	Current Status	Gaps	Recommendation
1.	Education and Vocational training.	Formal education and vocational training programs are implemented in correctional institutions as a strategy of rehabilitating offenders.	Lack of a policy on education and training of offenders.	The newly established Education & Vocational Training Coordination Unit to develop a policy that will give policy direction on the implementation of education and training programs of the offenders.
2.		Understaffing of trained teachers in schools in correctional institutions both in primary and secondary sections.	Trained teachers are not available to teach all subjects at all the levels.	The Kenya Prisons Service to recruit, train and deploy teachers to schools in correctional institutions to enhance access and quality education to offenders. Trained teachers to be assigned teaching duties and not general duties.

S/No.	Item	Current Status	Gaps	Recommendation
		Some trained teachers are not assigned teaching duties.	The officers are assigned general duties instead of teaching.	Trained teachers to offer teaching services only and be exempted from general duties.
		Trained teachers assigned teaching duties are also allocated general duties.	This negatively affects teaching and learning, leading to poor performance by learners, teachers are overwhelmed with work, and submission of education reports to headquarters is delayed.	The officer in charge of a Borstal institution and the heads of the primary and secondary sections should all be uniformed trained teachers. In these institutions, young offered are given a chance to free and compulsory education therefore, require a manager with an education background.
		Officers in charge of Borstal institutions are uniformed officers but not trained teachers.	The management of Borstal institutions offers a chance to young offenders to continue with their basic education yet not all children are enrolled for formal education.	
		Delayed promotion of teachers in correctional institutions.	Trained teachers in schools in correctional institutions overstay in one job group compared with their counterparts working for TSC	Trained teachers in correctional institutions should have promotion slots during promotion of prison officers. Any trained teacher deployed to teach in these institutions should be promoted on merit.
			Recruitment of teachers not informed by the	During the recruitment of teachers by KPS, the Education and Vocational Training Coordination Unit to guide on

S/No.	Item	Current Status	Gaps	Recommendation
		Recruitment of teachers in correctional institutions is undertaken by KPS.	existing needs. This was before the establishment of the new education coordinating unit.	the existing understaffed areas at all levels of education.
3.		Inadequate and obsolete teaching and learning materials, tools and equipment. Lack of laboratory equipment and reagents in Borstal institutions.	Majority of the schools in correctional institutions do not have the required textbooks, set books, reference books, exam revision books, CBC designs, and other necessary items like calculators, mathematical sets and tables, chalks, pens etc. All the Borstal institutions do not have lab equipment and reagents to facilitate teaching and learning of pure sciences. Yet the young offenders aged 18 years and below should have access to quality, free and compulsory education.	The government through the Ministry of Education to supply/ provide adequate teaching and learning materials to schools in correctional institutions to facilitate access and quality education among the offenders. These schools are public learning institutions where the vulnerable and disadvantaged citizens acquire their education. The Kenya Prisons Service provides reagents to facilitate teaching and learning of pure science in Borstal institutions. The Kenya Prisons Service to construct classrooms in all correctional institutions, science and computer laboratories and equip them especially in Borstal institutions.

S/No.	Item	Current Status	Gaps	Recommendation
		Inadequate classrooms, science laboratories, computer labs., lack of enough furniture in schools and correctional institutions.	Majority of the schools in correctional institutions do not have adequate buildings required to facilitate smooth learning of the offenders.	
4		Inadequate day care/EDCE centres in women prisons across.	Majority of women in prisons lack day care centres for the children of the incarcerated mothers. Consequently, the young children stay with their mothers throughout. This negatively impacts the growth of these children in a normal conducive environment.	The KPS to construct and equip day care/ ECDE centres for children of the incarcerated mothers in all women correctional institutions across the country.
5.		Teaching of vocational courses through apprenticeship	The offenders both young and adult enrol for vocational courses where they learn and acquire skills through apprenticeship. At	The training of vocational courses and production in correctional institutions should be separated where clients learn theory first and then practice the acquired knowledge through production. The KPS to provide training materials and production

S/No.	Item	Current Status	Gaps	Recommendation
			the end of the course the client acquires skills on how to make furniture/ metal items but lack basic theoretical knowledge (costing materials, labour charge etc) which would fully equip them for employment/ self-employment after their release.	materials on time in correctional institutions.

Appendix 6: Operationalisation of ICT infrastructure for Kenya Prisons Service Detailed components of ICT Infrastructure

- (i) KPS Information Management system PIMS
- (ii) KPS Security System
- (iii) Unified Communication (IP-Telephony)
- (iv) WAN Network Coverage

5.2 Operationalisation

Components of the digitalization process can be characterized in the following parts

S/No.	Component Part	Problem	Solution
1	Safety Protection	- Prison Break and Invisibility. - Lack of emergency command & Warning	- CCTV & Access Control - Intelligent surveillance to Prisoners - Emergency and Command control centre
2	Prisons Management	- Inefficient paper-based office. - Illegal collusion	- Prisons Information Management system. - Phone Jamming (Jammers)
3	Emergency Command	- Difficult to collaborate between sub-organs within Prisons. - Slow & Uninformed Decision	- IP- Telephony (Unified Communication) - Data Analytics, Visual analytics & Video analytic capabilities for Decision Making - Real-Time decision making

S/No.	Component Part	Problem	Solution
4	Infrastructure	- Lack of IP transmission. - Lack of Data centre	- LAN Network - Modular Data centre

Appendix: 7 Digitisation and Automation of Services

System	Justification
Integrated Digital Microwave Network (KPS Closed Network) - LAN Network	- KPS applications will include IP Telephony, IP Surveillance, Digital Radio, and data sharing in a secure network. - Microwave links are widely used for connectivity in modern digital IP networks. - Can deliver bandwidths in a reliable, cost-effective and flexible manner. - Wireless and Mobile backhaul connections i.e., transport network that connects the core network and the RAN (Radio Access Network) - Microwave Internet i.e. Internet connection delivered over the 'last mile' by a high-capacity microwave radio link (WiMAX, Wi-Fi link, wireless internet or our very own product IVM (internet via microwave)
Integrated HF/VHF Radio (Fleet Tracking and Communication)	- Real Time tracking. - Radio Communications
IP CCTV and Biometrics	- Integrated Command and Control (i) Incident management (ii) Automatic vehicle and personal location (AVL/APL) - Video Management (i) Advanced Jamming system (ii) Video surveillance system and cameras (iii) Video real time analytic systems (iv) Video analytics – Debriefing system - Wave solution - Control Room
IP Telephony services	- Unified Communication
KPS Information systems & Data centre services	Data centres to support KPS business applications and activities that include: - Prisoners Record Management system - Staff Personal files - Email and file sharing - Production applications

System	Justification
	- Enterprise resource planning (ERP) and databases - Data Analytics. - Virtual desktops, communications and collaboration services (Virtualization services)

Appendix 8: Cost Analysis: Proposed KSh. 2.5 billion Budget Requirement

S/No.	Item description	No. of Units	Estimated Unit cost	Est. Total cost (KSh.)
1	Computers/Laptops, Scanners, Photocopies and Printers			
	Computers	450	120,000	54,000,000
	Laptops/Note pads	150	170,000	25,500,000
	Photocopiers	20	450,000	9,000,000
	Photocopies (3-in-1 i.e. Printing copying and scanning)	150	60,000	9,000,000
2	Maintenance and Upgrading of KPS website	1	200,000	200,000
3	Structure Cabling	60	2,000,000	120,000,000
4	Integrated CCTV installations (Control and Command Centres)	100	20,000,000	200,000,000
5	Integrated Biometric Identifications	135	5,000,000	67,500,000
6	Data Centre Services	1	80,000,000	80,000,000
7	Integrated Prisoners Data Management System	1	40,000,000	40,000,000
8	Staff Personal File Mgt System	1	20,000,000	20,000,000
Telecommunication Infrastructure				
9	IP- Telephony (Purchase and installation of IP-PABXs)	130	1,200,000	156,000,000
10	Digital Microwave Network	1	150,000,000	150,000,000
Integrated Radio Communications (Tracking & Radio Communication)				
11	Digital VHF base Radio	100	150,000	150,000,000
12	Digital VHF Vehicle Mounted Radio	30	150,000	45,000,000
13	Digital HF Base Radio	50	250,000	25,000,000
14	Digital Hand-held VHF Radio	10,000	70,000	700,000,000
15	Restoration of Repeater Radio infrastructure (Ngong', KICC, ODS, Mt Kenya etc.)	-	35,000,000	35,000,000
16	Integrated Mobile Jamming systems	50	10,000,000	500,000,000
17	Solar power generations/ alternative energy source	20	3,000,000	60,000,000
18	Electrical Security Scanners (Walk Through scanners)	10	4,000,000	40,000,000
20	Hand Held electrical scanners	200	15,000	3,000,000

Appendix 9: KPS Modernization Programme and Modernization Fund 2024 - 2035

S/No	Programme Activities/Projects	Implementing/ Lead Agency	GOK - KPS Modernisation Fund (Millions)
1.	Complete construction of 11 new prisons (Nyamira, Sotik, Kilgoris, Marimanti, Chuka, Maara, Yatta,	MINA-KPS	1,360.50

S/No	Programme Activities/Projects	Implementing/ Lead Agency	GOK - KPS Modernisation Fund (Millions)
	Kehancha Loitoktok, Eldas and Eldoret maximum security prison)		
2.	Completion of 6 flagship prisons (Mwingi, Kwale, Rachuonyo, Vihiga, Kaloleni, Bomet prisons)	MINA-KPS	765.28
3.	Construct Super Maximum Prison at Manyani	MINA-KPS	2,200
4.	Construct 30 Women Prisons	MINA-KPS	12,000
5.	Construction of 1 BI for girls	MINA-KPS	169
6.	Construct 180 prisoners' wards	MINA-KPS	3,240
7.	Construct 27,000 staff houses	MINA-KPS	81,000
8.	Construct 90 dining halls in all prisons	MINA-KPS	690.5
9.	Refurbish and upgrade 120 medical facilities	MINA-KPS	489.8
10.	Install video conferencing facilities in 10 principle stations	MINA-KPS	80
11.	Install and maintain LPG plants in 134 prisons	MINA-KPS	1,060
12.	Install solar panels in 106 prisons	MINA-KPS	106
13.	Construct and maintain 50 boreholes	MINA-KPS	550
14.	Recruitment and training of 9,000 officers	MINA-KPS	4800
15.	Train members of staff (Development courses)	MINA-KPS	720
16.	Completion of an ultra-modern training wing at PSTC -- Ruiru	MINA-KPS	800
17.	Construct one senior prison officers' college -Eldoret	MINA-KPS	2,000
18.	Procure modern training equipment (including classified equipment)	MINA-KPS	1500
19.	Construct and equip 80 workshops	MINA-KPS	1,227.75
20.	Modernise and mechanise all prisons	MINA-KPS	2,000
21.	Construct classrooms in 50 prisons	MINA-KPS	222.75
22.	Install security surveillance system in 80 institutions	MINA-KPS	1600
23.	Procure alarm systems, electronic locks and metal detectors in 80 prisons	MINA-KPS	880
24.	Automate and digitise all prison services and install modern telecommunication system	MINA-KPS	4,800
25.	Procure 100 automatic generators	MINA-KPS	400
26.	Train 140 staff	MINA-KPS	300
27.	Install electric fence in 106 stations	MINA-KPS	31.8
28.	Reinforce/construct perimeter walls around wards in 34 prisons	MINA-KPS	494.46
29.	Construct 200 watchtowers	MINA-KPS	675.54
30.	Establish emergency response unit (Initial establishment of 250 personnel)	MINA-KPS	300
31.	Construct office space and procure equipment in 134	MINA-KPS	1,485
32.	Procure security equipment	MINA-KPS	7,800
33.	Expand horse unit & train 200 personnel	MINA-KPS	4
34.	Procure and maintain 130 horses	MINA-KPS	117
35.	Construct 100 stables	MINA-KPS	42
36.	Construct dog kennels in 134 prisons	MINA-KPS	24
37.	Procure and maintain equipment for the horse unit	MINA-KPS	33.75
38.	Expand canine unit & train 200 personnel	MINA-KPS	4
39.	Procure and train 200 dogs	MINA-KPS	40
40.	Procure and maintain equipment for the dog unit	MINA-KPS	4.5
41.	Establish an airwing by procuring a helicopter and train pilots and crew	MINA-KPS	300
42.	Review Caps 90 and 92/Review the Service Standing Orders	MINA-KPS	36
43.	Construct and equip 47 county offices	MINA-KPS	739.2

S/No	Programme Activities/Projects	Implementing/ Lead Agency	GOK - KPS Modernisation Fund (Millions)
44.	Procurement of vehicles; buses, saloon cars, utility vehicles, pickups, ambulances, motorcycles	MINA-KPS	4,000
45.	Develop effective healthcare system for prisons community Complete construction and operationalise prisons referral hospital	MINA-KPS	1200
46.	Provide adequate stores for both staff and inmates	MINA-KPS	20,000
	Total		162,269

Appendix 10: A table showing current land status and available arable land for farming in KPS

S/No.	Station	Current available land (acres)	current land under farming (acres)	Enterprises	Land mechanization level
1.	Nakuru main	467	110	Maize Vegetables Boma Rhodes Agroforestry	Not mechanized
2.	Naivasha medium	839	300	Vegetables Livestock Agroforestry	Not mechanized
3.	Kitale main	283	91	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
4.	Kitale medium	159	69	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
5.	Kitale annex	67	41	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
6.	Kitale women	20	13	Maize Vegetables	Not mechanized
7.	Eldoret main	494	430	Maize Vegetables Livestock Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
8.	Ngeria farm	1762	1392.	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry Livestock	Semi mechanized
9.	Kericho medium	101	72	Tea Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
10.	Kajiado prison	104	99	Vegetables	Not mechanized
11.	kitengela	272	100	Vegetables Livestock Agroforestry	Not mechanized
12.	Maralal	67	52	Vegetables Livestock Agroforestry	Not mechanized

S/No.	Station	Current available land (acres)	current land under farming (acres)	Enterprises	Land mechanization level
13.	Rumuruti prison farm	210	173	Vegetables Maize Agroforestry	Not mechanized
14.	Nanyuki prison & farm	76	65	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
15.	Lodwar and lodwar farm.	174	50	Vegetables	Not mechanized
16.	Kapenguria	66	40	Maize Vegetables Livestock Agroforestry	Not mechanized
17.	Narok	58	21	Vegetables Livestock Agroforestry	Not mechanized
18.	Kilgoris	74	42	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
19.	Eldama ravine	2	1	Vegetables	Not mechanized
20.	Tambach	3	2	Vegetables	Not mechanized
21.	Bomet	10	6	Vegetables Beans Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
22.	Sotik	58	10	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
23.	Kapsabet	7	1	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
24.	Kakamega	9	1	Vegetables	Not mechanized
25.	Shikusa farm	1050	532	Maize Vegetables Livestock Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
26.	Busia	141	91	Vegetables	Not mechanized
27.	Bungoma	10	2	Vegetables	Not mechanized
28.	Vihiga	10	2	Vegetables	Not mechanized
29.	Kisumu medium	304	106	Sunflower Vegetables Agroforestry	semi mechanized
30.	Kibos medium	231	192	Sunflower Vegetables Agroforestry	semi mechanized
31.	Kisii	15	2	Vegetables	Not mechanized
32.	Migori	4	1	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
33.	Homa bay	75	65	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
34.	Rachuonyo	26	17	Sorghum Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized

S/No.	Station	Current available land (acres)	current land under farming (acres)	Enterprises	Land mechanization level
35.	Kehancha	20	12	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
36.	Siaya	51	8	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
37.	Nyamira	49	20	Finger millet Agroforestry	Not mechanized
38.	Embu main	109	52	Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	Not mechanized
39.	Meru	15	5	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
40.	Kangeta	103	49	Potato Vegetables	Not mechanized
41.	Urugu	70	64	Tea Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
42.	Isiolo	79	51	Vegetables	Not mechanized
43.	Marsabit	30	10	Vegetables	Not mechanized
44.	Moyale	42	18	Vegetables	Not mechanized
45.	Kitui	43	17	Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	Not mechanized
46.	Mwingi	10	3	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
47.	Makueni	68	34	Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	Not mechanized
48.	Machakos main	25	14	Vegetables Beans Agroforestry	Not mechanized
49.	Yatta	24	18	Vegetables Beans Agroforestry	Not mechanized
50.	Chuka	100	12	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
51.	Nyeri	113	33	Coffee Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	Not mechanized
52.	Murang'a	6	3	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
53.	Maranjau	150	92	Vegetables maize Orchard Agroforestry	Not mechanized
54.	Kerugoya	25	10	Coffee Vegetables	Not mechanized

S/No.	Station	Current available land (acres)	current land under farming (acres)	Enterprises	Land mechanization level
				Agroforestry	
55.	Mwea	301	223	Rice Maize Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	semi mechanized
56.	Kiambu	4	1	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
57.	Thika	24	18	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
58.	Ruiru	588	237	Coffee Vegetables Tree nurseries Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
59.	Nyandarua	107	80	Potatoes Vegetables Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
60.	Shimo la tewa medium	637	385	Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	Semi mechanized
61.	Kwale	184	98	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
62.	Kilifi	58	30	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
63.	Malindi	262	225	Maize Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	Not mechanized
64.	Hindi	857	700	Maize Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
65.	Hola	247	40	Rice Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
66.	Manyani	319	16	Vegetables Orchard Agroforestry	Not mechanized
67.	Wundanyi	5	2	Vegetables	Not mechanized
68.	Taveta	34	22	Maize	Not mechanized
69.	Garissa medium	309	259	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
70.	Nairobi west	42	12	Vegetables Agroforestry	Not mechanized
71.	Langata women	43	5	Vegetables	Not mechanized
72.	Kamiti medium	928	593	Livestock Vegetables Orchard	Semi mechanized

S/No.	Station	Current available land (acres)	current land under farming (acres)	Enterprises	Land mechanization level
				Agroforestry	
73.	Jamhuri SS	6	3	Vegetables	Not mechanized
	Total acreage	12,895	7,665		

Appendix 11: Trades and courses available in different prisons in the KPS

	Station	Trade	(Tailoring stations with both semi vs auto machines)
1.	Prison Hq	n/a	
2.	Timber Yard	n/a	
3.	Kamiti Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, signwriting, leather work, tailoring/dress making, spray painter	semi vs auto
4.	Kamiti Medium	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	semi vs auto
5.	Langata Women	Tailoring & Dress making, weaving, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work, pottery, hair dressing & beauty therapy	semi vs auto
6.	Nairobi West	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work.	
7.	Kamae Girls	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work.	semi vs auto
8.	Kakamega Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
9.	Kakamega Women	Tailoring & Dress making, weaving, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
10.	Shikusa Bi	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, tailoring & dress making	
11.	Shikusa Farm	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
12.	Bungoma Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
13.	Bungoma Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery, fibre work	
14.	Vihiga	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
15.	Busia Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
16.	Busia Women	Tailoring & Dress making, weaving, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work	
17.	Eldoret Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, tailoring & Dress making	semi vs auto
18.	Eldoret Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work	
19.	Tambach	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
20.	Ngeria Farm	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
21.	Kapenguria Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
22.	Kapenguria Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery	
23.	Kapsabet	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	

	Station	Trade	(Tailoring stations with both semi vs auto machines)
24.	Lowder	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
25.	Kericho Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, Tailoring & Dress making	semi vs auto
26.	Kericho Women	Tailoring & Dress making, weaving knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work, Hair dressing & Salon	
27.	Maralal Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
28.	Maralal Women	Tailoring & Dress making, beadwork	
29.	Bomet	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
30.	Kilgolis	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
31.	Narok	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
32.	Kabarnet	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
33.	Eldama Ravine	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
34.	Naivasha Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, signwriting, tailoring & Dress making, printing	semi vs auto
35.	Naivasha Medium	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
36.	Naivasha Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work, fibre work	
37.	Nakuru Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, signwriting, Tailoring & Dress making ,	semi vs auto
38.	Nakuru Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
39.	Kajiado	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
40.	Kitengela	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, signwriting, leather work, tailoring, wood curving and soap & detergents making	semi vs auto
41.	Rumuruti	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
42.	Nanyuki Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
43.	Nanyuki Women	Dressing making, tailoring, knitting, embroidery , bead work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
44.	Kitale Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work , tailoring & dress making	semi vs auto
45.	Kitale Annex	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
46.	Kitale Women	Dressing making, tailoring, weaving knitting, embroidery, bead work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
47.	Kitale Medium	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
48.	Kisumu Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, tailoring & dress making	
49.	Kisumu Women	Dressing making, tailoring, knitting, embroidery , bead work, fibre work, pottery, hair dressing and beauty therapy	
50.	Siaya	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	

	Station	Trade	(Tailoring stations with both semi vs auto machines)
51.	Kibos Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work , tailoring & dress making.	semi VS auto
52.	Kisii Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, stone curving, tailoring & Dress making	semi VS auto
53.	Kisii Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting ,embroidery , bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
54.	Homabay	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
55.	Rachuonyo	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
56.	Migori Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery,metal work	
57.	Migori Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work	
58.	Marsabit	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
59.	Isiolo	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
60.	Meru Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, Tailoring & Dress making,	semi vs auto
61.	Meru Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
62.	Kangeta	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work , signwriting, leather work	
63.	Embu Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, Tailoring & Dress making	semi vs auto
64.	Embu Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
65.	Urugu	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
66.	Yatta	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
67.	Makueni	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
68.	Moyale	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
69.	Kitui Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
70.	Kitui Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work, weaving, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
71.	Machakos Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, paints	
72.	Machakos Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work, fibre work, weaving, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
73.	Mwingi	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
74.	Mwingi Women	Tailoring & Dress making ,hair dressing & Beauty therapy	
75.	Nyeri Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, tailoring & dress making	semi vs auto

	Station	Trade	(Tailoring stations with both semi vs auto machines)
76.	Nyeri Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
77.	Nyeri Medium	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
78.	T/Falls Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
79.	T/Falls Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
80.	Muranga Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
81.	Muranga Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery, bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
82.	Maranjau	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery , metal work	
83.	Mwea	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
84.	Kerugoya	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
85.	Kiambu	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
86.	Ruiru	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
87.	Thika Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
88.	Thika Women	Tailoring & Dress making, knitting, embroidery , bead work, fibre work, weaving, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
89.	Shimo Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, signwriting, leather work, tailoring & dress making	semi vs auto
90.	Shimo Women	Dressing making, tailoring, weaving, knitting ,embroidery, bead work, fibre work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
91.	Shimo Medium	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, wood curving weaving and basketry	
92.	Shimo Bi	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work, signwriting, tailoring & dress making	
93.	Voi	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
94.	Wundanyi Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
95.	Wundanyi Women	Dressing making, tailoring, knitting ,embroidery , bead work	
96.	Manyani	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery,metal work	
97.	Hola	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
98.	Kwale Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
99.	Kwale Women	Tailoring & dress making, weaving, knitting embroidery, bead work, hair dressing & beauty therapy	
100.	Hindi	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
101.	Malindi Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
102.	Malindi Women	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work,	
103.	Taita Taveta	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
104.	Kaloleni	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	

	Station	Trade	(Tailoring stations with both semi vs auto machines)
105.	Kilifi Main	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, metal work	
106.	Wajir	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	
107.	Mandera	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery, tailoring & dress making	
108.	Garissa	Carpentry, polishing, upholstery	

Appendix 12: Status of vehicles allocated to the Kenya Prisons Service

Details of grounded vehicles in the KPS that are in a repairable condition (as at 13 April 2023)

	GK. No.	Type/Make/Model	Station/Site Where the Vehicle is Located
		Prisons Headquarters	
1.	B903G	Subaru Forester (S/Wagon)	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
2.	A331H	Toyota Land Cruiser Prado	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
3.	A303S	Toyota Hiace Micro-Bus	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
4.	B738G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
5.	A939N	Nissan Ud Bus	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
6.	A135X	Toyota Avanza (S/Wagon)	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
7.	B979D	Mitsubishi Fuso Lorry	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
8.	A110P	Mitsubishi Fuso Tipper Lorry	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
9.	Y510	Suzuki	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
10.	417M	Isuzu 3.3 Truck (Breakdown)	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
11.	A601M	Isuzu Water Bowser Lorry	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
12.	A437L	Toyota Corolla Nze Saloon	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
13.	A341U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
14.	B730G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
15.	A362U	Land Rover Tdi Defender	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
16.	A790C	Isuzu Fsr Furniture Van	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
17.	A593P	Isuzu Fvr Furniture Van	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
18.	A692H	Nissan Pathfinder	PHQ – Grounded at Central Workshop Nairobi
		Nairobi Region	
19.	A566K	Isuzu Bus	Nbi Remand & Allocation – Grounded at Central Workshop Nbi
20.	A924N	Nissan Ud Bus	Nbi Remand & Allocation – Grounded at Central Workshop Nbi
21.	Z183	Land Rover 110	Kamiti Medium
		Rift Valley Region	
22.	A926N	Nissan Ud Bus	Naivasha Maximum
23.	464M	Isuzu Txd Caged Lorry	Kitale Medium
24.	A674M	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kericho Medium
25.	T461	Isuzu Open Lorry	Kapenguria Main
26.	488M	Isuzu Open Lorry	Ngeria Farm
27.	2045	Bedford Lorry	Rumuruti
28.	481M	Toyota Pick-Up	Kilgoris
		Eastern Region	
29.	A891V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Embu Women
30.	A095L	Land Rover 110	Moyale
		Central Region	
31.	S846	Isuzu Open Lorry	Thika Main
32.	A359S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Murang'a Main
33.	A968N	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kerugoya
34.	A010X	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Maranjau
35.	T480	Isuzu Open Lorry	Mwea

	GK. No.	Type/Make/Model	Station/Site Where the Vehicle is Located
		Coast Region	
36.	A845V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Shimo La Tewa Medium
37.	A890V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Shimo La Tewa Women
38.	A062F	Toyota Prado	Shimo La Tewa Borstal Institution
39.	B415D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	Malindi Main
40.	A328H	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Kwale Main
41.	A134U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kwale Main
42.	470M	Isuzu TXD Caged Lorry	Kwale Main
43.	A846V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Voi
44.	B018E	Isuzu D-Max KB250 Pick-Up	Kaloleni
		Western Region	
45.	A240Z	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Shikusa Farm
46.	A050E	Toyota Hilux Pick-Up	Shikusa Farm
47.	A513K	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Shikusa Borstal Institution
48.	X686	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Vihiga
		Nyanza Region	
49.	B017E	Isuzu D-Max Kb250 Pick-Up	Siaya Main
		North Eastern Region	
50.	S378	Land Rover 109	Wajir

Appendix: 13 Summary of grounded vehicles

Region	SUV/Staff Car	Land Rover	Pick-Ups	14-Seater Micro-Bus	33-Seater Mini-Bus	62-Seater Bus	4 Ton Lorry	9 Ton Lorry	Total
HQ (MVD)	8	1	–	2	–	1	1	5	18
Nairobi Area	–	1	–	–	–	2	–	–	3
Rift Valley	–	–	2	–	–	1	–	4	7
Eastern	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	2
Central	–	–	2	1	–	–	–	2	5
Coast	3	–	5	–	–	–	–	1	9
Western	–	–	2	2	–	–	–	–	4
Nyanza	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	1
North Eastern	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
PSTC Ruiru	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
SDCS HQS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	11	4	13	5	–	4	1	12	50

Appendix: 14 Details of serviceable vehicles at KPS (as at 13th April, 2023)

	GK. NO.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To
		PHQ (MVD Nairobi)	
1.	B451S	Toyota Land Cruiser V8	Prisons Headquarters
2.	B901G	Subaru Outback (S/Wagon)	Prisons Headquarters
3.	A096H	Mercedes Benz	Prisons Headquarters
4.	B649Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Prisons Headquarters
5.	B680Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Prisons Headquarters
6.	B682Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Prisons Headquarters
7.	B932D	Toyota Land Cruiser Prado	Prisons Headquarters
8.	B668Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Prisons Headquarters
9.	B665Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Prisons Headquarters
10.	B735G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
11.	B416D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
12.	B427D	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
13.	A022H	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Prisons Headquarters

	GK. NO.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To
14.	A966T	Nissan Sunny Ex-Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
15.	B901D	Toyota Land Cruiser Caravan	Prisons Headquarters
16.	B419D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
17.	A602K	Toyota Prado Land Cruiser	Prisons Headquarters
18.	B417D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
19.	B736G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
20.	B418D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	Prisons Headquarters
21.	A835V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters
22.	A338S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters
23.	A333U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Prisons Headquarters
24.	A253Z	Isuzu FSR Tipper Lorry	Prisons Headquarters
25.	B092B	Nissan UD Bus	Prisons Headquarters
26.	B923H	Isuzu Bus	Prisons Headquarters
27.	A360U	Land Rover TDI Defender	Prisons Headquarters
28.	A475E	Suzuki Vitara	Prisons Headquarters
29.	B166E	Isuzu Kb250 D-Max Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters
30.	A791C	Isuzu FSR Furniture Van	Prisons Headquarters
31.	B484Y	Isuzu FTR 90 Lorry	Prisons Headquarters
32.	B485Y	Isuzu FTR 90 Lorry	Prisons Headquarters
33.	A169M	Toyota Double-Cabin Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters
		Nairobi Region	
34.	B679Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Regional Command Office – Nairobi Area
35.	A342M	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Nairobi Remand & Allocation Maximum
36.	B094B	Nissan UD Bus	Nairobi Remand & Allocation Maximum
37.	A081U	Isuzu Water Bowser Lorry	Nairobi Remand & Allocation Maximum
38.	B015E	Isuzu Kb250 D-Max Pick-Up	Jamhuri Short Sentence
39.	B737G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Nairobi West
40.	A929X	Isuzu Npr66 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Nairobi West
41.	A569K	Isuzu Bus	Nairobi West
42.	A567K	Isuzu Bus	Langata Women Maximum
43.	A194L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Kamiti Maximum
44.	A559K	Isuzu Bus	Kamiti Maximum
45.	B093B	Nissan UD Bus	Kamiti Maximum
46.	A007X	Toyota Hilux Pick-Up	Kamiti Maximum
47.	B642C	Isuzu NKR 66l 4 Ton Lorry	Kamiti Maximum
48.	A867G	Toyota Hilux Pick-Up	Kamiti Medium
49.	A359U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Kamiti Medium
50.	A339U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Kamiti YCTC
51.	A344U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Kamae Girls Borstal Institution
		Rift Valley Region	
52.	B669Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Regional Command Office – Rift Valley
53.	B421D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	Regional Command Office – Rift Valley
54.	A188L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Nakuru Main
55.	A565K	Isuzu Bus	Nakuru Main
56.	A419S	Isuzu 4.5 Ton Mini-Lorry	Nakuru Main
57.	B925H	Isuzu Bus	Nakuru Main
58.	A427Y	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Nakuru Main
59.	A052E	Toyota Hilux Pick-Up	Nakuru Main
60.	B174B	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Nakuru Women
61.	A967T	Nissan Sunny Ex-Saloon	Naivasha Maximum
62.	A857A	Isuzu FSR Caged Lorry	Naivasha Maximum

	GK. NO.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To
63.	B939G	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Naivasha Medium
64.	A847V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Naivasha Medium
65.	S387	Mitsubishi Fuso Tipper Lorry	Naivasha Medium
66.	A965T	Nissan Sunny Ex-Saloon	Kericho Main
67.	A349S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kericho Main
68.	A957N	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kericho Women
69.	B778C	Isuzu NPR 66p 4-Ton Lorry	Kericho Medium
70.	A414L	Toyota Corolla Nze Saloon	Kitale Main
71.	A928N	Nissan UD Bus	Kitale Main
72.	Y880	Isuzu TXD Caged Lorry	Kitale Main
73.	B016E	Isuzu D-Max Kb250 Pick-Up	Kitale Women
74.	B414D	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kitale Annex
75.	A848V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Kitale Medium
76.	A963T	Nissan Sunny Ex-Saloon	Eldoret Main
77.	B311D	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Eldoret Main
78.	A444L	Toyota Hiace Micro-Bus	Eldoret Main
79.	A558K	Isuzu Bus	Eldoret Main
80.	A339S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Eldoret Women
81.	A320H	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Ngeria Farm
82.	A525L	Isuzu FVR Lorry	Ngeria Farm
83.	B014E	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Kitengela
84.	B177B	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kitengela
85.	A242Z	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kapenguria Main
86.	B942G	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Tambach
87.	B085B	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Eldama–Ravine
88.	A344S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kajiado Main
89.	B731G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Nyahururu Main
90.	A855A	Isuzu FSR Caged Lorry	Nyahururu Main
91.	A347S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Rumuruti
92.	W525	Isuzu TXD Caged Lorry	Rumuruti
93.	A245A	Toyota Corolla Saloon	Kapsabet Main
94.	A844V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Kapsabet Main
95.	A094L	Land Rover 110	Lodwar Main
96.	A137U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Bomet
		Eastern Region	
97.	A797Q	Nissan Patrol	Regional Command Office – Eastern Region
98.	A191L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Embu Main
99.	A940N	Nissan UD Bus	Embu Main
100.	A413L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Meru Main
101.	A535H	Nissan UD Lorry/Truck	Meru Main
102.	A135U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Meru Women
103.	B178B	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Machakos Main
104.	Z645	Isuzu TXD Caged Lorry	Machakos Main
105.	A850V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Machakos Women
106.	A132U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Makueni Remand
107.	B312D	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Uruku
108.	476M	Isuzu TXD Caged Lorry	Uruku
109.	A343U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Marsabit
110.	A337U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Kangeta
111.	B941G	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Mwingi Main
112.	A081L	Isuzu Open Lorry	Moyale

	GK. NO.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To
113.	B309D	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Chuka
114.	A133U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Chuka
115.	A346S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Marimanti
116.	A129U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Mutomo
		Central Region	
117.	A321H	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Regional Command Office – Central Region
118.	B733G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Nyeri Maximum
119.	A564K	Isuzu Bus	Nyeri Maximum
120.	A034X	Isuzu Npr66 4-Ton Mini-Lorry	Nyeri Maximum
121.	B308D	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Nyeri Medium
122.	B019E	Isuzu D-Max Kb250 Pick-Up	Thika Main
123.	A340U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Thika Main
124.	A929N	Nissan UD Bus	Murang'a Main
125.	A415L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Ruiru Prison
126.	A358S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Ruiru Prison
127.	A948N	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Mwea
128.	A130U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kiambu
129.	B020E	Isuzu D-Max Kb250 Pick-Up	Nyandarua
130.	A537H	Nissan Ud Truck/Lorry	Nyandarua
		Coast Region	
131.	B734G	Chevrolet Cruze Saloon	Regional Command Office – Coast Region
132.	A946N	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Shimo La Tewa Maximum
133.	B175B	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Shimo La Tewa Maximum
134.	B926H	Isuzu Bus	Shimo La Tewa Maximum
135.	B095B	Nissan UD Bus	Shimo La Tewa Maximum
136.	B291V	Toyota Hiace Micro-Bus	Shimo La Tewa Borstal Institution
137.	B938G	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Shimo La Tewa Medium
138.	B924H	Isuzu Bus	Manyani Maximum
139.	A412L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Manyani Maximum
140.	A082L	Isuzu Open Lorry	Manyani Maximum
141.	B021E	Isuzu D-Max Kb250 Pick-Up	Kwale Women
142.	A341S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Hola
143.	A125X	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kilifi
144.	A843V	Isuzu TFR Pick-Up	Hindi
		Western Region	
145.	B685Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Regional Command Office – Western Region
146.	A193L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Kakamega Main
147.	A851V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Kakamega Main
148.	A561K	Isuzu Bus	Kakamega Main
149.	A570K	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kakamega Women
150.	A331U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Shikusa Borstal Institution
151.	A536H	Nissan UD Truck/Lorry	Busia Main
152.	A927N	Nissan UD Bus	Bungoma Main
153.	A889V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Bungoma Main
154.	A128U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Vihiga
		Nyanza Region	
155.	B683Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Regional Command Office – Nyanza Region
156.	A189L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Kisumu Maximum
157.	A555K	Isuzu Bus	Kisumu Maximum
158.	A546	Toyota Hiace Micro-Bus	Kisumu Maximum
159.	R753	Peugeot 504 Saloon	Kisumu Medium

	GK. NO.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To
160.	A334S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kisumu Medium
161.	B576C	Isuzu D-Max D/Cabin Pick-Up	Kisumu Women
162.	A190L	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Kibos Maximum
163.	A955N	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kibos Maximum
164.	B940G	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kibos Medium
165.	A969N	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kibos Medium
166.	A332U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Kendege
167.	A340S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Nyamira
168.	A945N	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Kisii Main
169.	A562K	Isuzu Bus	Kisii Main
170.	A241Z	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Kisii Women
171.	A336S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Siaya Main
172.	A131U	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Homa Bay Women
173.	A260M	Toyota Corolla NZE Saloon	Migori Main
174.	B310D	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Migori Main
175.	A417S	Isuzu 4.5 Ton Mini-Lorry	Migori Main
176.	A893V	Isuzu D-Max TFR Pick-Up	Migori Main
177.	A343S	Isuzu D-Max Pick-Up	Migori Women
		North Eastern Region	
178.	A098L	Land Rover 110	Regional Command Office – North Eastern Region
179.	A683C	Land Rover 110	Garissa Main
180.	A356U	Nissan Urvan Micro-Bus	Garissa Medium
181.	A091L	Land Rover 110	Mandera
		PSTC – Ruiru	
182.	B660Y	Peugeot 3008 Active	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru
183.	B422D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru
184.	A923N	Nissan UD Bus	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru
185.	A082U	Isuzu FVR Water Bowser Lorry	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru
		SDCS Hqs – Telaposta	
186.	B902G	Subaru Forester (S/Wagon)	State Department for Correctional Services – Hqs (Teleposta)
187.	B420D	Toyota Corolla ZRE Saloon	State Department for Correctional Services – Hqs (Teleposta)
188.	A481G	Toyota Land Cruiser Prado	State Department for Correctional Services – Hqs (Teleposta)

Appendix: Summary of serviceable vehicles

Region	SUV/ Staff Car	Land Rover	Pick-up	14-Seater Micro-Bus	33-Seater Mini-Bus	62- Seater	4-Ton Lorry	9-Ton Lorry	TOTAL
PHQ (MVD)	21	1	4	1	–	2	–	4	33
Nairobi area	4	–	3	3	–	5	2	1	18
Rift valley	11	1	19	2	–	4	2	6	45
Eastern	3	–	10	2	–	1	–	4	20
Central	4	–	5	1	–	2	1	1	14
Coast	3	–	6	1	–	3	–	1	14
Western	2	–	4	1	–	2	–	1	10
Nyanza	6	–	12	2	–	2	1	–	23
North Eastern	-	3	–	1	–	-	–	–	4
PSTC Ruiru	2	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	4

Region	SUV/ Staff Car	Land Rover	Pick-up	14-Seater Micro-Bus	33-Seater Mini-Bus	62- Seater	4-Ton Lorry	9-Ton Lorry	TOTAL
SDCS HQS	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Total	59	5	63	14	—	22	6	19	188

Appendix 15: Details of Motor Vehicles in the KPS acquired through government lease programme (as at 13th April, 2023)

	GK. No.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To	Condition
		Phq (MVD Nairobi)		
1.	B126Y	Toyota Land Cruiser Caravan	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
2.	B841Z	Volkswagen Tiguan	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
3.	B738U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
4.	B741U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
5.	B743U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i-L	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
6.	B742U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
7.	B750U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
8.	B752U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
9.	B753U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
10.	B754U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
11.	B729U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i-L	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
12.	B210W	Subaru Outback	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
13.	B235W	Subaru Outback	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
14.	B263W	Isuzu D-Max D/Cabin TFS Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
15.	B264W	Isuzu D-Max D/Cabin TFS Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
16.	B269W	Isuzu D-Max D/Cabin TFS Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
17.	B270W	Isuzu D-Max D/Cabin TFS Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
18.	B209W	Subaru Outback	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
19.	B745U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
20.	B755T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
21.	B468T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
22.	B735Y	Isuzu NQR 81mk Mini-Bus	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
23.	B537U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
24.	B455U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
25.	B208M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
26.	B870Y	Isuzu Mv123 Bus	Prisons Headquarters	Serviceable
		Nairobi Region		
27.	B525T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Nairobi Remand & Allocation Maximum	Serviceable
28.	B286U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Nairobi Remand & Allocation Maximum	Serviceable
29.	B211M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Nairobi Remand & Allocation Maximum	Grounded
30.	B227M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Nairobi Remand & Allocation Maximum	Serviceable
31.	B262U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Nairobi Medium	Serviceable
32.	B271U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Langata Women Maximum	Serviceable
33.	C341A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Langata Women Maximum	Serviceable
34.	B380T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kamiti Maximum	Serviceable

	GK. No.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To	Condition
35.	B270U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kamiti Maximum	Serviceable
36.	B210M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Kamiti Maximum	Grounded
37.	C335A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Kamiti Maximum	Serviceable
38.	B509T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kamiti Medium	Serviceable
		Rift Valley Region		
39.	B511T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Regional Command Office – Rift Valley Region	Serviceable
40.	B267U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Nakuru Main	Serviceable
41.	C333A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Nakuru Main	Serviceable
42.	B438T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Naivasha Maximum	Serviceable
43.	B294U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Naivasha Maximum	Serviceable
44.	B736Y	Isuzu NQR 81mk Mini-Bus	Naivasha Maximum	Serviceable
45.	B461T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kericho Main	Serviceable
46.	B204M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Kericho Main	Grounded
47.	B295U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kitale Main	Serviceable
48.	B206M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Kitale Main	Grounded
49.	B510T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Eldoret Main	Serviceable
50.	C334A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Eldoret Main	Serviceable
51.	B296U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Ngeria Farm	Serviceable
52.	B203M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Ngeria Farm	Serviceable
53.	B265U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kitengela	Serviceable
54.	B205M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Kitengela	Serviceable
55.	B236U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Nyahururu Main	Serviceable
56.	B216M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Nyahururu Main	Grounded
57.	B234U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Maralal	Serviceable
58.	B486U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Nanyuki Main	Serviceable
59.	B489U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Narok Main	Serviceable
60.	B491U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kilgoris	Serviceable
61.	B297U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kabarnet	Serviceable
62.	B534U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Lodwar Main	Serviceable
63.	B264U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Sotik	Serviceable
64.	B483U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Loitokitok	Serviceable
		Eastern Region		
65.	B737U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	Regional Command Office – Eastern Region	Serviceable
66.	B452T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Regional Command Office – Eastern Region	Serviceable
67.	B379T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Embu Main	Serviceable
68.	B263U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Embu Main	Serviceable
69.	C336A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Embu Main	Serviceable
70.	B488U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Meru Main	Serviceable
71.	B220M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Meru Main	Serviceable
72.	B221M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Kitui Main	Serviceable
73.	B266U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kitui Main	Serviceable
74.	B383T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Machakos Main	Serviceable
75.	B214M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Machakos Main	Serviceable
76.	B218M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Machakos Main	Grounded
77.	B269U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Makueni Main	Serviceable

	GK. No.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To	Condition
78.	B229M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Makueni Main	Serviceable
79.	B499U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Marsabit	Serviceable
80.	B455T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Kangeta	Serviceable
81.	B497U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Isiolo Main	Serviceable
82.	B498U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Moyale	Serviceable
83.	B268U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Yatta	Serviceable
		Central Region		
84.	B756U	SUBARU FORESTER 2.0i-L	Regional Command Office – Central Region	Serviceable
85.	B970V	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Regional Command Office – Central Region	Serviceable
86.	B233U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Nyeri Maximum	Serviceable
87.	C331A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Nyeri Maximum	Serviceable
88.	B522T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kerugoya	Serviceable
89.	B261U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Mwea	Serviceable
90.	B235U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Maranjau	Serviceable
91.	B219M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Ruiru Farm Prison	Serviceable
		Coast Region		
92.	B842Z	Volkswagen Tiguan	Regional Command Office – Coast Region	Serviceable
93.	B507T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Regional Command Office – Coast Region	Serviceable
94.	B492U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Shimo La Tewa Maximum	Serviceable
95.	B226M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Shimo La Tewa Maximum	Grounded
96.	C339A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Shimo La Tewa Maximum	Serviceable
97.	B480T	Isuzu BQR 33-Seater Min-Bus	Shimo La Tewa Borstal Institution	Serviceable
98.	B378T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Mombasa Remand	Serviceable
99.	B493U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Manyani Maximum	Serviceable
100.	C332A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Manyani Maximum	Serviceable
101.	B495U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Malindi Main	Serviceable
102.	B228M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Malindi Main	Grounded
103.	B462T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kwale Main	Serviceable
104.	B494U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Hola	Serviceable
105.	B259U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Taveta Remand	Serviceable
106.	B260U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Wundanyi Main	Serviceable
107.	B237U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kaloleni	Serviceable
108.	B500U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Hindi	Serviceable
		Western Region		
109.	B508T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Regional Command Office – Western Region	Grounded
110.	B494T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kakamega Main	Serviceable
111.	C340A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Kakamega Main	Serviceable
112.	B526T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Shikusa Farm	Serviceable
113.	B431T	Isuzu BQR 33-Seater Min-Bus	Shikusa Borstal Institution	Serviceable
114.	B275U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Busia Main	Serviceable
115.	B276U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Bungoma Main	Serviceable
		Nyanza Region		
116.	B451T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Regional Command Office – Nyanza Region	Serviceable

	GK. No.	Type/Make/Model	Allocated To	Condition
117.	B272U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kisumu Maximum	Serviceable
118.	B225M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Kisumu Maximum	Grounded
119.	C337A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Kisumu Maximum	Serviceable
120.	B528T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kisumu Medium	Serviceable
121.	B375T	Isuzu Npr66p 4 Ton Mini-Lorry	Kibos Maximum	Serviceable
122.	B471U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Kisii Main	Serviceable
123.	B223M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Kisii Main	Serviceable
124.	B273U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Homa Bay Main	Serviceable
125.	B274U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Rachuonyo	Serviceable
126.	C338A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Migori Main	Serviceable
		North Eastern Region		
127.	B108Y	Toyota Land Cruiser Caravan	Regional Command Office – North Eastern Region	Serviceable
128.	B531T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Regional Command Office – North Eastern Region	Serviceable
129.	B530U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Garissa Main	Serviceable
130.	B222M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Garissa Main	Grounded
131.	B531U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Garissa Medium	Serviceable
132.	B532U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Wajir	Serviceable
133.	B535U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Mandera	Serviceable
		PSTC Ruiru		
134.	B744U	Subaru Forrester 2.0i-L	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru	Serviceable
135.	B496U	Toyota Land Cruiser Pick-Up	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru	Serviceable
136.	B519T	Isuzu FVR 23 10 Ton Lorry	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru	Serviceable
137.	B454T	Isuzu BQR 33-Seater Mini-Bus	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru	Serviceable
138.	B212M	Peugeot Boxer (Ambulance)	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru	Grounded
139.	B872Y	Isuzu Mv123 Bus	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru	Serviceable
140.	C342A	Toyota Land Cruiser Ambulance	Prisons Staff Training College – Ruiru	Serviceable
		SDCS Hqs – Teleposta		
141.	B739U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	
142.	B740U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	
143.	B747U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	
144.	B748U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	
145.	B749U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	
146.	B751U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	
147.	B755U	Subaru Forester 2.0i	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	
148.	B530T	Isuzu BQR 33-Seater Min-Bus	State Department for Correctional Services – Headquarters (Teleposta)	

Appendix: 16 Summary of leased Motor Vehicles in the KPS

Region	SUV/ Staff Car	Land Rover	Pick- Up	14- Seater Micro Bus	33- Seater Mini Bus	62- Seater Bus	4 Ton Lorry	9 Ton Lorry	Ambulance	Total
PHQ (MVD)	15	–	6	–	1	1	1	1	1	26
Nairobi area	–	–	4	–	–	–	2	1	5	12
Rift valley	–	–	14	–	1	–	1	3	7	26
Eastern	1	–	8	–	–	–	2	2	6	19
Central	1	–	3	–	–	–	1	1	2	8
Coast	1	–	8	–	1	–	2	1	4	17
Western	–	–	2	–	1	–	2	1	1	7
Nyanza	–	–	4	–	–	–	2	1	4	11
N/Eastern	1	–	4	–	–	–	–	1	1	7
PSTC Ruiru	1	–	1	–	1	1	–	1	2	7
SDCS HQS	7	–	-	–	1	–	–	–	–	8
Total	27	–	54	–	6	2	13	13	33	148

Appendix 17: Proposed additional leased vehicles

S/No.	Vehicle Description	2022/2023	2023/2024	2024/2025	TOTAL
1.	Medium Duty SUV Off -Road 4x4 (7-seater)	35	30	30	95
2.	Medium Duty Double Cabin Pick-up 4x4	30	50	40	120
3.	Heavy Duty Utility vehicle (Toyota Land cruiser Caravan)	20	30	30	80
4.	Heavy duty Utility vehicle (Toyota Land cruiser Pick-up)	70	60	65	195
5.	14-Seater Microbus	45	35	20	100
6.	33–35-Seater Mini-Bus	20	25	30	75
7.	62-Seater Bus	20	25	25	70
8.	4 Ton Medium Duty Truck (Mini-Lorry)	30	40	20	90
9.	10 Ton Lorry	20	20	20	60
10.	Ambulance	70	50	15	135
	TOTAL	360	365	295	1,020

PART IV: THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

CHAPTER TWENTY: LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

20.1 Introduction

1738. The National Youth Service (NYS) is a state corporation established under section 5 of the National Youth Service Act of 2018. The NYS Act provides for the establishment, functions and management of NYS. It outlines the NYS mandate, which is to provide training to youth in various fields, including national service, disaster response, and other activities that promote national unity. NYS was set up to train, discipline and empower youth through paramilitary training to effectively participate in national development and to catalyse transformative youth empowerment in Kenya.
1739. Section 5 of the Act establishes the Service. Section 6 provides that the Service shall consist of such number of members as determined by the NYS Council with the approval of the Cabinet Secretary. The Act, however, does not define nor clarify the status of servicemen and women, who were members of the Service under the previous Act.¹⁸ The ranks of the Service are provided for in the First Schedule to the Act, which further provides that these ranks may be amended by the NYS Council through a notice in the gazette. The Service may also establish branches, operational units, support units, and formations as approved by the Council.
1740. Section 7 of the NYS Act provides for the Service's functions, which include:
- (a) Undertake paramilitary training of members of the Service;
 - (b) Instil in members of the Service a tradition of patriotism, loyalty, integrity, duty and service to the nation;
 - (c) Provide vocational training, professional and personal development programmes and activities for members of the Service;
 - (d) Undertake such enterprises and commercial activities pursuant to the provisions of the Fourth Schedule to the Act as the Council may from time to time determine;
 - (e) Collaborate with stakeholders for the furtherance of its functions;
 - (f) Initiate, plan, organise, fund, manage and administer programmes and activities for the development of members of the Service;
 - (g) Develop leadership skills in members of the Service; and
 - (h) Perform any other function that may be conferred by the NYS Act, 2018, and any other written law.
1741. NYS is currently under the Ministry of Public Service, Performance and Delivery Management, which oversees its operations. The ministry is responsible for developing policies and strategies for youth development and empowerment. NYS has several policies and guidelines that define its operations, including the National Youth Service Strategic Plan (2019 -- 2023), the National Youth Service Act, 2018, Regulations, and the National Youth Service Training Curriculum.
1742. NYS is organised into two tiers, which comprise governance and management. Under the governance structure, there is a Council established pursuant to section 9(1) of the NYS Act. The Council is the supreme decision-making organ of the Service. The NYS Council members are appointed by the Cabinet Secretary while the President appoints the non-executive chairperson. The Council is responsible for overseeing the management and

¹⁸ NYS Act, Cap 208, Laws of Kenya (1967).

administration of NYS. The management is headed by a Director-General (DG), who is appointed by the Cabinet Secretary. The Director-General is responsible for the overall management and administration of the Service.

1743. The Council oversees the management and operations of the NYS, ensuring that it complies with relevant laws and regulations. The management is responsible for the day-to-day operations of NYS. The Director-General provides stewardship to the management team. NYS is structured into various directorates, departments and divisions.
1744. The Service grading structure ranges from PG15 for Office Assistant/Private, which is the lowest grade in the Career Development Career guidelines, to PG15 for Chief Executive Officer/Director-General.
1745. The core directorates within NYS are: paramilitary and national service, technical vocational training, commercialisation and enterprise development, and corporate services. The key departments in the Service are: strategy, planning and delivery; corporation secretary and legal services; supply chain management; and internal audit. The internal auditor reports functionally to the Council and administratively to the DG.
1746. The corruption crisis of 2018 led to changes in the governance structure of the Service as well as the appointment of new leadership. The Taskforce notes that there has been a recent change in the top leadership of the Service following the departure of the Director-General.

20.2 Historical background

1747. In September 1964, NYS was established as part of the transition process in Kenya from a colony to a nation-state. NYS was meant to support and resettle young Kenyans who had been disadvantaged in the struggle for independence. NYS was further charged with the responsibility of training young men and women to serve the nation, deploying them in tasks of national importance. In 1967, Parliament enacted the NYS Act (Cap. 208, now repealed) to govern the Service.
1748. Since inception, NYS has been domiciled in eight different ministries, thus denying it a sense of permanence in its governance. Between 1964 and 1979, NYS was under the Ministry of Labour before being moved to the Office of the President from 1979 to 1982. From 1982 to 1983, NYS was placed under the Ministry of Regional Development, and then moved back to the Office of the President for 20 years. Following the re-organisation of government in 2003, NYS was placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs for three years, and later moved to the then newly created Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports in 2006. In the 2013 re-organisation of government, NYS was placed under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning and later in the Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender in November 2015.
1749. The inclusion of the disadvantaged or disenfranchised youth remains a driving philosophy for the Service. In this regard, the Service has over the years provided opportunities for training, skills development, and employment for youth who do not transit to higher education. The role of the Service was, and remains, to re-socialise and empower, through various forms of training, such youth through its programmes. Such youth have and continue to be engaged in various projects, especially those that are of too large a scale for communities to handle on a self-help basis.
1750. A key innovative feature of NYS at inception was the adoption of paramilitary training needed to instil a high level of discipline and character development among a large body of the nation's men and women. In this regard, a military type of discipline was instilled for cohesion, peace, and productivity. This aspect of discipline, coupled with skills development and volunteerism associated with the Service, contributes to enhancing the capabilities of NYS graduates thereby making them preferred in the job market.

1751. Fifty (50) years after its establishment, with a burgeoning population consisting of a bulging 65 per cent youth, the Government restructured the NYS in 2014 and rebranded it with the objective of championing transformative youth empowerment in the country.
1752. Consequently, the Five-Point Vision strategic blueprint was developed to provide direction in the implementation of strategies and projects geared towards the realisation of the new Vision. The Vision for NYS became to “*Catalyse Transformative Youth Empowerment in Kenya.*” The Service was subsequently restructured within the five-pillar framework. The first four pillars involve programme restructuring while the fifth focuses on institutional restructuring and sustainability.
1753. The NYS Act, 2018, provides for Service members to be deployed to serve with the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) or in the defence of the nation within or without Kenya in times of emergency. Further, the Act also allows for the National Police Service to engage the services of NYS members in events as may be required.

Findings of the Taskforce on leadership and management

1754. NYS was initially founded to reintegrate the youth who were involved in the fight for independence. The reintegration was done through paramilitary training which instilled discipline for national service, obedience, patriotism, and a moral compass for character development. The Taskforce notes that the major focus of the Service was to provide skills through vocational training and empowerment of Kenyan youth to enable them to earn a living so that they could play their rightful and meaningful role in the country’s development. Underpinning its creation was the idea that youth can be mobilised to undertake programmes of great significance across the country. Additionally, members of the Service could be called upon in times of war and national emergencies to support the military as well as the police.
1755. Over the years, however, NYS has faced a number of challenges that have constrained the achievement of its founding vision. These setbacks and challenges have diminished the institution’s ability to achieve its expected potential. This national institution can be transformed to play its rightful role as the vehicle for the empowerment of youth through skills development and discipline if its challenges are addressed.

Addressing endemic corruption

1756. Corruption is one of the greatest challenges the Service has faced in the recent times. The Service was rocked by two major corruption scandals: one in 2015 and another in 2018. In the scandals, the public lost billions of shillings through the special cohorts’ project that was ostensibly aimed at engaging thousands of youth in the slums upgrading project as part of their empowerment and national service. Needless to say, those scandals greatly dented the image and credibility of the Service.
1757. It is these scandals that precipitated the restructuring and change of the Service from a government department to a Semi-Autonomous Government Agency (SAGA), and the establishment of the NYS Council. These changes were meant to restore the institution’s credibility and also provide a measure of oversight over its operations. The new Council and the NYS senior leadership have since made efforts to change the image of Service.
1758. Despite these changes, the Taskforce surmised that the intended purpose has not been achieved. There are widespread allegations that corruption has permeated every aspect of the institution, from recruitment to postings. The Taskforce received submissions from various cadres of staff that corruption continues to undermine transformation efforts at NYS. The poor state of NYS farms and equipment is not just a result of limited budgetary support but also the product of systemic corruption over the years. It was alleged that NYS has often been treated as a cash cow for well-connected politicians and senior government officials.

1759. The Task Force notes that overall, laws, policies, guidelines and procedures are in place for addressing corruption in all public institutions, including the NYS. However, there is little evidence in terms of results. It is clear that the only way to address the entrenched scourge of corruption is for the leadership to take responsibility in implementation.

Poor articulation of NYS mission and values

1760. Although NYS is an old institution that recruits nationally, the Service is not well understood across the country. Where it is known, its mission and values are not common public knowledge. A majority of Kenyans see it as a job opportunity or training programme for employment by the government. This explains why there is widespread frustration that the government does not offer NYS graduates job opportunities.
1761. The institutional mission of the NYS to empower young people to play a role in the development of the country remains poorly communicated. Internally, the institution appears torn between moving towards a largely paramilitary security institution and meeting its other objectives of skills building for the youth. The Service is also struggling to find its footing in enterprise development, which would support its operations.
1762. Clarity over which direction the Service ought to take is urgently needed, particularly given its transition in 2018 to a body corporate that is expected to generate its own revenue.

Political interference

1763. Since its establishment, the NYS has been domiciled in eight different ministries. The Taskforce was informed that these movements are partly linked to the long-running practice of using NYS as a cash cow and conduit for funds by senior government officials and politicians. This has left the NYS leadership vulnerable to external interference and manipulation in the institution's affairs, with little regard for professionalism and expertise. This is not consistent with the status of NYS as a paramilitary command structured institution.
1764. The NYS Act, 2018, sought to address the institution's governance challenge by creating a Council that would insulate the Director-General and the secretariat from political interference.
1765. The Taskforce is of the view that the transformation of the NYS hinges on the effective leadership of a visionary Council and a competent and effective Director-General.

Leadership of the Service

1766. The NYS Act, 2018, requires that the President appoints the DG on recommendations of the Council. However, the Act is silent on the procedure for determining the nominees for the position of DG.
1767. It is critical to note that the Service is not entirely about training and instilling discipline. Under the Act, NYS' focus is commercial enterprise and vocational training. These are diverse areas that require highly competent, capable, and transformational leadership. The commercial enterprise nature of the Service is meant to enable it to raise its own funds to finance its activities and reduce dependence on the National Treasury.
1768. Given the soaring unemployment rates in the country, it is common knowledge that that the nation faces a serious challenge of providing for the youth bulge. The youth (18- 35 years) constitute about 13,777,600 of the total population,¹⁹ with the balance of over 20 million children certain to join their ranks every year. About 900,000 students sit the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCPE) annually, with only about 180,000 of them

¹⁹ Ndungu, T. (2023) *Out of 47.6 million Kenyans, 35.7 million are under the age of 35*, *Citizen Digital*. Available at: <https://www.citizen.digital/news/out-of-47-6-million-kenyans-35-7-million-are-under-the-age-of-35-323822> (Accessed: 30 June 2023).

joining universities and tertiary colleges.²⁰ This is besides the nearly 200,000 who graduate from universities and tertiary colleges every year²¹

1769. The National Youth Service was set up to address the plight of Kenya's youth when their initial numbers were much lower than is currently the case. The role of NYS is, through paramilitary training, to discipline and instil in the youth national values such as patriotism, loyalty and integrity, and to enable them to effectively discharge national duties like disaster management and to support the military as well as the police in the defence of the nation in times of war and national emergencies. Through vocational training and personal development programmes, NYS is also tasked with equipping Kenyan youth with masonry, plumbing, electrical engineering, plant operation, plant mechanics, driving, supply chain management, catering and other skills to enable them to undertake enterprises and commercial activities to individually earn a living and contribute to national development.
1770. During its field visits, the Taskforce received earnest pleas from the public, and parents in particular, to set up NYS training institutions in every county to provide opportunities for youth to train. The President has urged NYS to admit at least 100,000 youth every year in an attempt to address these pleas.
1771. The National Youth Service Act, 2018, transformed the Service from a State Department to a parastatal organisation to ensure sustainability of its operations and harness resources required to carry out its momentous responsibility. The objective of this change was to enable NYS to undertake commercial activities to generate the bulk of the funds required to finance its activities and programmes.

Recommendations

Council leadership

1772. The legislative changes and new expectations placed on NYS should be complemented by a competent and versatile leadership that possesses uncompromising integrity in order to steer the Service from its past and current challenges to ensure its sustainability and the expansion of its reach and activities. In the circumstances, the Taskforce recommends the following changes to the NYS Council:
 - (a) A reconstitution of the current non-executive Council of NYS to comprise the Chairperson with the following qualifications and attributes: a citizen of Kenya; holds a degree from a university recognised in Kenya; has at least 15 years' experience in and the respective profession; has at least 10 years' experience in a managerial position, either in the public or private sector; and meets the requirements of leadership and integrity in Chapter Six of the Constitution;
 - (b) A reconstitution of the six members of the Council with the following qualifications and attributes: citizens of Kenya; holders of degrees from universities recognised in Kenya; have at least 10 years' experience in their respective professions; have at least 10 years' experience in a managerial position, either in the public or private sector; or those with distinguished service experience relevant to NYS of not less than 20 years; and meet the requirements of leadership and integrity in Chapter Six of the Constitution;

²⁰ @Educationnewshub.co.ke, M.T. (2023) 2022 KCSE results statistics analysis; must know, Educationnewshub.co.ke. Available at: <https://educationnewshub.co.ke/2022-kcse-results-statistics-analysis-must-know/> (Accessed: 30 June 2023).

²¹ Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2023 and 24 – 2025 and 26, 2022 Education Sector Report December 2022 12 and 6 and 2022 by Ministry of Education Sector Working Group.

- (c) The NYS Act should be amended to provide that the Chairperson and members of the NYS Council be recruited through a competitive process by a selection panel constituted by the President for that purpose; and
 - (d) The other members of the Council shall be: the Principal Secretary for the National Treasury, the Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for the Service; the Director-General who shall be the Secretary to the Council; the Chief of Defence Forces; and the Inspector-General of Police, or their representatives.
1773. Given the importance of the Service, and in order to attract competent persons, the chairperson and members shall each be paid a competitive retainer and sitting allowance determined by the Cabinet Secretary responsible for the Service in consultation with the Salaries and Remuneration Commission.

Management of the NYS

1774. The management of NYS (led by the Director-General and Deputy Directors-General) will oversee the day-to-day administration and operations of the Service. This will not only entail paramilitary and vocational training but also include running the investment portfolio of the Service in order to turn it into a self-sustaining national institution. The management, therefore, should be composed of capable persons who will offer technical leadership and guidance.
1775. The Taskforce recommends that the NYS Act 2018 be amended to provide that in addition to the Director-General, two Deputy Directors-General -- one in charge of the technical division (paramilitary training) and another in charge of the commercial investments and vocational training at NYS be appointed. The Taskforce makes the following further recommendations:
- (a) The Director-General shall have the following qualifications and attributes: a citizen of Kenya; holds a degree from a university recognised in Kenya; has at least 15 years' experience with distinguished service in a business-related field; has at least 10 years' experience in a managerial position, either in the public or private sector; and meets the requirements of leadership and integrity in Chapter Six of the Constitution;
 - (b) The Deputy Director-General in charge of the corporate division shall be a citizen of Kenya; holds a degree from a university recognised in Kenya; has at least 15 years' experience with distinguished service in a business-related field; is a member of relevant professional body; has at least five years' experience in a managerial position, either in the public or private sector; and meets the requirements of leadership and integrity in Chapter Six of the Constitution;
 - (c) The Deputy Director-General in charge of the technical division shall be a citizen of Kenya; holds a degree from a university recognised in Kenya; has at least 10 years' experience in a leadership position in the Service; and meets the requirements of leadership and integrity in Chapter Six of the Constitution; and
 - (d) The DG and the two Deputy Directors-General shall be competitively recruited by the Council.
1776. The Taskforce notes that the leadership of NYS has always been sourced from outside the Service. During its deliberations with internal stakeholders, the Taskforce noted that this practice was responsible for low morale among serving officers of the Service.
1777. From 2003 to 2013, the Director-General was Japhet K Mwania, CBS, from Kenya Police Service; Jasper K Rugutt, EBS, from National Government Administration and a former Provincial Commissioner, led the Service from 2013 to 2014. Dr Nelson Githinji, CBS, was recruited from the private sector and led the Service from 2014 to 2016; Dr Richard Ndubai, CBS, from the public service, led the Service from 2016 to 2018 while Matilda Sakwa, EBS,

from the National Government Administration and a former County Commissioner, led the Service from 2018 to 2023. All the Director-Generals between 2003 and 2023 have come from outside NYS.

Table 20. 1: NYS Director General since 2003

S/No.	Name	Year	Remark
1	Japhet K Mwanja, C.B.S.	2003 to 2013	Kenya Police Service
2	Jasper K Rugutt, E.B.S.	2013 to 2014	National Government Administration (Former Provincial Commissioner)
3	Dr Nelson Githinji, C.B.S.	2014 to 2016	Corporate (Private Sector)
4	Dr Richard Ndubai, C.B.S.	2016 to 2018	Public Service
5	Matilda Sakwa, E.B.S.	2018 to 2023	National Government Administration (Former County Commissioner)

Source: NYS

1778. The Taskforce therefore recommends that the Deputy Director-General in charge of the technical division should be recruited competitively from within the Service. This will raise the morale of the officers in the Service and also ensure that there is a possibility of an NYS leadership that is conversant with the complexities of the Service. The Deputy Director-General in charge of the corporate division should be recruited externally from the open market.
1779. Under the NYS Act, it appears that the Service is supposed to be converted from a government department to a parastatal to enable it generate revenue to fund some of its activities. The Taskforce has, however, been informed that this provision has never been implemented. Given its functions and the Taskforce's recommendation that the NYS be moved to the Security and Disciplined Services Sector, the Taskforce recommends that the Service be established as a Semi-Autonomous Government Agency.
1780. The itinerant domicile of NYS over the years partly results from political interference in the affairs of the Service. The Taskforce notes that the movement of the Service from one ministry to another without a clear policy justification has created a pattern of disruption of institutional policies, and even the leadership of the Service. Given the functions the Service is called upon to perform, the Taskforce recommends that NYS be domiciled in the Ministry of Interior and National Administration. As such, section 2 of the NYS Act should be appropriately amended.
1781. The NYS Act of 2018 does not clearly provide for the separation of functions between the NYS Council and the Office of the Director-General. The Taskforce notes that in a number of instances, the functions of the DG and those of the Council seem to overlap, thereby creating confusion in the leadership and management of the Service. In the circumstances, the Taskforce recommends the amendment of section 12 (1) (b) of the NYS Act to read "receive and direct action" on reports in order to address the confusion of roles between the Council and the Director-General.
1782. With regard to the staff establishment, the Taskforce has noted that NYS has vacant positions in all its ranks, except for the position of Director-General. While this implies that there is room for promotion of officers to higher grades, the unfilled positions at the higher ranks in the Service may lead to inefficient decision making since the office holders could be operating

in an acting capacity, or the functions of these positions have been relegated to lower cadres. There is no officer in post at the level of Director in the NYS. This creates a succession planning challenge in the institution.

Table 20. 2: Uniformed officers' establishment in the NYS

S/No.	Current Rank Structure	PG	STAFF ESTABLISHMENT				
			Authorised Establishment	In Post		Variance	% Variance per cent
1	Director-General	15	1	1	0	0	0
2	Deputy Director-General	14	4	2	2	-2	50
3	Director	13	6	0	6	-6	100
4	Senior Deputy Director	12	7	3	4	-4	57
5	Deputy Director	11	11	8	3	-3	27
6	Senior Assistant Director	10	20	16	4	-4	20
7	Assistant Director	9	40	30	10	-10	25
8	Senior Superintendent	8	50	36	14	-14	28
9	Superintendent	7	80	75	5	-5	6
10	Chief Inspector	6	170	112	58	-58	34
11	Inspector	5	230	225	5	-5	2
12	Senior Sergeant	4	336	147	189	-189	56
13	Sergeant	3	502	268	234	-234	46
14	Corporal	2	724	454	270	-270	37
15	Private	1	1037	428	609	-609	58
Total			3218	1805	1413	-1413	

Source: NYS

Other recommendations

1783. The NYS Act was enacted to restructure the Service in the aftermath of the 2018 corruption scandal. However, the Act requires a number of specific amendments to streamline the management and leadership of the Service. The Taskforce makes the following specific recommendations:

- Amend section 2 of the Act on definition of Cabinet Secretary to read: *Cabinet Secretary means "the Cabinet Secretary responsible for Internal Security"*.
- Amend section 20 by including a sub-section on expiry of the term of the holder of the Office of DG.
- The tenure of the DG and the Deputy DGs shall be a term of five years, renewable once based on performance.

20.3 The legal standing of servicemen and women

1784. The Taskforce was required to review and recommend improvement of the terms and conditions of service for the members of the three Services. It was also required to review the terms of service and make recommendations on reforms thereto. The Taskforce was further required to review the Human Capital Management and Development, focusing on deployment, recruitment, transfers, career progression, training, performance management, reward, promotions, exit, and post-exit management.

1785. The Taskforce has had no challenge in fulfilling these terms of reference with regard to NPS and KPS. However, when it comes to NYS, there was lack of clarity because its members fall in various categories, and not all members of NYS are employees of the Service. In NYS, there are recruits, servicemen and women, officers of the Service, and non-uniformed staff - all often referred to as members of the Service.

1786. Upon enlistment into the Service, as is clear from sections 23 and 7 of the NYS Act, 2018, the recruits become members of the Service. When they complete paramilitary training, they are deployed for national service and resocialisation as servicemen and servicewomen.

Thereafter, they transit to technical and vocational training. After completing the technical and vocations training, the servicemen and women are eligible for discharge from the Service, where they cease to be members.

1787. It is the servicemen and women, together with the NYS officers, who are regularly called upon to assist NPS and KDF in joint operations and are potential members of the KDF reserve.
1788. From the terms of reference, as captured earlier, it would appear that the focus of this Taskforce should be on the officers and the staff of the Service.
1789. However, the servicemen and women are the core, and largest, component of the National Youth Service. Despite the foregoing, their status is not clear under the NYS Act, 2018. While this group forms the largest component of the Service, their rights, duties, responsibilities and relation with the NYS seem to have been omitted from the Act.
1790. From section 2 of the NYS Act, 2018, it is unclear whether or not servicemen and women form part of the membership of the Service. The law does not define servicemen and women, and the ranks prescribed in the Act do not include them. The previous Act defined servicemen and women (referred to as under-officers in the Act). Consequently, it becomes difficult to develop policies and practices that speak to their allowances and salaries, recruitment, housing, medical scheme, compensation, the general working conditions, terms of service, and operational capacity.
1791. It would then appear that this group of individuals in the Service does not have legal standing to be associated with the Service. Yet it is especially clear that the said servicemen and women are the ones deployed for almost all NYS activities, including potential deployment to KDF and NPS operations when needed.
1792. During the public hearings, citizens submitted views on NYS from the understanding that the Service is synonymous with volunteers. The servicemen and women are an integral part of the Service and not just the officers and staff of the Service. It is the understanding of the Taskforce that one becomes a member of the Service after completing NYS paramilitary training.

Recommendations

1793. The Taskforce has found that the legal standing of the servicemen and women is not clearly spelt out in the Act. This has exposed the servicemen and women to severe prejudice given the nature of work they do and the operations they undertake together with other security agencies. As a result, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) The NYS Council should champion the amendment of the First Schedule of the Act to include Part I for the officers of the Service and Part II to provide for the servicemen and women and their ranking structure;
 - (b) Provide that recruits and servicemen and women are members of the Service;
 - (c) Clarify through amendment of the Act that the persons who can serve as reserve for KDF and NPS are those who have undertaken paramilitary training; and
 - (d) Amendment of the Act to state that save for the Director-General and Deputy Director-General (Corporate), all other officers must be recruited from among individuals who are or and have previously undergone the NYS paramilitary training.

CHAPTER TWENTY ONE: HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

21.1 Introduction

1794. The Taskforce was required to review human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in recruitment, deployment, transfers, training, career progression, performance-based and competitive promotions, reward, exit, and post-exit management; and to recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy, professionalism and retention in the National Youth Service.
1795. Article 10 of the Constitution espouses national values and principles of governance, while Article 232 on Values and Principles of Public Service obligates NYS to maintain and demonstrate the highest standards of professionalism and discipline, uphold integrity, and promote and practice transparency and accountability.
1796. NYS is, therefore, expected to comply with constitutional standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and ensure that its members are trained to the highest possible standards of competence and integrity, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and dignity. NYS is further expected to foster and promote relationships with the broader society.
1797. The Taskforce visited all NYS stations and field units, listened to officers and servicemen and women, and gathered public and stakeholder views and memoranda regarding the NYS. The issues raised can be categorised into the following thematic areas: Recruitment, Deployment, Transfers, Training, Scheme of Service (Career Progression), Competitive promotions, Reward, and Exit and Post-exit management.
1798. As noted in the previous chapter, NYS has vacancies across its cadres and its current actual strength is less than 33 per cent of its authorised establishment, which hinders efficient service delivery. There are shortages in various critical decision-making positions such as the Deputy Principals who are crucial in the running of the training institutions. There is also an observed lack of staff in the lower levels where positions are authorised but there are no in-post officers. It would be imperative to analyse the impact of this situation so as to determine if the numbers are required or they need to be abolished. The current staff establishment and strength can only support **3,000** servicemen and women.

21.2 Recruitment

Current context and practice

1799. Recruitment is the process of identifying, sourcing, interviewing and on-boarding candidates for a specific position or job. The definition of recruitment includes the entire hiring process, from inception to the individual recruit's integration into Service.
1800. In NYS, the recruitment process is threefold: recruitment of trainees to serve as servicemen and women; recruitment of officers; and recruitment of other NYS staff. Recruiting servicemen and women is the base starting point since officers who are recruited into the Service come from among the trainees.
1801. The recruitment process for the officers and staff is guided by the NYS Human Resource Manual, 2019. The manual provides that before sourcing recruits from outside the Service, consideration should always be given to promoting candidates from within the Service for Grade NYS 7 to NYS 15 so as to meet the employee career growth expectations.
1802. However, senior posts in Grades NYS 1 to NYS 5 are advertised externally in an open, competitive, fair and merit-based process. Even with the requirement for external advertisement, the Service must explore whether there are suitable persons within it who can

be promoted to fill senior positions. The Service may use the services of employment agencies when hiring suitable candidates.

1803. The Taskforce was mandated to review the human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in recruitment and recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in NYS.
1804. Further, the Taskforce was required to recommend review of remuneration for members of NYS and consideration of new and applicable allowances to NYS to enhance professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness of the Service.
1805. An examination of recruitment and exit data between 2012 and 2023 reveals that NYS has a recruitment rate of 2 per cent against its authorised establishment, while its exit rate against its authorised establishment is 1.2 per cent. The data show a significant variation in recruitment and exit patterns over the years. From 2012 to 2020 and to 2022, there were no recorded recruitments, while exits steadily occurred from 2015 to 2022. Starting from 2015, the Service witnessed an uptick in exits, reaching a peak of 62 officers in 2022. The year 2021 stood out for recruitment, with 728 officers joining the Service. The average annual number of recruitments and exits over this period is 66 and 40, respectively.

Table 21. 1: NYS trends in uniformed officers' recruitment and exit, 2012 - 2023

Year	Total Recruitment	Total Exits	Recruitment Against Authorised Establishment (percentage)	Exits Against Authorised Establishment (percentage)	Uniformed Officers Recruitment Cycle
2012	0		2.0%	1.2%	2 years
2013	0				
2014	0				
2015	0	14			
2016	0	49			
2017	0	40			
2018	0	23			
2019	0	48			
2020	0	61			
2021	728	26			
2022	0	62			
Average	66	40			

Source: NYS

Public and stakeholder views

1806. During the public hearings, many parents informed the Taskforce that they are not keen to have their sons and daughters recruited as NYS servicemen and women. This is largely because there seems to be no exit plan after training, and some of the ex-servicemen and women have gone back home and are not meaningfully engaged.
1807. Moreover, it was submitted that for those who may want their children join the Service, the recruitment is often opaque; it is not properly advertised and many people miss out on the opportunity. It was submitted that recruitment of servicemen and women is not properly advertised for the public.
1808. Further, the public submitted that currently, the recruitment of servicemen and women is not conducted in a transparent manner and is shrouded in corruption and bribery, where vacancies are 'sold' to the highest bidders.
1809. The members of the Service submitted that the recruitment process is dehumanising and that it strips them of their dignity owing to the intrusive medical tests conducted on them.
1810. Further, some parts of the country like Garissa, Wajir and Mandera noted that the minimum entry grades were too high as most of the youth from these areas have attained only the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) certificate. They proposed that the entry grade for these servicemen and women as well as officers be lowered to allow people from these regions to join the institution and study courses that do not require secondary education.
1811. Members of the public further expressed the view that they do not have sufficient information about the true purpose of NYS. Some of them termed the service as a rehabilitation centre.

Findings

1812. The Government's top agenda concerns the youth, and this explains the many initiatives that have been put in place to address unemployment and empowerment, which include Kazi kwa Vijana, Kazi Mtaani, and the Youth Enterprise Fund, among others. NYS plays a key role as an agent in driving this agenda for the government through training. The labour market demands a focused and disciplined workforce at any given time, not forgetting being patriotic, loyal, obedient, and commitment to duty, among others.
1813. Bearing in mind these market demands, the Taskforce observed that the most recurrent concerns raised were that recruitment for members of NYS is often not sufficiently publicised, is marred with corruption, and is conducted in a humiliating manner.
1814. However, the Taskforce noted that the recruitment of the members of the Service is published as per the law, including advertisement in newspapers of nationwide circulation.
1815. The Taskforce found that in some parts of the country, particularly the North Eastern region, NYS is not considered lucrative, hence people hardly clamour to join it at all levels. The brand of NYS in those places is associated with spades, which signal manual labour and are considered demeaning within these communities.
1816. Moreover, even for people who wish to join the Service, it is difficult to access the advertisement as it is only made through the print media. Majority of people in rural areas do not have access to, or even read newspapers due to low literacy levels and cost considerations. As a result, many proposed that vacancy advertisements be made through other channels such as local language radio stations to increase coverage of NYS activities and recruitment news for members of the Service. Further, the public suggested the use of National Government Administration officers to circulate the said information, although there were some reservations that this could breed corruption and cronyism.

1817. The Taskforce also found that the literacy levels in some regions of the country, such as North Eastern, are low. Given that most youth are KCPE certificate holders, they are often barred from joining the Service as servicemen and women yet they can benefit from some of the vocational training that does not require secondary education.

Recommendations

1818. Having analysed the views from the public and stakeholders, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) Aware of the government's 100 per cent transition policy from primary to secondary level education, the Taskforce recommends that NYS recruits should have, at a minimum, a secondary school leaving certificate;
 - (b) NYS should develop and restructure courses for various grades and qualifications, including basic skills courses for those whose KCSE grades may not qualify them for other higher courses;
 - (c) Aware of the constitutional requirement for inclusion, the Taskforce recommends that NYS develops and implements affirmative action policies to ensure equitable recruitment of servicemen and women, including from marginalised areas, communities, and groups;
 - (d) To deal with corruption, more so in the recruitment of privates, NYS should publicise recruitment in all media, including community radio stations, religious institutions, social media and through National Government Administration officers, and reduce human interaction in the recruitment process. NYS should embrace technology, which would entail an online application followed by the publication of shortlisted candidates, conduct of physical interviews at sub-county level and publication of the names of the successful recruits;
 - (e) Recruit and build the capacity of healthcare workers who will be embedded in the various units within the Service;
 - (f) Professionalise human resource management and development in NYS and fully automate and digitize all HR functions;
 - (g) Recruit NYS officers from among ex-servicemen and women; and
 - (h) Establish a cross-functional management committee at the NYS Council to aid in the implementation of the afore-mentioned recommendations.

21.3 Deployment and transfers

Current context and practice

1819. The Taskforce was mandated to review human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in deployment and transfers with a view to recommending implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in NYS.
1820. As earlier observed, deployment is the temporary movement of an officer from one station to another to undertake a specific assignment for a period not exceeding three months and in which the pay point remains the original station where the officer was initially posted prior to the deployment. Deployment in NYS may include 'operational deployment' where the Service has been seconded to other security agencies to provide specific services. On the other hand, "transfer" is the relocation of an officer from their current duty station to a new one, and matters relating to the officer including the pay point, are moved to the new duty station. Further, the Public Service Commission Act defines "transfer" as the deployment of an officer

from one ministry to another or from one duty station to another. Servicemen and women may only be deployed within the Service.

1821. Clause 46 of the NYS Standing Orders provides that the responsibility for deployment and transfer of members of the Service lies with the Director-General, who may delegate this function to another office holder.
1822. For effective service delivery, the Director-General deploys members of the Service to field stations, headquarters, regional offices and the NYS training institutions. The number of members of the Service deployed per station depends on the workload at each facility. Under the NYS Act, section 12(d) requires the NYS Council to direct and oversee the deployment of members of the Service.

Submissions by officers, stakeholders and the public

1823. Officers submitted that in several instances, they are transferred but not paid a transfer allowance. While senior commanders acknowledged this challenge, they posited that officers sometimes fail to tender sufficient documentation, or there are instances where there are no resources to facilitate the payment of transfer allowances. The senior commanders also blamed the non-payment challenge on lack of awareness on how to access transfer allowances. It is also noted that the policy of the institution precludes payment of allowances for transfers within a radius of 40 kilometres of the former duty station.
1824. It was also submitted that lack of clear policy guidelines has seen some officers deployed in hardship areas staying there for extended periods. Whereas section 48 of the Service Standing Orders provides for a maximum of five years' stay in a hardship area, officers submitted that some of them have been in such areas way beyond the five years prescribed or have in some instances transferred from one hardship area to another.
1825. Officers further submitted that some units had bloated staff while in other units, the numbers were dismal even when they should be much higher.
1826. The Taskforce also observed that most transfers, depending on the regions, are used as a tool for disciplinary action or reward against officers.
1827. Further, it was submitted that transfers and deployments were disruptive as they affected the ordinary course of lives for officers and their families, for instance, when transfers are effected in the middle of the school calendars and officers must relocate with their families.

Findings

1828. A cursory view of the issues raised demonstrates that deployments and transfers are used for disciplinary action or reward, which is against the sacrosanct principles of human resource management. Some regions such as North Eastern and Lower Eastern are considered hardship areas, where very few officers would readily want to work given the harsh climatic conditions, poor roads network, and lack of accessible basic amenities. Therefore, officers posted to these areas felt that they were sent there for disciplinary reasons.
1829. Further, the Taskforce found that despite the NYS Standing Orders expressly providing for the maximum period an officer can remain in a hardship area, some officers had been in such areas for more than 10 years, which affects their morale and productivity.

Recommendations

1830. Having analysed the issues, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) The Service Standing Orders should be reviewed and adhered to with regard to deployment and transfer of members of the Service;

- (b) The Service should develop clear guidelines on deployment to ensure that officers are deployed as per their competencies and skills;
- (c) An audit should be carried out to identify officers who have overstayed in their areas of deployment and appropriate recourse take ;
- (d) Transfer of officers from one operation or and hardship area to another operation or and hardship area should be abolished; and
- (e) The NYS Council should liaise with the Public Service Commission to review the Service policy on classification of hardship areas.

21.4 Career progression and Schemes of Service

Current situation, practice and policy

- 1831. Career progression provides a mechanism for members to advance their career creates a positive work environment and boosts morale and organisational behaviour. An effective career progression system has great potential to boost productivity.
- 1832. The NYS Career Progression Guidelines became operational from May 2019. The Guidelines are administered by the Director-General in consultation with the NYS Council. They provide for clear and concise job descriptions and specifications at all levels within the grading structure.
- 1833. The aims and objectives of the Guidelines, formerly known as Schemes of Service, are to provide a well-defined career structure and motivate the officers and staff, provide clearly defined job descriptions and specifications, delineating duties and responsibilities at all levels within the career structure to enable officers and staff to understand the requirements and demands of their jobs. The Guidelines also establish standards for recruitment, training and advancement within the career structure on the basis of qualifications, knowledge of the job, merit and ability as reflected in work performance and results. The Career Progression Guidelines ensure appropriate career planning and succession management.
- 1834. The Taskforce was mandated to review the human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in career progression, and recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in the Service. Resultantly, the following are the views collected from members of the public and stakeholders.
- 1835. There are three entry points into the Service, namely: Volunteer servicemen/ women, Private, and Cadet Inspector. Cadet Inspector positions are filled by essential professional fields that do not exist in the uniformed officers' establishment and they (Cadet Inspectors) can rise up to the rank of "Director" and serve as heads of Department or sections in their respective professional fields. The Guidelines provide that one must have entered NYS at the rank of Private in order to be appointed Director-General. This provision is meant to be a motivational factor as well as ensuring that the Director-General has all the technical and service knowledge required to effectively run the Service.
- 1836. However, the NYS Act provides details of entry requirements. (See Annex for entry requirements for each position in the Service).
- 1837. Data between 2012 and 2023 show that there were no promotions in the NYS between 2012 and 2016. However, from 2017, there was a resurgence of promotions with a significant peak in 2021 of 777 officers, and an average annual promotion of 131 officers.

Table 21. 2: NYS trends in uniformed officers' promotions 2012 - 2023

Year	Total Promotions	Promotion Rate against Authorised Establishment	Exit Rate against Authorised Establishment	Promotion Cycle Per Rank to Avoid Stagnation
2012	0	4%	1.2%	3.3 years
2013	0			
2014	0			
2015	0			
2016	0			
2017	208			
2018	02			
2019	03			
2020	71			
2021	777			
2022	390			
Average	131			

Source: National Youth Service

Officers, stakeholders and public views

1838. It was submitted that NYS officers and staff suffer career stagnation. Some officers remain in one rank for more than 10 years. In some cases, officers retire in the lowest rank in the Service. The Taskforce found that some officers with clean service records and the required training had still stagnated in one rank for many years.
1839. The officers and staff further submitted that there is no predictability with regard to promotions and other rewards. They stated that even officers who have progressed in their studies have no opportunity of getting promoted.
1840. The Taskforce was further informed that officers' promotions to the next rank were often not based on skills, merit, or academic qualifications. Promotions were often based on cronyism and connections with the top commanders.
1841. The Taskforce was also informed that the ranks of Inspector and Senior Sergeant are in the same Job Group 'J', yet they have different responsibilities. Likewise, the ranks of Chief Inspector and Superintendent are in the same job group. The officers noted that this anomaly may breed command structure issues in a disciplined service.
1842. It was generally submitted by officers that the majority of promotions in the National Youth Service are marred with corruption, bias, nepotism, tribalism and sexual favours.

Findings

1843. As highlighted, the Taskforce observed that the primary challenge in the Service is officers' stagnation in rank. The lack of predictability in promotions was blamed on fewer slots in the higher ranks, hence officers remaining in the lower ranks for long periods despite qualifying for promotions.
1844. Further, the Taskforce found that some ranks, like that of Inspector and Senior Sergeant, as well as Chief Inspector and Superintendent, are in one job group despite performing different functions. This raises issues of command and control within the Service.
1845. The Taskforce further notes that there is career stagnation within the Service, where officers serve more than 10 years within the lowest ranks.

Recommendations

1846. A professional and motivated NYS should be based on a clear career progression and advancement path that takes into consideration factors such as competence, integrity, relevant qualifications, skills and experience. The Taskforce established that the stagnation of junior officers in one rank, in many cases until retirement, is the source of widespread discontent and low morale in the Service. Given the earlier recommendation that those entering the Service with KCSE certificates should be capped at Senior Sergeant, the Taskforce recommends:
- (a) The establishment of grades between the ranks of Private and Corporal. Specifically, the grades should commence from Private III, II, and I, and Corporal III, II and I. The Salaries and Remuneration Commission should revise the current salary notches by harmonising the pay scales with these proposed grades;
 - (b) Promotions in common cadres in respect of the grades in (a) above should be on merit; and
 - (c) The NYS should amend the 2019 Career Guidelines to incorporate recommendations herein and implement them forthwith.

21.5 Rewards

Current situation, practice and policy

1847. A reward is a form of recognition given to an employee or officer who performs way above the call of duty. Whereas some officers perform the core minimum of what is expected, a number go out of their way to achieve their goals and better the Service. In such instances, the wider public service has put in place mechanisms to appreciate these efforts.
1848. The Taskforce was mandated to review the human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in rewards, and recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in the Service. Consequently, the following views were collected from the public and stakeholders.

Summary of officers', stakeholders' and public views

1849. The Service submitted that the current reward system is inefficient and ineffective. Apart from receiving the Certificate of Completion, newly appointed staff are appreciated through the following award categories during their period of training: best in drills, best in academics, best in sports, and best overall performance, which they feel are inadequate to appraise everyone in the Service.
1850. Officers decried the negative impact of the unsatisfactory rewards system on quality-of-service delivery. Further, the officers submitted that they had little or no information on how to enlist for national awards, which are issued by the Head of State.

Findings

1851. The Taskforce finds that the current reward system is inefficient and ineffective. There is no clear policy guideline on the manner of identifying and grading officers for rewards. As such, the reward scheme ends up demotivating officers rather than motivating them to provide exemplary services.

1852. Further, the Taskforce notes that it is evident that the lack of policy guidelines to govern reward systems has exposed the Service to untold prejudice and gaps, which can be exploited for corruption and favouritism.

Recommendations

1853. Having noted the issues arising from rewards, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) NYS should create a system for rewards and sanctions in the Service;
 - (b) The Service should support participation of its members in appropriate regional and international youth fora;
 - (c) Modalities for streamlining National Youth Service nomination for national awards should be introduced, with core consideration pegged on performance, competence and merit; and
 - (d) A standing committee on nominations should be established for an internal reward system, with representation from all units and stations across the Service.

21.6 Exit and post-exit management

Current situation, practice and policy

1854. Every employer must take measures to ensure the welfare of its employees during and after employment. Pursuant to that principle, the Service has developed a policy that guides exit and post-exit management. The NYS Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual of May 2019 provides for the following forms of exit: resignation, expiry of contract, retirement, termination in accordance with the terms of employment, dismissal, and death.
1855. The Government has also established the Public Service Superannuation Scheme for Civil Servants, Teaching Service and the Disciplined Services. It is a retirement benefits scheme under the Retirement Benefits Act, 1997. Currently, the Public Service Commission policies still apply to NYS.
1856. The Taskforce was mandated to review the human capital management and development policies with a view to examining and reviewing standards and practices in exit, and post-exit management and to recommend the implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in NYS.
1857. The Taskforce was also mandated to review reports of previous taskforces and committees with a view to gaining valuable lessons on the implementation of previous recommendations. In particular, the Taskforce analysed the findings and recommendations in the Report of the Presidential Committee on Review of Terms and Conditions of Service for the Kenya Police Force, the Administration Police Force, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service, December 1996 — August 1997.

Summary of officers', stakeholders and public views

1858. The officers submitted that the processing of terminal benefits is bureaucratic and tedious, which delays the payment of pension and lump sum gratuity. As a consequence, the payment system does not work in the favour of retirees, some of whom pass on before enjoying their benefits.
1859. Further, it was submitted that the processing of terminal dues is centralised, which is tedious to follow up, particularly for retirees from far-flung areas. Officers asked if it was possible to decentralise pension processes to the counties to make it convenient for them to follow up even after retirement.

1860. It was submitted that many NYS officers are not psychologically prepared for post-retirement life and are, therefore, not aware of any procedure on how to de-link themselves from the service in a humane manner.
1861. Further, the Taskforce was informed that the Service lacks a retirement policy that would provide pre-retirement training programmes to prepare officers for retirement in terms of time, financial and health management.
1862. With regard to servicemen and women, it was submitted that during the maximum five years in the Service, one earns a saving of KSh. 30,000 that is paid out at the time of exit. It is hoped that the NYS graduates would use this money as start-up capital for small and medium enterprises to earn a living. However, it was stated that the said sums are not sufficient to start any meaningful business. As a result, many graduates end up returning home with nothing to do.
1863. In this regard, it was proposed that strategies that will see the graduates use the savings prudently should be put in place, and this may include:
 - (a) The Government should match the savings on exit;
 - (b) Those with technical skills should be provided with a fully equipped toolbox in respect to their trade for self-employment; and
 - (c) Progressive enhancement of the 30 per cent employment quota policy into the disciplined services.

Findings

1864. The Taskforce finds that there is no procedure on how retired NYS officers are supposed to be delinked from the Service. They possess highly rated skills, but some retire at their peak in proficiency with no opportunity to put their skills to post-retirement use.
1865. Most officers expressed anxiety about frustrations in accessing their retirement benefits once they retire. The Taskforce found that quite a number of officers have died without accessing their benefits.
1866. Further, the Taskforce noted that dependants of officers who die in the line of duty or and during employment did not receive support from the Service to understand how to access benefits for their departed relatives.
1867. The Taskforce found that there is no policy in place to guide pre- and post-exit management of NYS officers in aspects such as the pension scheme and medical cover. Furthermore, the officers approaching retirement but still working in far-flung operation or hardship areas faced a challenge on reintegrating back into the community once they retired.
1868. The Taskforce found that entry into and exit from the NYS programme by the servicemen and women is fragmented. There is no data to manage the number of persons who have undertaken the NYS programme and their roles in society. Once a person leaves the programme, he or she is not documented and no follow-up is made to ensure use of the person's skills in society.
1869. Further, given that such persons have received paramilitary training, and the general level of unemployment, one cannot rule out some of them becoming security risks upon exit. The Taskforce also received reports of complaints about the illegal use of uniforms by ex-servicemen and women.

Recommendations

1870. Having considered the issues raised in the foregoing section, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) Mandatory pre-retirement seminars and workshops for all officers due for retirement should begin two years before retirement;
- (b) Officers with five (5) years or less to retirement should be posted to work within regions where they will eventually settle post-retirement;
- (c) The Service should appoint dedicated officers to assist in the timely processing of pensions for officers and to ensure that benefits are paid out within three months of exit;
- (d) The Service should commence the setting up of a contributory medical scheme to assist officers as they retire from the Service;
- (e) The Service should develop a policy to guide pre- and post-exit management of NYS officers;
- (f) The Service should automate HR processes pending which HR officers should be posted to NYS units and stations to hasten processes;
- (g) The Service should maintain and automate a database for and servicemen/women with their skills and competencies for ease of reach and contact; and(h) The Service should undertake market surveys for purposes of linking the skills of its servicemen/women to the market.

CHAPTER TWENTY TWO: REMUNERATION OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

22.1 Introduction

1871. The Taskforce was required to recommend review of remuneration for members of NYS and consideration of new and applicable allowances to enhance professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness.
1872. Before 2012, NYS was categorised in the same sector as NPS, KDF and KPS, in which all the Services' remuneration was harmonised. Since then, NYS has been isolated from the other disciplined services, and those serving in it have the lowest remuneration compared to the other agencies.
1873. As found in the Report of the Presidential Committee on Review of Terms and Conditions of Service for the Kenya Police Force, the Administration Police Force, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service, December 1996 — August 1997 (Kipng'eno Report), NYS is part of the Civil Service, hence officers and staff remuneration packages should be harmonised with those of the mainstream public sector. However, the last review of the Service's remuneration was conducted in 1990 by the Mbithi Salary Review Committee, whose findings do not reflect current economic realities.
1874. NYS is a unique institution in terms of the programmes and activities it undertakes, as demonstrated in the background section of this report. The Service is involved in almost all activities and programmes undertaken by the national and county governments.
1875. Proposals for remuneration increases ranging from **100** per cent to **250** per cent were, therefore, made to the Taskforce.
1876. The Taskforce has, however, considered these proposals, against other factors, which include:
 - (a) The country continues to face a challenging external and domestic environment. In addition to the Covid-19 pandemic, Kenya has over the past two years suffered a series of devastating negative and persistent shocks that include the worst drought in decades as well as the adverse spill-over from the conflict in Eastern Europe and tighter global financial market conditions;
 - (b) Extreme climate change events have emerged as key drivers of food insecurity and increased the cost of living. Indeed, many Kenyans are currently confronted with increasingly higher prices of basic commodities, especially food, energy and transport; and
 - (c) Ongoing government interventions that are aimed at providing short-term solutions to the high cost of living, which include duty waiver for importation of key food products such as white maize, rice, yellow maize, soya beans, soya bean meal, assorted protein concentrate, and feed additives, in order to bridge the food stocks deficit as well as lower and stabilise food prices.
1877. The Taskforce determined that its terms of reference to recommend a review of remuneration of uniformed members of NYS required it to address three issues:
 - (a) The system of remuneration and the need to establish an improved system for uniformed members of NYS;
 - (b) The review of the basic salary structure to address the poor salaries and working and living conditions of uniformed members of NYS; and
 - (c) The consideration of new and applicable allowances for NYS officers.

22.2 System of Remuneration

1878. The Taskforce notes that the Civil Service has for a long time used Job Groups in its grading, until 2019 when it converted to the Civil Service Grade (CSG). The Disciplined Services use Pay Grades (PG), while the Teaching Service was on job groups until recently when it converted to the T-Scale. While the Disciplined Services are delinked from the Civil Service Grades, the Pay Grades or Scale Rates are linked to the Civil Service Job Groups (e.g. U, T, S, R, P, N, M, L, K, J, H, G and F). The Job Groups are assigned to the KPS uniformed officers by the Public Service Commission in accordance with section 98 of the Public Service Commission Act, 2017. This means that uniformed members of KPS receive relatively the same basic salary as members of the Civil Service, regardless of the difference in their job descriptions, job specifications or roles and responsibilities, because they belong to the same job groups. The only exceptions to this are the police weighting and specific police allowances.
1879. The Taskforce concluded that the role of members of the NYS cannot be precisely compared with any single job group in the Civil Service cadre for purposes of determining remuneration. In determining remuneration, there should be **no mixing of grading nomenclatures** as equivalent. The Civil Service Job Groups should be for the Civil Service only, the Teaching Service T-Scale should be for teachers only, and the Disciplined Service Pay Grades should be for KDF, NIS, NPS, KPS and NYS. The unique nature of NPS and the work its members perform makes comparison or equating through Job Groups impossible. Table 20.1 illustrates how remuneration for members of the KPS is determined through the Civil Service Job Group Classification and not the Disciplined Services Pay Grade.

Table 22. 1: Disciplined Services remuneration based on Civil Service job group classification

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	Job Group	Basic Min	Basic Max
National Police Service Uniformed Personnel					
Inspector-General - Police (State Officer)	PG14	CC	U	459,113	
Deputy Inspector-General - Kenya Police (State Officer)	PG13	CC	T	372,750	
Senior Assistant Inspector-General - Police	PG12	CC	S	189,640	289,090
Assistant Inspector-General - Police	PG11	CC	R	151,550	197,830
Commissioner - Police	PG10	CC	P	103,360	144,090
Senior Superintendent - Police	PG 9	CC	N	68,720	98,380
Superintendent - Police	PG 8	CC	M	57,060	83,890
Assistant Superintendent - Police	PG 7	CC	L	53,570	81,120
Chief Inspector - Police	PG 6	AX	K	47,290	68,720
Inspector - Police	PG 5	CC	J	42,940	62,750
Senior Sergeant - Police	PG 4	AX	J	40,270	58,820
Sergeant - Police	PG 3	CC	H	36,450	53,570
Corporal - Police	PG 2	CC	G	26,500	50,330
Constable - Police	PG 1	CC	F	20,390	38,975
Kenya Prisons Service					
Commissioner General of Prisons	PG14	AU	U	292,765	576,120
Deputy Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 13	AU	T	212,270	323,640
Senior Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 12	AU	S	167,250	212,270
Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 11	AU	R	126,370	198,730

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	Job Group	Basic Min	Basic Max
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	PG 10	AU	P	78,510	138,910
Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	PG 9	AU	M	68,720	98,380
Senior Superintendent of Prisons	PG 8	AU	L	57,060	83,890
Superintendent of Prisons	PG 7	AU	K	48,780	73,310
Chief Inspector - Prisons	PG 6	AX	K	47,290	68,720
Inspector - Prisons	PG 5	AU	J	42,940	62,750
Senior Sergeant - Prisons	PG 4	AX	J	40,270	58,820
Sergeant - Prisons	PG 3	AU	H	36,450	53,570
Corporal - Prisons	PG 2	AU	G	26,500	50,330
Constable - Prisons	PG 1	AU	F	20,740	38,980
Civil Service (Non-Uniformed Officers NPS, KPS, NYS)					
Secretary	CSG4	AA	T	169,140	324,430
Director	CSG5	AA	S	133,870	197,800
Deputy Director	CSG6	AA	R	99,900	169,140
Assistant Director	CSG7	AA	P	87,360	121,430
Principal Officer	CSG8	AA	N	49,000	87,360
Senior Officer	CSG9	AA	L	42,970	59,120
Officer I	CSG10	AA	K	38,270	51,170
Officer II	CSG11	AA	J	31,270	41,260
Officer Assistant III	CSG12	AA	H	25,470	33,950
Technicians I	CSG13	AA	G	22,270	30,020
Technicians II	CSG14	AA	F	16,890	20,800
Senior Support Staff	CSG15	AA	E	15,670	17,570
Support Staff I	CSG16	AA	D	14,610	16,250
Support Staff II	CSG17	AA	C	13,280	15,120
National Youth Service (NYS)					
Director-General - NYS		AZ	U		
Director-General - NYS	PG15	AV	T	169,140	324,430
Deputy Director-General - NYS	PG14	AV	S	133,870	197,800
Senior Deputy Director [1] -	PG13	AV	R	121,430	169,140
Senior Deputy Director [2] -	PG12	AV	Q	99,900	133,870
Deputy Director - NYS	PG11	AV	P	87,360	121,430
Senior Assistant Director - NYS	PG10	AV	N	66,500	90,550
Assistant Director - NYS	PG09	AV	M	58,600	83,180
Senior Superintendent - NYS	PG08	AV	L	49,780	71,050
Superintendent - NYS	PG07	AZ	K	43,250	62,190
Chief Inspector - NYS	PG06	AV	K	41,990	58,600
Inspector - v	PG05	AV	J	38,340	54,190
Senior Sergeant NYS	PG04	AZ	J	36,240	51,250
Sergeant - NYS	PG03	AV	H	33,300	47,040
Corporal - NYS	PG02	AV	G	24,860	44,500
Private - NYS	PG01	AV	F	18,730	30,420
Teaching Service (TSC)					
Chief Principal	T-Scale 15	AB		131,380	157,656
Senior Principal	T-Scale 14	AB		118,242	141,891
Principal	T-Scale 13	AB		104,644	125,573
Deputy Principal III	T-Scale 12	AB		91,041	109,249
Senior Headmaster	T-Scale 11	AB		77,840	93,408
Head teacher	T-Scale 10	AB		62,272	77,840
Senior Lecturer IV	T-Scale 09	AB		52,308	65,385
Secondary Teacher I	T-Scale 08	AB		43,154	53,943
Secondary Teacher II	T-Scale 07	AB		34,955	43,694

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	Job Group	Basic Min	Basic Max
Secondary Teacher III	T-Scale 06	AB		27,195	33,994
Primary Teacher II	T-Scale 05	AB		21,756	27,195

Sources: Computation from NPS, KPS, NYS, CS and TSC basic salary structures

Civil Service Job Groups Classification and Salary Scales

Comparison of basic salary for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various services

1880. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for the Police Constable, Prisons Constable, Clerical Officer II and NYS Private is determined by Job Group 'F'. Therefore, the minimum basic salary for a Constable of Police is KSh. 20,390 and a maximum of KSh. 38,975; minimum basic salary for a Constable of Prisons is KSh. 20,740 and a maximum of KSh. 38,980, while the minimum basic salary for a Private in NYS is KSh. 18,730 and a maximum of KSh. 30,420. In comparison, a Civil Servant at Job Group 'F' equivalent has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 16,890, with a maximum of KSh. 20,800. The Civil Service Pay Group assumes that the Police Constable, Prisons Constable and NYS Private share job descriptions or job specifications with Clerical Officer II.

Table 22. 2: Basic salary comparison for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Constable — Police	20,390	38,975
Constable — Prisons	20,740	38,980
Clerical Officer II — CS	16,890	20,800
Private — NYS	18,730	30,420

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Comparison of basic salary for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services

1881. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for the Corporal – Police, Corporal – Prisons, Clerical Officer I, Corporal — NYS, and Primary Teacher II is determined by Job Group 'G'. The minimum basic salary for a Corporal of Police is KSh. 26,500 and a maximum of KSh. 50,330; minimum basic salary for a Corporal of Prisons is KSh. 26,500 and a maximum of KSh. 50,330, while the minimum basic salary for a Corporal in NYS is KSh. 24,860 and a maximum of KSh. 44,500. In comparison, a Civil Servant at Job Group 'G' equivalent has a minimum basic salary of KSh. 22,270 with a maximum of KSh. 30,020 while in the Teaching Service, teachers at T-Scale 5 have a minimum basic salary of KSh. 21,756 and a maximum KSh. 27,195. The Civil Service Pay Group assumes that the Corporal -- Police, Corporal – Prisons, Corporal -- NYS share job descriptions or job specifications with Clerical Officer I and Primary Teacher II.

Table 22. 3: Basic salary comparison for Job Group G equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Corporal -Police	26,500	50,330
Corporal -Prisons	26,500	50,330
Clerical Officer I -CS	22,270	30,020
Corporal -NYS	24,860	44,500
Primary Teacher II	21,756	27,195

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Comparison of basic salary for Job Group 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services

1882. Due to differences in grading structures, the nomenclature adopted for various managerial positions in the uniformed services differs at the higher ranks, e.g., at Job Group 'P' equivalent NPS has Commissioner of Police while KPS has Deputy Commissioner of Prisons.

There will be need for harmonisation of nomenclatures in the various uniformed services to enable peer comparisons and interaction.

1883. However, under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, Assistant Director – CS, Deputy Director – NYS, Senior Headmaster – TSC, remuneration is determined by Job Group ‘P’.
1884. The minimum basic salary for a Commissioner of Police is KSh. . 103,360 and a maximum of KSh. . 144,090. The minimum basic salary for a Deputy Commissioner of Prisons is KSh. . 78,510 and a maximum of KSh. . 138,910. The minimum basic salary for a Deputy Director in NYS and a Civil Servant at JG ‘P’ equivalent is KSh. . 87,360 and a maximum of KSh. . 121,430. In the Teaching Service, a Teacher at T-Scale 11 has a minimum basic salary of KSh. . 77,840 and a maximum of KSh. 97,408. This indicates that the Commissioner of Police at NPS earns a higher minimum and maximum basic salary than the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, who in turn earns a higher salary than the Deputy Director at NYS and Civil Servant at Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades. It is worth noting that the remuneration at this grade has been harmonised for NYS and the Civil Service. The teaching service has the lowest basic salary at Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades.

Table 22. 4: Basic salary comparison for Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades in the various services

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Commissioner - Police	103,360	144,090
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	78,510	138,910
Assistant Director – Civil Service	87,360	121,430
Deputy Director - NYS	87,360	121,430
Senior Headmaster - TSC	77,840	93,408

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group ‘F’ equivalent grades

1885. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, salaries for Police constable, Prisons constable, NYS Private, and KDF private are determined by Job Group ‘F’. Yet a Private with the KDF has a minimum basic salary of KSh. . 33,193 and a maximum of KSh. . 34,772 compared to the minimum basic salary for a police constable at KSh. . 20,390 and a maximum of KSh. . 38,975; a minimum basic salary for a prisons constable is KSh. . 20,740 and a maximum of KSh. 38,980, while the minimum basic salary for a private in NYS is KSh. . 18,730 and a maximum of KSh. . 30,420. This indicates that a Private in KDF earns a higher minimum basic salary than a constable in KPS, who in turn earns a slightly higher minimum basic salary than a constable at KPS and a private in NYS. The maximum basic salaries for constables in NPS and KPS are higher than those for the private in the KDF.

Table 22. 5: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group ‘F’ equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Constable -- Police	20,390	38,975
Constable -- Prisons	20,740	38,980
Private -- NYS	18,730	30,420
Private – KDF	33,193	34,772

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group ‘P’ equivalent grades

1886. Under the Civil Service Job Group Remuneration System, remuneration for a Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, Deputy Director – NYS, and Warrant Officer 1 is determined by Job Group ‘P’. Yet the minimum basic salary for a Commissioner of Police is

KSh. . 103,360 and a maximum of KSh. . 144,090. The minimum basic salary for a Deputy Commissioner of Prisons is KSh. . 78,510 and a maximum of KSh. . 138,910. The basic salary for a Deputy Director in NYS is a minimum of KSh. . 87,360 and a maximum KSh. . 121,430. In KDF, a Warrant Officer 1 has a minimum basic salary of KSh. . 81,216 and a maximum of KSh. . 84,415. This indicates that the Commissioner of Police at NPS earns a higher minimum and maximum basic salary than the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, who in turn earns a higher salary than the Deputy Director at NYS, all Job Group 'P' equivalents. The Warrant Officer 1 in KDF has the lowest basic salary maximum at JG 'P' equivalent grades.

Table 22. 6: Basic salary for uniformed services and KDF for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades

Designation	Basic Salary Minimum	Basic Salary Maximum
Commissioner – Police	103,360	144,090
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	78,510	138,910
Deputy Director – NYS	87,360	121,430
Warrant Officer 1 – KDF	81,216	84,415

Sources: Computation from KDF, NPS, KPS and NYS basic salary structure

Analysis of incremental notches

1887. The Taskforce examined incremental notches from the minimum basic salary to the basic maximum salary for uniformed officers in NYS. The Taskforce notes that SRC advised public entities to align their current salary structure in salary grades as evaluated **with salary structures of between eight (8) and 12 salary points**. This advice can therefore be taken as the current policy on salary structuring. It is, therefore, important to align all salary structures to the SRC advice of between eight (8) and 12 salary points.
1888. The salary structure developed for each job grade is summarised in Table 20.6. It should be noted, however, that:
- NYS Job Grades PG13, PG12 and PG11 have a salary structure that is not in line with the SRC policy;
 - The NYS salary structure is slightly enhanced beyond what obtains in the Civil Service at equivalent job groups for grades up to 'N' equivalent. For higher grades, the salary structures are more or less similar. NYS salary is, however, lower than what pertains in the rest of the disciplined services.
 - The incremental accords the officers a relatively higher salary over time and ensures they not stagnate after just a few years;
 - The NYS Job Grades PG13, PG12 and PG11 need restructuring since they are not in line with the minimum eight (8) salary points.

Table 22. 7: Incremental notches from minimum basic to maximum salary for uniformed officers in the National Youth Service

NYS Job Grade	Minimum Basic Salary	Number of Incremental Notches	Maximum Basic Salary
PG15	292,765	11	576,120
PG14	140,249	10	257,226
PG13	127,217	7	177,200
PG12	103,849	6	140,249
PG11	90,813	7	127,217
PG10	69,669	10	94,865
PG9	59,539	11	85,862
PG8	51,308	12	74,436
PG7	44,448	13	65,154

NYS Job Grade	Minimum Basic Salary	Number of Incremental Notches	Maximum Basic Salary
PG6	42,604	12	62,741
PG5	39,598	12	56,762
PG4	37,299	12	53,692
PG3	33,766	12	49,282
PG2	25,514	19	46,584
PG1	19,049	14	31,870

Source: PSC

Remuneration gaps across the disciplined services

1889. The Taskforce noted that pay reviews and increases for members of NPS, KPS and NYS have been closely linked to annual basic salary movement and incremental notches designed for the wider public service sector or Civil Service Job Groups, and not for the KDF or the Disciplined Services Pay Grades. As a result, NPS, KPS and NYS remuneration, or average earnings, do not take into account all aspects of change in remuneration for disciplined services. Since 2012, remuneration and salary reviews for the NPS, KPS and NYS have not broadly kept pace with that of members of KDF.
1890. The Taskforce compared the basic salary structures for KDF, NPS and KPS. It found that average earnings for KDF were higher on the minimum basic salary scale while NPS, KPS and NYS average earnings were higher on the maximum basic salary scale. The Taskforce observed that KDF minimum basic salary scale rates are generally 20 to 40 per cent higher than those of NPS, KPS and NYS for similar lower ranks or equivalent job group, and generally 8 to 10 per cent more for higher ranks or equivalent job groups. Some of the grades in KDF compared with NPS, KPS and NYS have relatively short salary structures, meaning that officers must progress within very short periods or they would stagnate should they not be promoted.
1891. The Taskforce concludes that there is no harmony across the grades in terms of minimum basic salary at comparable grades. Harmony is important, especially for grades that have similar entry qualifications and more or less similar training regimes in the disciplined services.

Table 22. 8: Remuneration gaps across the disciplined services

Rank & Grade	Kenya Defence Forces			National Police Service			Kenya Prisons Service			
	Ranks	Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum
PC	Private	33193-34772	PG 1	20390-38975	12803 - (-4203)	39% - (-12%)	PG 1	20740-38980	12453 - (-4208)	38% - (-12%)
CPL	S/ Private	36541-39379	PG 2	26500-50330	10041 - (-10951)	27% - (-28%)	PG 2	26500-50330	10041 - (-10951)	27% - (-28%)
SGT	Land CPL	47502-48302	PG 3	36450-53570	11052 - (-5268)	23% - (-11%)	PG 3	36450-53570	11052 - (-5268)	23% - (-11%)
S/ SGT	CPL	49757-53672	PG 4	40270-58820	9487 - (-5148)	19% - (-10%)	PG 4	40270-58820	9487 - (-5148)	19% - (-10%)
IP	SGT	53989-60376	PG 5	42940-62750	11049 - (-2374)	20% - (-4%)	PG 5	42940-62750	11049 - (-2374)	20% - (-4%)
CIP	S/SGT	63420-68220	PG 6	47290-68720	16130 - (-500)	25% - (-0.7%)	PG 6	47290-68720	16130 - (-500)	25% - (-0.7%)
ASP	WO2	70400-73600	PG 7	53570-81120	16830 - (-7520)	24% - (-10%)				

Rank & Grade	Kenya Defence Forces			National Police Service			Kenya Prisons Service			
NPS and KPS	Ranks	Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum	SRC JE Grade	Minimum & Maximum	Variance Minimum & Maximum	% Minimum & Maximum
SP	WO1	81216-84415	PG 8	57060-83890	24156 - 525	30% - 0.6%	PG 7	48780-73310	32436 - 11105	40% - 13%
SSP	2nd LT	87448 - 89197	PG 9	68720-98380	18728- (-9183)	21% - (-10%)	PG 8	57060-83890	24156 - 525	30% - 0.6%
ACP	LT	97184-103132					PG9	68720-98380	28464 - 4752	21% - (-10%)

Source: Taskforce Computation

Officers, public and stakeholder views

1892. It was submitted that NYS servicemen and women are entitled to a paltry monthly allowance of KSh. . 2,100, of which KSh. . 1,500 is issued monthly while KSh. . 600 is retained a compulsory saving, to be remitted upon exit from the Service. It was also submitted that the monthly stipend does not mirror the current economic times and challenges. After deduction of bank charges, the servicemen and women usually remain with around KSh. . 1,300, which they use to supplement the monthly issue.
1893. It was submitted that the monthly issue entails: medium kiwi (75 grams), bar soap, 1 toilet paper, and 1 sanitary pad for ladies. The Taskforce was informed that the tissue paper and sanitary pads are of poor quality. Servicemen and women noted that there is irregular issuance of the stipends and the monthly issue, which sometimes delayed for up to four months. It was also submitted that the volunteers are key in nation building, and their allowances should be reviewed upwards even though the Service is voluntary.
1894. It was submitted that the instructor's allowance is currently paid only to college-based instructors at the Gilgil Campus but officers submitted that training does not end at the college; it extends to the field units hence the need to pay instructors' allowances to officers in the field units as well.
1895. It was further submitted that the current annual leave allowance is KSh. 4,000, which is not commensurate to the prevailing inflation rates.
1896. The Taskforce was also informed that officers in designated hardship areas do not receive allowances unlike the case with other civil servants. Areas like Lambwe field station face hardships yet they are not classified as hardship areas by the Service. Other cadres in the Civil Service and teachers service have classified these places as a hardship area, though. The proposal for hardship allowance was given as 50 per cent of the basic salary.
1897. The Taskforce was also informed that the remuneration package for the entry rank for an NYS officer is lower than for the other disciplined services. Whereas officers of equivalent rank in other disciplined services enjoy a host of allowances, the officers in NYS below the rank of Senior Sergeant do not receive any allowances other than leave allowance. It was also submitted that all NYS uniformed officers are not paid commuter allowance. To address this, the Service requested that the remuneration package for NYS officers be harmonised with other disciplined services.
1898. It was submitted that the current pay for NYS officers is meagre and there is need to review it to make it more competitive and to reflect the unique nature of their service as well as address the high turnover in the Service.
1899. It was submitted that the Service personnel are always the first responders in disaster situations, as well as search and rescue missions. For example, NYS has responded to

disasters like the house collapses in Huruma Estate Nairobi and Kiambu, among other areas; fires such as the one that engulfed the Jomo Kenya International Airport in 2013, and the Aberdare Forest in February and March 2023, among many other disasters, yet they are the least paid in the disciplined services.

1900. Despite the low pay, the officers submitted that the Service personnel are often engaged in high-risk assignments such as the construction of the border all between Kenya and Somalia in Mandera, where one NYS officer was killed after the vehicle he travelling in was blown by an improvised explosive device (IED), and another one was seriously injured.
1901. In their assignments, NYS officers are not paid any allowance when they undertake high-risk duties or are deployed to operation areas.
1902. The Taskforce was also informed that NYS personnel are often deployed to work alongside other disciplined services in the same assignment and environment yet their remuneration is not commensurate with other disciplined services.

Recommendations

1903. Having examined the Civil Service remuneration system, the Taskforce recommends that:
 - (a) That SRC should establish a system of remuneration for disciplined services completely delinked from the Civil Service Job Groups Classification System and Pay Determination;
 - (b) PSC should review job descriptions for members of NYS for all pay grades and restructure the salary structure for PG13, PG12 and PG11 in line with the minimum eight (8) salary points; and
 - (c) Government should establish a Remuneration Advisory Board for Disciplined and Security Services through an Act of Parliament.

22.4 Salary

Analysis of salaries and allowances in NYS

1904. The Taskforce found that NYS plays an important role in nation-building and providing youth with the necessary skills for self-reliance. They are also called upon to assist in emergencies and disasters, like their counterparts in NPS and KPS. Therefore, the clamour for adequate remuneration is justified.
1905. The Taskforce recognises that members of NYS were categorised as a disciplined service and were, therefore, compensated commensurately up to 2012. Since then, NYS has been left behind in the review of remuneration packages.

Economic context and cost of living

1906. Despite lower rates of inflation rates between 2012 and 2022, the prices of all basic commodities more than doubled in the same period, without corresponding increases in real wages.
1907. Table 22.9 shows trends in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)²² and inflation rates in Kenya since 2012. The Consumer Price Index rose from 124.7 in 2012 to 228 in 2022. This, in effect, means that the cost of living rose by 104 points over the same period. Thus, in percentage terms, the cost of living rose by 84 per cent. This, in effect, means that the cost of living for the members of NYS rose by 84 per cent over the period.


Table 22. 9: Trends in inflation, consumer price indices and rise in the cost-of-living, 2012 – 2022

²² CPI reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.

Year	Inflation Rate	Consumer Price Index	Rise in Cost of Living
2012	9.38%	124.7	0.0%
2013	5.72%	131.8	7.1%
2014	6.88%	140.9	16.2%
2015	6.58%	150.2	25.5%
2016	6.30%	159.6	34.9%
2017	8.01%	172.4	47.7%
2018	4.69%	180.5	55.8%
2019	5.24%	190.0	65.3%
2020	5.40%	200.2	75.5%
2021	6.11%	212.5	87.8%
2022	7.66%	228.7	104.0%

Source: Computation from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Data

Figure 22. 1: Trends in inflation rate and rise in cost-of-living 2012 - 2022



Source: Computation from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Data

NYS private's basic salary from 2010 to 2023

1908. Although the cost of living has increased by 84 per cent since 2010, the growth in minimum basic salary for an NYS private has only been by 70 per cent (from KSh. . 11,010 to KSh. . 18,730) during the same period.

1909. Table 22.10 outlines the amounts in basic salary of KSh. . 11,000 and Housing Supplementation KSh. . 1,650 paid to an NYS private on entry in January 2010. The Total Gross Pay was KSh. . 12,650.

Table 22. 10: Gross salary of an NYS private on joining the Service in January 2010

Sand No	Pay category	Amount
1	Basic salary	11,000.00
2	Housing supplementation	1,650.00
	Gross Salary	12,650.00

Source: NYS

1910. Table 22.11 outlines the Basic Salary of KSh. . 18,730 and Housing Supplementation KSh. . 1,650 paid to an NYS private on entry in January 2022. The Total Gross Pay was KSh. .20,380.

Table 22. 11: Gross salary of NYS private on joining the Service in January 2021

S/No.	Pay category	Amount
1	Basic salary	18,730.00
2	Housing supplementation	1,650.00
	Gross Salary	20,380.00

Source: NYS


Table 22.12 outlines the salary progression for an NYS private over a period of 14 years. The progression takes into account salary reviews over that period and the officers' annual increments. It is important to note that the amount paid in monthly allowances (Housing Supplementation) has not been adjusted over that period of time.

Table 22. 12: Trends in increments in gross salary of NYS private who joined the Service in January 2010

Year	Basic Salary	Remarks	Monthly Allowances	Gross Salary
2010	11,000	Min. Basic Salary (on appointment)	1,650	12,650
2011	11,480	Annual Increment	1,650	13,130
2012	13,200	Salary Review 2012	1,650	14,850
2013	13,680	Annual Increment	1,650	15,330
2014	14,060	Annual Increment	1,650	15,710
2015	14,540	Annual Increment	1,650	16,190
2016	15,050	Annual Increment	1,650	16,670
2017	16,110	Salary Review 2017 (Phase I)	1,650	17,760
2018	16,990	Increment (Salary Review Phase II)	1,650	18,650
2019	17,600	Increment (Salary Review Phase III)	1,650	19,250
2020	18,730	Salary Review 2020	1,650	20,380
2021	19,400	Annual Increment	1,650	21,050
2022	20,070	Annual Increment	1,650	21,720
2023	20,740	Annual Increment	1,650	22,390

Source: Taskforce Computation

Figure 22. 2: Trends in increments in gross salary of NYS private who joined the Service in January 2010



Source: Taskforce Computation

Recommendations

1911. Having considered the uniqueness of the services offered by the members of NYS, their working conditions, duties and responsibilities, disrupted family life, and the potential risk they face in the course of their duties, the Taskforce recommends a basic salary increase of **40** per cent for the lowest rank or Pay Grade (PG 1) for uniformed officers reducing progressively to **3** per cent for the highest rank or Pay Grade (PG15). The Taskforce recommends that the new remuneration structure should be implemented in three (3) phases from 1st July, 2024.

Table 22. 13: Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Youth Service FY 2022/2023

NYS Officer		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowances					
Job Grade	NYS Grade	Min.	Max.	House: Nairobi	House: Cluster 2	House: Cluster 3:	House: Cluster 4:	Commuter	House Supplementation
U	PG15	292,767	576,120	80,000	70,000	-		official	
S	PG14	133,870	197,800	60,000	56,000	52,000	42,000	20,000	
R	PG13	121,430	169,140	50,000	35,000	25,000	20,000	16,000	
Q	PG12	99,900	133,870	45,000	28,000	21,000	16,800	14,000	
P	PG11	87,360	121,430	45,000	28,000	21,000	16,800	12,000	
N	PG10	66,500	90,550	35,000	25,500	18,000	15,400	8,000	
M	PG9	58,600	83,180	28,000	22,000	16,500	13,000	8,000	
L	PG8	49,780	71,050	28,000	22,000	16,500	13,000	6,000	
K	PG7	43,250	62,190	16,500	12,800	9,600	7,500	5,000	
K	PG6	41,990	58,590	16,500	12,800	9,600	7,500	5,000	
J	PG5	38,340	54,180	10,000	7,500	5,800	4,200	4,000	
J	PG4	36,240	51,250	10,000	7,500	5,800	4,200	4,000	
H	PG3	33,300	47,040	6,750	4,500	3,850	3,200	4,000	2,550
G	PG2	24,860	44,500	6,750	4,500	3,850	3,200	4,000	2,050
F	PG1	18,730	30,420	4,500	3,730	3,000	2,700	3,000	1,650

Source: Taskforce Computation

Table 22. 14: Recommendation for New Remuneration Structure for Uniformed Officers in the National Youth Service by the Taskforce

NYS Officer		Basic Salary		Monthly Allowance		
Job Grade	NYS Grade	Min.	Max.	House: National Rate	Commuter	NYS
U	PG15	301,550	584,903	80,000	official	14,000
S	PG14	137,886	201,816	60,000	20,250	14,000
R	PG13	125,073	172,783	50,000	16,250	14,000
Q	PG12	102,897	136,867	45,000	14,250	13,000
P	PG11	89,981	124,051	45,000	12,250	12,000
N	PG10	69,160	93,210	35,000	8,250	11,000
M	PG9	63,288	87,868	28,000	8,250	10,000
L	PG8	55,754	77,024	28,000	8,250	9,000
K	PG7	50,170	69,110	16,500	8,250	9,000
K	PG6	50,388	66,988	16,500	6,125	8,500
J	PG5	47,542	63,382	10,000	6,125	8,000
J	PG4	46,387	61,397	10,000	5,125	7,000
H	PG3	43,956	57,696	6,750	4,125	7,000
G	PG2	33,810	53,450	6,750	4,125	5,000
F	PG1	26,222	37,912	4,500	3,125	5,000

Source: Taskforce Computation

NOTE:

Introduce Common National House Allowance rate for all NYS Uniformed Officers

Introduce New “NYS Monthly Allowance” for NYS Uniformed Officers

Discontinue House Supplementation Allowance.

22.5 New and applicable allowances

1912. The Taskforce recognises that members of NYS were categorised as a disciplined service and were, therefore, compensated commensurately up to 2012. Since then, the NYS has been left behind in the review of remuneration packages.

1913. The Taskforce notes that there is a wide range in allowances that are currently paid to NYS officers. These allowances are summarised hereunder

Table 22. 15: List of allowances currently payable to uniformed members of the Service and the rate applicable per rank or job group

S/No.	Type of allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
1	Rental Allowance	House All Officers (Except Private JG “F” to Sergeant JG “H” who are not paid House Allowance.	JG F to JG H No House allowance Based on work station and rank, e.g. JG “J” KSh. 8,600 for Nairobi and KSh. 5,500.00 in other regions.
2	Hardship Allowance	Officers in designated hardship areas and Border Police Unit.	Based on rank for officers working in designated hardship areas ranging from KSh. 4,300.00 to KSh. 27,300.00.
3	Commuter Allowance	All Officers	Based on rank. JG “F” – KSh. 3.000 “G”- “J” – KSh. 4.000 JG “K” – KSh. 5.000 JG “L” – KSh. 6.000 “M”- “N” – KSh. 8,000 “P” – KSh. 12,000 “R” – KSh. 16,000 “S” – KSh. 20,000
4	Extraneous Duty Allowance	(only paid to Secretaries attached to DG and DDG’s Offices)	(only paid to secretaries attached to DG and DDG’s Offices) at a rate of 20% basic salary.
5	Instructors Allowance	All officers offering instructional duties at NYS Colleges and Campuses. (Except Uniformed Officers offering instructional duties at TVET institutions are not paid.)	Officers working at NYS Colleges and Campuses @ 25% of the basic salary. (Uniformed officers offering instructional duties at TVET institutions are not paid.)
6	Transfer Allowance	All Officers	Officers transferred from one station to another and a distance that is more than 40 km not provided with transport. (Officers’ basic salary).

S/No.	Type of allowance	Payable to	Amount payable
7	Housing Supplementation	-Constable -Corporal -Sergeant -Snr Sergeant	-Officers in the JG “F” to “J” -JG “F” KSh. 3,000 - “G” KSh. 3,400 - “H” KSh. 3,900 - “J” KSh. 4,400
8	Leave	-All Officers	Officers serving in designated hardship areas are paid leave travelling allowance once a year based on the rank ranging from KSh. 4,000.00 JG “F”- “J”, KSh. 6,000.00 JG “K”-JG “N” and KSh. 10,000.00 JG “P”-JG “S”
9	Non-Practicing Allowance	-Officers admitted to the bar to practice and attached to the Legal Unit. JG “K” and above. Qualified medical practitioners.	Paid at a rate of KSh. 15,000.00
10	Disability Allowance	Guide-Officers with disability (PWD)	Payable at a rate of KSh. 20,000.00 per month

Source: NYS

1914. The Taskforce was informed that the current allowances are inadequate given the changing economic realities. There are also other allowances that are not currently payable to NYS officers since they are clustered with the rest of the public servants.

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter hardship and leave allowances for NPS, KPS, NYS, and the wider public sector FY 2022 and 2023

1915. The Taskforce noted that the house, commuter, hardship, and leave allowance rates paid to members of NPS, KPS and NYS are closely linked to the public sector allowances system, and the rates are broadly determined equally for equivalent grades or job groups across the entire public sector. Table 22.16 is a summary of allowances paid to employees in various grades and job groups across the services.

Table 22. 16: Comparison of allowances paid to NPS, KPS, NYS, and the wider public sector FY 2022 and 2023

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
National Police Service Uniformed Personnel							
Inspector-General – Police (State Officer)	PG14	CC	U	-	-	-	50,000
Deputy Inspector-General – Kenya Police (State Officer)	PG13	CC	T	-	-	-	50,000
Senior Assistant Inspector – Police	PG12	CC	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Assistant Inspector – Police	PG11	CC	R	55,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Commissioner of Police	PG10	CC	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Senior Superintendent – Police	PG 9	CC	N	36,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Superintendent – Police	PG 8	CC	M	34,200	8,000	14,650	6,000
Assistant Superintendent – Police	PG 7	CC	L	33,500	6,000	12,300	6,000
Chief Inspector – Police	PG 6	AX	K	27,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector – Police	PG 5	CC	J	24,950	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant – Police	PG 4	AX	J	15,700	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant – Police	PG 3	CC	H	9,800	4,000	6,600	4,000
Corporal – Police	PG 2	CC	G	9,650	4,000	5,700	4,000
Constable – Police	PG 1	CC	F	9,500	4,000	4,300	4,000
Kenya Prisons Service							
Commissioner General of Prisons	PG14	AU	U	100,000	-	-	50,000
Deputy Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 13	AU	T	80,000	24,000	60,000	10,000
Senior Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 12	AU	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Assistant Commissioner General of Prisons	PG 11	AU	R	55,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	PG 10	AU	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Assistant Commissioner of Prisons	PG 9	AU	M	34,200	8,000	14,650	6,000
Senior Superintendent of Prisons	PG 8	AU	L	33,500	6,000	12,300	6,000
Superintendent of Prisons	PG 7	AU	K	30,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Chief Inspector – Prisons	PG 6	AX	K	27,000	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector – Prisons	PG 5	AU	J	24,950	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant – Prisons	PG 4	AX	J	15,700	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant – Prisons	PG 3	AU	H	9,800	4,000	6,600	4,000
Corporal – Prisons	PG 2	AU	G	9,800	4,000	5,700	4,000
Constable – Prisons	PG 1	AU	F	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Civil Service (Non-Uniformed Officers)							
Secretary	CSG4	AA	T	80,000	40,000	60,000	10,000
Director	CSG5	AA	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Deputy Director	CSG6	AA	R	50,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Assistant Director	CSG7	AA	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Principal Officer	CSG8	AA	N	35,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Senior Officer	CSG9	AA	L	28,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Officer I	CSG10	AA	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Officer II	CSG11	AA	J	10,000	4,000	8,200	4,000
Officer Assistant III	CSG12	AA	H	6,750	4,000	6,600	4,000
Technicians I	CSG13	AA	G	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000
Technicians II	CSG14	AA	F	4,500	4,000	4,300	4,000
Senior Support Staff	CSG15	AA	E	4,500	4,000	3,700	4,000
Support Staff I	CSG16	AA	D	4,125	3,000	3,300	4,000
Support Staff II	CSG17	AA	C	3,750	3,000	3,000	4,000
National Youth Service (NYS)							

Sector	Grade	Pay Group	JG Equivalent	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Director General - NYS		AZ	U	100,000	-	-	50,000
Director General – NYS	PG15	AV	T	80,000	24,000	-	10,000
Deputy Director General - NYS	PG14	AV	S	60,000	20,000	45,000	10,000
Senior Deputy Director [1] - NYS S	PG13	AV	R	50,000	16,000	38,100	10,000
Senior Deputy Director [2] - NYS	PG12	AV	Q	45,000	14,000	31,500	10,000
Deputy Director – NYS	PG11	AV	P	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Assistant Director - NYS	PG10	AV	N	35,000	8,000	17,100	6,000
Assistant Director – NYS	PG09	AV	M	28,000	8,000	14,650	6,000
Senior Superintendent – NYS	PG08	AV	L	28,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Superintendent – NYS	PG07	AZ	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Chief Inspector – NYS	PG06	AV	K	16,500	5,000	10,900	6,000
Inspector – NYS	PG05	AV	J	10,000	4,000	8,200	4,000
Senior Sergeant Major	PG04						
Senior Sergeant - NYS	PG04	AZ	J	8,668	4,000	8,200	4,000
Sergeant - NYS	PG03	AV	H	-	4,000	-	4,000
Corporal - NYS	PG02	AV	G	-	3,000	-	4,000
Private - NYS	PG01	AV	F	-	3,000	-	4,000
Teaching Service (TSC)							
Chief Principal	T-Scale 15	AB		50,000	16,000	38,100	16,000
Senior Principal	T-Scale 14	AB		45,000	14,000	31,500	14,000
Principal	T-Scale 13	AB		45,000	12,000	27,300	12,000
Deputy Principal III	T-Scale 12	AB		35,000	8,000	17,100	8,000
Senior Headmaster	T-Scale 11	AB		28,000	8,000	14,650	8,000
Head teacher	T-Scale 10	AB		16,000	6,000	12,300	6,000
Senior Lecturer IV	T-Scale 09	AB		10,500	5,000	10,700	5,000
Secondary Teacher I	T-Scale 08	AB		6,750	4,000	8,200	4,000
Secondary Teacher II	T-Scale 07	AB		6,750	4,000	6,600	4,000
Secondary Teacher III	T-Scale 06	AB		4,500	3,000	5,700	4,000
Primary Teacher II	T-Scale 05	AB		4,500	3,000	4,300	4,000

Source: SRC/PSC/NPSC/TSC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowance for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23

1916. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various services indicate that constables of Police and Prisons earn KSh. . 9,500, which is higher than that of Civil Servants in equivalent grades who earn KSh. . 4,500. Privates in NYS do not earn a house allowance at this level. It will be important to harmonise house allowance for the non-uniformed officers with that of the Police and Prisons, while implementing the allowance for the NYS personnel, hence allowing them to reside in private accommodation. The rates used to analyse the house allowance are Nairobi City rates, which are the highest among the regions.
1917. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance of KSh. 3,000, which is uniform across all the services. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 4,300, however the private at NYS does not earn this allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers in this grade across all the Services as indicated in the Table 22.17 and Figure 22.3.

Table 22. 17: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Constable – Police	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Constable – Prisons	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Clerical Officer II – CS	4,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Private – NYS	0	3,000	0	4,000

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various Services in FY 2022 and 23

1918. An analysis of the house allowance paid to the various services indicate that Corporal of Police and Prisons earn KSh. 9,650 which is higher than that of Civil Servants and Teachers in equivalent grades who earn KSh. 6,750. Privates in NYS do not earn a house allowance at this level. It will be important to harmonize House Allowance for the Civil Service and Teachers with that of the Police and Prisons, while implementing the allowance for NYS personnel hence allowing them to reside in private accommodation.
1919. All officers at this level earn monthly Commuter Allowance at KSh. 4,300 for Police and Prisons while employees in the Civil Service, NYS and Teachers earn KSh. 4,000. Hardship allowance is paid at a standard rate of KSh. 5,700 however the Privates at NYS does not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the services as indicated in the table and figure below.

Table 22. 18: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowance for Job Group 'G' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Corporal – Police	9,650	4,300	5,700	4,000
Corporal – Prisons	9,650	4,300	5,700	4,000
Clerical Officer I – CS	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000
Corporal – NYS	0	4,000	0	4,000
Primary Teacher II	6,750	4,000	5,700	4,000

Source: SRC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23

1920. An analysis of the house allowances indicates that at this level employees in all the Services earn a standard amount of KSh. 45,000. All employees across the various Services at this level receive a monthly commuter allowance at KSh. 12,000; hardship allowance is paid at a standard rate of KSh. 27,300 and leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 10,000 as indicated in the Table 22.19 below.

Table 22. 19: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' and equivalent grades in the various services in FY 2022 and 23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Commissioner - Police	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Assistant Director Officer II - CS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Director - NYS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Senior Headmaster - TSC	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000

Source: SRC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship, and leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022 and 23 (KDF included)

1921. An analysis of the House Allowances paid to the various disciplined services compared to those for KDF indicates that constables of Police and Prisons receive KSh. 9,500, which is lower than for KDF members serving at equivalent grades who earn KSh. 10,000. Privates in NYS do not receive a house allowance.
1922. All officers at this level receive a monthly commuter allowance of KSh. 3,000, which is uniform across all the services, but KDF members do not draw this allowance. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 4,300 but NYS and KDF privates do not earn the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 4,000 to officers at this grade across all the services, except for KDF, whose earning ranges from KSh. 25,000 to KSh. 45,000 as indicated in the Table 22.20 below.

Table 22. 20: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship, leave allowances for Job Group 'F' equivalent grades in FY 2022 and 23 (KDF included)

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Constable - Police	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Constable - Prisons	9,500	3,000	4,300	4,000
Private - NYS	0	3,000	0	4,000
Private - KDF	10,000	0	0	25,000

Source: SRC

Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship, leave allowances for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022 and 23

1923. An analysis of the housing allowance paid to the various disciplined services as compared to that of the KDF indicate that NPS, KPS and NYS members earn a higher rate of KSh. 45,000 compared to the KDF, who draw KSh. 36,000 at equivalent grades.
1924. All officers at this level earn a monthly commuter allowance of KSh. 12,000, which is uniform across all the Services, but KDF members do not draw this allowance. Hardship allowance is also paid at a standard rate of KSh. 27,300 but NYS and KDF privates do not draw the allowance. Leave allowance is paid annually at KSh. 10,000 to officers in this grade across all the Services, except for KDF, whose member earnings range from KSh. 25,000 to KSh. 45,000 as indicated in the Table 22.21 below.

Table 22. 21: Comparison of house (Nairobi), commuter, hardship and leave allowances for Job Group 'P' equivalent grades in FY 2022 and 23

Designation	House (Nairobi)	Commuter	Hardship	Leave
Commissioner - Police	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Commissioner of Prisons	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Deputy Director – NYS	45,000	12,000	27,300	10,000
Warrant Officer I – KDF	36,000	0	0	25,000 – 45,000

Source: SRC

Recommendations

Having considered the submissions and reviewed relevant documentation, the Taskforce concludes that **restructuring and review of NYS allowances is urgent**. Such restructuring and review must address the wide disparities and varied eligibility criteria for payments to achieve harmonisation and standardisation. The Taskforce recommends that:

- (a) That SRC should harmonise, standardise and review payable rates for monthly allowances for uniformed officers in NYS. The harmonised, standardised and payable rates should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.

- (b) That SRC and the NYS Council should introduce new allowances for servicemen and women. The new allowances should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.
- (c) There should be strict implementation of overtime pay as provided for in the Public Service HR Manual and NYS Standing Orders;
- (d) To curb the reported issues around allowances and other remittances not reaching junior officers, the Taskforce recommends strict adherence to the automation of payments for all allowances to NYS officers as is the practice in the Civil Service;
- (e) There should be strict prohibition of cash payment of allowances to NYS officers and servicemen and women;
- (f) There should be prompt payment of allowances during multi-agency operations that involve members of NYS and servicemen and women; and
- (g) There should be enhanced accountability for the automated system to prevent cases of embezzlement of funds and corruption.

22.6 Provision of stipend for the servicemen and women

1925. It is a matter of common understanding that NYS servicemen and women are apprentices. While they are trainees, they are often engaged in commercial activities where they offer their labour, ostensibly for nation building. During their stay in the Service, they receive a stipend of KSh. 2,100 per month, of which KSh. 600 is retained as mandatory savings that is paid as a lump sum at the time of their exit from the Service.

Stakeholder and public views

- 1926. The servicemen and women, as well as some of their parents, informed the Taskforce that the stipend is often too little to cater for their personal expenses. Out of the sums advanced, they only receive KSh. 1,500, which they spend on purchases to supplement the monthly issue, discussed earlier in this Report.
- 1927. They proposed an increase in the monthly stipend to enable them cater for basic personal expenses and even save for the after-service years when they can engage in entrepreneurship and self-employment.

Findings

- 1928. The Taskforce finds the stipend offered to the servicemen and women is very low and unreasonable. In the current economy, KSh. 1,500 per month is too little to meet the basic economic needs of any person, let alone support their families.
- 1929. Further, the Taskforce understands that the servicemen and women are made to sign a declaration that they have no dependents at the time of joining the Service, which absolves the NYS from any expectation for decent remuneration and the premise of taking care of family members back at home. While this declaration, founded in the Act is well-intentioned, the Taskforce finds that the amounts advanced to the servicemen and women are too little to even meet their personal needs while in training.

Recommendations

- 1930. Having analysed the views from the public and from stakeholders, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) Given the current economic conditions, the government should review the monthly stipend for servicemen and women upwards from KSh. 2,100 to KSh. 10,000 to be paid directly to them through the payroll at the end of every month;

- (b) The Council should establish the NYS Savings and Credit Cooperative (Sacco) Society to manage the savings of the servicemen and women as well as pay dividends on such savings;
- (c) The payment of instructor allowance should extend to trainers in the field units;
- (d) The members of the Service should be paid allowances whenever they are involved in multiagency operations such as administration of national Examinations and elections like the members of the other Services;
- (e) Officers in designated hardship areas should be eligible to receive a hardship allowance just like other civil servants; and
- (f) The annual leave allowance should be enhanced.

CHAPTER TWENTY THREE: WELFARE REFORMS IN THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

23.1 Introduction

1931. The Taskforce was required to review and recommend improvement of matters relating to welfare of officers in NYS. Welfare entails measures taken to improve the conditions of service for employees beyond compensation. Improved welfare enables employees to have morale and motivation to carry out their responsibilities.
1932. The Taskforce notes that NYS is yet to put in place measures to enhance the general welfare of members of the Service, including the development of a Welfare Policy and a Directorate dedicated to welfare concerns of members of the Service and Servicemen/ women
1933. During stakeholder engagements and visits to NYS facilities, officers expressed the need for welfare facilities such as canteens, messes, and even adequate medical facilities in field stations and units of the Service.

23.2 Medical and compensation scheme

1934. It is common practice that officers in the disciplined Services are provided with a comprehensive medical cover. NYS officers and staff enjoy the benefits of the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), which is comprehensive but on a graduated scale.
1935. The Taskforce is aware of a medical scheme proposed pursuant to the NYS Strategic Plan 2019 – 2023, which has not been operationalised.

Officers, public and stakeholder views

1936. The Taskforce was informed that NYS does not have a comprehensive medical scheme. Officers in the NYS submitted that they are covered by NHIF, which receives a statutory deduction from salaries and is not a comprehensive medical scheme. The medical scheme developed pursuant to the NYS Strategic Plan 2019 – 2023 has not been implemented.
1937. The Taskforce was also informed that compensation for officers who are injured or killed in the line of duty takes a long period to be actualised. It was further submitted that there is no compensation plan for servicemen and women should they be injured or killed in the line of duty.
1938. It was further submitted that there is no medical scheme in place to enable servicemen and women to receive treatment when injured in the line of duty. Unlike their counterparts from the other disciplined services, NYS servicemen and women do not have medical and compensation schemes when they go into multi-agency operations. It was submitted that even servicemen and women in the field units often lack basic medical amenities or aid that would enable them to get treatment for minor ailments or injuries. In instances where there are dispensaries, the same are overwhelmed by the high numbers of the servicemen and women as well as the neighbouring community.
1939. It was further submitted that NYS members have been exposed to risky ventures such as the building the border wall in Mandera and in “Linda Nchi” operations in Boni Forest under the KDF. However, while KDF officers are armed and have comprehensive compensation schemes and medical cover, the servicemen and women have neither.
1940. There are instances when servicemen and women have either been injured or lost their lives while on duty without a legal framework to compensate them or their families. It was reported that one serviceman lost his life in the fracas that erupted during the 2022 elections, which highlights the risks these valuable servants of the nation regularly face.

Findings

1941. The Taskforce found that the lack of a comprehensive medical scheme to cater for servicemen and women was a major concern. NYS officers, other disciplined services, and public servants enjoy comprehensive medical cover that is not available to the servicemen and women in the NYS. Neither do the servicemen and women have a compensation scheme to cater for injuries or death while on duty. As a matter of best practice, they should enjoy the full statutory benefits of employees, including provision of medical insurance.
1942. Similarly, the Taskforce observed that servicemen and women at the paramilitary academy and training institutions enjoy medical attention whenever they fall ill, but the same is not the case with service men and women in field units.
1943. Given the nature of work done by the servicemen and women, and the risks they are exposed to, the Taskforce found it unreasonable that they do not have a medical cover to enable them receive treatment when they fall sick or suffer injuries.
1944. Between 2012 and 2022, 18 NYS uniformed officers were killed and 13 were injured in the line of duty.

Table 23. 1: Number of NYS officers killed or injured in the line of duty since 2012

Year	Injured	Killed	Total (Injuries and Killed)
2012	0	0	0
2013	0	2	2
2014	0	0	0
2015	0	0	0
2016	0	0	0
2017	5	2	7
2018	0	0	0
2019	2	1	3
2020	0	5	5
2021	4	3	7
2022	2	5	7
Total	13	18	31

Recommendations

1945. The Taskforce makes the following recommendations regarding medical care for members of the Service:
- (a) The Service should establish fully equipped medical facilities including a Level 4 hospital and dispensaries in every field unit and station to provide medical aid;
 - (b) The current medical scheme for the officers should extend to the servicemen and women; and
 - (c) The Service is encouraged to enter into agreements with other disciplined Services to be allowed to access their medical facilities.
1946. The Taskforce makes the following further recommendations regarding the welfare of officers and members of the Service:
- (a) There should be established at least one Service Canteen to serve officers as well as servicemen and women within the respective units and stations. This shall also ensure that the welfare of servicemen and women who are also students are taken care of since they do not earn a salary but instead rely on a small stipend. The prices in the Service Canteen should be regulated by the Service management and should be subsidised just as it is the

case with the Kenya Defence Forces canteens. The canteens should be managed by the Service to cushion against inflated prices;

- (b) Promote recreational and sports activities in all the units.
- (c) There should be established an officers' mess in each and every unit operated and managed by the unit's administration;
- (d) The Service should establish a Department of Welfare Services and the office devolved to every region and unit across the country; and
- (e) The National Youth Service Welfare Policy should be formulated and adopted to ensure that the welfare of members and staff of the Service, including servicemen and women, is well taken care of.

23.3 Mental health

- 1947. Mental health is a topical issue in the contemporary world. With increased economic dynamism, the age of social media influence, and volatile capitalism, many people have been affected by mental health issues, which are exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Due to the demands brought about by the peculiar nature of their work, the disciplined services have been disproportionately affected by mental health problems. In view of the foregoing, mental health should form an important part of human resource policies for NYS, just like it is in many other institutions.
- 1948. The National Youth Service administration does not have a stand-alone policy on mental health. It is guided by the Kenya Mental Health Policy 2015 – 2030, which provides for a framework on interventions for securing mental health systems reforms in Kenya. This policy was developed through a consultative process involving public, private and non-state actors under the stewardship of the Ministry of Health.
- 1949. The Taskforce was required to assess and recommend the establishment of funds or schemes to cater for terminal illness, including mental health illness and possible legal and administrative framework to cater for NYS officers' dependents.

Summary of officers', public and stakeholder views

- 1950. The Taskforce was informed that the Service does not have experts to attend to mental health issues. Officers with mental health issues have been referred and admitted to the Chiromo Lane Medical Centre, which is a private facility in Nairobi, and Miritini Rehabilitation Centre in Mombasa for management and treatment. Servicemen and women, are taken to Mathari Hospital, although the budgetary provision to facilitate treatment at the facility is severely limited.
- 1951. To tackle mental health issues, the officers submitted that there are 30 'Shuga programme peer educators' at the NYS Paramilitary Academy. 'Shuga Programme' is an interactive video show that engages the youth on issues of drug abuse, unintended pregnancy, and HIV prevention.
- 1952. Further, it was submitted that there are six Sister-to-Sister peer educators providing psychosocial support at the NYS paramilitary facility for training for recruits. Out of these initiatives, some officers addicted to drugs have been taken through rehabilitation programmes. Through the programme also, cases of officers experiencing acute stress, trauma, depression and other mental disorders are being addressed. The Service submitted that the institution does not have any professional counsellors.

Findings

1953. The Taskforce noted that there are fundamental issues relating to mental health in the respective Services. There seem to be emerging trends of mental health challenges affecting the members of the Service, evidenced through signs of stress, drug abuse, and alcoholism.
1954. The Taskforce further found that these mental health issues can be attributed to the challenges that face members of the Services on a day-to-day basis. The Taskforce agrees with the officers that some of these symptoms of mental health issues arise out of poor working environment and lack of psychosocial support systems. The Taskforce is of the view that the prevalent cases of drug and alcohol abuse have significantly impacted on the productivity of the Service.
1955. Since 2012, a total of 65 NYS officers have been admitted to rehabilitation centres for various reasons including mental health challenges, with the highest numbers –20 and 12 being recorded in 2019 and 2012, respectively.

Table 23. 2: Number of NYS officers admitted to rehabilitation centres since 2012

Year	Number of officers
2012	02
2013	01
2014	0
2015	0
2016	08
2017	07
2018	04
2019	20
2020	04
2021	12
2022	04
Total	62

Recommendations

1956. The Taskforce has considered the issues raised regarding mental health care in NYS and makes the following recommendations:
- (a) Introduction of Guidance and Counselling services and well-equipped psychosocial support facilities in all units of the Service;
 - (b) In order to ensure spiritual nourishment and wellness of members of the Service, NYS should post chaplains to all its units and field stations;
 - (c) NYS should introduce a 24-hour toll-free call support centre where officers can receive debriefing, first line of care, linkages and a chance to disclose their concerns;
 - (d) NYS should develop a policy on mental health to address issues of stigma;
 - (e) Further, it is recommended that psychological counselling should be included in all training programmes of the Service for members; and
 - (f) The proposed medical cover for servicemen and women to include mental disorders, diagnosis and treatment.

Uniforms

1957. NYS, as both a disciplined and uniformed Service, has uniform as one of its critical components. The uniform is not only a form of identity but also one that instils discipline and a sense of pride. The uniform is a unique identifier of the service that distinguishes members from those of other institutions.

1958. Just like other uniformed Services, the issues around uniform include: quality, quantity, frequency of issuance, fit for purpose and uniqueness.
1959. The Taskforce was mandated to assess, consider, review and recommend the nature, quality and standard of uniform for members of the Service. In compliance with the said task, the Taskforce went around the country to gather information that would inform its recommendations.
1960. The Taskforce noted that the Service has a well-structured uniform system tailored to various ranks and occasions. Each uniform category is accompanied by specific accessories that complement the overall appearance. This attention to detail ensures that officers are appropriately attired for their roles and responsibilities.
1961. The differentiation in uniform types, colours, and accompanying accessories reflects a keen understanding of the diverse needs and contexts in which officers may operate. It also indicates a commitment to professionalism and discipline within the Service.
1962. Additionally, the inclusion of specific uniform requirements for different ranks, such as DG, DDG, College CDT, Deputy CDT, Director of Music, and Bandsmen and Bands women highlights the attention given to detail and the importance of representation within the Service. (see Annex for details of uniforms in the Service).

Summary of officers', public and stakeholder views

1963. It was submitted that the Service is frequently well-kitted with standard uniforms. It was also submitted that the quality of the uniform was good and the quantity was adequate. The existence of an internal uniform production system seemed to have largely contributed to the efficiency of the issuance of uniforms.
1964. The foregoing notwithstanding, members of the Service submitted that they are compelled to use the ordinary working uniforms without protective gear while undertaking national service duties such as farm work, road construction, and rescue operations, among others.
1965. It was submitted that there is no appropriate uniform for women that includes trousers, shirts and maternity attire.

Findings

1966. The Taskforce established that the Service has a working formula that ensures the members of NYS have appropriate uniform, although they have inadequate fit-for-purpose uniforms and kitting.
1967. The Taskforce established that the Service has a working policy that ensures seamless issuance of appropriate uniform, which can be attributed partly to the existence of an own-production facility.
1968. The Taskforce established that there was no gender consideration for certain aspects of female officer's uniform in the Service, especially the maternity attire, the zipping of trousers, and the buttons for blouses.

Recommendations

1969. Having considered the issues raised regarding uniforms, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
 - (a) The Service should ensure gender consideration for certain aspects of female officers' uniform, especially the maternity attire, the zipping of trousers, and the buttons for blouses;

- (b) The Service should ensure that members of NYS have appropriate and fit-for-purpose uniforms and kitting;
- (c) The NYS capacity for uniform production should be enhanced in order to serve other disciplined Services;
- (d) Supply management of uniforms should be decentralised from the National Youth Service headquarters to functional regional, unit and station levels;
- (e) Since uniforms are items that are subject to wear and tear, they should be supplied and issued a set of uniforms to officers automatically, once a year.

23.4 Housing

Current context and practice

1970. The Taskforce was mandated to assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current housing policy for members of the Service and, where appropriate, to recommend review including recommendation for a housing mortgage for NYS officers.

Summary of officers', public and stakeholder views

1971. The officers decried the state of housing as presenting a big challenge. The few available houses are in a deplorable state characterised by leaking roofs, walls and sewers, poor lighting, and a general state of disrepair. It was stated that most housing units in NYS have been condemned by the Ministry of Public Works. Officers noted that they pay rent to the State Department for Housing and yet no repair or maintenance is ever undertaken on the units.
1972. Members of the public, more so those living close to the field units, submitted their views on the substandard houses where the officers and servicemen and women reside.
1973. It was also stated that accommodation is inadequate and presents a big challenge in the entire Service. Lack of adequate housing, as well as non-payment of commuter and house allowance to the junior officers has caused crowding and compelled two or more families to share one housing unit without consideration of marital status and family size. This has precipitated mental anguish, moral decadence, family breakups, and other traumatic experiences for the officers and a toxic development environment for growing children.
1974. In some field units, like Athi River, the Taskforce was shown a model modern house for officers constructed under the initiative of the Commanding Officer using the available labour and innovative building blocks. However, the CO could not continue replicating such projects as he was required to pay 2 per cent of the costs of construction to the State Department for Public Works, and then later on the State Department for Housing would start collecting rent upon its completion and occupation.
1975. The servicemen and women complained that their living conditions continued to be deplorable. The crowding in barracks not only poses danger but also creates a fertile environment for the spread of communicable diseases.
1976. Members of the Service proposed a programme for modernising the existing houses and barracks as well as building more houses for officers. Stakeholders submitted that such a modernisation programme was easier to undertake since the Service already has the equipment and a workforce.

Table 23. 3: Distribution of NYS officers housing and accommodation

S/ No.	Rank	Staff Establishment			
		AE	IN POST	Officers Housed in NYS Institutional Housing	Officers Housed in Private Housing outside NYS
1.	DG	1	1	0	1
2.	DDG	4	1	1	0
3.	DIR	6	0	0	0
4.	SDD	7	3	2	1
5.	DD	11	8	3	5
6.	SAD	20	16	5	11
7.	AD	40	30	10	20
8.	Sand SUPT	50	36	30	6
9.	SUPT	80	75	70	5
10.	C. INSP	170	112	112	0
11.	INSP	230	225	215	10
12.	Sand SGT	336	147	93	54
13.	SGT	502	268	173	95
14.	CPL	724	454	241	213
15.	PVT	1037	428	212	216
		3218	1805	1167	637

Source: NYS

Findings

1977. The Taskforce admits that the nature of duties and responsibilities of members and staff of the Service requires them to be housed within the NYS work stations. Currently, the Service has 1,087, houses against a requirement of 2,247 staff, whose needs are managed by the State Department for Housing.
1978. It is the finding of the Taskforce that most of the NYS houses are dilapidated. Some units and stations, especially those in hardship areas, have makeshift structures to house members of the Service.
1979. The available houses are usually allocated to the officers. Servicemen and women, on the other hand, live in barracks at no cost. With the increased admission numbers for servicemen and women, the Taskforce finds that there has been corresponding pressure on the existing houses for officers and barracks for servicemen and women. The increased numbers require additional officers to manage the trainees. It is noteworthy that there has not been any deliberate attempt to expand the existing housing infrastructure to accommodate the growing needs of the Service. The current housing facilities cannot accommodate any additional servicemen and women.
1980. Just like NPS and KPS, the Taskforce found many cases of officers and servicemen and women living in condemned houses and barracks, respectively. In all the stations visited, the housing could appropriately be described as deplorable. The units were condemned, yet rent continued to being deducted from the officers' pay. There was no maintenance or repair by the State Department for Housing and Public Works. Officers below the rank of Senior Sergeant have no house allowance but supplementation, which ranges from KSh. 1,650 to KSh. 2550 a month.
1981. The barracks used to house the servicemen and women are traditional in design, congested and dilapidated because the Service has increased the number of recruits while the capacity of the barracks remains the same. Some of the barracks are also old, with broken window panes and no electricity. The picture from the housing units and barracks was that of a Service that seems keen on punishing its members as opposed to training them to be of service to the

nation. Some officers, specially, those in the lower ranks, share one housing unit between three of them, which deprives them of any privacy.

1982. The Taskforce found that despite the express constitutional requirement to incorporate persons with disabilities (PWDs) in mainstream public service, NYS premises and facilities have not been modified for use by the differently-abled persons within the community.

Table 23. 4: Distribution of NYS housing per unit

S/ No.	Unit	No. of Houses
	NYS Headquarters	Nil
	NYS Nairobi Holding Unit	549
	NYS Mechanical and Transport Branch	Nil
	NYS Engineering Institute	Nil
	NYS Texture and Garment Technology Institute	Nil
	NYS Vocational Training Institute	Nil
	NYS Yatta Field Unit	39
	NYS Athi River Field Unit	10
	NYS Mavoloni Field Unit	7
	NYS Garissa, Mbalambala	4
	NYS Technical College Mombasa	40
	NYS Mwatate	Nil
	NYS Witu	5
	NYS Hindi	4
	NYS Tana	Nil
	NYS Paramilitary Academy	290
	NYS Technical Training Institute, Naivasha	114
	NYS Tumaini	17
	NYS Kirimun	Nil
	NYS Turbo	18
	NYS Kerio Valley	Nil
	NYS Kisumu	1
	NYS Lambwe	7
	Total No. of houses in the Service	1,105
	Total No. of personnel	2,247
	Current Deficit of Housing Units	1,142

Source: NYS

Recommendations

1983. The Taskforce has analysed the issues described in the foregoing section and makes the following recommendations:
- The Service should develop a comprehensive housing policy that takes into consideration cases of housing allowance and mortgages for all officers;
 - The Service, in consultation with the State Department for Public Works and Housing, should develop model barracks and staff houses (*cookie-cutter model*) that take into consideration safety, sanitation, ventilation and climatic conditions, which can be replicated in all the field units and stations;
 - Owing to the skill set and manpower possessed by the NYS, the Taskforce recommends that the Government facilitates the Service to construct housing units for its members and waive levies and charges to enable the Service to construct and manage its own housing complexes;
 - The management and maintenance of all NYS institutional houses should revert to the Service from the State Department for Housing. In this regard, NYS should be allowed

to collect rent and retain revenues in the proposed Revolving Fund for development, repair and maintenance.

- (e) The Government should set aside a reasonable percentage of the affordable housing scheme for NYS officers.

CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR: TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

24.1 Introduction

1984. The Taskforce was mandated to assess the adequacy, sufficiency or otherwise of NYS tools, equipment, gear, communication and other measures, and to make appropriate recommendations including modernisation and embracing technology in NYS enterprise and commercial activities.
1985. The Taskforce visited various counties and NYS institutions where it heard views and collected memoranda on the state of tools and equipment used by the Service. Further, the members of the Taskforce had opportunity to inspect the premises and NYS industries where they gathered crucial information and made observations about the state of equipment at the disposal of the Service.

24.2 Tooling, modernisation and ICT

Current context and practice

1986. In the performance of its duties, the Taskforce was also mandated to recommend the most appropriate measures to be taken to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Service. Pursuant to the directive of His Excellency the President, members of the Taskforce further inquired into the industrial best practices to compare the most efficient tools and equipment and the Service's adoption of technology.
1987. As earlier pointed out in this Report, the Service was established as a corporate entity under the 2018 Act, and is expected to be commercially self-sustaining by providing vocational training, professional and personal development programmes and activities for members of the Service, as well as undertaking such enterprises and commercial activities as the Council may, from time to time, determine. As such, this section speaks to the current state of tools and the uptake of technology and ICT in the tooling framework of NYS, which would help it increase its productivity and reduce its reliance on the exchequer.

Summary of officers', stakeholder views and submissions

1988. First, it was submitted that the Service has poor quality equipment, which break down frequently, leading to delays in projects and increased costs of repair and maintenance. This issue is compounded by the failure to procure modern equipment for the NYS Industry. The Taskforce was informed that NYS industrial machines and equipment, which are in use today, were last procured in 2014.
1989. The Taskforce was informed that the Service currently has 229 trucks, 257 plant and machines and 92 small vehicles, which are inadequate to meet the operational demands on the Service. It was submitted that the Service has annual targets for farm and industrial produce, which are difficult to achieve with the current inadequate and outdated equipment. It was the view of the officers that with modern equipment in sufficient numbers, the Service could exceed the set targets.
1990. It was further submitted by the officers that 55 per cent of the machinery and equipment is obsolete and unserviceable due to unavailability of spare parts in the local market.
1991. The Taskforce was also informed that the Service has established 33 workshops and yards out of the required 63 across its training institutions; hence there is a shortage of workshops and tools within the Service.
1992. Likewise, the Taskforce was informed that the Service has 17 farming units with capacity to produce food for internal consumption and a surplus for sale if modern technology is

embraced. Three (3) of these units currently host demonstration farms for NYS students and the general public.

Table 24. 1: Current utilisation of NYS farms

S/No.	Unit	Total Acreage	Acreage under crops	Number of Livestock
1	Yatta	1,042	235	Cattle – 104 Rabbits – 110 Fish – 29,000
2	Athi River	2,980	206	Cattle - 144 Sheep – 1 Goats - 41
3	Tumaini	600.78	479	Cattle – 32 Pigs – 44 Rabbits - 50
4	Mavoloni	949.7	114	Cattle- 99 Sheep – 162 Goats - 186
5	Naivasha	133.01	17	Poultry – 2,000
6	Hindi	1543	200	0
7	Witu	296.4	211	0
8	Lambwe	631.08	159	0
9	Kerio valley	10.99	6	Cattle – 10
10	Garissa Mbalambala	170.92	65	0
11	Tana Basin	344.07	38	0
12	NYS College	743.47	9	55
13	Kisumu	23.81	3.5	0
14	Kirimun	85,807.8	56	Cattle – 56 Sheep – 985 Horses - 15
15	Mwatate	300	39	0
16	Turbo	4,000	126	Cattle – 26 Poultry – 1,000
17	Mombasa	246.97	10	Cattle - 14
Total		99,824	1973.5	

Source: NYS

Notes:

- (i) Farming in the above units is almost entirely rain-fed, with limited irrigation.
- (ii) Most of the units do not have reliable farm tractors and equipment for land preparation.
- (iii) Funding for agricultural production is severely constrained.

1993. The Service currently has one (1) Catering School at NYS College in Gilgil, with one kitchen for practical lessons and demonstration against a student population of 1,142. The kitchen also shows a dire shortage of the necessary facilities to train and equip the learners.

1994. Agricultural production in the Service is not mechanised. For instance, the 170-acre Garissa-Mbalambala Field Unit, which grows rice and horticultural produce, does not have a farm tractor, an excavator for maintaining water canals, or a combine harvester, among other sorely needed farm machinery. Because of low mechanisation, the field unit has only been able to utilise 50 acres of its land – less than a third – for agricultural purposes.

1995. Still on the same issue, it was submitted that in Mombasa NYS Training College, the machines are inefficient and obsolete. Majority of the tools in the stores are blunt, broken down and in need of repair. The officers noted that the machines are insufficient to provide

the required resources for training and production of materials for the market. The servicemen and women studying automotive operations only tackle theory and have no practical skills to repair motor vehicles or drive them.

1996. Likewise, all the methods used for farming in Mwatate are outmoded. Besides, the farms are 10 kilometres from the officers' residence. Members of the Service walk to and from the farms daily, which affects productivity. The officers submitted that there is need to have vehicles transporting them to and from the farms.
1997. Some areas, like the Garissa Mbalambala field unit, have not been fully serviced by a reliable and secure communication network. Without reliable network coverage, communication, which is an essential component for realising the commercial capability of the Service, is hampered.
1998. Further, there is lack of closed-circuit television, drones, and other equipment for security in the units. Officers decried their constant reliance on other law enforcement agencies for protection while they can invest in their own security, particularly in the northern and North-Eastern regions that are prone to security risks. They proposed the creation of a specialised armed unit within the Service to offer protection to their installations.
1999. The colleges and vocational training institutions are currently not connected to the Internet and are, therefore, unable to enhance research and learning.
2000. It was also submitted that there is a shortage of vehicles, machinery, plant and equipment as well as the lack of requisite spare parts. Worse, there is inadequate supply of utility vehicles, such ambulances, water bowsers and fire engines.
2001. Members of the Service are not sufficiently equipped with safety and protective gear for use in the course of duty at workshops, in industries, and the farms.
2002. The Taskforce also received submissions on the current state of the NYS training institutions' infrastructure and its proposed optimum development. The Service submitted that it has limited training resources and facilities to ensure optimal learning. The current training facilities are overstretched and lack capacity to accommodate additional numbers in subsequent intakes.

Findings

2003. It is apparent that the most glaring deficits in the training institutions are inadequate work tools, outdated and dilapidated equipment, and the failure to embrace technology to improve efficiency and productivity. It is also clear that even the training schools are ill-equipped to effectively train the servicemen and women as well as produce the products required of them. As a result, the Service can hardly produce enough food to sustain itself, let alone a surplus for sale.
2004. The Taskforce also established that there is poor uptake of technology and ICT in the Service. Many field stations do not have access to the Internet, which is an essential tool for modern organisations. Worse, the Taskforce established that telecommunication access to units such as Garissa Mbalambala, Homa Bay, and Lambwe, is extremely poor, which hampers operations and connectivity to the rest of the world.
2005. The Taskforce also observed that one of the primary reasons for the inadequate tooling and failure to adopt modern technology is low funding. Until now, the Service has primarily depended on the budget allocation from the National Treasury, which has been insufficient to implement planned programmes, projects, and activities. Of particular concern is the Development Budget. In the FYs 2021/2022 and 2022/2023, the Service was allocated KSh. 50 million and KSh. 70 million in the Budget, respectively against a request for KSh. 812.7 million and KSh. 269 million, respectively. This has largely affected construction of infrastructure and facilities for servicemen women, resulting in strain on the existing ones.

2006. Still on the issue of funding, NYS complained that it had not received adequate seed capital to enable it effectively run commercial enterprises. NYS required an estimated KSh. . 6.8 billion over the five-year strategic plan period 2019/20 – 2023/24 to fully commercialise its production activities. This was aimed at increasing revenue generation, thereby reducing overreliance on the Exchequer. These funds were never fully disbursed.
2007. The Taskforce further established that the Service has inadequate infrastructure and facilities to run its activities. In 2014, through a presidential directive, NYS increased the annual intake of youth from 4,000 to 30,000. With chronic underfunding of the development budget, the existing infrastructure and facilities, including barracks, dining halls, classrooms and workshops, sewer systems, ablution blocks and security walls and fences in all field units were strained and remain inadequate to accommodate all NYS servicemen and women in the national service as well as technical and vocational training programmes. This necessitated enrolment of servicemen women in the Ministry of Education TVETs, and rationalisation of the annual youth intake from 30,000 to 20,000. The lack of infrastructure is also largely affecting the quality and purpose of the NYS training programme.
2008. The Taskforce further established that the Service is confronted by the challenge of obsolete vehicles, plant, machinery and equipment. Almost half of the NYS vehicles, plant, machinery and equipment under the Mechanical and Transport Branch (MTB) are unserviceable.
2009. The Taskforce also confirmed that there is minimal uptake of technology and ICT in the Service's operations. Despite the 2021 investment in an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, the Service still has a long way to go in terms of automating its services and adopting best practices in the digital age.

Recommendations

2010. The workforce must be equipped with the necessary tools and protective gear to enable them to provide the required output for effective service delivery. Most importantly, the modern society requires constant innovation and use of ICT to boost productivity. It is now trite that innovation and technology must go hand in hand, lest the organisation falls behind its competitors in its respective industries. As a commercial producer and trainer of youth, the Service must embrace technology and procure the best tools to enable it achieve its mandate. Having considered the memoranda and views of the public, the Taskforce recommends that:
 - (a) The Government should provide adequate funding to NYS to ensure that the Service has sufficient resources to acquire modern and efficient tools and equipment;
 - (b) The Service should embark on research and innovation in its areas of teaching and training;
 - (c) The Service should generate its own income, while the government establishes a Revolving Fund for the Service's sustainability;
 - (d) NYS should ensure proper management, inventory listing and accountability for its equipment;
 - (e) NYS should collaborate with the private sector and development partners to ensure modernisation of its equipment and the gradual replacement of obsolete plant and equipment in its training centres;
 - (f) The Service to develop an integrated ICT system that enables it leverage on technology and improve service delivery and efficiency in its operations;
 - (g) The Service should connect all its unit facilities to the National Fibre Optic Backbone Infrastructure (NFOB) to ensure access to fast Internet and automate all its operations and communication to enhance efficiency, productivity and accountability.

24.3 Titling of land and building modern premises

Current context and practice

2011. The Taskforce was further mandated to assess and recommend general reforms and improvement of NYS premises, including titling of all NYS land, as well as progressive adoption and building of modern NYS institutions that comply with international best practices and standards.
2012. NYS has 22 field units and the headquarters with a total 43,048 hectares of land. Some 16 units have titles or certificates of lease while 11 have allotment letters. On the other hand, four (4) units do not have title deeds, thus exposing them to the risk of land grabbing. A significant chunk of NYS land has either been grabbed or cordoned off by unscrupulous individuals; hence it is not available for development. In fact, Madogo Sub-unit and Laikipia Marmar have already been encroached despite the Service having an allotment letter for these two parcels.
2013. Titling of land is an integral part of the Taskforce's terms of reference. The Taskforce notes that without proper and defined rights to property, it is always challenging to invest and develop the land in issue. Such is the precarious position that the Service finds itself.

Officers', public and stakeholder views

2014. It was submitted that most NYS pieces of land have not been issued with title deeds. Several facilities had only allotment letters, which do not denote exclusive interest in land. As a result, there are many cases in court by different individuals and groups claiming ownership of NYS land (see table below for details).

Findings

2015. As already posited, the Taskforce is of the view that the issue of NYS facilities is closely tied to that of the ownership of NYS land.
2016. Records perused by the Taskforce indicate that NYS has a total size of approximately 99,824 acres of land. The lack of titles has inescapably exposed the properties to grabbing. There are many disputes and court cases touching on the Service's land.
2017. The Taskforce further observed that with such disputes over land, developing it to improve the physical facilities in NYS is a challenge. The Taskforce observed that some of the field units with allotment letters have been encroached.
2018. The Taskforce also finds that the lack of registered interest in NYS land, coupled with the lack of perimeter walls has exposed the parcels to encroachment and grabbing. Table 24.2 shows the land belonging to NYS and the current status.

Table 24. 2: List of NYS land and title status

No.	Land and Premises	Are (Ha)	County	Title Status
Land with Title				
1.	NYS Hq	33.94	Nairobi County	Titled
2.	NYS Textile & Garments Factory	2.236	Nairobi County	Titled
3.	NYS Engineering Institute	11.88	Nairobi County	Titled (Disputed & encroached)
4.	NYS Vocational Training Institute	1.556	Nairobi County	Titled
5.	NYS Miritini Sub-unit Msa	5.8967	Msa County	Titled
6.	NYS Technical College Msa	99.99	Msa County	Titled
7.	(i) NYS Gilgil (ii) Training College	301	Nakuru County	Titled
	(iii) Primary School	4.054	Nakuru County	Titled

No.	Land and Premises	Are (Ha)	County	Title Status
	(iv) Public purpose site	9.785	Nakuru County	Titled
	(v) Water treatment	0.3327	Nakuru County	Titled
8.	NYS Mpeketoni Sub-unit	7.7	Lamu County	Titled
9.	NYS Naivasha (TTI)	53.85	Nakuru County	Titled
10.	Tumaini Pri. School	2.023	Nyandarua County	Titled
11.	NYS Marmar Ranch	18030	Laikipia County	Titled
12.	NYS Lambwe Dev. Unit	255.5	Homa Bay County	Titled
13.	NYS Kisii Municipality	1.2	Kisii County	Titled
14.	NYS Kisumu Township	9.638	Kisumu County	Titled
15.	NYS Nakuru Township	2.349	Nakuru County	Titled
16.	NYS Yatta Field Unit	408.3	Machakos County	Titled
17.	(i) NYS Athi River Unit parcel	721.5	Machakos County	Titled
18.	(ii) NYS Athi River Unit parcel	80.93	Machakos County	Titled
19.	(iii) NYS Athi River Unit parcel	80.94	Machakos County	Titled
20.	(iv) NYS Athi River Unit parcel	80.64	Machakos County	Titled
21.	(v) NYS Athi River Unit parcel	81	Machakos County	Titled
22.	(vi) NYS Athi River Unit parcel	80.76	Machakos County	Titled
23.	(vii) NYS Athi River Unit parcel	80.71	Machakos County	Titled
24.	(i) NYS Mavoloni Field Unit	250.41	Machakos County	Titled
25.	(ii) NYS Mavoloni Sub-Unit	100.5	Machakos County	Titled
26.	(iii) NYS Mavoloni Sub-	33.59	Machakos County	Titled
27.	(i) Unit NYS T. College Mombasa		Msa County	Titled
28.	(ii) NYS Secondary School Msa	2.3	Msa County	Titled
29.	(iii) NYS Primary School Msa	2.662	Msa County	Titled
30.	(iv) NYS Mosque site Msa	0.2265	Msa County	Titled
31.	(v) NYS Church Msa	0.1818	Msa County	Titled
32.	(vi) NYS Nursery School Msa	0.221	Msa County	Titled
33.	(vii) NYS Health Centre Msa	0.3745	Msa County	Titled
34.	NYS Bura Sub-Unit	87.02	Tana River County	Titled
35.	NYS South Ugenya	2.0	Siaya County	Titled
Land Parcels Surveyed with Deed Plans				
1.	NYS T. College Mombasa (i) Shopping Centre	3.32	Mombasa	Surveyed with Deed Plans
2.	(ii) Baptist Church	0.221	Mombasa	Surveyed with Deed Plans
3.	(iii) Social Hall	0.14	Mombasa	Surveyed with Deed Plans
4.	Sports Ground	1.52	Mombasa	Surveyed with Deed Plans

No.	Land and Premises	Are (Ha)	County	Title Status
5.	NYS Witu Farm	98.61	Lamu	Surveyed with Deed Plans
6.	NYS Naninghi Camp	4.0	Tana- River	Surveyed with Deed Plans
7.	NYS Bura Snr. Officers' Mess	3.668	Tana River	Surveyed with Deed Plans
8.	NYS Tana Basin Rd. Project	38	Tana- River	Surveyed with Deed Plans
9.	NYS Tana Basin Hola Camp	53.01	Tana River	Surveyed with Deed Plans
10.	NYS Tumaini Farm Unit	243.23	Nyandarua	Surveyed with Deed Plans
Land Parcels Surveyed without Deed Plans				
1.	NYS Garissa and Mbalambala Garissa/Mbalambala	78.08	Garissa	Surveyed without Deed Plans (disputed)
2.	NYS Turbo (i) Mess/Staff Quarters	10.44	Kakamega	Surveyed without Deed Plans (disputed)
	(ii) Craft school/ offices	9.11	Kakamega	Surveyed without Deed Plans
	(iii) Livestock	100.5	Kakamega	Surveyed without Deed Plans
3.	NYS Turbo Development Farm	4000	Kakamega	Surveyed without Deed Plans
4.	Kirimun-Kirimun Ranch	16703	Samburu	Surveyed without Deed Plans
5.	Athi River	73.9	Machakos	Surveyed without Deed Plans
6.	NYS Meru Municipality	0.2496	Meru	Surveyed without Deed Plans
Land Parcels with Part Development Plans (PDP) & Allotment Letters not Surveyed				
1.	NYS Madogo Sub-unit	21.08	Tana River	With PDP and Allotment, not surveyed (disputed)
2.	NYS College catchment (Morendat water)	8	Nakuru	With PDP and Allotment, not surveyed
3.	NYS Hindi and Lamu Dev. Hindi/Lamu Dev. Unit	625	Lamu	With PDP and Allotment, not surveyed
4.	NYS Eldoret Municipality	6.2	Uasin Gishu	With PDP and Allotment, not surveyed
5.	NYS Mwatate Field Unit	122	Taita Taveta	With PDP and Allotment, not surveyed
Land Parcels without Part Development Plans (PDP) and without Allotment Claims				
1.	NYS Kerio-Valley Unit	4.45	Elgeyo-Marakwet	No PDT no allotment (disputed)
2.	NYS Mogotio Sub-unit	40.47	Baringo	No PDT no allotment letter
3.	NYS Mwatate Unit	-	Taita Taveta	No PDT no allotment letter
4.	NYS Subukia Sub-unit	8.09	Nakuru	Block 1 Parcel Number 112 Allotment letter No PDT
5.	NYS Tana Basin Minjila Camp	9.0	Tana River	No PDT no allotment letter
6.	NYS Mombasa Sub-unit	20.5	Kilifi	No PDT no allotment letter

Source: NYS

Recommendations

2019. Having analysed the emerging issues from the field and stakeholder submissions, the Taskforce makes the following recommendation on the issue of NYS land and premises:

- (a) NYS Council should, within six months, appoint and facilitate a committee to carry out an inventory of all NYS land and ensure titling. The relevant state agencies and institutions should provide requisite cooperation and facilitation to the committee;
- (b) The NYS leadership should plan for the progressive securing of all NYS land through fencing;
- (c) All court cases involving NYS land should be fast-tracked and any other disputes involving NYS land settled through the alternative dispute resolution process.
- (d) The NYS Council should take measures to regularise NYS facilities constructed on contested or private land.
- (e) There should be a waiver on stamp duty and other charges for speedier registration of titles of NYS land;
- (f) NYS should develop and ensure approval of a framework for facilities of the Service.

24.4 Training

Current context and practice

- 2020. Training the youth is at the core of the primary functions of the National Youth Service. One of the main objectives of establishing the Service was to provide skills for the youth to empower them to join the job market or to create employment opportunities.
- 2021. Therefore, it is critical that the servicemen and women trained at NYS be adequately skilled to fill market gaps. This was the initial vision of the Service, as it was primarily aimed at empowering the youth for job creation.
- 2022. Given the centrality that training occupies in human capital management, the Taskforce was mandated to examine all capacity building measures – including training curriculum, syllabus, continuous development training, and reward measures in order to recommend reforms including incorporation of incentives for NYS officers, especially the lower cadres to address professionalism, motivation and retention.
- 2023. Previously, NYS graduates were considered the best in their craft which, coupled with their disciplined background, propelled them to the top echelons of their respective fields. However, this prized position seems to have changed in the recent past.
- 2024. Therefore, it is critical that the officers as well as the servicemen and women being trained at NYS be adequately skilled. The officers are presumed to be the trainers of the Service volunteers.
- 2025. Table 24.3 shows the current number of NYS training institutions' approved and current enrolment. The Taskforce noted that the enrolment in all NYS training institutions was between 120 per cent and 250 per cent above approved capacity.

Table 24. 3: NYS training institutions

S/No.	Institution	County	Approved Establishment	Current Enrolment
1	Advanced Building School	Nakuru	200	1,216
2	Institute of Business Studies	Nairobi	300	1,453
3	Nairobi Engineering Craft Training School	Nairobi	200	854
4	Naivasha Institute of Social Studies	Nakuru	240	527
5	NYS Catering School, Gilgil	Nakuru	150	1,042
6	NYS Driving School	Nairobi	200	208
7	NYS Engineering Institute	Nairobi	550	1,580

S/No.	Institution	County	Approved Establishment	Current Enrolment
8	NYS Technical College, Mombasa	Mombasa	700	1,306
9	NYS Technical Training Institute	Nakuru	250	550
10	NYS Turbo Technical and Vocational College	Kakamega	550	408
11	On Job Training Kerio Valley	Elgeyo Marakwet	200	1234
12	On Job Training MTB	Nairobi	200	537
13	On Job Training Tana Basin	Tana River	500	900
14	Plant Operators and Mechanics School	Machakos	200	590
15	Textile and Garment Technology Institute	Nairobi	350	445
16	Vocational Training Institute	Nairobi	300	704
17	Yatta School of Agriculture	Machakos	350	782
	TOTAL		5,440	14,336

Source: NYS

Officers and stakeholder views and submissions

2026. It was submitted that there are inadequate academic materials at the training institutions, e.g., books, pens and other stationary. The NYS training centres often lack adequate infrastructure, such as well-equipped workshops, classrooms, and dormitories. This, the Taskforce was informed, affects the quality of training and hampers the programme's ability to attract and retain young people.
2027. Further, the Taskforce was informed that there is lack of diversity in training courses in NYS colleges, which are unable to cater to new and emerging needs in the market and incorporate other disciplines such as ICT, medical studies, visual arts, aeronautical and marine engineering, adaptive eco-climate studies, renewable energy studies, and guidance and counselling. The officers and servicemen and women submitted that the training curriculum does not correspond to the market needs as most courses offered are not required in the economy; or have already saturated labour market.
2028. Further, it was submitted that there are only 17 NYS training institutions all over the country, limiting the Service's ability to admit recruits from all the 47 counties. This results in congestion in the institutions.
2029. Further, the Taskforce was informed that the training is more focused on the servicemen and women, and less on the NYS officers and instructors to update their skills. Yet, it was submitted that the officers are the primary instructors of the volunteers, and therefore need to advance their knowledge and skills to become better tutors.
2030. It was further submitted that, where the officers are trained, the in-service training is offered to gazetted officers who are due to retire, which offers little value for the growth and development of the Service. Effectively, junior officers within the Service are overlooked in the distribution of training opportunities.
2031. The Taskforce was further informed that many NYS officers have not received specialised or continuous training on constitutional human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the application of international instruments ratified by Kenya because the NYS curriculum has not integrated these elements. This is despite the fact that NYS officers are often deployed to work with other agencies on matters relating to service to the public.
2032. It also came to the attention of the Taskforce that although NYS has trained some of its officers, there is an over-reliance on external actors, such as development partners and civil society, to organise, conduct and fund training, which is not sustainable.

2033. The Taskforce was also informed that members of the Service are not properly trained in the use of modern tools and equipment. Hence, they end up lagging behind market trends despite having vital skills in specialist areas. Further, the use of tools without proper training exposes members to risks of injury.
2034. It was also submitted that NYS often experiences a shortage of trained trainers to teach its beneficiaries. This shortage results in the use of untrained trainers, which undermines the quality of training provided.

Findings

2035. The Taskforce observed that the most pronounced issues include the use of outdated technology to train members of the Service, therefore, failing to prepare them adequately for the job market; failure to revise the training curriculum and syllabi, and over-emphasis on training volunteers without paying equal attention to the officers. Further, there are insufficient training facilities throughout the country to adequately offer training support to the officers.
2036. It is established that the NYS training programmes require specialised equipment to provide practical training to the members of the Service. However, the programme often lacks the necessary equipment, which limits the effectiveness of the training provided.
2037. The Taskforce found that the syllabus for the servicemen and women, which has eight subjects, has not incorporated other diverse marketable disciplines like ICT, software engineering and coding, photography, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, social media entrepreneurship, business process outsourcing, waste management, and modern building technology, etc. The continued training on skills that are either outdated or have saturated the market has minimal economic benefit to the trainees. Besides, the Service has not incorporated financial literacy into its syllabus, which is a vital cog in modern-day adult trainings.
2038. The Taskforce observes that the foregoing issues, coupled with an acute shortage of trained personnel, exposes the Service to the risk of substandard training for the servicemen and women as well as its officers. The shortage of trained personnel is compounded by the influx of recruits after the 2015 presidential directive, which stretched training resources at the Service beyond its normal capacity.
2039. Further, it was observed that there is poor coordination of the various stakeholders providing training to NYS. The Taskforce noted that the increased intake of recruits compelled the Service to outsource some of its training to TVET institutions, which are not premised within the NYS discipline infrastructure. Other than failing to inculcate the discipline and ethos objectified in the NYS Act, the practice creates an atmosphere of unpredictability and commercialisation of the training, which obviously affects quality.

Table 24. 4: NYS training facilities and courses offered

	Institution		Description	Category	Exam Category
1	Advanced Building School Gilgil (Nakuru County)	1	Electrical Wireman	Artisan	NITA
		2	Carpentry and Joinery	Artisan	NITA
		3	Masonry	Artisan	NITA
		4	Plumbing	Artisan	NITA
		5	Upholstery	Artisan	NITA
		6	Building Technology	Craft	KNEC
		7	Carpentry	Craft	NITA
		8	Electrical & Electronics Engineering	Craft	KNEC

	Institution		Description	Category	Exam Category
		9	Masonry	Craft	NITA
		10	Plumbing	Craft	NITA
2	Driving School (Nairobi County)	1	Driving	Artisan	NTSA
3	Institute Of Business Studies (Nairobi County)	1	Business Management	Craft	KNEC
		2	Human Resource Management	Craft	KNEC
		3	Sales and Marketing	Craft	KNEC
		4	Supply Chain Management	Craft	KNEC
		5	Secretarial Studies (Group and Stage)	Craft	KNEC
		6	Accounting Technician Diploma	Diploma	KASNEB
		7	Business Management	Diploma	KNEC
		8	Information Communication Technology	Diploma	KNEC
		9	Sales and Marketing	Diploma	KNEC
		10	Supply Chain Management	Diploma	KNEC
		11	Secretarial Studies	Diploma	KNEC
		12	CPA (K) - Certified Public Accountant	Professional	KASNEB
4	On Job Training- Kerio Valley (Elgeyo Marakwet County)	1	Motor Vehicle Mechanic	Artisan	NITA
		2	Plant Mechanic	Artisan	NTSA
		3	Plant Operation	Artisan	NTSA
5	Nairobi Engineering Craft Training School (Nairobi County)	1	Automotive Engineering	Craft	KNEC
		2	Electrical & Electronics Engineering	Craft	KNEC
		3	Information Communication Technology	Craft	KNEC
		4	Mechanical Production	Craft	KNEC
6	Naivasha Institute of Social Studies (Nakuru County)	1	Library Studies	Craft	KNEC
		2	Social Work and Community Development	Craft	KNEC
		3	Child Care & Protection	Diploma	KNEC
		4	Early Childhood Teacher Education	Diploma	KNEC
		5	Disaster Management	Diploma	KNEC
		6	Human Resource Management	Diploma	KNEC
		7	Human Resource Management	Craft	KNEC
		8	Library Studies	Diploma	KNEC
		9	Counselling Psychology	Diploma	KNEC
		10	Social Work and Community Development	Diploma	KNEC
7	NYS Catering School – Gilgil (Nakuru County)	1	Catering and Accommodation Operations	Craft	KNEC
		2	Food and Beverage Production, Service and Sales	Craft	KNEC
		3	Information Communication Technology	Craft	KNEC

	Institution		Description	Category	Exam Category
		4	Catering and Accommodation Management	Diploma	KNEC
		5	Food and Beverage Management	Diploma	KNEC
8	NYS Engineering Institute (Nairobi County)	1	Automotive Engineering	Diploma	KNEC
		2	Building Technology	Diploma	KNEC
		3	Civil Engineering	Diploma	KNEC
		4	Computer Studies	Diploma	KNEC
		5	Electrical & Electronics Engineering (Instrumentation & Control Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		6	Electrical and Electronics Engineering (Power Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		7	Electrical Engineering (Telecommunication Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		8	Aeronautical Engineering (Airframes & Engines Options)	Diploma	KNEC
		9	Mechanical Engineering (Construction Plant Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		10	Mechanical Engineering (Industrial Plant Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		11	Mechanical Engineering (Welding and Fabrication Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		12	Aeronautical Engineering (Avionics Options)	Diploma	KNEC
		13	Electrical And Electronics Engineering (Telecommunication Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		14	Mechanical Engineering (Production Option)	Diploma	KNEC
9	NYS Technical College Mombasa (Mombasa County)	1	Carpentry and Joinery	Artisan	NITA
		2	Refrigeration and Air Conditioning	Artisan	NITA
		3	Automotive Engineering	Craft	KNEC
		4	Building Technology	Craft	KNEC
		5	Carpentry	Craft	NITA
		6	Electrical & Electronics Engineering	Craft	KNEC
		7	Masonry	Craft	NITA
		8	Mechanical Production	Craft	KNEC
		9	Plumbing	Craft	NITA
		10	Welding and Fabrication	Craft	NITA
		11	Building Technology	Diploma	KNEC
		12	Electrical & Electronics Engineering (Power Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		13	Mechanical Engineering (Welding and Fabrication Option)	Diploma	KNEC
		14	Mechanical Engineering (Production Option)	Diploma	KNEC

	Institution		Description	Category	Exam Category
10	NYS Turbo Technical and Vocational College (Kakamega County)	1	Motor Vehicle Mechanic	Artisan	NITA
		2	Welding and Fabrication	Artisan	NITA
		3	Automotive Engineering	Craft	KNEC
		4	Mechanical Production	Craft	KNEC
11	On Job Training Mechanical & Transport Branch (Nairobi County)	1	Motor Vehicle Electrician	Artisan	NITA
		2	Motor Vehicle Mechanic	Artisan	NITA
		3	Panel Beating & Spray Painting	Artisan	NITA
12	On Job Training Tana (Tana River County)	1	Motor Vehicle Electrician	Artisan	NITA
		2	Motor Vehicle Mechanic	Artisan	NITA
		3	Plant Mechanic	Artisan	NTSA
		4	Plant Operation	Artisan	NTSA
		5	Welding and Fabrication	Artisan	NITA
13	Plant Operators and Mechanics School Yatta (Machakos County)	1	Motor Vehicle Mechanic	Artisan	NITA
		2	Plant Mechanic	Artisan	NTSA
		3	Plant Operation	Artisan	NTSA
		4	Welding and Fabrication	Artisan	NITA
14	School of Fashion – Naivasha (Nakuru County)	1	Fashion & Design	Craft	KNEC
		2	Information Communication Technology	Craft	KNEC
		3	Fashion & Design	Diploma	KNEC
15	Textile and Garment Technical Institute (Nairobi County)	1	Hair Dressing and Beauty Therapy	Artisan	NAVCET
		2	Tailoring and Dressmaking	Artisan	NITA
		3	Fashion & Design	Diploma	KNEC
16	NYS Vocational Training Institute (Nairobi County)	1	Electrical Wireman	Artisan	NITA
		2	Motor Vehicle Mechanic	Artisan	NITA
		3	Welding and Fabrication	Artisan	NITA
		4	Electrical & Electronics Engineering	Craft	NITA
		5	Automotive Engineering	Craft	KNEC
		6	Information Communication Technology	Craft	KNEC
		7	Plumbing	Craft	KNEC
17	NYS Yatta School of Agriculture (Machakos)	1	General Agriculture	Craft	KNEC
		2	Information Communication Technology	Craft	KNEC
		3	General Agriculture	Diploma	KNEC
		4	Environmental Science & Technology	Diploma	KNEC
		5	Information Communication Technology	Diploma	KNEC

Recommendations

2040. Having analysed the issues, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:

- (a) The Service should enhance and diversify its curriculum and areas of training to cover market-relevant skills such as ICT; and area-specific courses such as Marine in Mombasa region;
- (b) The NYS leadership is encouraged to collaborate with county governments to establish mutually beneficial training programmes for youth;
- (c) The Government should consider the reinstatement of the NYS pre-university and tertiary institutions programme;
- (d) NYS should integrate human rights, gender and disability mainstreaming in their training programmes to reinforce the importance of human rights as a fundamental part of personal and professional development.

24.5 Gender mainstreaming and sexual harassment

Current context and practice

- 2041. With the ever-changing societal dynamics, it is imperative that private and public institutions comply with the prevailing trends. The issue of gender politics must be addressed by all organisations to ensure equality and equity in the sharing of resources, opportunities and responsibilities between men and women.
- 2042. This Taskforce was required to assess issues of gender mainstreaming, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, establishment of gender desks, psychological support, guidance and counselling at the Service and make recommendations to improve mental wellbeing in the NYS.
- 2043. The Constitution contains important commitments to gender equality and women's empowerment, and sets out the national values and principles that bind all Kenyans in implementing public policies including those that relate to the marginalised groups.
- 2044. The State Department for Gender and Affirmative Action in the Ministry of Public Service, Performance and Delivery Management is responsible for promoting gender equality and empowerment of women in Kenya. One of its key responsibilities is to promote the development and review of gender policies and legislation. The department developed the National Gender and Development Policy as a review of the Gender Policy adopted by the Cabinet in 2000. The policy outlines the national agenda for gender equality and how Kenya intends to realise these ideals. It details the overarching principles, which will be adopted and integrated into the National and County Government sectoral policies, practices and programmes and by all state and non-state actors.
- 2045. Having internalised its mandate, this Taskforce collected views and submissions on that specific issue, which views are briefly summarised hereunder.
- 2046. Gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes for women and men in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally, and to ensure that inequality is not perpetuated.
- 2047. Sexual and gender-based violence is any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person contrary to their will and that is based on socially ascribed differences between males and females, and which results in, or is likely lead to physical or psychological harm or suffering

for women, girls, boys and men - including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life, and include the economic and social harm caused by such violence, both long term and short term.

Stakeholder views and submissions

2048. It was submitted that many young women who participate in the NYS programme have reported being subjected to unwanted sexual advances, coercion, and even rape by their supervisors or fellow participants. This type of behaviour creates a hostile environment that makes it difficult for women to participate fully in the programme and to achieve their goals. Furthermore, it was submitted that most members of the Service are not aware of what constitutes sexual harassment or how to report it.
2049. It was submitted that NYS has a system in place for reporting incidents of sexual harassment, but this system is often inadequate. Often, most of the officers do not know the process of reporting and processing gender-based complaints because the policy on sexual harassment has not been adequately publicised.
2050. The Taskforce was informed that perpetrators of sexual harassment in the NYS programme are often not held to account for their actions. This can be due to lack of evidence, failure to investigate complaints thoroughly, or lack of consequences for those who are found culpable in incidents of harassment.
2051. The Taskforce was also informed that the Service does not have sufficient resources, including staff, funding, and training, to provide effective support to victims of gender-based violence. This can lead to long wait times for support, and limited options for counselling or other services.
2052. Similarly, the Taskforce was informed that no institutional channels exist in most of the field and farm units to report any case of GBV. Effectively, the members of the Service do not have a complaints channel should they be subjected to abuse or harassment.
2053. It was also submitted that some field units do not have female representation either for the officers or even the servicewomen. Effectively, some of the women miss out on gaining vital lessons that are taught in those specific field units, having not been given the opportunity to choose whether or not to go to those field units.

Findings

2054. The Taskforce notes that there are significant problems and a pattern of sexual harassment within the Service. Further, while there are mechanisms to address this vice, the victims of sexual harassment feel that these mechanisms are inadequate as very few perpetrators are sanctioned for their actions. Ultimately, sexual harassment of volunteers and junior officers has been normalised within the Service.
2055. It was also observed that there is no proper framework to ensure gender balance across all regions and departments. Specifically, women are restricted from working in some regions because of the difficult climatic environment, even when they would have opted to work in those regions.
2056. Further, the perception of the Taskforce is that members of the Service do not understand the boundaries of what is decent and what could amount to sexual violence or harassment. As such, many cases of the vice go unreported, which perpetuates the practice within the Service. Primarily, this may be attributed to lack of a comprehensive Sexual Harassment Policy in the Service.
2057. Further, the Taskforce found that the available mechanisms for addressing sexual and gender-based violence have not been made known to the vulnerable groups.

2058. The Taskforce also identified a number of concerns regarding the gender composition of the ranks in NYS. The Service has a total of 1,765 uniformed officers across various ranks. There are 509 female officers, constituting approximately 29 per cent of the total. Male officers make up the majority, totalling 1,256, or approximately 71 per cent of the Service. The rank of Private has the highest proportion of female officers (144 or 28 per cent) followed by Corporal (127 or 25%). Senior Deputy Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Director have the lowest proportions of female officers at 2 (0.4%), 5 (1%), and 9 (1.8%), respectively.
2059. In the Deputy Director-General and Senior Deputy Director ranks, there are no female officers. Female officers make up 30 per cent of the Deputy Director rank, while males constitute 70 per cent. Female officers represent 30 per cent of the Assistant Director rank, with males comprising the remaining 70 per cent. The proportion of females remains lower than that of males.
2060. In the ranks of Senior Superintendent and Superintendent, females constitute 39 per cent and 27 per cent of the officers, respectively. Males make up the majority in both ranks. Female officers account for 36 per cent of the Chief Inspector rank, while males make up 64 per cent. The proportion of females in some ranks is higher than it was previously but still lower than males. In the rank of Inspector, female officers constitute 35 per cent while males make up 65 per cent.
2061. In the rank of Sergeant, female officers are 24 per cent those holding the rank of Senior Sergeant, with males accounting for 76 per cent. In the Sergeant rank, female officers make up only 8 per cent, while males dominate at 92 per cent. The proportion of females is the lowest in this rank across the entire Service. Female officers account for 35 per cent of all corporals, while males make up 65 per cent. In the Private rank, female officers are 35 per cent while males comprise 65 per cent.
2062. Overall, the data indicate a notable gender imbalance among NYS uniformed officers, with a higher proportion of males in all ranks. While there is an increase in female representation in some middle-ranking positions, women remain underrepresented across all ranks, with the highest proportion at 39 per cent in the Senior Superintendent rank.

Table 24. 5: NYS uniformed officers' gender distribution by rank

Rank	Female	%	Male	%	Total	% Proportion Male	Proportion Female
Deputy Director-General - NYS	0	0	2	100	2	0.2	0.0
Senior Deputy Director [1] - NYS	0	0	4	100	4	0.3	0.0
Senior Deputy Director [2] - NYS	2	25	6	75	8	0.5	0.4
Deputy Director - NYS	5	30	12	70	17	1.0	1.0
Assistant Director - NYS	9	30	22	70	31	1.8	1.8
Senior Superintendent - NYS	21	39	33	61	54	2.6	4.1
Superintendent - NYS	17	27	46	73	63	3.7	3.3
Chief Inspector NYS	40	36	72	64	112	5.7	7.9
Inspector - NYS	79	35	148	65	227	11.8	15.5
Senior Sergeant - NYS	43	24	138	76	181	11.0	8.4
Sergeant - NYS	22	8	258	92	280	20.5	4.3
Corporal - NYS	127	35	238	65	365	18.9	25.0
Private - NYS	144	35	277	65	421	22.1	28.3
TOTAL	509	29%	1,256	71%	1,765	100	100

Source: NYS

2063. The Taskforce conducted an extended gender analysis of NYS. The findings showed that 31 per cent of servicemen and women were female while 69 per cent were male. 24 per cent of appointments as heads directorates, departments, units and training institutions were female while 76 per cent were male.
2064. Further analysis and disaggregation of the data revealed that the proportion of female uniformed officers appointed as heads of directorates, departments, units and training institutions was 3 per cent compared to the proportion of male uniformed officers, which stood at 4 per cent.
2065. Out of the 64 total appointments for heads directorates, departments, units, and training institutions as at 2023, some 49 (76%) positions were filled by male officers while their female counterparts secured 15 (24%). This indicates a significant predominance of male officers. While the percentage of female officers is lower than that of male officers, it still represents a notable representation of women in leadership positions.
2066. When comparing the proportions, male officers received a larger share of appointments (76%) than female officers (24%).

Table 24. 6: NYS gender distribution: Servicemen/women, uniformed officers' appointments as at 2023

	Number of Uniformed officers		Appointments to Head Directorates, Departments, Units and Training Institutions in 2023		Proportion of Appointments
	Number	%	Number	%	%
Male	1,256	71%	49	76%	4%
Female	509	29%	15	24 %	3%
Total	1,765	100%	64	100%	7%

Source: NYS

Recommendations

2067. Having analysed the stakeholder views and submissions, the Taskforce makes the following recommendations:
- (a) The NYS Council should develop gender-sensitive policies that promote gender equality and equity and address the specific needs and perspectives of both gender;
 - (b) The NYS Council should develop and implement a Sexual Harassment and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) Policy that includes a mechanism for confidential reporting of sexual harassment;
 - (c) The NYS Council should identify practical gender needs to help female and male officers, including servicemen and women, to cope better in their existing positions - particularly on issues of welfare;
 - (d) The Government should allocate resources to operationalise the gender mainstreaming and SGBV policies in the Service.

CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE: BENCHMARKING AND MODERNISATION

25.1 Introduction

2069. The Taskforce was obligated to assess and consider opportunities and platforms for benchmarking on regional and international standards and exchange programmes with a view to modernising the NYS. It is in light of this mandate that the Taskforce considered the necessity of continuously exposing members of the NYS to benchmarking and exchange programmes to enable the Service keep up with similar National Youth Service programmes and trends in other jurisdictions, exchange ideas and improve their knowledge and skills in areas such as career progression, capacity building, professional courses, and leadership.
2070. The Taskforce notes that Kenya has established strong relationships with many countries, including governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, and private entities that are capable of providing additional assistance or exchanging knowledge with the NYS.

25.2 Benchmarking

2071. Benchmarking is an efficiency tool based on the principle of measuring the performance of one organisation against a standard, whether absolute, or relative to other organisations. It can be used to: assess performance objectively, expose areas where improvement is needed, identify other organisations with processes resulting in better performance with a view to their adoption, and test whether improvement programmes have been successful.
2072. Benchmarking has three main aspects:
- (i) Standards benchmarking: setting a standard of performance that an effective organisation could be expected to achieve. The publication of a challenging standard can motivate staff and demonstrate a commitment to improve the service provided. Information on an organisation's performance against the standard can be used as a monitoring tool by its officers. This can only be achieved if field officers are enabled to do what is expected of them. The idea of performance contracting can also come in handy if the set objectives are "simple, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound -- SMART". This can be done in the context of the previous performance against the resources required to achieve set objectives.
 - (ii) Results benchmarking: comparing the performance of a number of organisations providing a similar service.
 - (iii) Process benchmarking: undertaking a detailed examination within a group of organisations of the processes that produce a particular output with a view to understanding the reasons for variations in performance and incorporating best practices.

Countries for benchmarking

2073. The National Youth Service of Namibia, which provides an ideal place for benchmarking, was established in March, 1994 to address the challenges, opportunities and obstacles facing young people in Namibia and to foster among them a spirit of national identity, a sense of unity and self-respect, as well as in-depth awareness of social, economic, political, educational and cultural prospects and adversities.
2074. The Namibian NYS has a functional governance structure, which has enabled it to achieve robust growth and development. Despite the fact that the Namibian NYS was established many years after Kenya's, it has made tremendous progress. The Namibian National Youth is also doing well in agriculture. It has heavily invested in agriculture (crop and animal production) and embraced value addition for dairy products so as to maximise profits. Some

farms have been set aside for game (wildlife) farming so as to promote local, regional and international tourism.

2075. The Namibian National Youth Service has well-structured training programmes also similar Kenya's but their output in terms of absorption into labour market is higher. Their recruits are well trained in firearms, making them well equipped and ready to serve together with other security agencies in cases of security challenges in the country. The Namibian NYS deploys its servicemen/women in traffic marshalling as well as providing security services in government installations and private entities during the national service programme.
2076. The Namibia Youth Credit Scheme (NYCS) is a loan guarantee programme that provides financial support to unemployed and out-of-school youth (beneficiaries) who do not have adequate collateral to access loans from the mainstream banking system. The scheme aims to empower youth with entrepreneurship opportunities by offering training in Basic Business Management, Access to Credit, as well as follow-up training, and counselling and mentoring to beneficiaries between 18 and 35 years of age. The programme operates through an individual and group lending system, which is phased.
2077. Kenya's own National Youth Service was established after the late Tom Mboya and a number of Kenyan officials made a benchmarking tour of the Israeli National Youth Service in 1964. The National Youth Service of Israel is well organised, funded, modernised and benchmarking on it may reveal where the Kenya's NYS might have taken a wrong turn in terms of formation, implementation and operationalisation of its service.
2078. The Israeli National Youth Service is well advanced in agricultural technology and mechanised farming (especially crop farming). This is an area the Kenyan NYS can learn a lot from, as well as in technology (farming, ICT, training, operations).
2079. Kenya NYS can collaborate with the Namibian and Israeli National Youth Services in:
 - (i) Employing modern technology in agriculture and mechanised farming;
 - (ii) Incorporation of ICT in administration and operational aspects of the Service;
 - (iii) Using modernised machines and equipment;
 - (iv) Exchange training programmes.

Recommendations

2080. The Taskforce therefore recommends that:

- (a) Through existing international relations frameworks, the CS and DG should engage other policing services within the region, in Africa and globally with a view to securing appropriate strategies to network and engage in exchange programmes.
- (b) The DG should ensure that there is a structured framework for the leadership and members of NYS to join relevant regional and international policing fora with a view to broadening the scope of engagement and advancement of the Service.
- (c) The DG should formulate a detailed policy to regulate benchmarking and exchange programmes within 12 months.
- (d) A policy should be created and implemented to ensure equity and fairness in offering opportunities to all members of the Service, including junior officers in the forward areas;
- (e) Those who attend benchmarking or exchange programmes should mandatorily be required to prepare and submit reports, and where possible, sensitise other members of the Service on the knowledge gained;

- (f) There is need to prevent and prohibit the misuse of benchmarking opportunities where same people are over-exposed at the expense of others;
- (g) The DG should establish, maintain and keep an updated database of those who have previously been exposed to benchmarking and exchange programmes;
- (h) The DG should establish a monitoring and evaluation strategy to assess the efficacy of the benchmarking and exchange programme, and ensure its continued improvement.

25.3 Modernisation

2081. The Taskforce notes that modernisation of NYS will not be achieved in a limited timeframe and should be an evolving process, with a long-term vision. Modernisation should focus on strengthening infrastructure at the cutting-edge by constructing buildings and premises, equipping the Service with the required level of mobility, modern weaponry and machines, communication systems, computerisation and digitisation, other equipment, forensic tools, training and sufficient housing and officers.

Recommendations

2082. Establish a Modernisation Programme for NYS (2024 – 2035) with the following specific aspects:

- (i) Organisational development including restructuring and streamlining of units for efficiency to avoid overlapping functions, and to simplify procedures, rationalisation procedures. Rationalisation of systems, standards and procedures in the administration of NYS;
- (ii) Professionalisation of human resources management and transformation of personnel; Infrastructure development in terms of upgrading basic support systems;
- (iii) Upgrading of equipment and facilities;
- (iv) Construction, improvement and upgrading of buildings, facilities and offices;
- (v) Undertaking continuous reforms; and
- (a) Establishing an NYS Modernisation Fund (2024 – 2035) with the following components:
 - (i) Construction;
 - (ii) Upgrading of infrastructure;
 - (iii) Mobility;
 - (iv) Weaponry;
 - (v) Training;
 - (vi) Computerisation and Digitisation;
 - (vii) Equipment;
 - (viii) Forensic; and
 - (ix) Reform.

CHAPTER TWENTY SIX: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX (NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE)

26.1 Summary of Recommendations

Leadership and management

2083. The current non-executive Council of NYS should be reconstituted to comprise the Chairperson with the following qualifications and attributes: a citizen of Kenya; holds a degree from a university recognised in Kenya; has at least 15 years' experience in and the respective profession; has at least 10 years' experience in a managerial position, either in the public or private sector; and meets the requirements of leadership and integrity in Chapter Six of the Constitution;
2084. The six members of the Council should have the following qualifications and attributes: citizens of Kenya; holders of degrees from universities recognised in Kenya; have at least 10 years' experience in their respective professions; have at least 10 years' experience in a managerial position, either in the public or private sector; or those with distinguished service experience relevant to NYS of not less than 20 years; and meet the requirements of leadership and integrity in Chapter Six of the Constitution;
2085. The NYS Act should be amended to provide that the chairperson and members of the NYS Council be recruited through a competitive process by a selection panel constituted by the President for that purpose;
2086. The other members of the Council shall be: the Principal Secretary for the National Treasury, the Principal Secretary in the ministry responsible for the Service; the Director-General who shall be the Secretary to the Council; the Chief of Defence Forces; and the Inspector-General of Police, or their representatives;
2087. Given the importance of the Service, and in order to attract competent persons, the chairperson and members shall each be paid a competitive retainer and sitting allowance determined by the Cabinet Secretary responsible for the Service in consultation with the Salaries and Remuneration Commission;
2088. Section 2 of the NYS Act should be amended in the relevant part to read: *Cabinet Secretary means "the Cabinet Secretary responsible for Internal Security"*;
2089. Section 20 of the NYS Act should be amended by including a sub-section on expiry of the term of the holder of the Office of DG;
2090. The tenure of the DG and the Deputy DGs shall be a term of five years, renewable once based on performance.

The status of servicemen and women

2091. The NYS Council should champion the amendment of the First Schedule of the Act to include Part I for the officers of the Service and Part II to provide for the servicemen and women and their ranking structure;
2092. Provide that recruits and servicemen and women are members of the Service;
2093. Clarify through amendment of the Act that the persons who can serve as reserve for KDF and NPS are those who have undertaken paramilitary training;
2094. Amendment of the Act to state that save for the Director-General and Deputy Director-General (Corporate), all other officers must be recruited from among individuals who are or and have previously undergone the NYS paramilitary training.

Recruitment

- 2095. Aware of the government's 100 per cent transition policy from primary to secondary level education, the Taskforce recommends that NYS recruits should have, at a minimum, a secondary school leaving certificate;
- 2096. NYS should develop and restructure courses for various grades and qualifications, including basic skills courses for those whose KCSE grades may not qualify them for other higher courses;
- 2097. Aware of the constitutional requirement for inclusion, the Taskforce recommends that NYS develops and implements affirmative action policies to ensure equitable recruitment of servicemen and women, including from marginalised areas, communities, and groups;
- 2098. To deal with corruption, more so in the recruitment of privates, NYS should publicise recruitment in all media, including community radio stations, religious institutions, social media and through National Government Administration officers, and reduce human interaction in the recruitment process. NYS should embrace technology, which would entail an online application followed by the publication of shortlisted candidates, conduct of physical interviews at sub-county level and publication of the names of the successful recruits;
- 2099. Recruit and build the capacity of healthcare workers who will be embedded in the various units within the Service;
- 2100. Professionalise human resource management and development in NYS and fully automate and digitize all HR functions;
- 2101. Recruit NYS officers from among ex-servicemen and women;
- 2102. Establish a cross-functional management committee at the NYS Council to aid in the implementation of the afore-mentioned recommendations.

Deployment and transfers

- 2103. The Service Standing Orders should be reviewed and adhered to with regard to deployment and transfer of members of the Service;
- 2104. The Service should develop clear guidelines on deployment to ensure that officers are deployed as per their competencies and skills;
- 2105. An audit should be carried out to identify officers who have overstayed in their areas of deployment and appropriate recourse taken;
- 2106. Transfer of officers from one operation or and hardship area to another operation or and hardship area should be abolished; and
- 2107. The NYS Council should liaise with the Public Service Commission to review the Service policy on classification of hardship areas.

Career progression and schemes of service

- 2108. There should be established grades between the ranks of Private and Corporal. Specifically, the grades should commence from Private III, II, and I, and Corporal III, II and I. The Salaries and Remuneration Commission should revise the current salary notches by harmonising the pay scales with these proposed grades;
- 2109. Promotions in common cadres in respect of the grades in (a) above should be on merit;
- 2110. The NYS should amend the 2019 Career Guidelines to incorporate recommendations herein and implement them forthwith;

Rewards

- 2111. NYS should create a system for rewards and sanctions in the Service;
- 2112. The Service should support participation of its members in appropriate regional and international youth fora;
- 2113. Modalities for streamlining National Youth Service nomination for national awards should be introduced, with core consideration pegged on performance, competence and merit;
- 2114. A standing committee on nominations should be established for an internal reward system, with representation from all units and stations across the Service.

Exit and post-exit management

- 2115. Mandatory pre-retirement seminars and workshops for all officers due for retirement should begin two years before retirement;
- 2116. Officers with five (5) years or less to retirement should be posted to work within regions where they will eventually settle post-retirement;
- 2117. The Service should appoint dedicated officers to assist in the timely processing of pensions for officers and to ensure that benefits are paid out within three months of exit;
- 2118. The Service should commence the setting up of a contributory medical scheme to assist officers as they retire from the Service;
- 2119. The Service should develop a policy to guide pre- and post-exit management of NYS officers;
- 2120. The Service should automate HR processes pending which HR officers should be posted to NYS units and stations to hasten processes; and
- 2121. The Service should maintain and automate a database for and servicemen/women with their skills and competencies for ease of reach and contact; and (h) undertake market surveys for purposes of linking the skills of its servicemen/women to the market.

System of remuneration

- 2122. That SRC should harmonise, standardise and review payable rates for monthly allowances for uniformed officers in NYS. The harmonised, standardised and payable rates should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.
- 2123. That SRC and the NYS Council should introduce new allowances for servicemen and women. The new allowances should be implemented fully with effect from July 1, 2024.
- 2124. There should be strict implementation of overtime pay as provided for in the Public Service HR Manual and NYS Standing Orders;
- 2125. To curb the reported issues around allowances and other remittances not reaching junior officers, the Taskforce recommends strict adherence to the automation of payments for all allowances to NYS officers as is the practice in the Civil Service;
- 2126. There should be strict prohibition of cash payment of allowances to NYS officers and servicemen and women;
- 2127. There should be prompt payment of allowances during multi-agency operations that involve members of NYS and servicemen and women; and
- 2128. There should be enhanced accountability for the automated system to prevent cases of embezzlement of funds and corruption.
- 2129. SRC should establish a system of remuneration for disciplined services completely delinked from the Civil Service Job Groups Classification System and Pay Determination

2130. PSC should review job descriptions for members of NYS for all pay grades and restructure the salary structure for PG13, PG12 and PG11 in line with the minimum eight (8) salary points;
2131. Government should establish a Remuneration Advisory Board for Disciplined and Security Services through an Act of Parliament.

Salary and remuneration

2132. The Taskforce recommends a basic salary increase of **40** per cent for the lowest rank or Pay Grade (PG 1) for uniformed officers reducing progressively to **3** per cent for the highest rank or Pay Grade (PG15). The Taskforce recommends that the new remuneration structure should be implemented in three (3) phases from 1st July 2024.

Provision of stipend for servicemen and women

2133. Given the current economic conditions, the government should review the monthly stipend for servicemen and women upwards from KSh. 2,100 to KSh. 10,000 to be paid directly to them through the payroll at the end of every month;
2134. The Council should establish the NYS Savings and Credit Cooperative (Sacco) Society to manage the savings of the servicemen and women as well as pay dividends on such savings;
2135. The payment of instructor allowance should extend to trainers in the field units;
2136. The members of the Service should be paid allowances whenever they are involved in multiagency operations such as administration of national Examinations and elections like the members of the other Services;
2137. Officers in designated hardship areas should be eligible to receive a hardship allowance just like other civil servants; and
2138. The annual leave allowance should be enhanced.

Medical and compensation schemes

2139. The Service should establish fully equipped medical facilities including a Level 4 hospital and dispensaries in every field unit and station to provide medical aid
2140. The current medical scheme for the officers should extend to the servicemen and women; and
2141. The Service is encouraged to enter into agreements with other disciplined Services to be allowed to access their medical facilities.
2142. The Taskforce makes the following further recommendations regarding the welfare of officers and members of the Service:
2143. There should be established at least one Service Canteen to serve officers as well as servicemen and women within the respective units and stations. This shall also ensure that the welfare of servicemen and women who are also students are taken care of since they do not earn a salary but instead rely on a small stipend. The prices in the Service Canteen should be regulated by the Service management and should be subsidised just as it is the case with the Kenya Defence Forces canteens. The canteens should be managed by the Service to cushion against inflated prices;
2144. Promote recreational and sports activities in all the units;
2145. There should be established an officers' mess in each and every unit operated and managed by the unit's administration;
2146. The Service should establish a Department of Welfare Services and the office devolved to every region and unit across the country; and

2147. The National Youth Service Welfare Policy should be formulated and adopted to ensure that the welfare of members and staff of the Service, including servicemen and women, is well taken care of.

Mental health

2148. NYS should introduce Guidance and Counselling services and well-equipped psychosocial support facilities in all units of the Service;
2149. In order to ensure spiritual nourishment and wellness of members of the Service, NYS should post chaplains to all its units and field stations;
2150. NYS should introduce a 24-hour toll-free call support centre where officers can receive debriefing, first line of care, linkages and a chance to disclose their concerns;
2151. NYS should develop a policy on mental health to address issues of stigma;
2152. Further, it is recommended that psychological counselling should be included in all training programmes of the Service for members; and
2153. The proposed medical cover for servicemen and women to include mental disorders, diagnosis and treatment;

Uniforms

2154. The Service should ensure gender consideration for certain aspects of female officers' uniform, especially the maternity attire, the zipping of trousers, and the buttons for blouses;
2155. The Service should ensure that members of NYS have appropriate and fit-for-purpose uniforms and kitting;
2156. The NYS capacity for uniform production should be enhanced in order to serve other disciplined Services;
2157. Supply management of uniforms should be decentralised from the National Youth Service headquarters to functional regional, unit and station levels;
2158. Since uniforms are items that are subject to wear and tear, they should be supplied and issued a set of uniforms to officers automatically, once a year.

Housing

2159. The Service should develop a comprehensive housing policy that takes into consideration cases of housing allowance and mortgages for all officers;
2160. The Service, in consultation with the State Department for Public Works and Housing, should develop model barracks and staff houses (*cookie-cutter model*) that take into consideration safety, sanitation, ventilation and climatic conditions, which can be replicated in all the field units and stations;
2161. Owing to the skill set and manpower possessed by the NYS, the Taskforce recommends that the Government facilitates the Service to construct housing units for its members and waive levies and charges to enable the Service to construct and manage its own housing complexes;
2162. The management and maintenance of all NYS institutional houses should revert to the Service from the State Department for Housing. In this regard, NYS should be allowed to collect rent and retain revenues in the proposed Revolving Fund for development, repair and maintenance;
2163. The Government should set aside a reasonable percentage of the affordable housing scheme for NYS officers.

Tooling, modernization and ICT

- 2164. The Government should provide adequate funding to NYS to ensure that the Service has sufficient resources to acquire modern and efficient tools and equipment;
- 2165. The Service should embark on research and innovation in its areas of teaching and training.
- 2166. The Service should generate its own income, while the government establishes a Revolving Fund for the Service's sustainability;
- 2167. NYS should ensure proper management, inventory listing and accountability for its equipment;
- 2168. NYS should collaborate with the private sector and development partners to ensure modernisation of its equipment and the gradual replacement of obsolete plant and equipment in its training centres;
- 2169. The Service to develop an integrated ICT system that enables it leverage on technology and improve service delivery and efficiency in its operations
- 2170. The Service should connect all its unit facilities to the National Fibre Optic Backbone Infrastructure (NFOB) to ensure access to fast Internet and automate all its operations and communication to enhance efficiency, productivity and accountability.

Titling of land and building of modern NYS institutions

- 2171. NYS Council should, within six months, appoint and facilitate a committee to carry out an inventory of all NYS land and ensure titling. The relevant state agencies and institutions should provide requisite cooperation and facilitation to the committee;
- 2172. The NYS leadership should plan for the progressive securing of all NYS land through fencing;
- 2173. All court cases involving NYS land should be fast-tracked and any other disputes involving NYS land settled through the alternative dispute resolution process
- 2174. The NYS Council should take measures to regularise NYS facilities constructed on contested or private land.
- 2175. There should be a waiver on stamp duty and other charges for speedier registration of titles of NYS land;
- 2176. NYS should develop and ensure approval of a framework for facilities of the Service.

Training

- 2177. The Service should enhance and diversify its curriculum and areas of training to cover market-relevant skills such as ICT; and area-specific courses such as Marine in Mombasa region;
- 2178. The NYS leadership is encouraged to collaborate with county governments to establish mutually beneficial training programmes for youth;
- 2179. The Government should consider the reinstatement of the NYS pre-university and tertiary institutions programme;
- 2180. NYS should integrate human rights, gender and disability mainstreaming in their training programmes to reinforce the importance of human rights as a fundamental part of personal and professional development.

Gender mainstreaming and sexual harassment

- 2181. NYS Council should develop gender-sensitive policies that promote gender equality and equity and address the specific needs and perspectives of both gender;
- 2182. The NYS Council should develop and implement a Sexual Harassment and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) Policy that includes a mechanism for confidential reporting of sexual harassment;
- 2183. The NYS Council should identify practical gender needs to help female and male officers, including servicemen and women, to cope better in their existing positions -particularly on issues of welfare;
- 2184. The Government should allocate resources to operationalise the gender mainstreaming and SGBV policies in the Service.

Benchmarking

- 2185. Through existing international relations frameworks, the CS and DG should engage other policing services within the region, in Africa and globally with a view to securing appropriate strategies to network and engage in exchange programmes;
- 2186. The DG should ensure that there is a structured framework for the leadership and members of NYS to join relevant regional and international policing fora with a view to broadening the scope of engagement and advancement of the Service;
- 2187. The DG should formulate a detailed policy to regulate benchmarking and exchange programmes within 12 months;
- 2188. A policy should be created and implemented to ensure equity and fairness in offering opportunities to all members of the Service, including junior officers in the forward areas;
- 2189. Those who attend benchmarking or exchange programmes should mandatorily be required to prepare and submit reports, and where possible, sensitise other members of the Service on the knowledge gained;
- 2190. There is need to prevent and prohibit the misuse of benchmarking opportunities where same people are over-exposed at the expense of others;
- 2191. The DG should establish, maintain and keep an updated database of those who have previously been exposed to benchmarking and exchange programmes;
- 2192. The DG should establish a monitoring and evaluation strategy to assess the efficacy of the benchmarking and exchange programme, and ensure its continued improvement.

Modernisation

- 2193. Establish a Modernisation Programme for NYS (2024 – 2035) with the following specific aspects:
 - (i) Organisational development including restructuring and streamlining of units for efficiency to avoid overlapping functions, and to simplify procedures, rationalisation procedures, rationalisation of systems, standards and procedures in the administration of NYS;
 - (ii) Professionalisation of human resources management and transformation of personnel; Infrastructure development in terms of upgrading basic support systems;
 - (iii) Upgrading of equipment and facilities;
 - (iv) Construction, improvement and upgrading of buildings, facilities and offices;
 - (v) Undertaking continuous reforms; and

(vi) Establishing an NYS Modernisation Fund (2024 – 2035) with the following components:

- (a) Construction;
- (b) Upgrading of infrastructure;
- (c) Mobility;
- (d) Weaponry;
- (e) Training;
- (f) Computerisation and Digitisation;
- (g) Equipment;
- (h) Forensic; and
- (i) Reform.

26.2 Implementation Matrix

S.No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
Leadership and Management			
1	<i>1.1 Amend the NYS Act and reconstitute the NYS Council as recommended.</i>	Six months	Parliament Secretary to the Cabinet CS, Ministry of Public Service CS, Ministry of Interior
	<i>1.2 Domicile NYS in the Ministry of Interior.</i>	Three months	Head of Public Service
Servicemen/Women			
2	<i>2.1 Amend the Act as recommended to clearly define the legal standing of servicemen and women</i>	Six months	Parliament Responsible CS
Recruitment.			
3	<i>3.1 Streamline the recruitment process as recommended to include affirmative action policies and 100% government transition policy</i>	One year	NYS Council
	<i>3.2 Fully automate, digitize and professionalize all HR functions</i>	One year	NYS Council
	<i>3.3 Recruit NYS officers from among EX service men and women</i>	One year	NYS Council
Deployment and Transfers.			
4	<i>4.1 Review and implement the Transfer and Deployment Policy as recommended the task force report</i>	One year	NYS Council
	<i>4.2 Review and implement the NYS Service Standing Orders as recommended in this report.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
	<i>4.3 The NYS Council should liaise with the Public Service Commission to review the Service policy on classification of hardship areas.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
Career Progression and Schemes of Work			
5	<i>5.1 Review and implement the Career Progression guidelines as recommended.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
Rewards.			
6	<i>6.1 Develop and implement Reward and Sanctions Policy as recommended.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
Exit and Post-Exit Management.			
7	<i>7.1 Develop and implement an Exit and Post-Exit Policy as recommended.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
	<i>7.2 Develop and maintain an automated database for Officers and Servicemen/women for skills-linkage and reserve-duty as recommended.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
Medical and Compensation Scheme.			
8	<i>8.1 Enter into service-level agreements with other Disciplined Services for access to their medical services.</i>	Immediate	NYS Council
	<i>8.2 Expand the medical scheme to cover Servicemen/women.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
	<i>8.3 Progressively establish fully equipped dispensaries to provide medical services in the field units.</i>	Three Years	NYS Council
Mental Health.			
9	<i>9.1 Develop and implement a comprehensive mental health policy as recommended.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
	<i>Develop/ Review and implement psychological counseling services Policy, including adequate support infrastructure, medical cover, and shared services</i>	One Year	NYS Council

S.No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	<i>Customization of the wellness program. and implementation of psycho-social support policy.</i>	One Year	NYS Council
Uniforms.			
10	<i>10.1 Enact a law providing for the establishment of a National Uniform Standards Committee.</i>	Immediate	Parliament
	<i>Establish uniforms quality and assurance committee for KPS and empower it to develop and implement measures to address recommendations regarding uniforms in the Service</i>	Immediate	Parliament
Salary and Allowances.			
11	<i>11.1 Improve Monthly Stipend Allowances for Service Men/Women.</i>	One Year	NYS Council SRC National Treasury
	<i>11.2 Create a National Security and Disciplined and Security Services Sector as a separate budgeting sector for separate planning and budget allocations.</i>	Two Months	
	<i>11.2 Implement recommendations on NPS basic salaries structures for uniformed Servicemen/women as provided in this report</i>	Within One (1) Year	
	<i>11.3 To extend payment of Instructor Allowance to cover all instructors in all units as recommended.</i>	One Year	NYS Council National Treasury SRC
	<i>11.3 Establish remuneration and advisory board for Security and Disciplined Services.</i>	Within One (1) Year	
	<i>11.4 Conduct Job Evaluations based on new job description manuals.</i>	Within One (1) Year	
Housing.			
11	<i>11.1 Develop and Implement Comprehensive Housing Policy as recommended. including decentralization of management</i>	One Year	NYS Council State Department of Housing /Public Works
	<i>11.2 Develop a masterplan for NYS facilities.</i>	One Year	NYS Council State Department of Housing /Public Works
	<i>11.3 Ensure transfer of NYS housing to the NYS directorate responsible for housing.</i>	One Year	NYS Council State Department of Housing /Public Works
	<i>11.4 Undertake an audit of incomplete and stalled projects, while pursuing public private partnerships for completion</i>	One Year	NYS Council State Department of Housing /Public Works
ICT and Modernization.			
12	<i>12.1 Develop and implement a legislation and policies to anchor digitization and automation of services with gradual integration with security and disciplined sector as recommended in the report</i>	Within Two years	Responsible CS CS ICT
	<i>18.1 Develop and implement legislation and policies to anchor digitization and automation of services with gradual integration with security and disciplined sector</i>	One year	

S.No.	Recommendation/Specific Action to be Taken	Time Frame	Responsibility
	18.2 Digitize all police services as per recommendations in the report	Within two years	
	18.3 Establish an integrated case management system and complaints mechanism.	Within two years	
Titling of Land.			
13	13.1 Appoint a Multi-agency committee to carry out inventory and titling of NYS land.	Within one Year	Responsible CS CS Lands AG
	13.2 Fence NPS land as a progressive plan of securing NYS land.	Six Months	NYS Council
	13.3 Fast-track land dispute cases and settle other cases through the ADR process.		
	13.4 Gazette, publish and publicize the approved framework on construction of modern NYS facilities including field stations by establishing a multi-agency Committee on premises	One Year	NYS Council
	13.5 Development and Approval of Facility Framework.	One Year	NYS Council Parliament
	13.6 Complete the housing and police premises projects.	Two years	NYS Council
Training.			
14	14.1 Review and implement the Training Policy as recommended.	One Year	NYS Council
Gender Mainstreaming.			
15	15.1 Adopt and implement the NYS gender policy as recommended in this report	One Year	NYS Council Responsible CS CS Gender
	15.2 Establish NYS sexual harassment and gender-based Violence (SGBV) Policy.	One year	NYS Council National Uniforms Committee
General Welfare			
16	16.1 Formulate and implement NYS Welfare policy as recommended	One Year	NYS Council
Benchmarking			
17	17.1 Develop and implement policies and guidelines to regulate benchmarking as recommended	One Year	NYS Council
	17.2 Provide resources to facilitate benchmarking	One Year	National Treasury
General Recommendations			
18	18.1 Develop a government Policy paper to adopt the recommendations of this Report for progressive implementation and to ensure allocation of resources.	One Year	Secretary to Cabinet
	18.2 Each of the three Services to develop and implement a Climate Change and Environmental Conservation Policy	One Year	NYS Council
	18.3 Each of the three services to develop and implement a policy stipulating sharing of information to combat global crimes.	One Year	NYS Council

26.3 APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Entry into the NYS Grading Structure

Entry	Rank	Minimum requirements
(Entry point) Recruit servicemen/women	Servicemen/Women Volunteers	(1) is a Kenyan citizen by birth; (2) is aged between 18 – 24 years; (3) obtained a minimum grade of D Plain in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education or its equivalent; (4) is medically and physically fit; (5) has not been convicted of a criminal offence; (6) has a valid Certificate of Good Conduct; and (7) meets any other qualification that the Director-General may prescribe.
(Entry point) Private NYS	Private NYS	Uniformed • NYS Paramilitary Basic Training Course lasting not less than six (6) months; • KCSE (mean grade D plain) or equivalent qualification; • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six (6) of the Constitution.
	Corporal NYS	• Served at the rank of Private for a minimum period of three (3) years; • NYS Corporal's Command and Leadership Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks; • Artisan Certificate from a recognized institution; • Certificate in computer applications • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six (6) of the Constitution.
Sergeant NYS	Sergeant NYS	Uniformed • NYS Paramilitary Basic Training Course lasting not less than six (6) months; • KCSE (mean grade D plain) or equivalent qualification; • Served at the rank of Corporal for a minimum period of three (3) years; • NYS Sergeant's Command and Leadership Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks; • Artisan Certificate from a recognized institution; • Certificate in computer applications; • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
Uniformed Senior Sergeant	Uniformed Senior Sergeant	Uniformed Officer Appointment

Entry	Rank	Minimum requirements
		level for Diploma Holders • Diploma from a recognized Institution • NYS Paramilitary Basic Training Course lasting not less than six (6) months • Certificate in computer applications • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya. Promotion • NYS Paramilitary Basic Training Course lasting not less than six (6) months; • KCSE (mean grade D plain) or equivalent qualification; • Served at the rank of Sergeant for a minimum period of three (3) years; • NYS Sergeant's Command and Leadership Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks; • Artisan Certificate from a recognized institution; • Certificate in computer applications; and • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
(Entry level) Cadet Inspector	Cadet Inspector	Uniformed Entry level for Cadets • Bachelor's Degree in essential fields not found in the existing/serving uniformed officers from a recognized institution; • Membership to a professional body where applicable • Certificate in computer applications • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya. NOTE: Cadet Officers with skills necessary to needed by the Service but not found in the existing Uniformed establishment i.e. • Doctors • Quantity surveyors • Land surveyors • Nurses • Geologists • Road/structural engineers • Lawyers

Entry	Rank	Minimum requirements
		• Counselling or Guidance and Counselling; Theology; • Pharmacy • Biomedical Engineers • Landscape Architecture • Laboratory Scientists • Actuarial Scientists • Civil Engineers Cadet officers entering the Service under the above will rise/promoted in their line of specialization up to the rank of Director NYS to head their specific departments.
Promotion of serving officers to inspector NYS	Inspector	Promotion • Diploma from a recognized institution; • NYS Paramilitary Basic Training Course lasting not less than six (6) months; • Served at the rank of Senior Sergeant for a minimum period of three (3) years; • NYS Inspectorate Command and Leadership Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks; • Certificate in computer applications; • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
Uniformed Chief Inspector	Uniformed Chief Inspector	• Bachelor's degree from a recognized institution; • Served at the rank of Cadet for a minimum period of three (3) years; • Membership to a professional body where applicable; • Certificate in computer applications; • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya. OR • Diploma from a recognized Institution • Served at the rank of Inspector for a minimum period of three (3) years • NYS Paramilitary Basic Training Course lasting not less than six (6) months; • NYS Inspectorate Command and Leadership Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks;

Entry	Rank	Minimum requirements
		• Certificate in Computer applications; • Fulfilled the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
Uniformed superintendent	Uniformed Superintendent	Uniformed For Degree holders • Bachelor's degree from a recognized institution • Served at the rank of Chief Inspector for a minimum period of three (3) years • NYS Superintendent Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks • Management Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks • Membership to a professional body where applicable • Certificate in computer applications • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya OR For Diploma holders • Diploma from a recognized institution • Served at the rank of Chief Inspector for a minimum period of three (3) years • NYS Paramilitary Basic Training Course lasting not less than six (6) months • Management course lasting not less than four (4) weeks; • NYS Superintendent Course lasting not less than four (4) weeks • Certificate in Computer applications • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
Uniformed Senior Superintendent	Uniformed Senior Superintendent	• Bachelor's degree from a recognised institution • Served at the rank of Superintendent for a minimum period of three (3) years; • NYS Superintendent Course for lasting not less than four (4) weeks • Management course lasting not less than four (4) weeks from a recognized

Entry	Rank	Minimum requirements
		institution • Membership to a professional body where applicable • Certificate in computer applications - Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
Uniformed Assistant Director	Uniformed Assistant Director	• Bachelor's degree from a recognized institution • Served at the rank of Senior Superintendent for a minimum period of three (3) years; • Director's promotion course lasting not less than four (4) weeks • Management course lasting not less than four (4) weeks from a recognized institution • Membership to a professional body where applicable • Certificate in computer applications - Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
Uniformed Deputy Director	Uniformed Deputy Director	• Bachelor's Degree from a recognized institution • Master's Degree from a recognized institution • Served at the rank of Assistant Director for a minimum period of three (3) years • Director's promotion course lasting not less than four (4) weeks • Leadership course lasting not less than four (4) weeks from a recognized institution • Management course lasting not less than four (4) weeks from a recognized institution • Membership to a professional body where applicable • Certificate in computer applications • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya
Uniformed Senior Deputy Director	Uniformed Senior Deputy Director	• Master's degree from a recognized institution • Bachelor's degree from a recognized institution

Entry	Rank	Minimum requirements
		- Served at the rank of Deputy Director for a minimum period of three (3) years - Director's promotion course lasting not less than four (4) weeks - Leadership course lasting not less than four (4) weeks - Management course lasting not less than four (4) weeks from a recognized institution - Membership to a professional body where applicable - Certificate in computer applications - Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
Uniformed Director	Director	- Master's Degree from a recognized institution - Bachelor's Degree from a recognized Institution - Served at the rank of Senior Deputy Director for a minimum period of three (3) years - Director's promotion course lasting not less than four (4) weeks - Leadership course lasting not less than four (4) weeks from a recognized institution - Management course lasting not less than four (4) weeks from a recognized institution - Membership to a professional body where applicable - Certificate in computer applications - Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya
Deputy Director General	Deputy Director-General	Uniformed Officers - Master's Degree from a recognised institution - Bachelor's Degree from a recognised institution - Served at the rank of Director for a minimum period of three (3) years - Leadership course lasting not less than four (4) weeks - Management course lasting not less than four

Entry	Rank	Minimum requirements
		(4) weeks from arecognized institution • Membership to a professionalbody where applicable • Certificate in computeraapplications • Fulfil the requirements ofChapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.
	Director-General	• Master's Degree in any of the following fields: Business Management/Administration or equivalent qualification from a recognised institution; • Bachelor's Degree in any of the following fields: Public Administration, Business Management/Administration or equivalent qualification from a recognised institution; • Served at a senior rank in the National Youth Service in the uniformed staff establishment and has not attained retirement age; • At least ten (10) years relevant work experience, five (5) of which have been at Senior Management level; • Must have served in the Service at the entry rank of Private NYS; • Leadership course lasting not less than four (4) weeks; • Certificate in computer applications; • Fulfil the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya.

PART FIVE: ANNEXURES

Annex 1: Gazette Notice 1

GAZETTE NOTICE NO. 15792

THE NATIONAL TASKFORCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND OTHER REFORMS FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE AND KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

APPOINTMENT

WHEREAS perennial welfare challenges continue to compromise the efficacy and ability of the National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service to effectively deliver on their solemn mandate;

WHEREAS the Administration has instituted reforms to steer the nation towards an autonomous, accountable, and responsive National Police Service;

WHEREAS the ongoing reforms build on past efforts aimed at tooling and retooling of our security organs, as Kenya seeks to make our security organs more capable of addressing the security challenges that the country faces;

WHEREAS the imperative of strengthening the security sector remains a national priority and the primary means of surmounting the emerging and dynamic security challenges we face; and

WHEREAS there is a compelling public interest in institutionalizing welfare reforms of our internal security organs whilst also fostering the citizen-facing service elements of the National Police Service whose pace of reform matches public expectations:

NOW therefore, I, William Samoei Ruto, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Head of State and Government by the Constitution and the Laws of the Republic of Kenya, do hereby:

(a) Establish a Taskforce on improvement of the terms and conditions of service and other reforms for members of the National Police Service and the Kenya Prisons Service.

(b) The Taskforce shall comprise of–

Chief Justice (Rtd.) David Kenani Maraga – *Chairperson*

Carole Kariuki – *Vice Chairperson*

Members

Moffat Muriithi Kangi,

John Ole Moyaki,

Ibrahim Jillo Guyo,

Richard Kirundi,

Elizabeth Mueni,

Roseline Odede,

Joash Odhiambo Dache,

Doreen Muthaura,

Albert Mwenda,

Terry Chebet Maina,

Hassan Sheikh Mohamed,

Capt. (Rtd.) Simiyu Werunga (Dr.),

Mutuma Ruteere (Dr.),

Anne Ireri,

Stephen Kayongo,

Jafaar Mohamed,

Sammy Chepkwony,

Khadija Mire.

Joint Secretaries:-

Omwanza Ombati,

Joy Mdivo Masinde,

Rosemary Kamau.

1. The objectives of the Taskforce are to–

(a) Identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational constraints on effective service delivery by the National Police Service (hereafter, NPS) and the Kenya Prisons Service (hereafter, KPS);

(b) Identify and recommend legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational reforms in the NPS and KPS for effective service delivery;

(c) Review and recommend improvement of the terms and conditions of service;

(d) Review and recommend improvement of matters relating to welfare of officers in all cadres of the NPS and KPS and all other matters incidental to the optimal service delivery by the NPS and KPS.

(e) Review and recommend on any other matter incidental to improved terms and conditions of service and other reforms in the NPS and KPS.

2. The Terms of Reference of the Taskforce are to–

On welfare of members of the NPS and KPS;

(a) Examine the existing legislative, policy, institutional, administrative and operational structures, systems and strategies and recommend comprehensive reforms in the NPS and KPS;

- (b) Examine the extent of the uptake of the recommendations of previous Task Forces, including but not limited to the John Mutony, (2002–2003), the Philip Ransley (2009) and the Titus Naikuni (2010-2012) Task Forces;
- (c) Review the human capital management and development policies with a view of examining and reviewing standards and practices in recruitment, deployment, transfers, training, career progression, performance based and competitive promotions, reward, exit, and post-exit management; and recommend implementation of changes that enhance morale, meritocracy and professionalism in the NPS and KPS;
- (d) Consider recommendations of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, National Police Service Commission, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Independent Policing Oversight Authority and any other recommendation on NPS and KPS welfare or reforms by any state organ;
- (e) Recommend review of remuneration of members of the NPS and KPS and consideration of new and applicable allowances to the NPS and KPS to enhance professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness of the NPS and KPS;
- (f) Assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current medical scheme for the NPS and KPS and recommend comprehensive reform or revision of the same with a view of improving it;
- (g) Assess and recommend the establishment of funds or schemes to cater for loss of life or injuries in the line of duty, terminal illness including mental health illness and possible legal and administrative framework to cater for NPS and KPS officers' dependants;
- (h) Assess and recommend improvement of working and living conditions of members of the NPS and KPS;
- (i) Assess the adequacy or otherwise of the current housing policy for members of the NPS and KPS and where appropriate, recommend review of the same including recommendation for a housing mortgage for officers;
- (j) Examine all capacity building measures including training curriculum, syllabus, continuous development trainings, reward measures and recommend reforms including incorporation of incentives for Police and prison officers especially the lower cadres to address professionalism, motivation and retention;
- (k) Consider the integration or otherwise of constitutional human rights and fundamental freedoms in the training and curriculum for NPS and KPS officers, including application of international instruments ratified by the State;
- (l) Assess issues of gender mainstreaming, sexual harassment, gender-based violence, establishment of gender desks, psychological support, guidance and counselling at station level and any other recommendation to improve mental wellbeing of the NPS and KPS;
- (m) Assess, consider, review and recommend the nature, quality and standard of the uniform for NPS and KPS officers as well as that of prisoners/inmates;

On technical and operational capability of the NPS and KPS

- (n) Assess, review tooling, equipping, logistical and technological capacity of the NPS and recommend changes necessary to sustain modern security management, disaster management, conflicts and early warning, rapid response systems and joint operational preparedness strategy;
 - (o) Assess adequacy, sufficiency or otherwise of NPS tools, equipment, gear, communication and surveillance measures including use of drones and make appropriate recommendation including modernization and embracing technology in policing;
 - (p) Assess the necessity of adopting and operationalizing ICT usage in all NPS and KPS operations including adoption of digital occurrence books, body cameras, vehicles cameras, smart and intelligent surveillance equipment, among others, consistent with the Constitution;
 - (q) Assess and recommend general reforms and improvement of NPS and KPS premises, including titling of all NPS and KPS land, progressive adoption and building of modern police stations that comply with international best practices and standards;
 - (r) Assess and consider the administration of the forensic laboratory with a view to ensuring more independence in its operations and decision making and expand its usage by multiple agencies within the criminal justice system;
 - (s) Assess and propose the review of reporting command, governance and accountability framework within the NPS and KPS;
 - (t) Assess the implication on command and good order of NPS following the restructuring/merger of the Administration Police Service and Kenya Police Service;
 - (u) Assess and recommend establishment of clear guidelines on formation of specialized units within the NPS;
 - (v) Assess and consider opportunities and platforms for benchmarking on regional and international standards and exchange programmes with a view to modernizing policing and correctional services;
 - (w) Assess the legal and administrative framework to operationalize community policing with a view of embracing all-inclusive measures to combat crime;
 - (x) Undertake a comprehensive audit of legal framework to assess its consistencies and adequacy in executing the constitutional and statutory mandate of the NPS and KPS;
 - (y) Identify and propose any legislative and policy review, including review of standing orders, necessary to give effect to the recommendations of the Task Force; and
 - (z) Make any other recommendation(s) incidental to the improvement of terms and conditions of service for members of NPS and KPS.
3. In the performance of its tasks, the Task Force shall regulate its own procedure and, may:
- (a) Co-opt any person(s) as it may consider necessary or expedient for the proper performance of its functions;
 - (b) Hold public hearings including pre-hearings;
 - (c) In exceptional circumstances and when necessary, hold hearings or receive information *in camera*;
 - (d) Record all its hearings on Hansard or any other manner embracing technology;
 - (e) Where appropriate administer oaths or affirmation, or take statements;
 - (f) Hold meetings, forums or consultations as it may deem necessary in such places and at such times as it may consider necessary for the proper discharge of its mandate;
 - (g) Consider reports of past or ongoing initiatives towards enhancing the legal, policy and institutional framework on NPS and KPS reforms and welfare;
 - (h) Review official reports, policy, legislative or any other document related to the Task Force mandate;
 - (i) Carry out or cause to be carried out such studies or research as may be necessary to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its mandate;
 - (j) Where appropriate, ensure the protection and safety of participants;
 - (k) Provide a conducive environment for hearings or interviews;
 - (l) Engage experts as may be necessary for the execution of its mandate;

- (m) Review and compile background information and data on the subject matter;
 - (n) Invite stakeholders, key informants and experts to appear before the Task Force;
 - (o) Seek production of any document or record relevant to the Task Force mandate;
 - (p) Question any person and require from him/her the disclosure of relevant information, in respect to the matters under consideration;
 - (q) Receive written memoranda or information from professional bodies, public officers and the public;
 - (r) Take all steps necessary, to prevent the disclosure of any information that would be injurious to a participant, NPS or KPS;
 - (s) Establish committees or sub-committees to expedite the discharge of its tasks; and
 - (t) Adopt any other procedures and methods that it may consider expedient for the proper conduct of its business and to sit at any time or place that it may decide.
4. In furtherance of the objectives and purpose of the Taskforce, all State entities are directed to afford the Taskforce all necessary support and cooperation.
5. The Taskforce shall, as much as possible, engage relevant non-state institutions including international and local partners, community-based organizations, social service entities, and faith-based institutions, among others.
6. The deliverables of the Taskforce are—
- (a) A Task Force Report; and
 - (b) An Implementation Matrix.
7. The term of the Taskforce is a period of ninety (90) days with effect from the date of this notice.
8. The Secretariat of the Taskforce shall be at the Ministry of Interior and National Administration.
9. The Secretariat address shall be:
- Ministry of Interior and National Administration
P.O. Box 30510–00100
Nairobi
- Dated the 21st December, 2022.

WILLIAM SAMOEI RUTO,
President.

GAZETTE NOTICE NO. 626

**THE NATIONAL TASKFORCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND OTHER REFORMS FOR
MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE AND KENYA PRISONS SERVICE**

CORRIGENDUM

IT IS notified for the General information of the public that—

JANE CHEGE

has been appointed as a representative of the Public Service Commission to the National Taskforce established pursuant to Gazette Notice No. 15792 of 21st December, 2022.

Annex 2: Gazette Notice 2

GAZETTE NOTICE NO. 2853

THE NATIONAL TASKFORCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND OTHER REFORMS FOR
MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE AND KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

AMENDMENT

IT IS notified for the general information of the public that His Excellency the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces amends the Gazette Notice No. 15792 of 2022:

(a) By deleting paragraph (a) and substituting therefor the following:

Establish a Taskforce on improvement of the terms and conditions of service and other reforms for members of the National Police Service, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service

(b) By adding National Youth Service (hereafter NYS) immediately after “National Police Service (hereafter, NPS) and the Kenya Prisons Service (hereafter, KPS)” in paragraph 1;

(c) By adding “and NYS” immediately after and “NPS and KPS” wherever they occur in the Gazette Notice;

(d) By deleting paragraph 7 and substituting therefor the following.

The term of the Taskforce is a period of one hundred fifty (150) days, with effect from the 22nd December, 2022.

Dated the 3rd March, 2023.

FELIX K. KOSKEI,
Chief of Staff and Head of the Public Service.

Annex 3: Gazette Notice 3

Gazette Notice No. 14717

THE NATIONAL TASKFORCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND OTHER REFORMS
FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE, KENYA PRISONS SERVICE AND THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

EXTENSION OF TERM

IT IS notified for the general information of the public that His Excellency William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, has extended the term of the National Taskforce appointed *vide* Gazette Notice No. 15792 of 2022. The term of the Taskforce shall lapse on the 4th November, 2023.

Dated the 3rd November, 2023.

FELIX K. KOSKEI,
*Chief of Staff and
Head of the Public Service.*

Annex 4: List of Facilities and Installations Visited by the Taskforce

S/No.	National Police Service	Kenya Prisons Service	National Youth Service
1.	Kabarnet Police Station	Kabarnet GK Prison	Hindi Development Unit
2.	Tambach Police Station	Nakuru GK Main Prison	Witu Development Unit
3.	Reale Hospital (CIC Facility)	Rumuruti GK Prison	L. Kenyatta Sub-Station
4.	Rumuruti Police Station	Nanyuki GK Prison	Miritini Sub-station
5.	Nanyuki Police Station	Maralal GK Prison	NYS Technical College
6.	Maralal Police Station	Tambach GK Prison	Tana Basin Roriso and project
7.	Kitui Police Station	Kitui GK Prison	Mwatate Field Unit
8.	Kitui Police Lines	Busia GK Prison	Yatta Field Unit
9.	Kitui Administration Police Lines	Siaya GK Prison	Mavoloni Field Unit,
10.	Kitui Administration Police Offices	Kodiaga Maximum Prison	Athi River Field Unit
11.	Migwani Police Station	Marsabit Main Prison	Meru Sub unit
12.	Busia Police Station	Isiolo GK Prison	Ndalani Sub-Unit
13.	Siaya Police Station	Kapsabet GK Main Prison	Ex Kwal Sub-Unit
14.	Kisumu Police Station	Kapsabet Women Prison	Kisii Sub-Unit
15.	Marsabit Police Station	Bungoma G.K Main Prison	Lambwe Development Unit
16.	Isiolo Police Station	Bungoma Women Prison	Eldoret Substation
17.	Aremete GSU Camp	Langata Women Prison	Kirimun- Field Unit
18.	Nandi Hills Police Station	Naivasha Maximum Security Prison	Marakwet Kerio Valley Development Unit
19.	Tinderet Police Station	Industrial Area Remand Prison	Ugunja Sub Unit
20.	Songhor Police Station	Shimo La Tewa Prison	Turbo Field Unit
21.	Kapsabet Police Station	Chuka GK Male Prison	Kisumu Field Unit
22.	Nandi South Police Station	Chuka GK Women Prison	Garissa Mbalambala Field Unit
23.	Navakholo Sub County Police Post	Kilifi GK Prison	Madogo Sub Unit
24.	Eshilakwe Police Station	Malindi GK Prison	Paramilitary Training Institute in Gilgil
25.	Kakamega Police Station	Meru GK Prison	NYS Headquarters

S/No.	National Police Service	Kenya Prisons Service	National Youth Service
26.	Shisasari Patrol Base	Embu GK Main Prison	Nairobi Holding Unit
27.	Khayega Police Station	Embu GK Women Prison	Bedi Investment
28.	Muhundu Police Station	Kwale GK Main Prison	NYS Textile and Garment Technology Institute
29.	Cheptulu Police Station	Kwale GK Women Prison	NYS Mechanical and Transport Branch
30.	Shamakhokho Police Post	Kabarnet GK Women Prison	Tumaini Farm Unit
31.	Sarem Police Station	Nakuru GK Women Prison	
32.	Kapsotik Patrol Base	Garissa G.K Main Prison	
33.	Hamisi CIPU	Prison Staff Training College	
34.	Gambogi Police Station	Kisumu Maximum Prison	
35.	Mbale Police Station	Lodwar GK Prison	
36.	Vihiga Police Station	Kamiti Maximum Prison	
37.	Ibubi Police Station	Nairobi West Prison	
38.	Luanda CIPU	Kodiaga GK Prison	
39.	Luanda Police Station	Kakamega Maximum Prison	
40.	Myanga Police Station	Kisumu Court Cells	
41.	Kimwanga Police Station	Ruiru Prison Staff College	
42.	Bukembe Police Station	Mathare Mental Hospital	
43.	Webuye West Police Station	Manyani Prison, Taita Taveta	
44.	Webuye East Police Station	Makadara Court Cells	
45.	Administration Police Training College	Nakuru G.K Women Prison	
46.	General Service Unit Training College		
47.	POLICARE Centre		
48.	Anti-Terror Police Unit		
49.	National Police Service Hospital Mbagathi Way		
50.	Directorate of Criminal Investigation Forensic Lab		
51.	Makadara Law Courts		
52.	Kilimani Stapol		

S/No.	National Police Service	Kenya Prisons Service	National Youth Service
53.	Police Dog Unit		
54.	Kayole Stapol		
55.	Central Police Station		
56.	Kiambeni Police Station		
57.	Chaani Police Station		
58.	Changamwe Police Station		
59.	Mbaraki Police Station		
60.	Tononoka Administration Police Camp		
61.	Kathwana Police Station		
62.	Marimanti Police Station		
63.	Chuka Police Station		
64.	Chiakariga Police Station		
65.	Maua Police Station		
66.	Maua AP Camp		
67.	Kangeta Police Station		
68.	Kilifi Police Station		
69.	Langobaya Police Station		
70.	Embu Police Station		
71.	Embu AP camp		
72.	Makutano Police Station		
73.	Msambweni Police Station		
74.	Diani Police Station		
75.	Kinango Police Station		
76.	Vigurugani Police Station		
77.	Border Patrol Unit Modika		
78.	Kiambene Police Station		
79.	Mbaraki Police Station		
80.	Police Training College Kiganjo		
81.	Lodwar Police Station		

S/No.	National Police Service	Kenya Prisons Service	National Youth Service
82.	Railway Training Centre, Makindu		
83.	Kondele Police Lines		
84.	Sigomere Police Station Ugunja		
85.	Western Regional Training College		
86.	Quick Response Unit - Modica		
87.	Rapid Response Unit – Modica		
88.	Border Patrol Unit - Modica		
89.	Kanyonyo Border Patrol Training Campus		
90.	Kibra Police Station		
91.	CID Training School		
92.	VIP Protection Unit and SGB (Uhuru Camp)		
93.	Police Maritime Training School		
94.	Anti – Stock Theft Unit Gilgil		

Annex 5: List of Organisations who appeared before the Taskforce

S/No.	Organisations
1	National Police Service
2	Kenya Prisons Service
3	National Police Service Commission
4.	Independent Policing Oversight Authority
5.	The Kenya Defence Forces
6.	Directorate of Criminal Investigation
7.	Ministry of Interior and National Administration
8.	Community Social Justice Centres Working Group
9.	Police Reform Working Group
10.	National Association of Retired Police Officers of Kenya
11.	Kenya Prisons Retired Officers Association
12.	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
13.	The Media Council of Kenya
14.	The Kenya Editors Guild
15.	Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR)
16.	Public Service Commission (PSC)
17.	National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC)
18.	National Council of Persons Living with Disability (NCPWD)
19.	National Council on the Administration of Justice (NCAJ)-SGBV Working Committee
20.	Law Society of Kenya (LSK)
21.	Council of Governors
22.	The National Treasury
23.	Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC)
24.	State Department of Housing
25,	State Department of Correctional Services and Probation
26.	Parliamentary Committee – National Administration and Security
27.	National Council of Administration of Justice
28.	National Uniform Committee
29.	CIC Insurance
30.	Medical Cover Evaluation Committee

S/No.	Organisations
31.	National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA)
32.	National Police Service Training College Embakasi
33.	Kenya Prisons Service Training College, Ruiru
34.	Green Network

Annex 6: List of Organisations Invited to Submit Information to the Taskforce

S/No.	Government/State Organs/NGOs
1	National Police Service (NPS)
2	National Police Service Commission (NPSC)
3	Kenya Prisons Service (KPS)
4	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)
5	National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC)
6	Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ)
7	Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC)
8	Ministry of Internal Security and National Administration
9	Parliamentary Service Commission
10	Public Service Commission (PSC)
11	Central Bank of Kenya (CBK)
12	Ministry of Defence
13	Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)
14	Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)
15	Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC)
16	Kenya Law Reform Commission (KLR)
17	The Judiciary
18	Office of the Solicitor General
19	National Land Commission
20	Ministry of Health
21	Office of the Chief Government Pathologist
22	Witness Protection Agency
23	Probation and Aftercare Service
24	National Crime Research Centre
25	Anti-Counterfeit Authority
26	Department of Children Services, State Department for Social Protection
27	The Kenya Professional Society of Criminology

S/No.	Government/State Organs/NGOs
28	National Authority for the Campaign against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA)
29	Ministry of Information, Communication and Telecommunication
30	Kenya Coast Guard Service
31	National Youth Service (NYS)
32	National Counter Terrorism Centre
33	Internal Affairs Unit (IAU)
34	Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI)
35	Kenya Wildlife Service
36	Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)
37	The Council of Governors
38	Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
39	Independent Policing Oversight Authority
40	Law Society of Kenya (LSK)
41	Kenya Prisons Retired Officers Association
42	Kenya Prisons Retired Officers Association
43	State Department for Immigration and Citizen Services
44	The National Council for Persons with Disabilities
45	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
46	The National Treasury
47	Parliamentary Committee – National Administration and Security
48	Medical Cover Evaluation Committee
49	The National Transport and Safety Authority
50	The National Uniform Committee
51	National Council on Administration of Justice
52	NPS Training College Commandants
53	KPS Training College Commandants
54	CIC
55	State Department of Housing

S/No.	Government/State Organs/NGOs
56	NCAJ – SGBV Working Committee
57	Judicial Service Commission
58	The Media Council
59	Office of the Resident Coordinator, United Nations
60	Kenya Association of Retired Officers
61	Country Representative, UNWOMEN United Nations
62	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
63	United Nations office on Drugs and Crime
64	United Nations Development Programme
65	Tetra Tec Company
66	Independent Medico Legal Unit
67	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
68	Criminology Society of Africa
69	Reprieve International
70	Faraja Foundation
71	Legal Resources Foundation
72	Katiba Institute
73	The Independent Medical Legal Unit
74	Kituo cha Sheria
75	Defenders Coalition
76	Clean Start
78	Nafisika Trust
79	Federation of Women Lawyers
80	International Commission of Jurists Kenya
81	Kenya Prisons Retirees Association
82	Community Social Justice Centres Working Group
83	National Association of Retired Police Officers
84	Justice Defenders

S/No.	Government/State Organs/NGOs
85	Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
86	The Kenya Editors Guild
87	Green Network
88	Kenya Private Sector Alliance

Annex 7: Number of People who Participated in Public Hearings per County

S/No.	County	Male	Female	Total
1	Mombasa	184	24	208
2	Kwale	92	36	128
3	Kilifi	177	29	206
4	Tana River	101	45	146
5	Lamu	126	52	178
6	Taita-Taveta	127	54	181
7	Garissa	114	48	162
8	Wajir	177	13	190
9	Mandera	140	9	149
10	Marsabit	106	16	122
11	Isiolo	70	24	94
12	Meru	193	71	264
13	Tharaka Nithi	108	33	141
14	Embu	129	69	198
15	Kitui	246	38	284
16	Machakos	15	5	20
17	Makueni	253	67	320
18	Nyandarua	112	49	161
19	Nyeri	50	17	67
20	Kirinyaga	102	38	140
21	Murang'a	98	46	144
22	Kiambu	250	78	328
23	Turkana	259	37	296
24	West-Pokot	236	56	292
25	Samburu	162	30	192
26	Trans Nzoia	84	31	115
27	Uasin Gishu	158	70	228

S/No.	County	Male	Female	Total
28	Elgeyo Marakwet	105	14	119
29	Nandi	137	65	202
30	Baringo	154	31	185
31	Laikipia	105	46	151
32	Nakuru	104	54	158
33	Narok	112	35	147
34	Kajiado	166	55	221
35	Kericho	115	39	154
36	Bomet	107	29	136
37	Kakamega	213	65	278
38	Vihiga	122	41	163
39	Bungoma	224	77	301
40	Busia	143	73	216
41	Siaya	103	50	153
42	Kisumu	111	42	153
43	Homabay	143	27	170
44	Migori	128	54	182
45	Kisii	113	80	193
46	Nyamira	107	19	126
47	Nairobi	310	196	506
Total		6,691	2,177	8,868
Percentage		75%	25%	100%

Annex 8: Call for Public Participation 1



REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND OTHER REFORMS FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE, KENYA PRISONS SERVICE AND NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

CALL FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUBMISSION OF MEMORANDA

Vide Gazette Notice No. 15792 dated 21st December 2022, H.E William Samsoni Ruto, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defense Forces, established the National Taskforce on Improvement of the Terms and Conditions of Service of the National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service Staff.

By an addendum contained in Gazette Notice No. 2853 dated 3rd March 2023, H.E. the President amended the said Gazette Notice No. 15792 dated 21st December 2022 and extended the mandate of the Taskforce to cover the National Youth Service (NYS).

The objectives of the Taskforce are to:

- Identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational constraints on effective service delivery by the National Police Service, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service;
- Identify and recommend legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational reforms in the National Police Service, the Kenya Prisons Service and the National Youth Service for effective service delivery;
- Review and recommend improvement of the terms and conditions of service;
- Review and recommend improvement of matters relating to welfare of officers in all cadres of the National Police Service, Kenya Prisons Service, National Youth Service, and all other matters incidental to the optimal service delivery by the National Police Service, Kenya Prisons Service and National Youth Service;
- Review and recommend on any other matters incidental to improved terms and conditions of service and other reforms in the National Police Service, Kenya Prisons Service and National Youth Service.

STAKE HOLDERS and ALL MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC are called upon to participate in the process by preparing and submitting memoranda via email, to police.prison.reforms@interior.go.ke to be received on or before the 28th April, 2023.

Stakeholders and members of the public who are not able to submit written memoranda are invited to attend Public Hearings and give their views. The venues, dates and time are as stated below.

County	Venue	Date	Time
Baringo	Kenya School of Government Kabarnet	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Bomet	St. Bakhita Bomet	18 th April, 2023	9:00am
Bungoma	Kibabii University Hall	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Busia	Lwanyia Special School	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Elgeyo Marakwet	KMTI Iten	25 th April, 2023	9:00am
Embu	Talent Academy Embu	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Garissa	Government Guest House Garissa Town	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Homa Bay	Kabunde Social Hall	28 th April, 2023	9:00am
Isiolo	Isiolo Police Canteen	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Kajiado	Maasai Technical Training Institute	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Kakamega	Mumias Cultural Centre	21 st April, 2023	9:00am
Kericho	TTC Hall	27 th April, 2023	9:00am
Kisumu	Kisumu AP Chapel Kisumu Town	27 th April, 2023	10:00am
Kilifi	Juwaba Social Hall	20 th April, 2023	9:00am
Kirinyaga	NG-CDF Hall Karugoya	20 th April, 2023	10:00am
Kisii	Kisii Cultural Hall	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Kisumu	Mama Grace Dnyango Hall	27 th April, 2023	9:00am
Kitui	Multi-Purpose Hall Kitui	21 st April, 2023	9:00am
Kwale	Kwale Cultural Centre	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Lakipia	ACC Daiga Hall Kalalu	26 th April, 2023	9:00am
Lamu	Marine Training School Mokore	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Machakos	Machakos Teachers Training College	26 th April, 2023	9:00am
Makueni	Wote Technical College	19 th April, 2023	9:00am
Mandera	NDMA Hall Mandera Town	24 th April, 2023	10:00am
Meru	Meru CDF Hall	19 th April, 2023	9:00am
Migori	IFAD Hall	26 th April, 2023	9:00am
Marsabit	ACK Hall	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Mombasa	Kenya School of Government	18 th April, 2023	9:00am
Muranga	Muranga University of Science and Technology Hall	25 th April, 2023	9:00am
Nairobi	Jericho Social Hall	03 rd May, 2023	9:00am
	Dagoretti Empowerment Centre	03 rd May, 2023	9:00am
Nakuru	Regional Commissioners Hall	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Nandi	AP/CDFU Chapel Kapsabet	24 th April, 2023	9:00am
Narok	Youth Empowerment Centre	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Nyamira	Jamhuri Gardens Nyamira	20 th April, 2023	9:00am
Nyandarua	National Government CDF Hall Oikaleu	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Nyeri	Regional Training Centre Ruringu	19 th April, 2023	9:00am
Samburu	Maralal Vocational Training Centre	21 st April, 2023	9:00am
Siaya	Siaya Institute of Technology Hall Siaya	25 th April, 2023	9:00am
Taita Taveta	Mwatate NG-CDF Hall	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Tana River	Hola Primary School Hall	27 th April, 2023	9:00am
Tharaka Nithi	Chuka University Hall	21 st April, 2023	9:00am
Trans Nzoia	Kitale Museum	19 th April, 2023	9:00am
Turkana	Lodwar Youth Polytechnic (LDYOPD)	17 th April, 2023	9:00am
Uasin Gishu	County Municipal Hall Eldoret	26 th April, 2023	9:00am
Vihiga	Kaimosi University Hall	19 th April, 2023	9:00am
Wajir	ICT Hall	20 th April, 2023	10:00am
West Pokot	Mtelo Hall	21 st April, 2023	9:00am

**The Secretariat,
The Taskforce on NPS/KPS Reforms, Bomas of Kenya,
P.O Box 30510-00100, Nairobi.**

Annex 9: Call for Public Participation 2



NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND OTHER REFORMS FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE AND KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

CALL FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUBMISSION OF MEMORANDA

Vide Gazette Notice NO. 15792 dated 23rd December 2022, H.E William Samoei Ruto, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defense Forces, established the National Taskforce on Improvement of the Terms and Conditions of Service of the National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service Staff.

The objectives of the Taskforce are to:

- Identify the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational constraints on effective service delivery by the National Police Service and the Kenya Prisons Service;
- Identify and recommend legal, policy, administrative, institutional and operational reforms in the National Police Service and the Kenya Prisons Service for effective service delivery;
- Review and recommend improvement of the terms and conditions of service;
- Review and recommend improvement of matters relating to welfare of officers in all cadres of the National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service and all other matters incidental to the optimal service delivery by the National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service;
- Review and recommend on any other matters incidental to improve terms and conditions of service and other reforms in the National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service.

STAKE HOLDERS and ALL MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC are called upon to participate in the process by preparing and submitting memoranda via email, to police-prisonsreforms@interior.go.ke to be received on or before the 17th February 2023.

Stakeholders and members of the public who are not able to submit written memoranda are invited to attend Public Hearings and give their views. The venues, dates and time are as stated below.

County	Venue	Date	Time
Barings	Kenya School of Government Kabaret	15 Feb 2023	9:00am
Bomet	St. Bakhita Bomet	08 Feb 2023	9:00am
Bungoma	Kibabii University hall	17 Feb 2023	9:00am
Busia	Lwanya Special School	07 Feb 2023	9:00am
Elgeyo Marakwet	KMTC Iten	13 Feb 2023	9:00am
Embu	Talent Academy Embu	17 Feb 2023	9:00am
Garissa	Government Guest House Garissa Town	06 Feb 2023	9:00am
Homa Bay	Kabunde Social Hall	15 Feb 2023	9:00am
Isiolo	Isiolo Police Canteen	16 Feb 2023	9:00 am
Kajiado	Maasai Technical Training Institute	10 Feb 2023	9:00am
Kakamega	Mumias Cultural Centre	13 Feb 2023	9:00am
Kericho	TTC Hall	06 Feb 2023	9:00am
Kiambu	Kiambu AP Chapel Kiambu Town	17 Feb 2023	10:00am
Kilifi	Juwalba Social Hall	10 Feb 2023	9:00am
Kirinyaga	NG-CDF Hall Kerugoya	15 Feb 2023	10:00am
Kisii	Kisii Cultural Hall	12 Feb 2023	9:00am
Kisumu	Mama Grace Onyango Hall	10 Feb 2023	9:00am
Kitui	Multi-Purpose Hall Kitui	10 Feb 2023	9:00am
Kwale	Kwale Cultural Centre	8 Feb 2023	9:00am
Lakipia	ACC Daiga Hall Kalalu	09 Feb 2023	9:00am
Lamu	Marine Training School Mokowe	06 Feb 2023	9:00am
Machakos	Machakos Teachers Training College	09 Feb 2023	9:00am
Makueni	Wote Technical College	08 Feb 2023	11:00am
Mandera	NDMA Hall Mandera Town	06 Feb 2023	9:00am
Meru	Meru CDF Hall	15 Feb 2023	9:00am
Migori	IFAD Hall	14 Feb 2023	9:00am
Marsabit	ACK Hall	14 Feb 2023	9:00am
Mombasa	Kenya School of Government	6 Feb 2023	9:00am
Muranga	Muranga University of Science and Technology Hall	16 Feb 2023	9:00am
Nairobi	Jericho Social Hall	23 Feb 2023	9:00am
Nakuru	Dagoretti Empowerment Centre	17 Feb 2023	9:00am
Nandi	Regional Commissioners hall	17 Feb 2023	9:00am
Narok	AP/CIPU Chapel Kapsabet	09 Feb 2023	9:00am
Narok	Youth Empowerment Centre	09 Feb 2023	9:00am
Nyamira	Jamhuri Gardens Nyamira	10 Feb 2023	9:00am
Nyandarua	National Government CDF Hall Olkalau	10 Feb -2023	9:00am
Nyeri	Regional Training Centre Ruringo	13 Feb 2023	9:00am
Samburu	Maralal Vocational Training Centre	07 Feb 2023	9:00am
Siaya	Siaya Institute of Technology Hall Siaya	09 Feb 2023	9:00am
Taita Taveta	Mwatate NG- CDF Hall	07 Feb 2023	9:00am
Tana River	Hola Primary School Hall	08 Feb 2023	9:00am
Tharaka Nithi	Chuka University Hall	14 Feb 2023	9:00am
Trans Nzoia	Kitale Museum	15 Feb 2023	9:00am
Turkana	Lodwar Youth Polytechnic (LDYOPD)	13 Feb 2023	9:00am
Uasin Gishu	County Municipal Hall Eldoret	13 Feb 2023	9:00am
Vihiga County	Kaimosi University Hall	15 Feb 2023	9:00am
Wajir County	ICT Hall	13 Feb 2023	9:00am
West Pokot County	Mtelo Hall	17 Feb 2023	9:00am

The Secretariat,
The Taskforce on NPS/KPS Reforms,
Bomas of Kenya,
P.O Box 30510-00100,
Nairobi.

Annex 10: List of Secretariat Support Staff

S/No.	Name	Role
1.	Dr. Charles Anderson Otieno	Technical Lead Advisor
2.	Dr. Conrad Bosire	Technical Support /Report Drafter
3.	Linda Omanyia	Technical Support
4.	Belydah Ongaki	Technical Support
5.	Julius Kipkemboi Sang	Technical Support
6.	Benjamin Ombuya Njoga	Technical Support
7.	Andrew Okwach	Technical Support
8.	Sally J. Tanui	Technical Support
9.	Stephen Ambasa	Technical Support
10.	Nellius Wambui Ng'anga	Technical Support
11.	Charles Okwemba Ojowi	Technical Support
12.	Asher David Koga	Technical Support
13.	Nicholas J. Makokha HSC	Technical Support
14.	Loice C Koech	Technical Support
15.	Isaac Njiru	Technical Support
16.	Abdi Hassan Ali	Government Press/ Prepress support
17.	Peter Kiprono Bett	Government Press/ Prepress support
18.	Margaret Mumbi Nderitu	Government Press/ Prepress support
19.	Gerald Anderson Juma	Government Press/ Prepress support
20.	Aggrey Omukunda	Government Press/ Prepress support
21.	Muhul Fred	Ministry of Interior/ Logistics
22.	John Njoroge	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
23.	John Nyabwari	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
24.	Alice Wanjiru	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
25.	Jacob Muiruri Karii	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
26.	Victor M. Njagi	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
27.	David Mutia	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
28.	Archbald Waithaka	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
29.	Reuben Mwaura Kimani	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
30.	Eliakim Azangu	National Archives
31.	Angela Njue	Ministry of Interior /Logistics
32.	Rachael Wairimu Nyamweya	Research Assistant
33.	Brian Ochieng Saka	Research Assistant
34.	Joseph Mokua Manyara	Research Assistant
35.	Mary Bosibori Nyamwange	Research Assistant
36.	Hanan Hassan El Kathri	Research Assistant
37.	John Masirivai Wesonga	Research Assistant
38.	Areba Omwoyo Samba	Research Assistant
39.	Florence Momanyi Cherenno	Research Assistant
40.	Milcah Kithinji Kawira	Research Assistant
41.	Sheila Alivitsa Majani	Research Assistant
42.	Leon Kiptoo Tororey	Research Assistant

43.	Job Mugiira Munyua	Research Assistant
44.	Emmanuel Ekiru	Research Assistant
45.	Nicolas Kisoï	Rapporteur
46.	Esther Muthani John	Rapporteur
47.	Daniel Tei	Rapporteur
48.	Geoffrey Muriithi	Rapporteur
49.	Philomena Mbithi	Rapporteur
50.	Samuel Oduor Ooko	Rapporteur
51.	Stephen Muchiri Nduati	Rapporteur
52.	Gordon Ouma Ochola	Rapporteur
53.	Pride Wanjiru Kabue	Rapporteur
54.	Faith Jemesis Kandagor	Rapporteur
55.	Josphat Makunda Njue	Rapporteur
56.	Samson Omondi	Communication
57.	Emma Kanana	Communication
58.	Lucia Malombe	Records
59.	Paul Cheubei Makio	Records
60.	Winnie Wangari Wambui	Records
61.	Doreen Nyantine Mongina	Records
62.	Dorcas Arith Nakuwa	Records
63.	Susan Naserian	Clerk
64.	Doris Obonyo David	Clerk
65.	Morine Mumbi	Clerk
66.	Cyprian Nyakundi Bosire	Clerk
67.	Laureen Leila Osanya	Clerk
68.	Joseph Kariuki Nguri	Personal Driver
69.	Francis Mosiro	Personal Driver
70.	Peter Njeri Mwangi	Personal Driver
71.	Eric Onyango Ouso	Personal Driver
72.	Sgt. Francis Macharia	Personal Driver
73.	Japhet Kathiari Lyria	Personal Driver
74.	Bonface Mukweyi Lyanda	Personal Driver
75.	Gibson Mararo Mwaniki	Personal Driver
76.	Festus Vaati James	Personal Driver
77.	Joseph Maina Mwangi	Personal Driver
78.	Kasaine Saibulu	Personal Driver
79.	Earnest Wafula	Personal Driver
80.	Patrick Mwai	Personal Driver
81.	Charles Omwane Mwita	Personal Driver
82.	David Orero	Personal Driver
83.	Raymond Mwangi Kimani	Personal Driver
84.	Joshua Mirmet	Personal Driver
85.	Abdalla Kayasi	Personal Driver
86.	Hassan Shindula	Personal Driver
87.	Eric Makori Isoe	Personal Driver

88.	Marikus Otieno	Personal Driver
89.	Moses Shomet	Personal Driver
90.	Danny Okoth	Personal Driver
91.	Walter Orengo	Personal Driver
92.	George Nyaora	Personal Driver
93.	Kiplimo Kirui	Personal Driver
94.	Joshua Kuyo	Personal Driver
95.	Charels Nzuki	Personal Driver
96.	Frankiline Koome Mutua	Personal Driver
97.	Paul Macharia Kariuki	Personal Driver
98.	Edwin Change Moenga	Personal Driver
99.	Hymphrey Soropai Maiko	Personal Driver
100.	Erastus Bargoret	Personal Driver
101.	Dennis Nyaga Murimi	Personal Driver
102.	David Musila	Personal Security
103.	Dennis Laban Simiyu	Personal Security
104.	Cpt. Jonah Wachira	Personal Security
105.	Joash Nyaundi Asiago	Personal Security
106.	Samuel Kinyanjui Mwangi	Personal Security
107.	Hezron Moruri Omari	Personal Security
108.	Isaiah Ochieng Okeyo	Personal Security
109.	Nicanor Oketch Owino	Personal Security
110.	Joel Pere	Personal Security